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ART. I.—THE POSITIVE PHILOSOPHY OF AUGUSTE
COMTE.

1. *Cours de Philosophie Positive.* Par AUGUSTE COMTE, Répétiteur d'Analyse transcendante et de Mécanique rationnelle à l'Ecole Polytechnique, et Examinateur des Candidats qui se destinent à cette Ecole. Deuxième Edition, augmentée d'une Préface par E. Littré, et d'une Table alphabétique des matières. Paris: 1864.
2. *Auguste Comte et la Philosophie Positive.* Par E. LITTRÉ. Paris: 1863.

FOR some time much has been said, in England and on the Continent, concerning "Positivism" and "the Positive Philosophy." Those phrases, which during the life of the eminent thinker who introduced them had made their way into no writings or discussions but those of his very few direct disciples, have emerged from the depths and manifested themselves on the surface of the philosophy of the age. It is not very widely known what they represent, but it is understood that they represent something. They are symbols of a recognised mode of thought, and one of sufficient importance to induce almost all who now discuss the great problems of philosophy, or survey from any elevated point of view the opinions of the age, to take what is termed the Positivist view of things into serious consideration, and define their own position, more or less friendly or hostile, in regard to it. Indeed, though the mode of thought expressed by the terms Positive and Positivism is widely spread, the words [Vol. LXXXIII. No. CLXIV.]—NEW SERIES, Vol. XXVII. No. II. A A

themselves are, as usual, better known through the enemies of that mode of thinking than through its friends; and more than one thinker who never called himself or his opinions by those appellations, and carefully guarded himself against being confounded with those who did, finds himself, sometimes to his displeasure, though generally by a tolerably correct instinct, classed with Positivists, and assailed as a Positivist. This change in the bearings of philosophic opinion commenced in England earlier than in France, where a philosophy of a contrary kind had been more widely cultivated, and had taken a firmer hold on the speculative minds of a generation formed by Royer-Collard, Cousin, Jouffroy, and their compeers. The great treatise of M. Comte was scarcely mentioned in French literature or criticism, when it was already working powerfully on the minds of many British students and thinkers. But, agreeably to the usual course of things in France, the new tendency, when it set in, set in more strongly. Those who call themselves Positivists are indeed not numerous; but all French writers who adhere to the common philosophy, now feel it necessary to begin by fortifying their position against "the Positivist school." And the mode of thinking thus designated is already manifesting its importance by one of the most unequivocal signs, the appearance of thinkers who attempt a compromise or *juste milieu* between it and its opposite. The acute critic and metaphysician M. Taine, and the distinguished chemist M. Berthelot, are the authors of the two most conspicuous of these attempts.

The time, therefore, seems to have come, when every philosophic thinker not only ought to form, but may usefully express, a judgment respecting this intellectual movement; endeavouring to understand what it is, whether it is essentially a wholesome movement, and if so, what is to be accepted and what rejected of the direction given to it by its most important movers. There cannot be a more appropriate form for the discussion of these points than a critical examination of the philosophy of Auguste Comte; for which the appearance of a new edition of his fundamental treatise, with a preface by the most eminent, in every point of view, of his professed disciples, M. Littré, affords a good opportunity. The name of M. Comte is more identified than any other with this mode of thought. He is the first who has attempted its complete systematization, and the scientific extension of it to all objects of human knowledge. And in doing this he has displayed a quantity and quality of mental power, and achieved an amount of success, which have not only won but retained the high admiration of thinkers as radically and strenuously opposed as it is possible to be, to nearly the whole of his later tendencies, and to many of his earlier opinions. It would have been a mis-

take had such thinkers busied themselves in the first instance with drawing attention to what they regarded as errors in his great work. Until it had taken the place in the world of thought which belonged to it, the important matter was not to criticise it, but to help in making it known. To have put those who neither knew nor were capable of appreciating the greatness of the book, in possession of its vulnerable points, would have indefinitely retarded its progress to a just estimation, and was not needful for guarding against any serious inconvenience. While a writer has few readers, and no influence except on independent thinkers, the only thing worth considering in him is what he can teach us: if there be anything in which he is less wise than we are already, it may be left unnoticed until the time comes when his errors can do harm. But the high place which M. Comte has now assumed among European thinkers, and the increasing influence of his principal work, while they make it a more hopeful task than before to impress and enforce the strong points of his philosophy, have rendered it, for the first time, not inopportune to discuss his mistakes. Whatever errors he may have fallen into are now in a position to be injurious, while the free exposure of them can no longer be so.

We propose, then, to pass in review the main principles of M. Comte's philosophy; confining ourselves for the present to the great treatise by which, in this country, he is chiefly known, and leaving out of consideration the writings of the last ten years of his life, except for the occasional illustration of detached points. When we extend our examination to these later productions, as we hope hereafter to do, we shall have, in the main, to reverse our judgment. Instead of recognising, as in the *Cours de Philosophie Positive*, an essentially sound view of philosophy, with a few capital errors, it is in their general character that we deem the subsequent speculations false and misleading, while in the midst of this wrong general tendency, we find a crowd of valuable thoughts, and suggestions of thought, in detail. For the present we put out of the question this signal anomaly in M. Comte's intellectual career. We shall consider only the principal gift which he has left to the world, his clear, full, and comprehensive exposition, and in part creation, of what he terms the *Positive Philosophy*: endeavouring to sever what in our estimation is true, from the much less which is erroneous, in that philosophy as he conceived it, and distinguishing, as we proceed, the part which is specially his, from that which belongs to the philosophy of the age, and is the common inheritance of thinkers. This last discrimination has been partially made in a late pamphlet, by Mr. Herbert Spencer, in vindication of his own independence of thought: but this does not diminish the utility of doing it, with

a less limited purpose, here ; especially as Mr. Spencer rejects nearly all which properly belongs to M. Comte, and in his abridged mode of statement does scanty justice to what he rejects. The separation is not difficult, even on the direct evidence given by M. Comte himself, who, far from claiming any originality not really belonging to him, was eager to connect his own most original thoughts with every germ of anything similar which he observed in previous thinkers.

The fundamental doctrine of a true philosophy, according to M. Comte, and the character by which he defines Positive Philosophy, is the following :—We have no knowledge of anything but Phænomena ; and our knowledge of phænomena is relative, not absolute. We know not the essence, nor the real mode of production, of any fact, but only its relations to other facts in the way of succession or of similitude. These relations are constant ; that is, always the same in the same circumstances. The constant resemblances which link phænomena together, and the constant sequences which unite them as antecedent and consequent, are termed their laws. The laws of phænomena are all we know respecting them. Their essential nature, and their ultimate causes, either efficient or final, are unknown and inscrutable to us.

M. Comte claims no originality for this conception of human knowledge. He avows that it has been virtually acted on from the earliest period by all who have made any real contribution to science, and became distinctly present to the minds of speculative men from the time of Bacon, Descartes, and Galileo, whom he regards as collectively the founders of the Positive Philosophy. As he says, the knowledge which mankind, even in the earliest ages, chiefly pursued, being that which they most needed, was *foreknowledge* : “*savoir, pour prévoir.*” When they sought for the cause it was mainly in order to control the effect, or if it was uncontrollable, to foreknow and adapt their conduct to it. Now, all foresight of phænomena, and power over them, depend on knowledge of their sequences, and not upon any notion we may have formed respecting their origin or inmost nature. We foresee a fact or event by means of facts which are signs of it, because experience has shown them to be its antecedents. We bring about any fact, other than our own muscular contractions, by means of some fact which experience has shown to be followed by it. All foresight, therefore, and all intelligent action, have only been possible in proportion as men have successfully attempted to ascertain the successions of phænomena. Neither foreknowledge, nor the knowledge which is practical power, can be acquired by any other means.

The conviction, however, that knowledge of the successions and

coexistences of phænomena is the sole knowledge accessible to us, could not be arrived at in a very early stage of the progress of thought. Men have not even now left off hoping for other knowledge, nor believing that they have attained it; and that, when attained, it is, in some undefinable manner, greatly more precious than mere knowledge of sequences and coexistences. The true doctrine was not seen in its full clearness even by Bacon, though it is the result to which all his speculations tend: still less by Descartes. It was, however, correctly apprehended by Newton.* But it was probably first conceived in its entire generality by Hume, who carries it a step further than Comte, maintaining not merely that the only causes of phænomena which can be known to us are other phænomena, their invariable antecedents, but that there is no other kind of causes: cause, as he interprets it, means the invariable antecedent. This is the only part of Hume's doctrine which was contested by his great adversary, Kant; who maintaining as strenuously as Comte that we know nothing of Things in themselves, of Noumena, of real Substances and real Causes, yet peremptorily asserted their existence. But neither does Comte question this: on the contrary, all his language implies it. Among the direct successors of Hume, the writer who has best stated and defended Comte's fundamental doctrine is Dr. Thomas Brown. The doctrine and spirit of Brown's philosophy are entirely Positivist, and no better introduction to Positivism than the early part of his Lectures has yet been produced. Of living thinkers we do not speak; but the same great truth formed the groundwork of all the speculative philosophy of Bentham, and preeminently of James Mill: and Sir William Hamilton's famous doctrine of the Relativity of human knowledge has guided many to it, though we cannot credit Sir William Hamilton himself with having understood the principle, or been willing to assent to it if he had.

The foundation of M. Comte's philosophy is thus in no way peculiar to him, but the general property of the age, however far as yet from being universally accepted even by thoughtful minds. The philosophy called Positive is not a recent invention of M. Comte, but a simple adherence to the traditions of all the great scientific minds whose discoveries have made the human race what it is. M. Comte has never presented it in any other light. But he has made the doctrine his own by his manner of treating it. To know rightly what a thing is, we require to know, with equal distinctness, what it is not. To enter into the real character of any mode of thought, we must understand what

* See the Chapter on Efficient Causes in Reid's "Essays on the Active Powers," which is avowedly grounded on Newton's ideas.

other modes of thought compete with it. M. Comte has taken care that we should do so. The modes of philosophizing which, according to him, dispute ascendancy with the Positive, are two in number, both of them anterior to it in date; the Theological, and the Metaphysical.

We use the words Theological, Metaphysical, and Positive, because they are chosen by M. Comte as a vehicle for M. Comte's ideas. Any philosopher whose thoughts another person undertakes to set forth, has a right to require that it should be done by means of his own nomenclature. They are not, however, the terms we should ourselves choose. In all languages, but especially in English, they excite ideas other than those intended. The words Positive and Positivism, in the meaning assigned to them, are ill fitted to take root in English soil; while Metaphysical suggests, and suggested even to M. Comte, much that in no way deserves to be included in his denunciation. The term Theological is less wide of the mark, though the use of it as a term of condemnation implies, as we shall see, a greater reach of negation than need be included in the Positive creed. Instead of the Theological we should prefer to speak of the Personal, or Volitional explanation of nature; instead of Metaphysical, the Abstractional or Ontological: and the meaning of Positive would be less ambiguously expressed in the objective aspect by Phenomenal, in the subjective by Experiential. But M. Comte's opinions are best stated in his own phraseology; several of them, indeed, can scarcely be presented in some of their bearings without it.

The Theological, which is the original and spontaneous form of thought, regards the facts of the universe as governed not by invariable laws of sequence, but by single and direct volitions of beings, real or imaginary, possessed of life and intelligence. In the infantile state of reason and experience, individual objects are looked upon as animated. The next step is the conception of invisible beings, each of whom superintends and governs an entire class of objects or events. The last merges this multitude of divinities in a single God, who made the whole universe in the beginning, and guides and carries on its phenomena by his continued action, or, as others think, only modifies them from time to time by special interferences.

The mode of thought which M. Comte terms Metaphysical, accounts for phenomena by ascribing them, not to volitions either sublunary or celestial, but to realized abstractions. In this stage it is no longer a god that causes and directs each of the various agencies of nature: it is a power, or a force, or an occult quality, considered as real existences, inherent in but distinct from the concrete bodies in which they reside, and which

they in a manner animate. Instead of Dryads presiding over trees, producing and regulating their phenomena, every plant or animal has now a Vegetative Soul, the *θρεπτική ψυχή* of Aristotle. At a later period the Vegetative Soul has become a Plastic Force, and still later, a Vital Principle. Objects now do all that they do because it is their Essence to do so, or by reason of an inherent Virtue. Phænomena are accounted for by supposed tendencies and propensities of the abstraction Nature; which, though regarded as impersonal, is figured as acting on a sort of motives, and in a manner more or less analogous to that of conscious beings. Aristotle affirms a tendency of Nature towards the best, which helps him to a theory of many natural phænomena. The rise of water in a pump is attributed to Nature's horror of a vacuum. The fall of heavy bodies, and the ascent of flame and smoke, are construed as attempts of each to get to its *natural* place. Many important consequences are deduced from the doctrine that Nature has no breaks (*non habet saltum*). In medicine the curative force (*vis medicatrix*) of Nature furnishes the explanation of the reparative processes which modern physiologists refer each to its own particular agencies and laws.

Examples are not necessary to prove to those who are acquainted with the past phases of human thought, how great a place both the theological and the metaphysical interpretations of phenomena have historically occupied, as well in the speculations of thinkers as in the familiar conceptions of the multitude. Many had perceived before M. Comte that neither of these modes of explanation was final: the warfare against both of them could scarcely be carried on more vigorously than it already was, early in the seventeenth century, by Hobbes. Nor is it unknown to any one who has followed the history of the various physical sciences, that the positive explanation of facts has substituted itself, step by step, for the theological and metaphysical, as the progress of enquiry brought to light an increasing number of the invariable laws of phenomena. In these respects M. Comte has not originated anything, but has taken his place in a fight long since engaged, and on the side already in the main victorious. The generalization which belongs to himself, and in which he had not, to the best of our knowledge, been at all anticipated, is, that every distinct class of human conceptions passes necessarily through all these stages, beginning with the theological, and proceeding through the metaphysical to the positive: the metaphysical being a mere state of transition, but an indispensable one, from the theological mode of thought to the positive, which is destined finally to prevail, by the universal recognition that all phenomena without exception are governed by invariable laws, with which no volitions, either natural or supernatural, interfere. This general theorem is com-

pleted by the addition, that the theological mode of thought has three stages, Fetichism, Polytheism, and Monotheism: the successive transitions being prepared, and indeed caused, by the gradual uprising of the two rival modes of thought, the metaphysical and the positive, and in their turn preparing the way for the ascendancy of these; first and temporarily of the metaphysical, finally of the positive.

This generalization is the most fundamental of the doctrines which originated with M. Comte; and the survey of history, which occupies the two largest volumes of the six composing his work, is a continuous exemplification and verification of the law. How well it accords with the facts, and how vast a number of the greater historical phenomena it explains, is known only to those who have studied its exposition, where alone it can be found—in these most striking and instructive volumes. As this theory is the key to M. Comte's other generalizations, all of which are more or less dependent on it; as it forms the backbone, if we may so speak, of his philosophy, and, unless it be true, he has accomplished little; we cannot better employ part of our space than in clearing it from misconception, and giving the explanations necessary to remove the obstacles which prevent many competent persons from assenting to it.

It is proper to begin by relieving the doctrine from a religious prejudice. The doctrine condemns all theological explanations, and replaces them, or thinks them destined to be replaced, by theories which take no account of anything but an ascertained order of phenomena. It is inferred that if this change were completely accomplished, mankind would cease to refer the constitution of Nature to an intelligent will, or to believe at all in a Creator and supreme Governor of the world. This supposition is the more natural, as M. Comte was avowedly of that opinion. He indeed disclaimed, with some acrimony, dogmatic atheism, and even says (in a later work, but the earliest contains nothing at variance with it) that the hypothesis of design has much greater verisimilitude than that of a blind mechanism. But conjecture, founded on analogy, did not seem to him a basis to rest a theory on, in a mature state of human intelligence. He deemed all real knowledge of a commencement inaccessible to us, and the enquiry into it an overpassing of the essential limits of our mental faculties. To this point, however, those who accept his theory of the progressive stages of opinion are not obliged to follow him. The Positive mode of thought is not necessarily a denial of the supernatural; it merely throws back that question to the origin of all things. If the universe had a beginning, its beginning, by the very conditions of the case, was supernatural; the laws of nature cannot account for their own origin. The Positive philosopher is free to form his opinion on the subject,

according to the weight he attaches to the analogies which are called marks of design, and to the general traditions of the human race. The value of these evidences is indeed a question for Positive philosophy, but it is not one upon which positive philosophers must necessarily be agreed. It is one of M. Comte's mistakes that he never allows of open questions. Positive Philosophy maintains that within the existing order of the universe, or rather of the part of it known to us, the direct determining cause of every phenomenon is not supernatural but natural. It is compatible with this to believe, that the universe was created, and even that it is continuously governed, by an Intelligence, provided we admit that the intelligent Governor adheres to fixed laws, which are only modified or counteracted by other laws of the same dispensation, and are never either capriciously or providentially departed from. Whoever regards all events as parts of a constant order, each one being the invariable consequent of some antecedent condition, or combination of conditions, accepts fully the Positive mode of thought: whether he acknowledges or not an universal antecedent on which the whole system of nature was originally consequent, and whether that universal antecedent is conceived as an Intelligence or not.

There is a corresponding misconception to be corrected respecting the Metaphysical mode of thought. In repudiating metaphysics, M. Comte did not interdict himself from analysing or criticising any of the abstract conceptions of the mind. He was not ignorant (though he sometimes seemed to forget) that such analysis and criticism are a necessary part of the scientific process, and accompany the scientific mind in all its operations. What he condemned was the habit of conceiving these mental abstractions as real entities, which could exert power, produce phenomena, and the enunciation of which could be regarded as a theory or explanation of facts. Men of the present day with difficulty believe that so absurd a notion was ever really entertained, so repugnant is it to the mental habits formed by long and assiduous cultivation of the positive sciences. But those sciences, however widely cultivated, have never formed the basis of intellectual education in any society. It is with philosophy as with religion: men marvel at the absurdity of other people's tenets, while exactly parallel absurdities remain in their own, and the same man is unaffectedly astonished that words can be mistaken for things, who is treating other words as if they were things every time he opens his mouth to discuss. No one, unless entirely ignorant of the history of thought, will deny that the mistaking of abstractions for realities pervaded speculation all through antiquity and the middle ages. The mistake was generalized and systematized in the famous Ideas of Plato. The Aristotelians carried it on. Essences, quiddities, virtues

residing in things, were accepted as a *bonâ fide* explanation of phænomena. Not only abstract qualities, but the concrete names of genera and species, were mistaken for objective existences. It was believed that there were General Substances corresponding to all the familiar classes of concrete things: a substance Man, a substance Tree, a substance Animal, which, and not the individual objects so called, were directly denoted by those names. The real existence of Universal Substances was the question at issue in the famous controversy of the later middle ages between Nominalism and Realism, which is one of the turning points in the history of thought, being its first struggle to emancipate itself from the dominion of verbal abstractions. The Realists were the stronger party, but though the Nominalists for a time succumbed, the doctrine they rebelled against fell, after a short interval, with the rest of the scholastic philosophy. But while universal substances and substantial forms, being the grossest kind of realized abstractions, were the soonest discarded, Essences, Virtues, and Occult Qualities, long survived them, and were first completely extruded from real existence by the Cartesians. In Descartes' conception of science, all physical phænomena were to be explained by matter and motion, that is, not by abstractions but by invariable physical laws: though his own explanations were many of them hypothetical, and turned out to be erroneous. Long after him, however, fictitious entities (as they are happily termed by Bentham) continued to be imagined as means of accounting for the more mysterious phænomena; above all, in physiology, where, under great varieties of phrase, mysterious *forces* and *principles* were the explanation, or substitute for explanation, of the phænomena of organized beings. To modern philosophers, these fictions are merely the abstract names of the classes of phænomena which correspond to them; and it is one of the puzzles of philosophy, how mankind, after inventing a set of mere names to keep together certain combinations of ideas or images, could have so far forgotten their own act as to invest these creations of their will with objective reality, and mistake the name of a phænomenon for its efficient cause. What was a mystery from the purely dogmatic point of view, is cleared up by the historical. These abstract words are indeed now mere names of phænomena, but were not so in their origin. To us they denote only the phænomena, because we have ceased to believe in what else they once designated; and the employment of them in explanation is to us evidently, as M. Comte says, the naïf reproduction of the phænomenon as the reason for itself: but it was not so in the beginning. The metaphysical point of view was not a perversion of the positive, but a transformation of the theological. The human mind, in framing a class of objects, did

not set out from the notion of a name, but from that of a divinity. The realization of abstractions was not the embodiment of a word, but the gradual disembodiment of a Fetish.

The primitive tendency or instinct of mankind is to assimilate all the agencies which they perceive in Nature, to the only one of which they are directly conscious, their own voluntary activity. Every object which seems to originate power, that is, to act without being first visibly acted upon, to communicate motion without having first received it, they suppose to possess life, consciousness, will. This first rude conception of nature can scarcely, however, have been at any time extended to all phænomena. The simplest observation, without which the preservation of life would have been impossible, must have pointed out many uniformities in nature, many objects which, under given circumstances, acted exactly like one another: and whenever this was observed, men's natural and untutored faculties led them to form the similar objects into a class, and to think of them together: of which it was a natural consequence to refer effects, which were exactly alike, to a single will, rather than to a number of wills precisely accordant. But this single will could not be the will of the objects themselves, since they were many: it must be the will of an invisible being, apart from the objects, and ruling them from an unknown distance. This is Polytheism. We are not aware that in any tribe of savages or negroes who have been observed, Fetichism has been found totally unmixed with Polytheism, and it is probable that the two coexisted from the earliest period at which the human mind was capable of forming objects into classes. Fetichism proper gradually becomes limited to objects possessing a marked individuality. A particular mountain or river is worshipped bodily (as it is even now by the Hindoos and the South Sea Islanders) as a divinity in itself, not the mere residence of one, long after invisible gods have been imagined as rulers of all the great classes of phænomena, even intellectual and moral, as war, love, wisdom, beauty, &c. The worship of the earth (Tellus or Pales) and of the various heavenly bodies, was prolonged into the heart of Polytheism. Every scholar knows, though *littérateurs* and men of the world do not, that in the full vigour of the Greek religion, the Sun and Moon, not a god and goddess thereof, were sacrificed to as deities—older deities than Zeus and his descendants, belonging to the earlier dynasty of the Titans (which was the mythical version of the fact that their worship was older) and these deities had a distinct set of fables or legends connected with them. The father of Phaëton and the lover of Endymion were not Apollo and Diana, whose identification with the Sun-god and the Moongoddess was a late invention. Astrolatry, which, as M. Comte observes, is the last form of Fetichism, survived the

other forms, partly because its objects, being inaccessible, were not so soon discovered to be in themselves inanimate, and partly because of the persistent spontaneousness of their apparent motions.

As far as Fetichism reached, and as long as it lasted, there was no abstraction, or classification of objects, and no room consequently for the metaphysical mode of thought. But as soon as the voluntary agent, whose will governed the phænomenon, ceased to be the physical object itself, and was removed to an invisible position, from which he or she superintended an entire class of natural agencies, it began to seem impossible that this being should exert his powerful activity from a distance, unless through the medium of something present on the spot. Through the same Natural Prejudice which made Newton unable to conceive the possibility of his own law of gravitation without a subtle ether filling up the intervening space, and through which the attraction could be communicated—from this same natural infirmity of the human mind, it seemed indispensable that the god, at a distance from the object, must act through something residing in it, which was the immediate agent, the god having imparted to the intermediate Something the power whereby it influenced and directed the object. When mankind felt a need for naming these imaginary entities, they called them the *nature* of the object, or its *essence*, or *virtues* residing in it, or by many other different names. These metaphysical conceptions were regarded as intensely real, and at first as mere instruments in the hands of the appropriate deities. But the habit being acquired of ascribing not only substantive existence, but real and efficacious agency, to the abstract entities, the consequence was that when belief in the deities declined and faded away, the entities were left standing, and a semblance of explanation of phænomena, equal to what existed before, was furnished by the entities alone, without referring them to any volitions. When things had reached this point, the metaphysical mode of thought had completely substituted itself for the theological.

Thus did the different successive states of the human intellect, even at an early stage of its progress, overlap one another, the Fetichistic, the Polytheistic, and the Metaphysical modes of thought coexisting even in the same minds, while the belief in invariable laws, which constitutes the Positive mode of thought, was slowly winning its way beneath them all, as observation and experience disclosed in one class of phænomena after another the laws to which they are really subject. It was this growth of positive knowledge which principally determined the next transition in the theological conception of the universe, from Polytheism to Monotheism.

It cannot be doubted that this transition took place very tardily. The conception of a unity in Nature, which would admit of attributing it to a single will, is far from being natural to man, and only finds admittance after a long period of discipline and preparation, the obvious appearances all pointing to the idea of a government by many conflicting principles. We know how high a degree both of material civilization and of moral and intellectual development preceded the conversion of the leading populations of the world to the belief in one God. The superficial observations by which Christian travellers have persuaded themselves that they found their own Monotheistic belief in some tribes of savages, have always been contradicted by more accurate knowledge: those who have read, for instance, Mr. Kohl's *Kitchigami*, know what to think of the Great Spirit of the American Indians, who belongs to a well-defined system of Polytheism, interspersed with large remains of an original Fetichism. We have no wish to dispute the matter with those who believe that Monotheism was the primitive religion, transmitted to our race from its first parents in uninterrupted tradition. By their own acknowledgment, the tradition was lost by all the nations of the world except a small and peculiar people, in whom it was miraculously kept alive, but who were themselves continually lapsing from it, and in all the earlier parts of their history did not hold it at all in its full meaning, but admitted the real existence of other gods, though believing their own to be the most powerful, and to be the Creator of the world. A greater proof of the unnaturalness of Monotheism to the human mind before a certain period in its development, could not well be required. The highest form of Monotheism, Christianity, has persisted to the present time in giving partial satisfaction to the mental dispositions that lead to Polytheism, by admitting into its theology the thoroughly polytheistic conception of a devil. When Monotheism, after many centuries, made its way to the Greeks and Romans from the small corner of the world where it existed, we know how the notion of dæmons facilitated its reception, by making it unnecessary for Christians to deny the existence of the gods previously believed in, it being sufficient to place them under the absolute power of the new God, as the gods of Olympus were already under that of Zeus, and as the local deities of all the subjugated nations had been subordinated by conquest to the divine patrons of the Roman State.

In whatever mode, natural or supernatural, we choose to account for the early monotheism of the Hebrews, there can be no question that its reception by the Gentiles was only rendered possible by the slow preparation which the human mind had undergone from the philosophers. In the age of the Cæsars, nearly the whole educated and cultivated class had outgrown the poly-

theistic creed, and though individually liable to returns of the superstition of their childhood, were predisposed (such of them as did not reject all religion whatever) to the æknowledge-ment of one Supreme Providence. It is vain to object that Christianity did not find the majority of its early proselytes among the educated class : since, except in Palestine, its teachers and propagators were mainly of that class—many of them, like St. Paul, well versed in the mental culture of their time ; and they had evidently found no intellectual obstacle to the new doctrine in their own minds. We must not be deceived by the recrudescence, at a much later date, of a metaphysical Paganism in the Alexandrian and other philosophical schools, provoked not by attachment to polytheism, but by distaste for the political and social ascendancy of the Christian teachers. The fact was, that Monotheism had become congenial to the cultivated mind : and a belief which has gained the cultivated minds of any society, unless put down by force, is certain, sooner or later, to reach the multitude. Indeed the multitude itself had been prepared for it, as already hinted, by the more and more complete subordination of all other deities to the supremacy of Zeus ; from which the step to a single Deity, surrounded by a host of angels, and keeping in recalcitrant subjection an army of devils, was by no means difficult.

By what means, then, had the cultivated minds of the Roman Empire been educated for Monotheism ? By the growth of a practical feeling of the invariability of natural laws. Monotheism had a natural adaptation to this belief, while Polytheism naturally and necessarily conflicted with it. As men could not easily, and in fact never did, suppose that beings so powerful had their power absolutely restricted, each to its special department, the will of any divinity might always be frustrated by another : and unless all their wills were in complete harmony (which would itself be the most difficult to credit of all cases of invariability, and would require beyond anything else the ascendancy of a Supreme Deity) it was impossible that the course of any of the phænomena under their government could be invariable. But if, on the contrary, all the phænomena of the universe were under the exclusive and uncontrollable influence of a single will, it was an admissible supposition that this will might be always consistent with itself, and might choose to conduct each class of its operations in an invariable manner. In proportion, therefore, as the invariable laws of phænomena revealed themselves to observers, the theory which ascribed them all to one will began to grow plausible ; but must still have appeared improbable until it had come to seem likely that invariability was the common rule of all nature. The Greeks and Romans at the Christian era had

reached a point of advancement at which this supposition had become probable. The admirable height to which geometry had already been carried, had familiarized the educated mind with the conception of laws absolutely invariable. The logical analysis of the intellectual processes by Aristotle had shown a similar uniformity of law in the realm of mind. In the concrete external world, the most imposing phænomena, those of the heavenly bodies, which by their power over the imagination had done most to keep up the whole system of ideas connected with supernatural agency, had been ascertained to take place in so regular an order as to admit of being predicted with a precision which to the notions of those days must have appeared perfect. And though an equal degree of regularity had not been discerned in natural phænomena generally, even the most empirical observation had ascertained so many cases of an uniformity *almost* complete, that enquiring minds were eagerly on the lookout for further indications pointing in the same direction; and vied with one another in the formation of theories which, though hypothetical and essentially premature, it was hoped would turn out to be correct representations of invariable laws governing large classes of phænomena. When this hope and expectation became general, they were already a great encroachment on the original domain of the theological principle. Instead of the old conception, of events regulated from day to day by the unforeseen and changeable volitions of a legion of deities, it seemed more and more probable that all the phænomena of the universe took place according to rules, which must have been planned from the beginning; by which conception the function of the gods seemed to be limited to forming the plans, and setting the machinery in motion: their subsequent office appeared to be reduced to a sinecure, or if they continued to reign, it was in the manner of constitutional kings, bound by the laws to which they had previously given their assent. Accordingly, the pretension of philosophers to explain physical phænomena by physical causes, or to predict their occurrence, was, up to a very late period of polytheism, regarded as a sacrilegious insult to the gods. Anaxagoras was banished for it, Aristotle had to fly for his life, and the mere unfounded suspicion of it contributed greatly to the condemnation of Socrates. We are too well acquainted with this form of the religious sentiment even now, to have any difficulty in comprehending what must have been its violence then. It was inevitable that philosophers should be anxious to get rid of at least *these* gods, and so escape from the particular fables which stood immediately in their way; accepting a notion of divine government which harmonized better with the lessons they learnt from the study of nature, and a God concerning whom no mythos, as far as they knew, had yet been invented.

Again, when the idea became prevalent that the constitution of every part of Nature had been planned from the beginning, and continued to take place as it had been planned, this was itself a striking feature of resemblance extending through all Nature, and affording a presumption that the whole was the work, not of many, but of the same hand. It must have appeared vastly more probable that there should be one indefinitely foreseeing Intelligence and immovable Will, than hundreds and thousands of such. The philosophers had not at that time the arguments which might have been grounded on universal laws, not yet suspected, such as the law of gravitation and the laws of heat; but there was a multitude, obvious even to them, of analogies and homologies in natural phænomena, which suggested unity of plan; and a still greater number were raised up by their active fancy, aided by their premature scientific theories, all of which aimed at interpreting some phænomenon by the analogy of others supposed to be better known; assuming, indeed, a much greater similarity among the various processes of Nature, than ampler experience has since shown to exist. The theological mode of thought thus advanced from Polytheism to Monotheism through the direct influence of the Positive mode of thought, not yet aspiring to complete speculative ascendancy. But, inasmuch as the belief in the invariability of natural laws was still imperfect even in highly cultivated minds, and in the merest infancy in the uncultivated, it gave rise to the belief in one God, but not in an immovable one. For many centuries the God believed in was flexible by entreaty, was incessantly ordering the affairs of mankind by direct volitions, and continually reversing the course of nature by miraculous interpositions; and this is believed still, wherever the invariability of law has established itself in men's convictions as a general, but not as an universal truth.

In the change from Polytheism to Monotheism, the Metaphysical mode of thought contributed its part, affording great aid to the up-hill struggle which the Positive spirit had to maintain against the prevailing form of the Theological. M. Comte, indeed, has considerably exaggerated the share of the Metaphysical spirit in this mental revolution, since by a lax use of terms he credits the Metaphysical mode of thought with all that is due to dialectics and negative criticism—to the exposure of inconsistencies and absurdities in the received religions. But this operation is quite independent of the Metaphysical mode of thought, and was no otherwise connected with it than in being very generally carried on by the same minds (Plato is a brilliant example), since the most eminent efficiency in it does not necessarily depend on the possession of positive scientific knowledge. But the Metaphysical spirit, strictly so called, did contribute largely to the advent

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of Monotheism. The conception of impersonal entities, interposed between the governing deity and the phænomena, and forming the machinery through which these are immediately produced, is not repugnant, as the theory of direct supernatural volitions is, to the belief in invariable laws. The entities not being, like the gods, framed after the exemplar of men—being neither, like them, invested with human passions, nor supposed, like them, to have power beyond the phænomena which are the special department of each, there was no fear of offending them by the attempt to foresee and define their action, or by the supposition that it took place according to fixed laws. The popular tribunal which condemned Anaxagoras had evidently not risen to the metaphysical point of view. Hippocrates, who was concerned only with a select and instructed class, could say with impunity, speaking of what were called the god-inflicted diseases, that to his mind they were neither more nor less god-inflicted than all others. The doctrine of abstract entities was a kind of instinctive conciliation between the observed uniformity of the facts of nature, and their dependence on arbitrary volition; since it was easier to conceive a single volition as setting a machinery to work, which afterwards went on of itself, than to suppose an inflexible constancy in so capricious and changeable a thing as volition must then have appeared. But though the régime of abstractions was in strictness compatible with Polytheism, it demanded Monotheism as the condition of its free development. The received Polytheism being only the first remove from Fetichism, its gods were too closely mixed up in the daily details of phænomena, and the habit of propitiating them and ascertaining their will before any important action of life was too inveterate, to admit, without the strongest shock to the received system, the notion that they did not habitually rule by special interpositions, but left phænomena in all ordinary cases to the operation of the Essences or peculiar Natures which they had first implanted in them. Any modification of Polytheism which would have made it fully compatible with the Metaphysical conception of the world, would have been more difficult to effect than the transition to Monotheism, as Monotheism was at first conceived.

We have given, in our own way, and at some length, this important portion of M. Comte's view of the evolution of human thought, as a sample of the manner in which his theory corresponds with and interprets historical facts, and also to obviate some objections to it, grounded on an imperfect comprehension, or rather on a mere first glance. Some, for example, think the doctrine of the three successive stages of speculation and belief, inconsistent with the fact that they all three existed contemporaneously; much as if the natural succession of the hunting, the

nomad, and the agricultural state could be refuted by the fact that there are still hunters and nomads. That the three states were contemporaneous, that they all began before authentic history, and still coexist, is M. Comte's express statement: as well as that the advent of the two later modes of thought was the very cause which disorganized and is gradually destroying the primitive one. The Theological mode of explaining phenomena was once universal, with the exception, doubtless, of the familiar facts which, being even then seen to be controllable by human will, belonged already to the Positive mode of thought. The first and easiest generalizations of common observation, anterior to the first traces of the scientific spirit, determined the birth of the Metaphysical mode of thought; and every further advance in the observation of nature, gradually bringing to light its invariable laws, determined a further development of the Metaphysical spirit at the expense of the Theological, this being the only medium through which the conclusions of the Positive mode of thought and the premises of the Theological could be temporarily made compatible. At a later period, when the real character of the positive laws of nature had come to be in a certain degree understood, and the theological idea had assumed, in scientific minds, its final character, that of a God governing by general laws, the Positive spirit, having now no longer need of the fictitious medium of imaginary entities, set itself to the easy task of demolishing the instrument by which it had risen. But though it destroyed the actual belief in the objective reality of these abstractions, that belief has left behind it vicious tendencies of the human mind, which are still far enough from being extinguished, and which we shall presently have occasion to characterize.

The next point on which we have to touch is one of greater importance than it seems. If all human speculation had to pass through the three stages, we may presume that its different branches, having always been very unequally advanced, could not pass from one stage to another at the same time. There must have been a certain order of succession in which the different sciences would enter, first into the metaphysical, and afterwards into the purely positive stage; and this order M. Comte proceeds to investigate. The result is his remarkable conception of a scale of subordination of the sciences, being the order of the logical dependence of those which follow on those which precede. It is not at first obvious how a mere classification of the sciences can be not merely a help to their study, but itself an important part of a body of doctrine; the classification, however, is a very important part of M. Comte's philosophy.

He first distinguishes between the Abstract and the Concrete sciences. The abstract sciences have to do with the laws which

govern the elementary facts of Nature; laws on which all phenomena actually realized must of course depend, but which would have been equally compatible with many other combinations than those which actually come to pass. The concrete sciences, on the contrary, concern themselves only with the particular combinations of phenomena which are found in existence. For example; the minerals which compose our planet, or are found in it, have been produced and are held together by the laws of mechanical aggregation and by those of chemical union. It is the business of the abstract sciences, Physics and Chemistry, to ascertain these laws: to discover how and under what conditions bodies may become aggregated, and what are the possible modes and results of chemical combination. The great majority of these aggregations and combinations take place, so far as we are aware, only in our laboratories; with these the concrete science, Mineralogy, has nothing to do. Its business is with those aggregates, and those chemical compounds, which form themselves, or have at some period been formed, in the natural world. Again, Physiology, the abstract science, investigates, by such means as are available to it, the general laws of organization and life. Those laws determine what living beings are possible, and maintain the existence and determine the phenomena of those which actually exist: but they would be equally capable of maintaining in existence plants and animals very different from these. The concrete sciences, Zoology and Botany, confine themselves to species which really exist, or can be shown to have really existed: and do not concern themselves with the mode in which even these would comport themselves under all circumstances, but only under those which really take place. They set forth the actual mode of existence of plants and animals, the phenomena which they in fact present: but they set forth all of these, and take into simultaneous consideration the whole real existence of each species, however various the ultimate laws on which it depends, and to whatever number of different abstract sciences these laws may belong. The existence of a date tree, or of a lion, is the joint result of many natural laws, physical, chemical, biological, and even astronomical. Abstract science deals with these laws separately, but considers each of them in all its aspects, all its possibilities of operation: concrete science considers them only in combination, and so far as they exist and manifest themselves in the animals or plants of which we have experience. The distinctive attributes of the two are summed up by M. Comte in the expression, that concrete science relates to Beings, or Objects, abstract science to Events.*

* Mr. Herbert Spencer, who also distinguishes between abstract and concrete sciences, employs the terms in a different sense from that explained above. He calls a science abstract when its truths are merely ideal; when, like the

The concrete sciences are inevitably later in their development than the abstract sciences on which they depend. Not that they begin later to be studied; on the contrary, they are the earliest cultivated, since in our abstract investigations we necessarily set out from spontaneous facts. But though we may make empirical generalizations, we can form no scientific theory of concrete phenomena until the laws which govern and explain them are first known; and those laws are the subject of the abstract sciences. In consequence, there is not one of the concrete studies (unless we count astronomy among them) which has received, up to the present time, its final scientific constitution, or can be accounted a science, except in a very loose sense, but only materials for science: partly from insufficiency of facts, but more, because the abstract sciences, except those at the very beginning of the scale, have not attained the degree of perfection necessary to render real concrete sciences possible.

Postponing, therefore, the concrete sciences, as not yet formed, but only tending towards formation, the abstract sciences remain to be classed. These, as marked out by M. Comte, are six in number; and the principle which he proposes for their classification is admirably in accordance with the conditions of our study of Nature. It might have happened that the different classes of phenomena had depended on laws altogether distinct; that in changing from one to another subject of scientific study, the student left behind all the laws he previously knew, and passed under the dominion of a totally new set of uniformities. The

truths of geometry, they are not exactly true of real things—or, like the so-called law of inertia (the persistence in direction and velocity of a motion once impressed) are “involved” in experience but never actually seen in it, being always more or less completely frustrated. Chemistry and biology he includes, on the contrary, among concrete sciences, because chemical combinations and decompositions, and the physiological action of tissues, do actually take place (as our senses testify) in the manner in which the scientific propositions state them to take place. We will not discuss the logical or philological propriety of either use of the terms abstract and concrete, in which two-fold point of view very few of the numerous acceptations of these words are entirely defensible: but of the two distinctions M. Comte’s answers to by far the deepest and most vital difference. Mr. Spencer’s is open to the radical objection, that it classifies truths not according to their subject-matter or their mutual relations, but according to an unimportant difference in the manner in which we come to know them. Of what consequence is it that the law of inertia (considered as an exact truth) is not generalized from our direct perceptions, but inferred by combining with the movements which we see, those which we should see if it were not for the disturbing causes? In either case we are equally certain that it *is* an exact truth: for every dynamical law is perfectly fulfilled even when it seems to be counteracted. There must, we should think, be many truths in physiology (for example) which are only known by a similar indirect process; and Mr. Spencer would hardly detach these from the body of the science, and call them abstract and the remainder concrete.

sciences would then have been wholly independent of one another ; each would have rested entirely on its own inductions, and if deductive at all, would have drawn its deductions from premises exclusively furnished by itself. The fact, however, is otherwise. The relation which really subsists between different kinds of phænomena, enables the sciences to be arranged in such an order, that in travelling through them we do not pass out of the sphere of any laws, but merely take up additional ones at each step. In this order M. Comte proposes to arrange them. He classes the sciences in an ascending series, according to the degree of complexity of their phænomena ; so that each science depends on the truths of all those which precede it, with the addition of peculiar truths of its own.

Thus, the truths of number are true of all things, and depend only on their own laws : the science, therefore, of Number, consisting of Arithmetic and Algebra, may be studied without reference to any other science. The truths of Geometry presuppose the laws of number, and a more special class of laws peculiar to extended bodies, but require no others : Geometry, therefore, can be studied independently of all sciences except that of Number. Rational Mechanics presupposes, and depends on, the laws of number and those of extension, and along with them another set of laws, those of Equilibrium and Motion. The truths of Algebra and Geometry nowise depend on these last, and would have been true if these had happened to be the reverse of what we find them : but the phænomena of equilibrium and motion cannot be understood, nor even stated, without assuming the laws of number and extension, such as they actually are. The phænomena of Astronomy depend on these three classes of laws, and on the law of gravitation besides ; which last has no influence on the truths of number, geometry, or mechanics. Physics (badly named in common English parlance Natural Philosophy) presupposes the three mathematical sciences and also astronomy ; since all terrestrial phænomena are affected by influences derived from the motions of the earth and of the heavenly bodies. Chemical phænomena depend (besides their own laws) on all the preceding, those of physics among the rest, especially on the laws of heat and electricity ; physiological phænomena, on the laws of physics and chemistry, and their own laws in addition. The phænomena of human society obey laws of their own, but do not depend solely upon these : they depend upon all the laws of organic and animal life, together with those of inorganic nature, these last influencing society not only through their influence on life, but by determining the physical conditions under which society has to be carried on. "*Chacun de ces degrés successifs exige des inductions qui lui sont propres ; mais elles ne peuvent jamais devenir*

systématiques que sous l'impulsion déductive résultée de tous les ordres moins compliqués."*

Thus arranged by M. Comte in a series, of which each term represents an advance in speciality beyond the term preceding it, and (what necessarily accompanies increased speciality) an increase of complexity—a set of phenomena determined by a more numerous combination of laws; the sciences stand in the following order: 1st, Mathematics; its three branches following one another on the same principle, Number, Geometry, Mechanics. 2nd, Astronomy. 3rd, Physics. 4th, Chemistry. 5th, Biology. 6th, Sociology, or the Social Science, the phenomena of which depend on, and cannot be understood without, the principal truths of all the other sciences. The subject matter and contents of these various sciences are obvious of themselves, with the exception of Physics, which is a group of sciences rather than a single science, and is again divided by M. Comte into five departments: Barology, or the science of weight; Thermology, or that of heat; Acoustics, Optics, and Electrology. These he attempts to arrange on the same principle of increasing speciality and complexity, but they hardly admit of such a scale, and M. Comte's mode of placing them varied at different periods. All the five being essentially independent of one another, he attached little importance to their order, except that barology ought to come first, as the connecting link with astronomy, and electrology last, as the transition to chemistry.

If the best classification is that which is grounded on the properties most important for our purposes, this classification will stand the test. By placing the sciences in the order of the complexity of their subject matter, it presents them in the order of their difficulty. Each science proposes to itself a more arduous enquiry than those which precede it in the series: it is therefore likely to be susceptible, even finally, of a less degree of perfection, and will certainly arrive later at the degree attainable by it. In addition to this, each science, to establish its own truths, needs those of all the sciences anterior to it. The only means, for example, by which the physiological laws of life could have been ascertained, was by distinguishing, among the multifarious and complicated facts of life, the portion which physical and chemical laws cannot account for. Only by thus isolating the effects of the peculiar organic laws, did it become possible to discover what these are. It follows that the order in which the sciences succeed one another in the series, cannot but be, in the main, the historical order of their development; and is the only order in which they can rationally be studied. For this last there is an

* "Système de Politique Positive," ii. 36.

additional reason: since the more special and complete sciences require not only the truths of the simpler and more general ones, but still more, their methods. The scientific intellect, both in the individual and in the race, must learn in the more elementary studies that art of investigation and those canons of proof which are to be put in practice in the more elevated. No intellect is properly qualified for the higher part of the scale, without due practice in the lower.

Mr. Herbert Spencer, in his essay entitled "The Genesis of Sciences," and more recently in a pamphlet on "the Classification of the Sciences," has criticised and condemned M. Comte's classification, and proposed a more elaborate one of his own: and M. Littré, in his valuable biographical and philosophical work on M. Comte ("Auguste Comte et la Philosophie Positive"), has at some length criticised the criticism. Mr. Spencer is one of the small number of persons who by the solidity and encyclopedical character of their knowledge, and their power of co-ordination and concatenation, may claim to be the peers of M. Comte, and entitled to a vote in the estimation of him. But after giving to his animadversions the respectful attention due to all that comes from Mr. Spencer, we cannot find that he has made out any case. It is always easy to find fault with a classification. There are a hundred possible ways of arranging any set of objects, and something may almost always be said against the best, and in favour of the worst of them. But the merits of a classification depend on the purposes to which it is instrumental. We have shown the purposes for which M. Comte's classification is intended. Mr. Spencer has not shown that it is ill adapted to those purposes; and we cannot perceive that his own answers any ends equally important. His chief objection is that if the more special sciences need the truths of the more general ones, the latter also need some of those of the former, and have at times been stopped in their progress by the imperfect state of sciences which follow long after them in M. Comte's scale; so that, the dependence being mutual, there is a *consensus*, but not an ascending scale or hierarchy of the sciences. That the earlier sciences derive help from the later is undoubtedly true; it is part of M. Comte's theory, and amply exemplified in the details of his work. When he affirms that one science historically precedes another, he does not mean that the perfection of the first precedes the humblest commencement of those which follow. Mr. Spencer does not distinguish between the empirical stage of the cultivation of a branch of knowledge, and the scientific stage. The commencement of every study consists in gathering together unanalysed facts, and treasuring up such spontaneous generalizations as present themselves to natural sagacity. In this stage any branch of enquiry can be carried on

independently of every other; and it is one of M. Comte's own remarks that the most complex, in a scientific point of view, of all studies, the latest in his series, the study of man as a moral and social being, since from its absorbing interest it is cultivated more or less by every one, and preeminently by the great practical minds, acquired at an early period a greater stock of just though unscientific observations than the more elementary sciences. It is these empirical truths that the later and more special sciences lend to the earlier: or, at most, some extremely elementary scientific truth, which happening to be easily ascertainable by direct experiment, could be made available for carrying a previous science already founded, to a higher stage of development; a reaction of the later sciences on the earlier which M. Comte not only fully recognised, but attached great importance to systematizing.*

But though detached truths relating to the more complex order of phenomena may be empirically observed, and a few of them even scientifically established, contemporaneously with an early stage of some of the sciences anterior in the scale, such detached truths, as M. Littré justly remarks, do not constitute a science. What is known of a subject, only becomes a science when it is made a connected body of truth; in which the relation between the general principles and the details is definitely made out, and each particular truth can be recognised as a case of the operation of wider laws. This point of progress, at which the

* The strongest case which Mr. Spencer produces of a scientifically ascertained law, which, though belonging to a later science, was necessary to the scientific formation of one occupying an earlier place in M. Comte's series, is the law of the accelerating force of gravity; which M. Comte places in Physics, but without which the Newtonian theory of the celestial motions could not have been discovered, nor could even now be proved. This fact, as is judiciously remarked by M. Littré, is not valid against the plan of M. Comte's classification, but discloses a slight error in the detail. M. Comte should not have placed the laws of terrestrial gravity under Physics. They are part of the general theory of gravitation, and belong to astronomy. Mr. Spencer has hit one of the weak points in M. Comte's scientific scale; weak however only because left unguarded. Astronomy, the second of M. Comte's abstract sciences, answers to his own definition of a concrete science. M. Comte however was only wrong in overlooking a distinction. There is an abstract science of astronomy, namely the theory of gravitation, which would equally agree with and explain the facts of a totally different solar system from the one of which our earth forms a part. The actual facts of our own system, the dimensions, distances, velocities, temperatures, physical composition, &c., of the sun, earth, and planets, are properly the subject of a concrete science, similar to natural history; but the concrete is more inseparably united to the abstract science than in any other case, since the few celestial facts really accessible to us, are nearly all required for discovering and proving the law of gravitation as an universal property of bodies, and have therefore an indispensable place in the abstract science as its fundamental data.

study passes from a preliminary state of mere preparation, into a science, cannot be reached by the more complex studies until it has been attained by the simpler ones. A certain regularity of recurrence in the celestial appearances was ascertained empirically before much progress had been made in geometry; but astronomy could no more be a science until geometry was a highly advanced one, than the rule of three could have been practised before addition and subtraction. The truths of the simpler sciences are a part of the laws to which the phænomena of the more complex sciences conform: and are not only a necessary element in their explanation, but must be so well understood as to be traceable through complex combinations, before the special laws which coexist and co-operate with them can be brought to light. This is all that M. Comte affirms, and enough for his purpose.* He no doubt occasionally indulges in more unqualified expressions than can be completely justified, regarding the logical perfection of the construction of his series, and its exact correspondence with the historical evolution of the sciences: exaggerations confined to language, and which the details of his exposition often correct. But he is sufficiently near the truth, in both respects, for every practical purpose.† Minor inaccuracies must often be forgiven

* The only point at which the general principle of the series fails in its application, is the subdivision of Physics; and there, as the subordination of the different branches scarcely exists, their order is of little consequence. Thermology, indeed, is altogether an exception to the principle of decreasing generality, heat, as Mr. Spencer truly says, being as universal as gravitation. But the place of Thermology is marked out, within certain narrow limits, by the ends of the classification, though not by its principle. The desideratum is, that every science should precede those which cannot be scientifically constituted or rationally studied until it is known. It is as a means to this end that the arrangement of the phænomena in the order of their dependence on one another is important. Now, though heat is as universal a phænomenon as any which external nature presents, its laws do not affect, in any manner important to us, the phænomena of Astronomy, and operate in the other branches of Physics only as slight modifying agencies, the consideration of which may be postponed to a rather advanced stage. But the phænomena of Chemistry and Biology depend on them often for their very existence. The ends of the classification require therefore that Thermology should precede Chemistry and Biology, but do not demand that it should be thrown farther back. On the other hand, those same ends, in another point of view, require that it should be subsequent to Astronomy, for reasons not of doctrine but of method: Astronomy being the best school of the true art of interpreting Nature, by which Thermology profits like other sciences, but which it was ill-adapted to originate.

† The philosophy of the subject is perhaps nowhere so well expressed as in the "Système de Politique Positive," (iii. 41). "Conçu logiquement, l'ordre suivant lequel nos principales théories accomplissent l'évolution fondamentale résulte nécessairement de leur dépendance mutuelle. Toutes les sciences peuvent, sans doute, être ébauchées à la fois: leur usage pratique exige même cette culture simultanée. Mais elle ne peut concerner que les inductions

even to great thinkers. Mr. Spencer, in the very writings in which he criticises M. Comte, affords signal instances of them.*

Combining the doctrines, that every science is in a less advanced state as it occupies a higher place in the ascending scale, and that all the sciences pass through the three stages, theological, metaphysical, and positive, it follows that the more special a science is, the tardier is it in effecting each transition, so that a completely positive state of an earlier science has often coincided with the metaphysical state of the one next to it, and a purely theological state of those farther on. This statement correctly represents the general course of the facts, though

propres à chaque classe de spéculations. Or cet essor inductif ne saurait fournir des principes suffisants qu'envers les plus simples études. Partout ailleurs, ils ne peuvent être établis qu'en subordonnant chaque genre d'inductions scientifiques à l'ensemble des déductions émanées des domaines moins compliqués, et dès-lors moins dépendants. Ainsi nos diverses théories reposent dogmatiquement les unes sur les autres, suivant un ordre invariable, qui doit régler historiquement leur avènement décisif, les plus indépendantes ayant toujours dû se développer plus tôt."

* "Science," says Mr. Spencer in his "Genesis," "while purely inductive is purely qualitative. . . . All quantitative prevision is reached deductively; induction can achieve only qualitative prevision." Now, if we remember that the very first accurate quantitative law of physical phenomena ever established, the law of the accelerating force of gravity, was discovered and proved by Galileo strictly by experiment; that the quantitative laws on which the whole theory of the celestial motions is grounded, were generalized by Kepler from direct comparison of observations; that the quantitative law of the condensation of gases by pressure, the law of Boyle and Mariotte, was arrived at by direct experiment; that the proportional quantities in which every known substance combines chemically with every other, were ascertained by innumerable experiments, from which the general law of chemical equivalents, now the ground of the most exact quantitative previsions, was an inductive generalization; we must conclude that Mr. Spencer has committed himself to a general proposition, which a very slight consideration of truths perfectly known to him would have shown to be unsustainable.

Again, in the very pamphlet in which Mr. Spencer defends himself against the supposition of being a disciple of M. Comte ("The Classification of the Sciences," p. 37), he speaks of "M. Comte's adherent, Mr. Buckle." Now, except in the opinion common to both that history may be made a subject of science, the speculations of these two thinkers are not only different, but run in different channels, M. Comte applying himself principally to the laws of evolution common to all mankind, Mr. Buckle almost exclusively to the diversities: and it may be affirmed without presumption, that they neither saw the same truths, nor fell into the same errors, nor defended their opinions, either true or erroneous, by the same arguments. Indeed, it is one of the surprising things in the case of Mr. Buckle as of Mr. Spencer, and devoting himself to speculations of the same kind, he profited so little by M. Comte.

These oversights prove nothing against the general accuracy of Mr. Spencer's acquirements. They are mere lapses of inattention, such as thinkers who attempt speculations requiring that vast multitudes of facts should be kept in recollection at once, can scarcely hope always to avoid.

requiring allowances in the detail. Mathematics, for example, from the very beginning of its cultivation, can hardly at any time have been in the theological state, though exhibiting many traces of the metaphysical. No one, probably, ever believed that the will of a god kept parallel lines from meeting, or made two and two equal to four; or ever prayed to the gods to make the square of the hypotenuse equal to more or less than the sum of the squares of the sides. The most devout believers have recognised in propositions of this description, a class of truths independent of the divine omnipotence. Even among the truths which popular philosophy calls by the misleading name of Contingent, the few which are at once exact and obvious were probably, from the very first, excepted from the theological explanation. M. Comte observes, after Adam Smith, that we are not told in any age or country of a god of Weight. It was otherwise with Astronomy: the heavenly bodies were believed not merely to be moved by gods, but to be gods themselves: and when this theory was exploded, their movements were explained by metaphysical conceptions; such as a tendency of Nature to perfection, in virtue of which these sublime bodies, being left to themselves, move in the most perfect orbit, the circle. Even Kepler was full of fancies of this description, which only terminated when Newton, by unveiling the real physical laws of the celestial motions, closed the metaphysical period of astronomical science. As M. Comte remarks, our power of foreseeing phenomena, and our power of controlling them, are the two things which destroy the belief of their being governed by changeable wills. In the case of phenomena which science has not yet taught us either to foresee or to control, the theological mode of thought has not ceased to operate: men still pray for rain, or for success in war, or to avert a shipwreck or a pestilence, but not to put back the stars in their courses, to abridge the time necessary for a journey, or to arrest the tides. Such vestiges of the primitive mode of thought linger in the more intricate departments of sciences which have attained a high degree of positive development. The metaphysical mode of explanation, being less antagonistic than the theological to the idea of invariable laws, is still slower in being entirely discarded. M. Comte finds remains of it in the sciences which are the most completely positive, with the single exception of astronomy, mathematics itself not being, he thinks, altogether free from them: which is not wonderful, when we see at how very recent a date mathematicians have been able to give the really positive interpretation of their own symbols.* We have

* We refer particularly to the mystical metaphysics connected with the negative sign, imaginary quantities, infinity and infinitesimals, &c., all cleared up

already however had occasion to notice M. Comte's propensity to use the term metaphysical in cases containing nothing that truly answers to his definition of the word. For instance, he considers chemistry as tainted with the metaphysical mode of thought by the notion of chemical affinity. He thinks that the chemists who said that bodies combine because they have an affinity for each other, believed in a mysterious entity residing in bodies and inducing them to combine. On any other supposition, he thinks the statement could only mean that bodies combine because they combine. But it really meant more. It was the abstract expression of the doctrine, that bodies have an invariable tendency to combine with one thing in preference to another: that the tendencies of different substances to combine are fixed quantities, of which the greater always prevails over the less, so that if A detaches B from C in one case it will do so in every other; which was called having a greater attraction, or, more technically, a greater affinity for it. This was not a metaphysical theory, but a positive generalization, which accounted for a great number of facts, and would have kept its place as a law of nature, had it not been disproved by the discovery of cases in which though A detached B from C in some circumstances, C detached it from A in others, showing the law of elective chemical combination to be a less simple one than had at first been supposed. In this case, therefore, M. Comte made a mistake: and he will be found to have made many similar ones. But in the science next after chemistry, biology, the empty mode of explanation by scholastic entities, such as a plastic force, a vital principle, and the like, has been kept up even to the present day. The German physiology of the school of Oken, notwithstanding his acknowledged genius, is almost as metaphysical as Hegel, and there is in France a quite recent revival of the Animism of Stahl. These metaphysical explanations, besides their inanity, did serious harm, by directing the course of positive scientific enquiry into wrong channels. There was indeed nothing to prevent investigating the mode of action of the supposed plastic or vital force by observation and experiment; but the phrases gave currency and coherence to a false abstraction and generalization, setting enquirers to look out for one cause of complex phenomena which undoubtedly depended on many.

According to M. Comte, chemistry entered into the positive stage with Lavoisier, in the latter half of the last century (in a subsequent treatise he places the date a generation earlier); and biology at the beginning of the present, when Bichat drew the fundamental distinction between nutritive or vegetative and pro-

and put on a rational footing in the highly philosophical treatises of Professor De Morgan.

perly animal life, and referred the properties of organs to the general laws of the component tissues. The most complex of all sciences, the Social, had not, he maintained, become positive at all, but was the subject of an ever-renewed and barren contest between the theological and the metaphysical modes of thought. To make this highest of the sciences positive, and thereby complete the positive character of all human speculations, was the principal aim of his labours, and he believed himself to have accomplished it in the last three volumes of his Treatise. But the term Positive is not, any more than Metaphysical, always used by M. Comte in the same meaning. There never can have been a period in any science when it was not in some degree positive, since it always professed to draw conclusions from experience and observation. M. Comte would have been the last to deny that previous to his own speculations, the world possessed a multitude of truths, of greater or less certainty, on social subjects, the evidence of which was obtained by inductive or deductive processes from observed sequences of phenomena. Nor could it be denied that the best writers on subjects upon which so many men of the highest mental capacity had employed their powers, had accepted as thoroughly the positive point of view, and rejected the theological and metaphysical as decidedly, as M. Comte himself. Montesquieu; even Macchiavelli; Adam Smith and the political economists universally, both in France and in England; Bentham, and all thinkers initiated by him, had a full conviction that social phenomena conform to invariable laws, the discovery and illustration of which was their great object as speculative thinkers. All that can be said is, that those philosophers did not get so far as M. Comte in discovering the methods best adapted to bring these laws to light. It was not, therefore, reserved for M. Comte to make sociological enquiries positive. But what he really meant by making a science positive, is what we will call, with M. Littré, giving it its final scientific constitution; in other words, discovering or proving, and pursuing to their consequences, those of its truths which are fit to form the connecting links among the rest: truths which are to it what the law of gravitation is to astronomy, what the elementary properties of the tissues are to physiology, and we will add (though M. Comte did not) what the laws of association are to psychology. This is an operation which, when accomplished, puts an end to the empirical period, and enables the science to be conceived as a co-ordinated and coherent body of doctrine. This is what had not yet been done for sociology; and the hope of effecting it was, from his early years, the prompter and incentive of all M. Comte's philosophic labours.

It was with a view to this that he undertook that wonderful systematization of the philosophy of all the antecedent sciences,

from mathematics to physiology, which, if he had done nothing else, would have stamped him, in all minds competent to appreciate it, as one of the principal thinkers of the age. To make its nature intelligible to those who are not acquainted with it, we must explain what we mean by the philosophy of a science, as distinguished from the science itself. The proper meaning of philosophy we take to be, what the ancients understood by it—the scientific knowledge of Man, as an intellectual, moral, and social being. Since his intellectual faculties include his knowing faculty, the science of Man includes everything that man can know, so far as regards his mode of knowing it: in other words, the whole doctrine of the conditions of human knowledge. The philosophy of a Science thus comes to mean the science itself, considered not as to its results, the truths which it ascertains, but as to the processes by which the mind attains them, the marks by which it recognises them, and the co-ordinating and methodizing of them with a view to the greatest clearness of conception and the fullest and readiest availability for use: in one word, the logic of the science. M. Comte has accomplished this for the first five of the fundamental sciences, with a success which can hardly be too much admired. We never reopen even the least admirable part of this survey, the volume on chemistry and biology (which was behind the actual state of those sciences when first written, and is far in the rear of them now), without a renewed sense of the great reach of its speculations, and a conviction that the way to a complete rationalizing of those sciences, still very imperfectly conceived by most who cultivate them, has been shown nowhere so successfully as there.

Yet, for a correct appreciation of this great philosophical achievement, we ought to take account of what has not been accomplished, as well as of what has. Some of the chief deficiencies and infirmities of M. Comte's system of thought will be found, as is usually the case, in close connexion with its greatest successes.

The philosophy of Science consists of two principal parts; the methods of investigation, and the requisites of proof. The one points out the roads by which the human intellect arrives at conclusions, the other the mode of testing their evidence. The former if complete would be an Organon of Discovery, the latter of Proof. It is to the first of these that M. Comte principally confines himself, and he treats it with a degree of perfection hitherto unrivalled. Nowhere is there anything comparable, in its kind, to his survey of the resources which the mind has at its disposal for investigating the laws of phenomena; the circumstances which render each of the fundamental modes of exploration suitable or unsuitable to each class of phenomena; the extensions and transformations which the process of investigation has to undergo in

adapting itself to each new province of the field of study; and the especial gifts with which every one of the fundamental sciences enriches the method of positive enquiry, each science in its turn being the best fitted to bring to perfection one process or another. These, and many cognate subjects, such as the theory of Classification, and the proper use of scientific Hypotheses, M. Comte has treated with a completeness of insight which leaves little to be desired. Not less admirable is his survey of the most comprehensive truths that had been arrived at by each science, considered as to their relation to the general sum of human knowledge, and their logical value as aids to its further progress. But after all this, there remains a further and distinct question. We are taught the right way of searching for results, but when a result has been reached, how shall we know that it is true? How assure ourselves that the process has been performed correctly, and that our premises, whether consisting of generalities or of particular facts, really prove the conclusion we have grounded on them? On this question M. Comte throws no light. He supplies no test of proof. As regards deduction, he neither recognises the syllogistic system of Aristotle and his successors (the insufficiency of which is as evident as its utility is real) nor proposes any other in lieu of it: and of induction he has no canons whatever. He does not seem to admit the possibility of any general criterion by which to decide whether a given inductive inference is correct or not. Yet he does not, with Dr. Whewell, regard an inductive theory as proved if it accounts for the facts: on the contrary, he sets himself in the strongest opposition to those scientific hypotheses which, like the luminiferous ether, are not susceptible of direct proof, and are accepted on the sole evidence of their aptitude for explaining phenomena. He maintains that no hypothesis is legitimate unless it is susceptible of verification, and that none ought to be accepted as true unless it can be shown not only that it accords with the facts, but that its falsehood would be inconsistent with them. He therefore needs a test of inductive proof; and in assigning none, he seems to give up as impracticable the main problem of Logic properly so called. At the beginning of his treatise he speaks of a doctrine of Method, apart from particular applications, as conceivable, but not needful: method, according to him, is learnt only by seeing it in operation, and the logic of a science can only usefully be taught through the science itself. Towards the end of the work, he assumes a more decidedly negative tone, and treats the very conception of studying Logic otherwise than in its applications as chimerical. He got on, in his subsequent writings, to considering it as wrong. This indispensable part of Positive Philosophy he not only left to be supplied by others, but did all that depended on him to discourage them from attempting it.

This hiatus in M. Comte's system is not unconnected with a defect in his original conception of the subject matter of scientific investigation, which has been generally noticed, for it lies on the surface, and is more apt to be exaggerated than overlooked. It is often said of him that he rejects the study of causes. This is not, in the correct acceptation, true, for it is only questions of ultimate origin, and of Efficient as distinguished from what are called Physical causes, that he rejects. The causes that he regards as inaccessible are causes which are not themselves phænomena. Like other people he admits the study of causes, in every sense in which one physical fact can be the cause of another. But he has an objection to the *word* cause; he will only consent to speak of Laws of Succession: and depriving himself of the use of a word which has a Positive meaning, he misses the meaning it expresses. He sees no difference between such generalizations as Kepler's laws, and such as the theory of gravitation. He fails to perceive the real distinction between the laws of succession and coexistence which thinkers of a different school call Laws of Phænomena, and those of what they call the action of Causes: the former exemplified by the succession of day and night, the latter by the earth's rotation which causes it. The succession of day and night is as much an invariable sequence, as the alternate exposure of opposite sides of the earth to the sun. Yet day and night are not the causes of one another; why? Because their sequence, though invariable in our experience, is not unconditionally so: those facts only succeed each other, provided that the presence and absence of the sun succeed each other, and if this alternation were to cease, we might have either day or night unfulfilled by one another. There are thus two kinds of uniformities of succession, the one unconditional, the other conditional on the first: laws of causation, and other successions dependent on those laws. All ultimate laws are laws of causation, and the only universal law beyond the pale of mathematics is the law of universal causation, namely that every phænomenon has a phænomenal cause; has some phænomenon other than itself, or some combination of phænomena, on which it is invariably and unconditionally consequent. It is on the universality of this law that the possibility rests of establishing a canon of Induction. A general proposition inductively obtained is only then proved to be true, when the instances on which it rests are such that if they have been correctly observed, the falsity of the generalization would be inconsistent with the constancy of causation; with the universality of the fact that the phænomena of nature take place according to invariable laws of succession.* It is probable, there-

* Those who wish to see this idea followed out, are referred to "A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive." It is not irrelevant to state that M.

fore, that M. Comte's determined abstinence from the word and the idea of Cause, had much to do with his inability to conceive an Inductive Logic, by diverting his attention from the only basis upon which it could be founded.

We are afraid it must also be said, though shown only by slight indications in his fundamental work, and coming out in full evidence only in his later writings—that M. Comte, at bottom, was not so solicitous about completeness of proof as becomes a positive philosopher, and that the unimpeachable objectivity, as he would have called it, of a conception—its exact correspondence to the realities of outward fact—was not, with him, an indispensable condition of adopting it, if it was subjectively useful, by affording facilities to the mind for grouping phenomena. This appears very curiously in his chapters on the philosophy of Chemistry. He recommends, as a judicious use of "the degree of liberty left to our intelligence by the end and purpose of positive science," that we should accept as a convenient generalization the doctrine that all chemical composition is between two elements only; that every substance which our analysis decomposes, let us say into four elements, has for its immediate constituents two hypothetical substances, each compounded of two simpler ones. There would have been nothing to object to in this as a scientific hypothesis, assumed tentatively as a means of suggesting experiments by which its truth might be tested. With this for its destination, the conception would have been legitimate and philosophical; the more so, as, if confirmed, it would have afforded an explanation of the fact that some substances which analysis shows to be composed of the same elementary substances in the same proportions, differ in their general properties, as for instance, sugar and gum.* And if, besides affording a reason for difference between things which differ, the hypothesis had afforded a reason for agreement between things which agree; if the intermediate link by which the quaternary compound was resolved into two binary ones, could have been so chosen as to bring each of them within the analogies of some known class of binary compounds (which it is easy to suppose possible, and which, in some par-

Comte, soon after the publication of that work, expressed, both in a letter (published in M. Littré's volume) and in print, his high approval of it (especially of the Inductive part) as a real contribution to the construction of the Positive Method. But we cannot discover that he was indebted to it for a single idea, or that it influenced, in the smallest particular, the course of his subsequent speculations.

* The force, however, of this last consideration has been much weakened by the progress of discovery since M. Comte left off studying chemistry; it being now probable that most if not all substances, even elementary, are susceptible of *allotropic* forms; as in the case of oxygen and ozone, the two forms of phosphorus, &c.

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ticular instances actually happens);* the universality of binary composition would have been a successful example of an hypothesis in anticipation of a positive theory, to give a direction to enquiry which might end in its being either proved or abandoned. But M. Comte evidently thought that even though it should never be proved—however many cases of chemical composition might always remain in which the theory was still as hypothetical as at first—so long as it was not actually disproved (which it is scarcely in the nature of the case that it should ever be) it would deserve to be retained for its mere convenience in bringing a large body of phenomena under a general conception. In a *résumé* of the general principle of the positive method at the end of the work, he claims, in express terms, an unlimited license of adopting “without any vain scruple” hypothetical conceptions of this sort; “in order to satisfy, within proper limits, our just mental inclinations, which always turn, with an instinctive predilection, towards simplicity, continuity, and generality of conceptions, while always respecting the reality of external laws in so far as accessible to us” (vi. 639). “The most philosophic point of view leads us to conceive the study of natural laws as destined to represent the external world so as to give as much satisfaction to the essential inclinations of our intelligence, as is consistent with the degree of exactitude commanded by the aggregate of our practical wants” (vi. 642). Among these “essential inclinations” he includes not only our “instinctive predilection for order and harmony,” which makes us relish any conception, even fictitious, that helps to reduce phenomena to system; but even our feelings of taste, “les convenances purement esthétiques,” which, he says, have a legitimate part in the employment of the “genre de liberté resté facultatif pour notre intelligence.” After the due satisfaction of our “most eminent mental inclinations,” there will still remain “a considerable margin of indeterminateness, which should be made use of to give a direct gratification to our *besoin* of ideality, by embellishing our scientific thoughts, without injury to their essential reality” (vi. 647). In consistency with all this, M. Comte warns thinkers against too severe a scrutiny of the exact truth of scientific laws, and stamps with “severe reprobation” those who break down “by too minute an investigation” generalizations already made, without being able to substitute others (vi. 639): as in the case of Lavoisier’s general theory of chemistry, which would have made that science more satisfactory than at present to “the instinctive inclinations of our

* Thus; by considering prussic acid as a compound of hydrogen and cyanogen rather than of hydrogen and the elements of cyanogen (carbon and nitrogen) it is assimilated to a whole class of acid compounds between hydrogen and other substances, and a reason is thus found for its agreeing in their acid properties.

intelligence" if it had turned out true, but unhappily it did not. These mental dispositions in M. Comte account for his not having found or sought a logical criterion of proof; but they are scarcely consistent with his inveterate hostility to the hypothesis of the luminiferous ether, which certainly gratifies our "predilection for order and harmony," not to say our "besoin d'idéalité," in no ordinary degree. This notion of the "destination" of the study of natural laws is to our minds a complete dereliction of the essential principles which form the Positive conception of science; and contained the germ of the perversion of his own philosophy which marked his later years, and which we propose on a future occasion to describe and characterise. It might be interesting, but scarcely worth while, to attempt to penetrate to the just thought which misled M. Comte, for there is almost always a grain of truth in the errors of an original and powerful mind.

There is another grave aberration in M. Comte's view of the method of positive science, which though not more unphilosophical than the last mentioned, is of greater practical importance. He rejects totally, as an invalid process, psychological observation properly so called, or in other words, internal consciousness, at least as regards our intellectual operations. He gives no place in his series of the sciences to Psychology, and always speaks of it with contempt. The study of mental phenomena, or, as he expresses it, of moral and intellectual functions, has a place in his scheme, under the head of Biology, but only as a branch of physiology. Our knowledge of the human mind must, he thinks, be acquired by observing other people. How we are to observe other people's mental operations, or how interpret the signs of them without having learnt what the signs mean by knowledge of ourselves, he does not state. But it is clear to him that we can learn very little about the feelings, and nothing at all about the intellect, by self-observation. Our intelligence can observe all other things, but not itself: we cannot observe ourselves observing, or observe ourselves reasoning: and if we could, attention to this reflex operation would annihilate its object, by stopping the process observed.

There is little need for an elaborate refutation of a fallacy respecting which the only wonder is that it should impose on any one. Two answers may be given to it. In the first place M. Comte might be referred to experience, and to the writings of his countryman M. Cardailiac and our own Sir William Hamilton, for proof that the mind can not only be conscious of, but attend to, more than one, and even a considerable number, of impressions at once.* It is true that attention is weakened by being divided;

* According to Sir William Hamilton, as many as six; but numerical

and this forms a special difficulty in psychological observation, as psychologists (Sir William Hamilton in particular) have fully recognised; but a difficulty is not an impossibility. Secondly, it might have occurred to M. Comte that a fact may be studied through the medium of memory, not at the very moment of our perceiving it, but the moment after: and this is really the mode in which our best knowledge of our intellectual acts is generally acquired. We reflect on what we have been doing, when the act is past, but when its impression in the memory is still fresh. Unless in one of these ways, we could not have acquired the knowledge which nobody denies us to have of what passes in our minds. M. Comte would scarcely have affirmed that we are not aware of our own intellectual operations. We know of our observings and our reasonings, either at the very time, or by memory the moment after; in either case, by direct knowledge, and not (like things done by us in a state of somnambulism) merely by their results. This simple fact destroys the whole of M. Comte's argument. Whatever we are directly aware of, we can directly observe.

And what Organon for the study of "the moral and intellectual functions" does M. Comte offer, in lieu of the direct mental observation which he repudiates? We are almost ashamed to say, that it is Phrenology! Not, indeed, he says, as a science formed, but as one still to be created; for he rejects almost all the special organs imagined by phrenologists, and accepts only their general division of the brain into the three regions of the propensities, the sentiments, and the intellect,* and the subdivision of the latter region between the organs of meditation and those of observation. Yet this mere first outline of an apportionment of the mental functions among different organs, he regards as extricating the mental study of man from the metaphysical stage, and elevating it to the positive. The condition of mental science would be sad indeed if this were its best chance of being positive; for the later course of physiological observation and speculation has not tended to confirm, but to discredit, the phrenological hypothesis. And even if that hypothesis were true, psychological observation would still be necessary; for how is it possible to ascertain the correspondence between two things, by observation of only one of them? To establish a relation between mental functions and cerebral conformations, requires not only a parallel system of observations applied to each, but (as M. Comte himself, with some incon-

precision in such matters is out of the question, and it is probable that different minds have the power in different degrees.

* Or, as afterwards corrected by him, the appetites and emotions, the active capacities, and the intellectual faculties; "le cœur," "le caractère," and "l'esprit."

sistency, acknowledges) an analysis of the mental faculties, "des diverses facultés élémentaires," (iii. 573) conducted without any reference to the physical conditions, since the proof of the theory would lie in the correspondence between the division of the brain into organs and that of the mind into faculties, each shown by separate evidence. To accomplish this analysis requires direct psychological study carried to a high pitch of perfection; it being necessary, among other things, to investigate the degree in which mental character is created by circumstances, since no one supposes that cerebral conformation does all, and circumstances nothing. The phrenological study of Mind thus supposes as its necessary preparation the whole of the Association psychology. Without, then, rejecting any aid which study of the brain and nerves can afford to psychology (and it has afforded, and will yet afford, much) we may affirm that M. Comte has done nothing for the constitution of the positive method of mental science. He refused to profit by the very valuable commencements made by his predecessors, especially by Hartley, Brown, and James Mill (if indeed any of those philosophers were known to him) and left the Psychological branch of the positive method, as well as psychology itself, to be put in their true position as a part of Positive Philosophy by successors who duly placed themselves at the twofold point of view of physiology and psychology, Mr. Bain and Mr. Herbert Spencer. This great mistake is not a mere hiatus in M. Comte's system, but the parent of serious errors in his attempt to create a Social Science. He is indeed very skilful in estimating the effect of circumstances in moulding the general character of the human race; were he not, his historical theory could be of little worth: but in appreciating the influence which circumstances exercise, through psychological laws, in producing diversities of character, collective or individual, he is sadly at fault.

After this summary view of M. Comte's conception of Positive Philosophy, it remains to give some account of his more special and equally ambitious attempt to create the science of Sociology, or, as he expresses it, to elevate the study of social phenomena to the positive state.

He regarded all who profess any political opinions, as hitherto divided between the adherents of the theological and those of the metaphysical mode of thought: the former deducing all their doctrines from divine ordinances, the latter from abstractions. This assertion, however, cannot be intended in the same sense as when the terms are applied to the sciences of inorganic nature; for it is impossible that acts evidently proceeding from the human will could be ascribed to the agency (at least immediate) of either divinities or abstractions. No one ever regarded himself or his

fellow-man as a mere piece of machinery worked by a god, or as the abode of an entity which was the true author of what the man himself appeared to do. True, it was believed that the gods, or God, could move or change human wills, as well as control their consequences, and prayers were offered to them accordingly, rather as able to overrule the spontaneous course of things, than as at each instant carrying it on. On the whole, however, the theological and metaphysical conceptions, in their application to sociology, had reference not to the production of phænomena, but to the rule of duty, and conduct in life. It is this which was based, either on a divine will, or on abstract mental conceptions, which, by an illusion of the rational faculty, were invested with objective validity. On the one hand, the established rules of morality were everywhere referred to a divine origin. In the majority of countries the entire civil and criminal law was looked upon as revealed from above; and it is to the petty military communities which escaped this delusion, that man is indebted for being now a progressive being. The fundamental institutions of the state were almost everywhere believed to have been divinely established, and to be still, in a greater or less degree, of divine authority. The divine right of certain lines of kings to rule, and even to rule absolutely, was but lately the creed of the dominant party in most countries of Europe; while the divine right of popes and bishops to dictate men's beliefs (and not respecting the invisible world alone) is still striving, though under considerable difficulties, to rule mankind. When these opinions began to be out of date, a rival theory presented itself to take their place. There were, in truth, many such theories, and to some of them the term metaphysical, in M. Comte's sense, cannot justly be applied. All theories in which the ultimate standard of institutions and rules of action was the happiness of mankind, and observation and experience the guides (and some such there have been in all periods of free speculation) are entitled to the name Positive, whatever, in other respects, their imperfections may be. But these were a small minority. M. Comte was right in affirming that the prevailing schools of moral and political speculation, when not theological, have been metaphysical. They affirmed that moral rules, and even political institutions, were not means to an end, the general good, but corollaries evolved from the conception of Natural Rights. This was especially the case in all the countries in which the ideas of publicists were the offspring of the Roman Law. The legislators of opinion on these subjects, when not theologians, were lawyers: and the Continental lawyers followed the Roman jurists, who followed the Greek metaphysicians, in acknowledging as the ultimate source of right and wrong in morals, and consequently in institutions, the imaginary

law of the imaginary being Nature. The first systematizers of morals in Christian Europe, on any other than a purely theological basis, the writers on International Law, reasoned wholly from these premises, and transmitted them to a long line of successors. This mode of thought reached its culmination in Rousseau, in whose hands it became as powerful an instrument for destroying the past, as it was impotent for directing the future. The complete victory which this philosophy gained in speculation over the old doctrines, was temporarily followed by an equally complete practical triumph, the French Revolution: when, having had, for the first time, a full opportunity of developing its tendencies, and showing what it could not do, it failed so conspicuously as to determine a partial reaction to the doctrines of feudalism and Catholicism. Between these and the political metaphysics (metapolitics as Coleridge called it) of the Revolution, society has since oscillated; raising up in the process a hybrid intermediate party, termed *Conservative*, or the party of *Order*, which has no doctrines of its own, but attempts to hold the scales even between the two others, borrowing alternately the arguments of each to use as weapons against whichever of the two seems at the moment most likely to prevail.

Such, reduced to a very condensed form, is M. Comte's exposition of the state of European opinion on politics and society. An Englishman's criticism would be, that it describes well enough the general division of political opinion in France and the countries which follow her lead, but not in England, or the communities of English origin: in all of which, divine right died out with the Jacobites, and the law of nature and natural rights have never been favourites even with the extreme popular party, who preferred to rest their claims on the historical traditions of their own country, and on maxims drawn from its law books, and since they outgrew this standard, almost always base them on general expediency. In England, the preference of one form of government to another seldom turns on anything but the practical consequences which it produces, or which are expected from it. M. Comte can point to little of the nature of metaphysics in English politics, except "*la metaphysique constitutionnelle*," a name he chooses to give to the conventional fiction by which the occupant of the throne is supposed to be the source from whence all power emanates, while nothing can be further from the belief or intention of anybody than that such should really be the case. Apart from this, which is a matter of forms and words, and has no connexion with any belief except belief in the proprieties, the severest criticism can find nothing either worse or better, in the modes of thinking either of our conservative or of our liberal party, than a particularly shallow and flimsy kind of positivism. The working classes in-

deed, or some portion of them, perhaps still rest their claim to universal suffrage on abstract right, in addition to more substantial reasons, and thus far and no farther does metaphysics prevail in the region of English politics. But politics is not the whole art of social existence: ethics is still a deeper and more vital part of it: and in that, as much in England as elsewhere, the current opinions are still divided between the theological mode of thought and the metaphysical. What is the whole doctrine of Intuitive Morality, which reigns supreme wherever the idolatry of Scripture texts has abated and the influence of Bentham's philosophy has not reached, but the metaphysical state of ethical science? What else, indeed, is the whole *à priori* philosophy, in morals, jurisprudence, psychology, logic, even physical science, for it does not always keep its hands off that, the oldest domain of observation and experiment? It has the universal diagnostic of the metaphysical mode of thought, in the Comtean sense of the word; that of erecting a mere creation of the mind into a test or *norma* of external truth, and presenting the abstract expression of the beliefs already entertained, as the reason and evidence which justifies them. Of those who still adhere to the old opinions we need not speak; but when one of the most vigorous as well as boldest thinkers that English speculation has yet produced, full of the true scientific spirit, Mr. Herbert Spencer, places in the front of his philosophy the doctrine that the ultimate test of the truth of a proposition is the inconceivableness of its negative; when, following in the steps of Mr. Spencer, an able expounder of positive philosophy like Mr. Lewes, in his meritorious and by no means superficial work on Aristotle, after laying, very justly, the blame of almost every error of the ancient thinkers on their neglecting to *verify* their opinions, announces that there are two kinds of verification, the Real and the Ideal, the ideal test of truth being that its negative is unthinkable, and by the application of that test judges that gravitation must be universal even in the stellar regions, because in the absence of proof to the contrary, "the idea of matter without gravity is unthinkable;"—when those from whom it was least to be expected thus set up acquired necessities of thought in the minds of one or two generations as evidence of real necessities in the universe, we must admit that the metaphysical mode of thought still rules the higher philosophy, even in the department of inorganic nature, and far more in all that relates to man as a moral, intellectual, and social being.

But, while M. Comte is so far in the right, we often, as already intimated, find him using the name metaphysical to denote certain practical conclusions, instead of a particular kind of theoretical premises. Whatever goes by the different names of the

revolutionary, the radical, the democratic, the liberal, the free-thinking, the sceptical, or the negative and critical school or party in religion, politics, or philosophy, all passes with him under the designation of metaphysical, and whatever he has to say about it forms part of his description of the metaphysical school of social science. He passes in review, one after another, what he deems the leading doctrines of the revolutionary school of politics, and dismisses them all as mere instruments of attack upon the old social system, with no permanent validity as social truths.

He assigns only this humble rank to the first of all the articles of the liberal creed, "the absolute right of free examination, or the dogma of unlimited liberty of conscience." As far as this doctrine only means that opinions, and their expression, should be exempt from *legal* restraint, either in the form of prevention or of penalty, M. Comte is a firm adherent of it: but the *moral* right of every human being, however ill-prepared by the necessary instruction and discipline, to erect himself into a judge of the most intricate as well as the most important questions that can occupy the human intellect, he resolutely denies. "There is no liberty of conscience," he said in an early work, "in astronomy, in physics, in chemistry, even in physiology, in the sense that every one would think it absurd not to accept in confidence the principles established in those sciences by the competent persons. If it is otherwise in politics, the reason is merely because, the old doctrines having gone by and the new ones not being yet formed, there are not properly, during the interval, any established opinions." When first mankind outgrew the old doctrines, an appeal from doctors and teachers to the outside public was inevitable and indispensable, since without the toleration and encouragement of discussion and criticism from all quarters, it would have been impossible for any new doctrines to grow up. But in itself, the practice of carrying the questions which more than all others require special knowledge and preparation, before the incompetent tribunal of common opinion, is, he contends, radically irrational, and will and ought to cease when once mankind have again made up their minds to a system of doctrine. The prolongation of this provisional state, producing an ever increasing divergence of opinions, is already, according to him, extremely dangerous, since it is only when there is a tolerable unanimity respecting the rule of life, that a real moral control can be established over the self-interest and passions of individuals. Besides which, when every man is encouraged to believe himself a competent judge of the most difficult social questions, he cannot be prevented from thinking himself competent also to the most important public duties, and the baneful competition for power and official functions spreads constantly

downwards to a lower and lower grade of intelligence. In M. Comte's opinion the peculiarly complicated nature of sociological studies, and the great amount of previous knowledge and intellectual discipline requisite for them, together with the serious consequences that may be produced by even temporary errors on such subjects, render it necessary in the case of ethics and politics still more than of mathematics and physics, that whatever legal liberty may exist of questioning and discussing, the opinions of mankind should really be formed for them by an exceedingly small number of minds of the highest class, trained to the task by the most thorough and laborious mental preparation: and that the questioning of their conclusions by any one not of an equivalent grade of intellect and instruction, should be accounted equally presumptuous, and more blamable, than the attempts occasionally made by sciolists to refute the Newtonian astronomy. All this is, in a sense, true: but we confess our sympathy with those who feel towards it like the man in the story, who being asked whether he admitted that six and five make eleven, refused to give an answer until he knew what use was to be made of it. The doctrine is one of a class of truths, which unless completed by other truths, are so liable to perversion, that we may fairly decline to take notice of them except in connexion with some definite application. In justice to M. Comte it should be said that he does not wish this intellectual dominion to be exercised over an ignorant people. Far from him is the thought of promoting the allegiance of the mass to scientific authority by withholding from them scientific knowledge. He holds it the duty of society to bestow on every one who grows up to manhood or womanhood as complete a course of instruction in every department of science, from mathematics to sociology, as can possibly be made general: and his ideas of what is possible in that respect are carried to a length to which few are prepared to follow him. There is something startling, though when closely looked into, not Utopian or chimerical, in the amount of positive knowledge of the most varied kind which he believes may, by good methods of teaching, be made the common inheritance of all persons with ordinary faculties who are born into the world: not the mere knowledge of results, to which, except for the practical arts, he attaches only secondary value, but knowledge also of the mode in which those results were attained, and the evidence on which they rest, so far as it can be known and understood by those who do not devote their lives to its study.

We have stated thus fully M. Comte's opinion on the most fundamental doctrine of liberalism, because it is the clue to much of his general conception of politics. If his object had only been to exemptify by that doctrine the purely negative character of the

principal liberal and revolutionary schools of thought, he need not have gone so far: it would have been enough to say, that the mere liberty to hold and express any creed, cannot itself be that creed. Every one is free to believe and publish that two and two make ten, but the important thing is to know that they make four. M. Comte has no difficulty in making out an equally strong case against the other principal tenets of what he calls the revolutionary school; since all that they generally amount to is that something ought not to be, which cannot possibly be the whole truth, and which M. Comte, in general, will not admit to be even part of it. Take for instance the doctrine which denies to governments any initiative in social progress, restricting them to the function of preserving order, or in other words keeping the peace: an opinion which, so far as grounded on so-called rights of the individual, he justly regards as purely metaphysical; but does not recognise that it is also widely held as an inference from the laws of human nature and human affairs, and therefore, whether true or false, as a Positive doctrine. Believing with M. Comte that there are no absolute truths in the political art, nor indeed in any art whatever, we agree with him that the *laissez-faire* doctrine, stated without large qualifications, is both unpractical and unscientific; but it does not follow that those who assert it are not, nineteen times out of twenty, practically nearer the truth than those who deny it. The doctrine of Equality meets no better fate at M. Comte's hands. He regards it as the erection into an absolute dogma of a mere protest against the inequalities which came down from the middle ages and answered no legitimate end in modern society. He observes, that mankind in a normal state, having to act together, are necessarily, in practice, organized and classed with some reference to their unequal aptitudes, natural or acquired, which demand that some should be under the direction of others: scrupulous regard being at the same time had to the fulfilment towards all, of "the claims rightfully inherent in the dignity of a human being; the aggregate of which, still very insufficiently appreciated, will constitute more and more the principle of universal morality as applied to daily use. . . . a grand moral obligation, which has never been directly denied since the abolition of slavery" (iv. 54). There is not a word to be said against these doctrines: but the practical question is one which M. Comte never even entertains—viz., when after being properly educated, people are left to find their places for themselves, do they not spontaneously class themselves in a manner much more conformable to their unequal or dissimilar aptitudes, than governments or social institutions are likely to do it for them? The Sovereignty of the People, again—that metaphysical axiom which in France and the rest of the Continent has

so long been the theoretic basis of radical and democratic politics, he regards as of a purely negative character, signifying the right of the people to rid themselves by insurrection of a social order that has become oppressive: but, when erected into a positive principle of government, which condemns indefinitely all superiors to "an arbitrary dependence upon the multitude of their inferiors," he considers it as a sort of "transportation to people of the divine right so much reproached to kings" (iv. 55, 56). On the doctrine as a metaphysical dogma or an absolute principle, this criticism is just; but there is also a Positive doctrine, without any pretension to being absolute, which claims the direct participation of the governed in their own government, not as a natural right, but as a means to important ends, under the conditions and with the limitations which those ends impose. The general result of M. Comte's criticism on the revolutionary philosophy, is that he deems it not only incapable of aiding the necessary reorganization of society, but a serious impediment thereto, by setting up, on all the great interests of mankind, the mere negation of authority, direction, or organization, as the most perfect state, and the solution of all problems: the extreme point of this aberration being reached by Rousseau and his followers, when they extolled the savage state, as an ideal from which civilization was only a degeneracy, more or less marked and complete.

The state of sociological speculation being such as has been described—divided between a feudal and theological school, now effete, and a democratic and metaphysical one, of no value except for the destruction of the former; the problem, how to render the social science positive, must naturally have presented itself, more or less distinctly, to superior minds. M. Comte examines and criticises, for the most part justly, some of the principal efforts which have been made by individual thinkers for this purpose. But the weak side of his philosophy comes out prominently in his strictures on the only systematic attempt yet made by any body of thinkers, to constitute a science, not indeed of social phenomena generally, but of one great class or division of them. We mean, of course, political economy, which (with a reservation in favour of the speculations of Adam Smith as valuable preparatory studies for science) he deems unscientific, unpositive, and a mere branch of metaphysics, that comprehensive category of condemnation in which he places all attempts at positive science which are not in his opinion directed by a right scientific method. Any one acquainted with the writings of political economists need only read his few pages of animadversions on them (iv. 193 to 205) to learn how extremely superficial M. Comte can sometimes be. He affirms that they have added nothing really new to the original *aperçus* of Adam Smith; when

every one who has read them knows that they have added so much as to have changed the whole aspect of the science, besides rectifying and clearing up in the most essential points the *aperçus* themselves. He lays an almost puerile stress, for the purpose of disparagement, on the discussions about the meaning of words which are found in the best books on political economy, as if such discussions were not an indispensable accompaniment of the progress of thought, and abundant in the history of every physical science. On the whole question he has but one remark of any value, and that he misapplies; namely, that the study of the conditions of national wealth as a detached subject is unphilosophical, because, all the different aspects of social phenomena acting and reacting on one another, they cannot be rightly understood apart: which by no means proves that the material and industrial phenomena of society are not, even by themselves, susceptible of useful generalizations, but only that these generalizations must necessarily be relative to a given form of civilization and a given stage of social advancement. This, we apprehend, is what no political economist would deny. None of them pretend that the laws of wages, profits, values, prices, and the like, set down in their treatises, would be true in the savage state (for example), or in a community composed of masters and slaves. But they do think, with good reason, that whoever understands the political economy of a country with the complicated and manifold civilization of the nations of Europe, can deduce without difficulty the political economy of any other state of society, with the particular circumstances of which he is equally well acquainted.* We do not pretend that political economy has never been prosecuted or taught in a contracted spirit. As often as a study is cultivated by narrow minds, they will draw from it narrow conclusions. If a political economist is deficient in general knowledge, he will exaggerate the importance and universality of the limited class of truths which he knows. All kinds of scientific men are liable to this imputation, and M. Comte is never weary of urging it against them; reproaching them with their narrowness of mind, the petty scale of their thoughts, their incapacity for large views, and the stupidity of those they

* M. Littré, who, though a warm admirer, and accepting the position of a disciple of M. Comte, is singularly free from his errors, makes the equally ingenious and just remark, that Political Economy corresponds in social science to the theory of the nutritive functions in biology, which M. Comte, with all good physiologists, thinks it not only permissible but a great and fundamental improvement to treat, in the first place, separately, as the necessary basis of the higher branches of the science: although the nutritive functions can no more be withdrawn *in fact* from the influence of the animal and human attributes, than the economical phenomena of society from that of the political and moral.

occasionally attempt beyond the bounds of their own subjects. Political economists do not deserve these reproaches more than other classes of positive enquirers, but less than most. The principal error of narrowness with which they are frequently chargeable, is that of regarding, not any economical doctrine, but their present experience of mankind, as of universal validity; mistaking temporary or local phases of human character for human nature itself; having no faith in the wonderful pliability of the human mind; deeming it impossible, in spite of the strongest evidence, that the earth can produce human beings of a different type from that which is familiar to them in their own age, or even, perhaps, in their own country. The only security against this narrowness is a liberal mental cultivation, and all it proves is that a person is not likely to be a good political economist who is nothing else.

Thus far, we have had to do with M. Comte, as a sociologist, only in his critical capacity. We have now to deal with him as a constructor—the author of a sociological system. The first question is that of the Method proper to the study. His view of this is highly instructive.

The Method proper to the Science of Society must be, in substance, the same as in all other sciences; the interrogation and interpretation of experience, by the twofold process of Induction and Deduction. But its mode of practising these operations has features of peculiarity. In general, Induction furnishes to science the laws of the elementary facts, from which, when known, those of the complex combinations are thought out deductively: specific observation of complex phenomena yields no general laws, or only empirical ones; its scientific function is to verify the laws obtained by deduction. This mode of philosophizing is not adequate to the exigencies of sociological investigation. In social phenomena the elementary facts are feelings and actions, and the laws of these are the laws of human nature, social facts being the results of human acts and situations. Since, then, the phenomena of man in society result from his nature as an individual being, it might be thought that the proper mode of constructing a positive Social Science must be by deducing it from the general laws of human nature, using the facts of history merely for verification. Such, accordingly, has been the conception of social science by many of those who have endeavoured to render it positive, particularly by the school of Bentham. M. Comte considers this as an error. We may, he says, draw from the universal laws of human nature some conclusions (though even these, we think, rather precarious) concerning the very earliest stages of human progress, of which there are either no, or very imperfect, historical records. But as society proceeds in its development,

its phenomena are determined, more and more, not by the simple tendencies of universal human nature, but by the accumulated influence of past generations over the present. The human beings themselves, on the laws of whose nature the facts of history depend, are not abstract or universal but historical human beings, already shaped, and made what they are, by human society. This being the case, no powers of deduction could enable any one, starting from the mere conception of the Being Man, placed in a world such as the earth may have been before the commencement of human agency, to predict and calculate the phenomena of his development such as they have in fact proved. If the facts of history, empirically considered, had not given rise to any generalizations, a deductive study of history could never have reached higher than more or less plausible conjecture. By good fortune (for the case might easily have been otherwise) the history of our species, looked at as a comprehensive whole, does exhibit a determinate course, a certain order of development: though history alone cannot prove this to be a necessary law, as distinguished from a temporary accident. Here, therefore, begins the office of Biology (or, as we should say, of Psychology) in the social science. The universal laws of human nature are part of the data of sociology, but in using them we must reverse the method of the deductive physical sciences: for while in these specific experience commonly serves to verify laws arrived at by deduction, in sociology it is specific experience which suggests the laws, and deduction which verifies them. If a sociological theory, collected from historical evidence, contradicts the established general laws of human nature; if (to use M. Comte's instances) it implies, in the mass of mankind, any very decided natural bent, either in a good or in a bad direction; if it supposes that the reason, in average human beings, predominates over the desires, or the disinterested desires over the personal; we may know that history has been misinterpreted, and that the theory is false. On the other hand, if laws of social phenomena, empirically generalized from history, can when once suggested be affiliated to the known laws of human nature; if the direction actually taken by the developments and changes of human society, can be seen to be such as the properties of man and of his dwelling place made antecedently probable, the empirical generalizations are raised into positive laws, and Sociology becomes a science.

Much has been said and written for centuries past by the practical or empirical school of politicians, in condemnation of theories founded on principles of human nature, without an historical basis; and the theorists, in their turn, have successfully retaliated on the practicalists. But we know not any thinker who, before M. Comte, had penetrated to the philosophy of the matter, and

placed the necessity of historical studies as the foundation of sociological speculation on the true footing. From this time any political thinker who fancies himself able to dispense with a connected view of the great facts of history, as a chain of causes and effects, must be regarded as below the level of the age; while the vulgar mode of using history, by looking in it for parallel cases, as if any cases were parallel, or as if a single instance, or even many instances not compared and analysed, could reveal a law, will be more than ever, and irrevocably, discredited.

The inversion of the ordinary relation between Deduction and Induction is not the only point in which, according to M. Comte, the Method proper to Sociology differs from that of the sciences of inorganic nature. The common order of science proceeds from the details to the whole. The method of Sociology should proceed from the whole to the details. There is no universal principle for the order of study, but that of proceeding from the known to the unknown; finding our way to the facts at whatever point is most open to our observation. In the phenomena of the social state the collective phenomenon is more accessible to us than the parts of which it is composed. This is already, in a great degree, true of the mere animal body. It is essential to the idea of an organism, and it is even more true of the social organism than of the individual. The state of every part of the social whole at any time, is intimately connected with the contemporaneous state of all the others. Religious belief, philosophy, science, the fine arts, the industrial arts, commerce, navigation, government, all are in close mutual dependence on one another, insomuch that when any considerable change takes place in one, we may know that a parallel change in all the others has preceded or will follow it. The progress of society from one general state to another is not an aggregate of partial changes, but the product of a single impulse, acting through all the partial agencies, and can therefore be most easily traced by studying them together. Could it even be detected in them separately, its true nature could not be understood except by examining them in the *ensemble*. In constructing, therefore, a theory of society, all the different aspects of the social organization must be taken into consideration at once.

Our space is not consistent with enquiring into all the limitations of this doctrine. It requires many of which M. Comte's theory takes no account. There is one, in particular, dependent on a scientific artifice familiar to students of science, especially of the applications of mathematics to the study of nature. When an effect depends on several variable conditions, some of which change less, or more slowly, than others, we are often able to determine, either by reasoning or by experiment, what would be the law of variation of the effect if its changes depended only on

some of the conditions, the remainder being supposed constant. The law so found will be sufficiently near the truth for all times and places in which the latter set of conditions do not vary greatly, and will be a basis to set out from when it becomes necessary to allow for the variations of those conditions also. Most of the conclusions of social science applicable to practical use are of this description. M. Comte's system makes no room for them. We have seen how he deals with the part of them which are the most scientific in character, the generalizations of political economy.

There is one more point in the general philosophy of sociology requiring notice. Social phenomena, like all others, present two aspects, the statical, and the dynamical; the phenomena of equilibrium, and those of motion. The statical aspect is that of the laws of social existence, considered abstractedly from progress, and confined to what is common to the progressive and the stationary state. The dynamical aspect is that of social progress. The statics of society is the study of the conditions of existence and permanence of the social state. The dynamics studies the laws of its evolution. The first is the theory of the *consensus*, or interdependence of social phenomena. The second is the theory of their filiation.

The first division M. Comte, in his great work, treats in a much more summary manner than the second; and it forms, to our thinking, the weakest part of the treatise. He can hardly have seemed even to himself to have originated, in the statics of society, anything new,* unless his revival of the Catholic idea of a Spiritual Power may be so considered. The remainder, with the exception of detached thoughts, in which even his feeblest productions are always rich, is trite, while in our judgment far from being always true.

He begins by a statement of the general properties of human nature which make social existence possible. Man has a spontaneous propensity to the society of his fellow-beings, and seeks it instinctively, for its own sake, and not out of regard to the advantages it procures for him, which, in many conditions of humanity, must appear to him very problematical. Man has also a certain, though moderate, amount of natural benevolence. On the other hand, these social propensities are by nature weaker

* Indeed his claim to be the creator of Sociology does not extend to this branch of the science; on the contrary, he, in a subsequent work, expressly declares that the real founder of it was Aristotle, by whom the theory of the conditions of social existence was carried as far towards perfection as was possible in the absence of any theory of Progress. Without going quite this length, we think it hardly possible to appreciate too highly the merit of those early efforts, beyond which little progress had been made, until a very recent period, either in ethical or in political science.

than his selfish ones; and the social state, being mainly kept in existence through the former, involves an habitual antagonism between the two. Further, our wants of all kinds, from the purely organic upwards, can only be satisfied by means of labour, nor does bodily labour suffice, without the guidance of intelligence. But labour, especially when prolonged and monotonous, is naturally hateful, and mental labour the most irksome of all; and hence a second antagonism, which must exist in all societies whatever. The character of the society is principally determined by the degree in which the better incentive, in each of these cases, makes head against the worse. In both the points, human nature is capable of great amelioration. The social instincts may approximate much nearer to the strength of the personal ones, though never entirely coming up to it; the aversion to labour in general, and to intellectual labour in particular, may be much weakened, and the predominance of the inclinations over the reason greatly diminished, though never completely destroyed. The spirit of improvement results from the increasing strength of the social instincts, combined with the growth of an intellectual activity, which guiding the personal propensities, inspires each individual with a deliberate desire to improve his condition. The personal instincts left to their own guidance, and the indolence and apathy natural to mankind, are the sources which mainly feed the spirit of Conservation. The struggle between the two spirits is an universal incident of the social state.

The next of the universal elements in human society is family life; which M. Comte regards as originally the sole, and always the principal, source of the social feelings, and the only school open to mankind in general, in which unselfishness can be learnt, and the feelings and conduct demanded by social relations be made habitual. M. Comte takes this opportunity of declaring his opinions on the proper constitution of the family, and in particular of the marriage institution. They are of the most orthodox and conservative sort. M. Comte adheres not only to the popular Christian, but to the Catholic view of marriage in its utmost strictness, and rebukes Protestant nations for having tampered with the indissolubility of the engagement, by permitting divorce. He admits that the marriage institution has been, in various respects, beneficially modified with the advance of society, and that we may not yet have reached the last of these modifications; but strenuously maintains that such changes cannot possibly affect what he regards as the essential principles of the institution—the irrevocability of the engagement, and the complete subordination of the wife to the husband, and of women generally to men; which are precisely the great vulnerable points of the existing constitution of society on this important subject. It is unpleasant to have to say it of a philosopher, but the inci-

dents of his life which have been made public by his biographers afford an explanation of one of these two opinions: he had quarrelled with his wife.* At a later period, under the influence of circumstances equally personal, his opinions and feelings respecting women were very much modified, without becoming more rational: in his final scheme of society, instead of being treated as grown children, they were exalted into goddesses: honours, privileges, and immunities, were lavished on them, only not simple justice. On the other question, the irrevocability of marriage, M. Comte must receive credit for impartiality, since the opposite doctrine would have better suited his personal convenience: but we can give him no other credit, for his argument is not only futile but refutes itself. He says that with liberty of divorce, life would be spent in a constant succession of experiments and failures; and in the same breath congratulates himself on the fact that modern manners and sentiments have in the main prevented the baneful effects which the toleration of divorce in Protestant countries might have been expected to produce. He did not perceive that if modern habits and feelings have successfully resisted what he deems the tendency of a less rigorous marriage law, it must be because modern habits and feelings are inconsistent with the perpetual series of new trials which he dreaded. If there are tendencies in human nature which seek change and variety, there are others which demand fixity, in matters which touch the daily sources of happiness; and one who had studied history as much as M. Comte, ought to have known that ever since the nomad mode of life was exchanged for the agricultural, the latter tendencies have been always gaining ground on the former. All experience testifies that regularity in domestic relations is almost in direct proportion to industrial civilization. Idle life, and military life with its long intervals of idleness, are the conditions to which either sexual profligacy, or prolonged vagaries of imagination on that subject, are congenial. Busy men have no time for them, and have too much other occupation for their thoughts: they require that home should be a place of rest, not of incessantly renewed excitement and disturbance. In the condition, therefore, into which modern society has passed, there is no probability that marriages would often be contracted without a sincere desire on both sides that they should be permanent. That this has been the case hitherto in countries where divorce was permitted, we have on M. Comte's own showing: and everything leads us to believe that the power, if granted elsewhere, would in

* It is due to them both to say, that he continued to express, in letters which have been published, a high opinion of her, both morally and intellectually; and her persistent and strong concern for his interests and his fame is attested both by M. Littré and by his own correspondence.

general be used only for its legitimate purpose—for enabling those who, by a blameless or excusable mistake, have lost their first throw for domestic happiness, to free themselves (with due regard for all interests concerned) from the burthensome yoke, and try, under more favourable auspices, another chance. Any further discussion of these great social questions would evidently be incompatible with the nature and limits of the present paper.

Lastly, a phenomenon universal in all societies, and constantly assuming a wider extension as they advance in their progress, is the co-operation of mankind one with another, by the division of employments and interchange of commodities and services; a communion which extends to nations as well as individuals. The economic importance of this spontaneous organization of mankind as joint workers with and for one another, has often been illustrated. Its moral effects, in connecting them by their interests, and as a more remote consequence, by their sympathies, are equally salutary. But there are some things to be said on the other side. The increasing specialisation of all employments; the division of mankind into innumerable small fractions, each engrossed by an extremely minute fragment of the business of society, is not without inconveniences, as well moral as intellectual, which, if they could not be remedied, would be a serious abatement from the benefits of advanced civilization. The interests of the whole—the bearings of things on the ends of the social union—are less and less present to the minds of men who have so contracted a sphere of activity. The insignificant detail which forms their whole occupation—the infinitely minute wheel they help to turn in the machinery of society—does not arouse or gratify any feeling of public spirit or unity with their fellow-men. Their work is a mere tribute to physical necessity, not the glad performance of a social office. This lowering effect of the extreme division of labour tells most of all on those who are set up as the lights and teachers of the rest. A man's mind is as fatally narrowed, and his feelings towards the great ends of humanity as miserably stunted, by giving all his thoughts to the classification of a few insects or the resolution of a few equations, as to sharpening the points or putting on the heads of pins. The "dispersive speciality" of the present race of scientific men, who, unlike their predecessors, have a positive aversion to enlarged views, and seldom either know or care for any of the interests of mankind beyond the narrow limits of their pursuit, is dwelt on by M. Comte as one of the great and growing evils of the time, and the one which most retards moral and intellectual regeneration. To contend against it is one of the main purposes towards which he thinks the forces of society should be directed. The obvious remedy is a large and liberal general education, preparatory to all

special pursuits: and this is M. Comte's opinion: but the education of youth is not in his estimation enough: he requires an agency set apart for obtruding upon all classes of persons through the whole of life, the paramount claims of the general interest, and the comprehensive ideas that demonstrate the mode in which human actions promote or impair it. In other words, he demands a moral and intellectual authority, charged with the duty of guiding men's opinions and enlightening and warning their consciences; a Spiritual Power, whose judgments on all matters of high moment should deserve, and receive, the same universal respect and deference which is paid to the united judgments of astronomers in matters astronomical. The very idea of such an authority implies that an unanimity has been attained, at least in essentials, among moral and political thinkers, corresponding or approaching to that which already exists in the other sciences. There cannot be this unanimity, until the true methods of positive science have been applied to all subjects, as completely as they have been applied to the study of physical science: to this, however, there is no real obstacle; and when once it is accomplished, the same degree of accordance will naturally follow. The undisputed authority which astronomers possess in astronomy, will be possessed on the great social questions by Positive Philosophers; to whom will belong the spiritual government of society, subject to two conditions: that they be entirely independent, within their own sphere, of the temporal government, and that they be peremptorily excluded from all share in it, receiving instead the entire conduct of education.

This is the leading feature in M. Comte's conception of a regenerated society; and however much this ideal differs from that which is implied more or less confusedly in the negative philosophy of the last three centuries, we hold the amount of truth in the two to be about the same. M. Comte has got hold of half the truth, and the so-called liberal or revolutionary school possesses the other half; each sees what the other does not see, and seeing it exclusively, draws consequences from it which to the other appear mischievously absurd. It is, without doubt, the necessary condition of mankind to receive most of their opinions on the authority of those who have specially studied the matters to which they relate. The wisest can act on no other rule, on subjects with which they are not themselves thoroughly conversant; and the mass of mankind have always done the like on all the great subjects of thought and conduct, acting with implicit confidence on opinions of which they did not know, and were often incapable of understanding, the grounds, but on which as long as their natural guides were unanimous they fully relied, growing uncertain and sceptical only when these became divided, and

teachers who as far as they could judge were equally competent, professed contradictory opinions. Any doctrines which come recommended by the nearly universal verdict of instructed minds will no doubt continue to be, as they have hitherto been, accepted without misgiving by the rest. The difference is, that with the wide diffusion of scientific education among the whole people, demanded by M. Comte, their faith, however implicit, would not be that of ignorance: it would not be the blind submission of dunces to men of knowledge, but the intelligent deference of those who know much, to those who know still more. It is those who have some knowledge of astronomy, not those who have none at all, who best appreciate how prodigiously more Lagrange or Laplace knew than themselves. This is what can be said in favour of M. Comte. On the contrary side it is to be said, that in order that this salutary ascendancy over opinion should be exercised by the most eminent thinkers, it is not necessary that they should be associated and organized. The ascendancy will come of itself when the unanimity is attained, without which it is neither desirable nor possible. It is because astronomers agree in their teaching that astronomy is trusted, and not because there is an Academy of Sciences or a Royal Society issuing decrees or passing resolutions. A constituted moral authority can only be required when the object is not merely to promulgate and diffuse principles of conduct, but to direct the detail of their application; to declare and inculcate, not duties, but each person's duty, as was attempted by the spiritual authority of the middle ages. From this extreme application of his principle M. Comte does not shrink. A function of this sort, no doubt, may often be very usefully discharged by individual members of the speculative class; but if entrusted to any organized body, would involve nothing less than a spiritual despotism. This however is what M. Comte really contemplated, though it would practically nullify that peremptory separation of the spiritual from the temporal power, which he justly deemed essential to a wholesome state of society. Those whom an irresistible public opinion invested with the right to dictate or control the acts of rulers, though without the means of backing their advice by force, would have all the real power of the temporal authorities, without their labours or their responsibilities. M. Comte would probably have answered that the temporal rulers, having the whole legal power in their hands, would certainly not pay to the spiritual authority more than a very limited obedience: which amounts to saying that the ideal form of society which he sets up, is only fit to be an ideal because it cannot possibly be realized.

That education should be practically directed by the philosophic class, when there is a philosophic class who have made good their

claim to the place in opinion hitherto filled by the clergy, would be natural and indispensable. But that all education should be in the hands of a centralized authority, whether composed of clergy or of philosophers, and be consequently all framed on the same model, and directed to the perpetuation of the same type, is a state of things which instead of becoming more acceptable, will assuredly be more repugnant to mankind, with every step of their progress in the unfettered exercise of their highest faculties. We shall see, on a future occasion, the evils with which the conception of the new Spiritual Power is pregnant, coming out into full bloom in the more complete development which M. Comte gave to the idea in his later years.

After this unsatisfactory attempt to trace the outline of Social Statics, M. Comte passes to a topic on which he is much more at home—the subject of his most eminent speculations; Social Dynamics, or the laws of the evolution of human society.

Two questions meet us at the outset: Is there a natural evolution in human affairs? and is that evolution an improvement? M. Comte resolves them both in the affirmative by the same answer. The natural progress of society consists in the growth of our human attributes, comparatively to our animal and our purely organic ones: the progress of our humanity towards an ascendancy over our animality, ever more nearly approached though incapable of being completely realized. This is the character and tendency of human development, or of what is called civilization; and the obligation of seconding this movement—of working in the direction of it—is the nearest approach which M. Comte makes in this treatise to a general principle or standard of morality.

But as our more eminent, and peculiarly human, faculties are of various orders, moral, intellectual, and æsthetic, the question presents itself, is there any one of these whose development is the predominant agency in the evolution of our species? According to M. Comte, the main agent in the progress of mankind is their intellectual development. Not because the intellectual is the most powerful part of our nature, for, limited to its inherent strength, it is one of the weakest: but because it is the guiding part, and acts not with its own strength alone, but with the united force of all parts of our nature which it can draw after it. In a social state the feelings and propensities cannot act with their full power, in a determinate direction, unless the speculative intellect places itself at their head. The passions are, in the individual man, a more energetic power than a mere intellectual conviction; but the passions tend to divide, not to unite, mankind: it is only by a common belief that passions are brought to work together, and become a collective force instead of forces neutralizing one

another. Our intelligence is first awakened by the stimulus of our animal wants and of our stronger and coarser desires; and these for a long time almost exclusively determine the direction in which our intelligence shall work: but once roused to activity, it assumes more and more the management of the operations of which stronger impulses are the prompters, and constrains them to follow its lead, not by its own strength, but because in the play of antagonistic forces, the path it points out is (in scientific phraseology) the direction of least resistance. Personal interests and feelings, in the social state, can only obtain the maximum of satisfaction by means of co-operation, and the necessary condition of co-operation is a common belief. All human society, consequently, is grounded on a system of fundamental opinions, which only the speculative faculty can provide, and which when provided, directs our other impulses in their mode of seeking their gratification. And hence the history of opinions, and of the speculative faculty, has always been the leading element in the history of mankind.

This doctrine has been combated by Mr. Herbert Spencer, in the pamphlet already referred to: and we will quote, in his own words, the theory he propounds in opposition to it:—

“ Ideas do not govern and overthrow the world; the world is governed or overthrown by feelings, to which ideas serve only as guides. The social mechanism does not rest finally upon opinions, but almost wholly upon character. Not intellectual anarchy, but moral antagonism, is the cause of political crises. All social phenomena are produced by the totality of human emotions and beliefs, of which the emotions are mainly predetermined, while the beliefs are mainly post-determined. Men’s desires are chiefly inherited; but their beliefs are chiefly acquired, and depend on surrounding conditions; and the most important surrounding conditions depend on the social state which the prevalent desires have produced. The social state at any time existing, is the resultant of all the ambitions, self-interests, fears, reverences, indignations, sympathies, &c., of ancestral citizens and existing citizens. The ideas current in this social state must, on the average, be congruous with the feelings of citizens, and therefore, on the average, with the social state these feelings have produced. Ideas wholly foreign to this social state cannot be evolved, and if introduced from without, cannot get accepted—or, if accepted, die out when the temporary phase of feeling which caused their acceptance ends. Hence, though advanced ideas, when once established, act upon society and aid its further advance, yet the establishment of such ideas depends on the fitness of society for receiving them. Practically, the popular character and the social state determine what ideas shall be current; instead of the current ideas determining the social state and the character. The modification of men’s moral natures, caused by the continuous discipline of social life, which adapts them more and more to social

relations, is therefore the chief proximate cause of social progress."*

A great part of these statements would have been acknowledged as true by M. Comte, and belong as much to his theory as to Mr. Spencer's. The reaction of all other mental and social elements upon the intellectual not only is fully recognised by him, but his philosophy of history makes great use of it, pointing out that the principal intellectual changes could not have taken place unless changes in other elements of society had preceded; but also showing that these were themselves consequences of prior intellectual changes. It will not be found, on a fair examination of what M. Comte has written, that he has overlooked any of the truth that there is in Mr. Spencer's theory. He would not indeed have said (what Mr. Spencer apparently wishes us to say) that the effects which can be historically traced, for example to religion, were not produced by the belief in God, but by reverence and fear of him. He would have said that the reverence and fear presuppose the belief: that a God must be believed in before he can be feared or revered. The whole influence of the belief in a God upon society and civilization, depends on the powerful human sentiments which are ready to attach themselves to the belief; and yet the sentiments are only a social force at all, through the definite direction given to them by that or some other intellectual conviction; nor did the sentiments spontaneously throw up the belief in a God, since in themselves they were equally capable of gathering round some other object. Though it is true that men's passions and interests often dictate their opinions, or rather decide their choice among the two or three forms of opinion which the existing condition of human intelligence renders possible, this disturbing cause is confined to morals, politics, and religion; and it is the intellectual movement in other regions than these, which is at the root of all the great changes in human affairs. It was not human emotions and passions which discovered the motion of the earth, or detected the evidence of its antiquity; which exploded Scholasticism, and inaugurated the exploration of nature; which invented printing, paper, and the mariner's compass. Yet the Reformation, the English and French Revolutions, and still greater moral and social changes yet to come, are direct consequences of these and similar discoveries. Even alchemy and astrology were not believed because people thirsted for gold and were anxious to pry into the future, for these desires are as strong now as they were then: but because alchemy and astrology were conceptions natural to a particular stage in the growth of

* "Of the Classification of the Sciences," pp. 37, 38.

human knowledge, and consequently determined during that stage the particular means whereby the passions which always exist, sought their gratification. To say that men's intellectual beliefs do not determine their conduct, is like saying that the ship is moved by the steam and not by the steersman. The steam indeed is the motive power; the steersman, left to himself, could not advance the vessel a single inch; yet it is the steersman's will and the steersman's knowledge which decide in what direction it shall move and whither it shall go.

Examining next what is the natural order of intellectual progress among mankind, M. Comte observes, that as their general mode of conceiving the universe must give its character to all their conceptions of detail, the determining fact in their intellectual history must be the natural succession of theories of the universe; which, it has been seen, consists of three stages, the theological, the metaphysical, and the positive. The passage of mankind through these stages, including the successive modifications of the theological conception by the rising influence of the other two, is, to M. Comte's mind, the most decisive fact in the evolution of humanity. Simultaneously, however, there has been going on throughout history a parallel movement in the purely temporal department of things, consisting of the gradual decline of the military mode of life (originally the chief occupation of all freemen) and its replacement by the industrial. M. Comte maintains that there is a necessary connexion and interdependence between this historical sequence and the other: and he easily shows that the progress of industry and that of positive science are correlative; man's power to modify the facts of nature evidently depending on the knowledge he has acquired of their laws. We do not think him equally successful in showing a natural connexion between the theological mode of thought and the military system of society: but since they both belong to the same age of the world—since each is, in itself, natural and inevitable, and they are together modified and together undermined by the same cause, the progress of science and industry, M. Comte is justified in considering them as linked together, and the movement by which mankind emerge from them as a single evolution.

These propositions having been laid down as the first principles of social dynamics, M. Comte proceeds to verify and apply them by a connected view of universal history. This survey nearly fills two large volumes, above a third of the work, in all of which there is scarcely a sentence that does not add an idea. We regard it as by far his greatest achievement, except his review of the sciences, and in some respects more striking even than that. We wish it were practicable in the compass of an essay like the present, to give even a faint conception of the extraordinary merits

of this historical analysis. It must be read to be appreciated. Whoever disbelieves that the philosophy of history can be made a science, should suspend his judgment until he has read these volumes of M. Comte. We do not affirm that they would certainly change his opinion: but we would strongly advise him to give them a chance.

We shall not attempt the vain task of abridgment. A few words are all we can give to the subject. M. Comte confines himself to the main stream of human progress, looking only at the races and nations that led the van, and regarding as the successors of a people not their actual descendants, but those who took up the thread of progress after them. His object is to characterize truly though generally, the successive states of society through which the advanced guard of our species has passed, and the filiation of these states on one another—how each grew out of the preceding and was the parent of the following state. A more detailed explanation, taking into account minute differences and more special and local phenomena, M. Comte does not aim at, though he does not avoid it when it falls in his path. Here, as in all his other speculations, we meet occasional misjudgments, and his historical correctness in minor matters is now and then at fault; but we may well wonder that it is not oftener so, considering the vastness of the field, and a passage in one of his prefaces in which he says of himself that he *rapidly* amassed the materials for his great enterprise (vi. 34). This expression in his mouth does not imply what it would in that of the majority of men, regard being had to his rare capacity of prolonged and concentrated mental labour: and it is wonderful that he so seldom gives cause to wish that his collection of materials had been less "rapid." But (as he himself remarks) in an enquiry of this sort the vulgar facts are the most important. A movement common to all mankind—to all of them at least who do move—must depend on causes affecting them all; and these, from the scale on which they operate, cannot require abstruse research to bring them to light: they are not only seen, but best seen, in the most obvious, most universal, and most undisputed phenomena. Accordingly M. Comte lays no claim to new views respecting the mere facts of history; he takes them as he finds them, builds almost exclusively on those concerning which there is no dispute, and only tries what positive results can be obtained by combining them. Among the vast mass of historical observations which he has grouped and co-ordinated, if we have found any errors they are in things which do not affect his main conclusions. The chain of causation by which he connects the spiritual and temporal life of each era with one another and with the entire series, will be found, we think, in all essentials, irrefragable. When local or tempo-

rary disturbing causes have to be taken into the account as modifying the general movement, criticism has more to say. But this will only become important when the attempt is made to write the history or delineate the character of some given society on M. Comte's principles.*

* Such doubtful statements, or misappreciations of states of society, as we have remarked, are confined to cases which stand more or less apart from the principal line of development of the progressive societies. For instance, he makes greatly too much of what, with many other Continental thinkers, he calls the Theocratic state. He regards this as a natural, and at one time almost an universal stage of social progress, though admitting that it either never existed or speedily ceased in the two ancient nations to which mankind are chiefly indebted for being permanently progressive. We hold it doubtful if there ever existed what M. Comte means by a theocracy. There was indeed no lack of societies in which, the civil and penal law being supposed to have been divinely revealed, the priests were its authorized interpreters. But this is the case even in Mussulman countries, the extreme opposite of theocracy. By a theocracy we understand to be meant, and we understand M. Comte to mean, a society founded on caste, and in which the speculative, necessarily identical with the priestly caste, has the temporal government in its hands or under its control. We believe that no such state of things ever existed in the societies commonly cited as theocratic. There is no reason to think that in any of them, the king, or chief of the government, was ever, unless by occasional usurpation, a member of the priestly caste. It was not so in Israel, even in the time of the Judges; Jephtha, for example, was a Gileadite, of the tribe of Manasseh, and a military captain, as all governors in such an age and country needed to be. Priestly rulers only present themselves in two anomalous cases, of which next to nothing is known: the Mikados of Japan and the Grand Lamas of Thibet: in neither of which instances was the general constitution of society one of caste, and in the latter of them the priestly sovereignty is as nominal as it has become in the former. India is the typical specimen of the institution of caste—the only case in which we are certain that it ever really existed, for its existence anywhere else is a matter of doubtful inference in the remote past. But in India, where the importance of the sacerdotal order was greater than in any other recorded state of society, the king not only was not a priest, but, consistently with the religious law, could not be one: he belonged to a different caste. The Brahmins were invested with an exalted character of sanctity, and an enormous amount of civil privileges; the king was enjoined to have a council of Brahmin advisers; but practically he took their advice or disregarded it exactly as he pleased. As is observed by the historian who first threw the light of reason on Hindoo society (Mill, *History of British India*, book ii. chap. iii.) the king, though in dignity, to judge by the written code, he seemed vastly inferior to the Brahmins, had always the full power of a despotic monarch: the reason being that he had the command of the army, and the control of the public revenue. There is no case known to authentic history in which either of these belonged to the sacerdotal caste. Even in the cases most favourable to them, the priesthood had no voice in temporal affairs, except the "consultative" voice which M. Comte's theory allows to every spiritual power. His collection of materials must have been unusually "rapid" in this instance, for he regards almost all the societies of antiquity, except the Greek and Roman, as theocratic, even Gaul under the Druids, and Persia under Darius; admitting, however, that in these two countries, when they emerge into the light of history, the theocracy had already been much

M. Comte is singularly exempt from most of the twists and exaggerations which we are used to find in almost all thinkers who meddle with speculations on history. Scarcely any of them is so free (for example) from the opposite errors of ascribing too much or too little influence to accident, and to the qualities of individuals. The vulgar mistake of supposing that the course of history has no tendencies of its own, and that great events usually proceed from small causes, or that kings, or conquerors, or the founders of philosophies and religions, can do with society what they please, no one has more completely avoided or more tellingly exposed. But he is equally free from the error of those who ascribe all to general causes, and imagine that neither casual

broken down by military usurpation. By what evidence he could have proved that it ever existed, we confess ourselves unable to divine.

The only other imperfection worth noticing here, which we find in M. Comte's view of history, is that he has a very insufficient understanding of the peculiar phenomena of English development; though he recognises, and on the whole correctly estimates, its exceptional character in relation to the general European movement. His failure consists chiefly in want of appreciation of Protestantism; which, like almost all thinkers, even unbelievers, who have lived and thought exclusively in a Catholic atmosphere, he sees and knows only on its negative side, regarding the Reformation as a mere destructive movement, stopped short in too early a stage. He does not seem to be aware that Protestantism has any positive influences, other than the general ones of Christianity; and misses one of the most important facts connected with it, its remarkable efficacy, as contrasted with Catholicism, in cultivating the intelligence and conscience of the individual believer. Protestantism, when not merely professed but actually taken into the mind, makes a demand on the intelligence; the mind is expected to be active, not passive, in the reception of it. The feeling of a direct responsibility of the individual immediately to God, is almost wholly a creation of Protestantism. Even when Protestants were nearly as persecuting as Catholics (quite as much so they never were); even when they held as firmly as Catholics that salvation depended on having the true belief, they still maintained that the belief was not to be accepted from a priest, but to be sought and found by the believer, at his eternal peril if he failed; and that no one could answer to God for him, but that he had to answer for himself. The avoidance of fatal error thus became in a great measure a question of culture; and there was the strongest inducement to every believer, however humble, to seek culture and to profit by it. In those Protestant countries, accordingly, whose Churches were not, as the Church of England always was, principally political institutions—in Scotland, for instance, and the New England States—an amount of education was carried down to the poorest of the people, of which there is no other example; every peasant expounded the Bible to his family (many to their neighbours), and had a mind practised in meditation and discussion on all the points of his religious creed. The food may not have been the most nourishing, but we cannot be blind to the sharpening and strengthening exercise which such great topics gave to the understanding—the discipline in abstraction and reasoning which such mental occupation brought down to the humblest layman, and one of the consequences of which was the privilege long enjoyed by Scotland of supplying the greater part of Europe with professors for its universities, and educated and skilled workmen for its practical arts.

circumstances, nor governments by their acts, nor individuals of genius by their thoughts, materially accelerate or retard human progress. This is the mistake which pervades the instructive writings of the thinker who in England and in our own times bore the nearest, though a very remote, resemblance to M. Comte—the lamented Mr. Buckle; who, had he not been unhappily cut off in an early stage of his labours, and before the complete maturity of his powers, would probably have thrown off an error, the more to be regretted as it gives a colour to the prejudice which regards the doctrine of the invariability of natural laws as identical with fatalism. Mr. Buckle also fell into another mistake which M. Comte avoided, that of regarding the intellectual as the only progressive element in man, and the moral as too much the same at all times to affect even the annual average of crime. M. Comte shows, on the contrary, a most acute sense of the causes which elevate or lower the general level of moral excellence; and deems intellectual progress in no other way so beneficial as by creating a standard to guide the moral sentiments of mankind, and a mode of bringing those sentiments effectively to bear on conduct.

M. Comte is equally free from the error of considering any practical rule or doctrine that can be laid down in politics as universal and absolute. All political truth he deems strictly relative, implying as its correlative a given state or situation of society. This conviction is now common to him with all thinkers who are on a level with the age, and comes so naturally to any intelligent reader of history, that the only wonder is how men could have been prevented from reaching it sooner. It marks one of the principal differences between the political philosophy of the present time and that of the past; but M. Comte adopted it when the opposite mode of thinking was still general, and there are few thinkers to whom the principle owes more in the way of comment and illustration.

Again, while he sets forth the historical succession of systems of belief and forms of political society, and places in the strongest light those imperfections in each which made it impossible that any of them should be final, this does not make him for a moment unjust to the men or the opinions of the past. He accords with generous recognition the gratitude due to all who, with whatever imperfections of doctrine or even of conduct, contributed materially to the work of human improvement. In all past modes of thought and forms of society he acknowledged a useful, in many a necessary, office, in carrying mankind through one stage of improvement into a higher. The theological spirit in its successive forms, the metaphysical in its principal varieties, are honoured by him for the services they rendered in bringing mankind out of pristine

savagery into a state in which more advanced modes of belief became possible. His list of heroes and benefactors of mankind includes, not only every important name in the scientific movement, from Thales to Fourier the mathematician and Blainville the biologist, and in the æsthetic from Homer to Manzoni, but the most illustrious names in the annals of the various religions and philosophies, and the really great politicians in all states of society.* Above all, he has the most profound admiration for the services rendered by Christianity, and by the Church of the middle ages. His estimate of the Catholic period is such as the majority of Englishmen (from whom we take the liberty to differ) would deem exaggerated, if not absurd. The great men of Christianity, from St. Paul to St. Francis of Assisi, receive his warmest homage: nor does he forget the greatness even of those who lived and thought in the centuries in which the Catholic Church, having stopt short while the world had gone on, had become a hindrance to progress instead of a promoter of it; such men as Fénelon and St. Vincent de Paul, Bossuet and Joseph de Maistre. A more catholic, sympathy and reverence towards real worth, and every kind of service to humanity, we have not met with in any thinker. Men who would have torn each other in pieces, who even tried to do so, if each usefully served in his own way the interests of mankind, are all hallowed to him.

Neither is his a cramped and contracted notion of human excellence, which cares only for certain forms of development. He not only personally appreciates, but rates high in moral value, the creations of poets and artists in all departments, deeming them, by their mixed appeal to the sentiments and the understanding, admirably fitted to educate the feelings of abstract thinkers, and enlarge the intellectual horizon of people of the world.† He regards the law of progress as applicable, in spite of appearances, to poetry and art as much as to science and politics. The common impression to the contrary he ascribes solely to the fact,

* At a somewhat later period M. Comte drew up what he termed a Positivist Calendar, in which every day was dedicated to some benefactor of humanity, (generally with the addition of a similar but minor luminary, to be celebrated in the room of his principal each bissextile year). In this no kind of human eminence, really useful, is omitted, except that which is merely negative and destructive. On this principle (which is avowed) the French *philosophes* as such are excluded, those only among them being admitted who, like Voltaire and Diderot, had claims to admission on other grounds: and the Protestant religious reformers are left out entirely, with the curious exception of George Fox—who is included, we presume, in consideration of his Peace principles.

† He goes still further and deeper in a subsequent work. "L'art ramène doucement à la réalité les contemplations trop abstraites du théoricien, tandis qu'il pousse noblement le praticien aux spéculations désintéressées." *Système de Politique Positive*, i. 287.

that the perfection of æsthetic creation requires as its condition a consentaneousness in the feelings of mankind, which depends for its existence on a fixed and settled state of opinions : while the last five centuries have been a period not of settling, but of unsettling and decomposing, the most general beliefs and sentiments of mankind. The numerous monuments of poetic and artistic genius which the modern mind has produced even under this great disadvantage, are (he maintains) sufficient proof what great productions it will be capable of, when one harmonious vein of sentiment shall once more thrill through the whole of society, as in the days of Homer, of Æschylus, of Phidias, and even of Dante.

After so profound and comprehensive a view of the progress of human society in the past, of which the future can only be a prolongation, it is natural to ask, to what use does he put this survey as a basis of practical recommendations ? Such recommendations he certainly makes, though, in the present Treatise, they are of a much less definite character than in his later writings. But we miss a necessary link ; there is a break in the otherwise close concatenation of his speculations. We fail to see any scientific connexion between his theoretical explanation of the past progress of society, and his proposals for future improvement. The proposals are not, as we might expect, recommended as that towards which human society has been tending and working through the whole of history. It is thus that thinkers have usually proceeded, who formed theories for the future, grounded on historical analysis of the past. Tocqueville, for example, and others, finding, as they thought, through all history, a steady progress in the direction of social and political equality, argued that to smooth this transition, and make the best of what is certainly coming, is the proper employment of political foresight. We do not find M. Comte supporting his recommendations by a similar line of argument. They rest as completely, each on its separate reasons of supposed utility, as with philosophers who like Bentham, theorize on politics without any historical basis at all. The only bridge of connexion which leads from his historical speculations to his practical conclusions, is the inference, that since the old powers of society, both in the region of thought and of action, are declining and destined to disappear, leaving only the two rising powers, positive thinkers on the one hand, leaders of industry on the other, the future necessarily belongs to these : spiritual power to the former, temporal to the latter. As a specimen of historical forecast this is very deficient ; for are there not the masses as well as the leaders of industry ? and is not theirs also a growing power ? Be this as it may, M. Comte's conceptions of the mode in which these growing powers should be or-

ganized and used, are grounded on anything rather than on history. And we cannot but remark a singular anomaly in a thinker of M. Comte's calibre. After the ample evidence he has brought forward of the slow growth of the sciences, all of which except the mathematico-astronomical couple are still, as he justly thinks, in a very early stage, it yet appears as if, to his mind, the mere institution of a positive science of sociology were tantamount to its completion; as if all the diversities of opinion on the subject, which set mankind at variance, were solely owing to its having been studied in the theological or the metaphysical manner, and as if when the positive method which has raised up real sciences on other subjects of knowledge, is similarly employed on this, divergence would at once cease, and the entire body of positive social enquirers would exhibit as much agreement in their doctrines as those who cultivate any of the sciences of inorganic life. Happy would be the prospects of mankind if this were so. A time such as M. Comte reckoned upon, may come; unless something stops the progress of human improvement, it is sure to come: but after an unknown duration of hard thought and violent controversy. The period of decomposition, which has lasted, on his own computation, from the beginning of the fourteenth century to the present, is not yet terminated: the shell of the old edifice will remain standing until there is another ready to replace it; and the new synthesis is barely begun, nor is even the preparatory analysis completely finished. On other occasions M. Comte is very well aware that the Method of a science is not the science itself, and that when the difficulty of discovering the right processes has been overcome, there remains a still greater difficulty, that of applying them. This, which is true of all sciences, is truest of all in Sociology. The facts being more complicated, and depending on a greater concurrence of forces, than in any other science, the difficulty of treating them deductively is proportionally increased, while the wide difference between any one case and every other in some of the circumstances which affect the result, makes the presence of direct induction usually no better than empiricism. It is therefore, out of all proportion, more uncertain than in any other science, whether two enquirers equally competent and equally disinterested will take the same view of the evidence, or arrive at the same conclusion. When to this intrinsic difficulty is added the infinitely greater extent to which personal or class interests and predilections interfere with impartial judgment, the hope of such accordance of opinion among sociological enquirers as would obtain, in mere deference to their authority, the universal assent which M. Comte's scheme of society requires, must be adjourned to an indefinite distance.

M. Comte's own theory is an apt illustration of these difficulties,
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since, though prepared for these speculations as no one had ever been prepared before, his views of social regeneration even in the rudimentary form in which they appear above ground in this treatise (not to speak of the singular system into which he afterwards enlarged them) are such as perhaps no other person of equal knowledge and capacity would agree in. Were those views as true as they are questionable, they could not take effect until the unanimity among positive thinkers, to which he looked forward, shall have been attained; since the mainspring of his system is a Spiritual Power composed of positive philosophers, which only the previous attainment of the unanimity in question could call into existence. A few words will sufficiently express the outline of his scheme. A corporation of philosophers, receiving a modest support from the state, surrounded by reverence, but peremptorily excluded not only from all political power or employment but from all riches, and all occupations except their own, are to have the entire direction of education: together with, not only the right and duty of advising and reproving all persons respecting both their public and their private life, but also a control (whether authoritative or only moral is not defined) over the speculative class itself, to prevent them from wasting time and ingenuity on enquiries and speculations of no value to mankind (among which he includes many now in high estimation) and compel them to employ all their powers on the investigations which may be judged, at the time, to be the most urgently important to the general welfare. The temporal government which is to coexist with this spiritual authority, consists of an aristocracy of capitalists, whose dignity and authority are to be in the ratio of the degree of generality of their conceptions and operations—bankers at the summit, merchants next, then manufacturers, and agriculturists at the bottom of the scale. No representative system, or other popular organization, by way of counterpoise to this governing power, is ever contemplated. The checks relied upon for preventing its abuse, are the counsels and remonstrances of the Spiritual Power, and unlimited liberty of discussion and comment by all classes of inferiors. Of the mode in which either set of authorities should fulfil the office assigned to it, little is said in this treatise: but the general idea is, while regulating as little as possible by law, to make the pressure of opinion, directed by the Spiritual Power, so heavy on every individual, from the humblest to the most powerful, as to render legal obligation, in as many cases as possible, needless. Liberty and spontaneity on the part of individuals form no part of the scheme. M. Comte looks on them with as great jealousy as any scholastic pedagogue, or ecclesiastical director of consciences. Every particular of conduct, public or private, is to be open to the public eye, and to be kept, by the

power of opinion, in the course which the Spiritual corporation shall judge to be the most right.

This is not a sufficiently tempting picture to have much chance of making converts rapidly, and the objections to the scheme are too obvious to need stating. Indeed, it is only thoughtful persons to whom it will be credible, that speculations leading to this result can deserve the attention necessary for understanding them. Their further consideration must be deferred until we can examine them as part of the elaborate and coherent system of doctrine, which M. Comte afterwards put together for the reconstruction of society. Meanwhile the reader will gather, from what has been said, that M. Comte has not, in our opinion, created Sociology. Except his analysis of history, to which there is much to be added, but which we do not think likely to be ever, in its general features, superseded, he has done nothing in Sociology which does not require to be done over again, and better. Nevertheless, he has greatly advanced the study. Besides the great stores of thought, of various and often of eminent merit, with which he has enriched the subject, his conception of its method is so much truer and more profound than that of any one who preceded him, as to constitute an era in its cultivation. If it cannot be said of him that he has created a science, it may be said truly that he has, for the first time, made the creation possible. This is a great achievement, and, with the extraordinary merit of his historical analysis, and of his philosophy of the physical sciences, is enough to immortalize his name. But his renown with posterity would probably have been greater than it is now likely to be, if after showing the way in which the social science should be formed, he had not flattered himself that he had formed it, and that it was already sufficiently solid for attempting to build upon its foundation the entire fabric of the Political Art.

J. S. M.

ART. II.—ST. JOHN'S GOSPEL.

1. *Probabilia de Evangelii et Epistolarum Johannis, apostoli, indole et origine, &c., modeste subjecti Carolus Theoph. Bretschneider, &c.* Lipsiæ. 1820.
2. *Das Nachapostolische Zeitalter in den Hauptmomenten seiner Entwicklung.* Von Dr. ALBERT SCHWEGLER. Tübingen. 1846.
3. *Kritische Untersuchungen über die Kanonische Evangelien, &c.* Von Dr. FERDINAND CHRISTIAN BAUR, &c. Tübingen. 1847.
4. *Die Evangelien und die Briefe Johannis, &c.* Von Dr. ADOLF HILGENFELD, &c. Halle. 1849.
5. *Die Evangelien, &c.* Von Dr. ADOLF HILGENFELD, &c. Leipzig. 1854.
6. *Das Leben Jesu für das Deutsche Volk bearbeitet.* Von DAVID FRIEDRICH STRAUSS. Leipzig. 1864.
7. *Life of Jesus.* By ERNEST RÉNAN. London: Trübner and Co. 1865.

IN a recent article, on the *Life of Jesus* by Strauss,* we omitted to examine the nature and claims of the Gospel which holds the fourth place in our Canon, and is all but universally accepted as a composition of the Apostle John. At the same time we expressed a hope that on some future occasion we might be able to discuss the question of its origin and purpose more fully and adequately than was then practicable. We now address ourselves to the task of giving a detailed statement of the results of modern inquiry into the character of that favourite record of Christian thought and sentiment. This investigation will not only afford us the opportunity of completing our sketch of Strauss's critical procedure, and of indicating his final opinions on the nature and growth of this remarkable production, but will also enable us to supply a corrective, or show where a corrective may be found, for a misconception that materially affects the value of another "Life of Jesus" which has made the tour of Europe and has already brought the question of the genuineness and authenticity of the Gospel before the popular mind. The one great defect of M. Rénan's fearless and beautiful book, published at the time when

* See "Westminster Review," No. LII., October, 1864.

Strauss was bringing his own kindred labours to a close, is the assumption of the relative accuracy of the narrative of St. John, whose historical sense is in reality far lower than that of the Synoptics. Admitting the want of external testimony to establish the genuineness of the Gospel, clearly recognising the self-interested bias of the author, his mental reservation, his apologetic attitude, his obscure Gnosticism and distorted metaphysics, Rénan comes to the singular conclusion that in numerous instances the historical indications of St. John are entitled to our acceptance. This remarkable inconsistency in so fine and discriminative an intellect can only be explained by Rénan's ignorance of the results of the important investigations of the great school of Tübingen. This ignorance it is that occasions the wavering language in which he speaks of the authorship of this Gospel, in one place evincing reluctance to regard it as the production of any one but the Apostle, in another declining to pronounce on the material question what hand has written it, in a third expressing himself hypothetically on the authority for the discourses of Jesus, in a fourth inclining to the opinion that *they* at least are not from the son of Zebedee, and finally persuading himself that at any rate the fourth Gospel is the Gospel according to John in the same sense in which the first and second Gospels are the Gospels according to Matthew and according to Mark. We cannot but heartily echo the wish expressed by Strauss, that the accomplished author of the French version of the great story may be induced to reconsider and rescind his conclusion. It is scarcely possible to doubt that a careful perusal of the pages of the grave German disquisition in which Strauss has restated the arguments against both the authenticity and genuineness of this Gospel, followed by a study of the important treatises of Baur, Schwegler, and Hilgenfeld, would issue in a conviction of the untenableness of his present hypothesis, and the eventual removal of some errors from his vivid presentment of the Life of Jesus. Meanwhile, we gladly acknowledge the value of M. Rénan's own researches. That his independent inquiries into the character of the fourth Gospel have terminated in its partial repudiation; that, but slightly influenced by the great pioneers of theological progress, he has at least struck into the same path; that he has some glimpses of the deliberate purpose and subjective spirit of the fourth Evangelist, are so many acts of homage to the maturer views of his German predecessors, and suggest at any rate a hope of their ultimate adoption by M. Rénan.

The cardinal difference between the character of the synoptical Gospels, all of which contemplate the person and mission of Jesus from the same general point of view, and that of St. John's Gospel, which has an almost wholly new and peculiar horizon, was very

early remarked. Towards the end of the second century, the Alogi, or Irrationalists, as they were called by a sarcastic opponent, rejected the Gospel of the Logos (Reason or Word), alleging that it could not be the work of the Apostle John because it contradicted the other Evangelists. They pointed out—for the Alogi were not without critical acumen—that the fourth Evangelist omitted all mention of the incidents of the childhood of Jesus, and even excluded the Temptation. Long centuries after, the claims of Biblical criticism were represented by Semler, Eichhorn, Paulus, Herder, Gieseler, and Schleiermacher. Till the year 1820, however, the investigators of the literature of the New Testament limited their labours almost entirely to the examination of the synoptical Gospels. In that year Bretschneider, in a thoughtful and learned essay, gave expression to formidable doubts reflecting on the character of the narrative of the fourth Gospel. These doubts, however, he subsequently affected to withdraw,—silenced, it may be, but certainly not answered. Somewhat similar vacillation was afterwards exhibited by Strauss. Weisse, in 1838, attempted to discriminate between the genuine and ungenue elements of the Gospel. The timid and hesitating De Wette pronounced that the Gospel and the Apocalypse could not both have been the production of the same author, and terminated a long preliminary indecision by his ultimate adhesion to the view which asserts the apostolical origin of the former—thus holding “the balance of belief and doubt only so long as belief appeared to be in no real jeopardy.” Finally, the researches of Strauss, who in the fourth edition of his *Life of Jesus* reverted to his earlier position, prepared the way for the conclusive inquiry of Ferdinand Christian Baur, who in 1844 undertook the solution of a problem which had proved insoluble even to Strauss himself.

In his attempt to discover the data for a *Life of Jesus*, Strauss had proceeded from an examination of the Synoptics to a critical analysis of the fourth Gospel. He had already pointed out some of the peculiarities of these records, had affirmed the superior credibility of Matthew, the historical pretentiousness of Luke, the exaggerated mannerism of Mark, the artificial construction of the narrative, and the ideal character of certain passages in John: more than this he was unable to effect. Baur took up the problem where Strauss dropped it. Especially qualified for its solution by philosophical prepossessions, inspired partly by his researches into Gnostic speculations, and partly by yet earlier inquiries into the true relation in which St. Paul stood to the older Apostles, he at once detected the ideal character of the fourth Gospel, and speedily ascertained the historical development which it represented. The distinctive principle of this original and powerful critic is, that each individual constituent of

the New Testament literature reflects the spirit of the age in which it was produced; mirrors the existing state of Christian consciousness, and indicates the progress of contending or parallel doctrines, or the presence in the Church of some characteristic controversy. Thus in St. Paul's letter to the Galatians, one of our oldest canonical documents, we observe the opposition of a spiritual and universal Christianity to that of the narrow Judaizing type upheld by the first promulgators of the new religion, James, Peter, and John. The Apocalypse, too, generally accepted as the production of the last of these three Apostles, strikingly exhibits the Jewish predilections of its author, and attests the expectation by the Christian community of the approaching advent of the Messiah. So again the universalism of Luke implies an advance on the Christianity of the prejudiced Matthew, who depicts Jesus as the Son of David sent to the lost sheep of the house of Israel, and describes the Saviour of the world as forbidding the twelve Apostles even to approach the cities or enter the public paths of the Samaritans or Gentiles; while Mark, who does little more than copy his two predecessors, betrays his conciliating purpose by omissions and appropriate modifications. The thorough elaboration of this principle, with profound learning and almost unexampled patience, is what constitutes the merit of Baur and his school. Baur began the establishment of this principle by attacking the problem in an inverse order; assisted by previous investigations which, convincing him of the radical opposition between Petrine and Pauline Christianity, had already put him in the right track. Before examining the synoptical Gospels, he made a critical estimate of the Gospel of St. John, and while thus engaged he quickly discovered what we will briefly call its *corresponding environment*. As early as the close of the second century, Irenæus, and after him Epiphanius, Jerome, and Victorinus, maintained the polemical nature of the prologue; and in our own day M. Rénan expatiates on the part it played in Gnosticism, particularly the Valentinian form of that heresy, in Montanism and the Quartodeciman controversy. The speculations of Basilides and Valentinus, the Paraclete doctrine, the Paschal debate, the Logos idea, were the distinctive characteristics of the theological movement of the second century; and these characteristics the Gospel of St. John reflects in its own peculiar way. Christianity had gone beyond the Pauline type in the age in which this Gospel was composed. The writer had lived to see the interest of the Gentile world, which once centred round Paul, settle on his supplanter John, in whom it could formerly have had but little interest. For him the Sabbath observance, the rite of circumcision, and the law of Moses had ceased to have any real importance. His sympathies were with

the ethnic world, not with the Jews; with the Samaritans or the Greeks, not with "the children of the kingdom." In his time the theology of Asia had far transcended even the idealizing Christianity of St. Paul. According to Baur, three distinct phases disclose themselves in the early speculations on the person and religion of Christ. In the Jewish or Synoptical phase Christianity is regarded as the universalized and spiritualized law combined with the new covenant of forgiveness of sins established through the death of Jesus, who here appears as the Son of God, but only in a strictly Messianic sense. In the Pauline phase Christianity presents itself as the antithesis of Law and Gospel, and Jesus assumes a higher dignity than that accorded him in its earlier type. He is the Christ in a more exalted sense than that of the Synoptics—he is the object of faith as conceived by St. Paul; the lord of the Church; and though essentially human, he is now the heavenly man. In this system justification and union with the dead, risen, and ascended Reconciler are realized by a process of moral conquest and self-assimilation to Christ. The third or Johannean phase of Christianity abolishes the opposition between the Law and the Gospel, substitutes for the Pauline mediation through conflict, rest in the unity which is the balance of the two opposing principles, and identifies Jesus with the Logos, or Word, who is not only from all eternity in close proximity with God, but who is God. It is this identification which is the great argument of the prologue. Christianity is no longer the eternal, moral, half-objective, half-subjective religion of Paul. It discloses a beautiful inward essence, and appears as a revelation of divine glory in the Only Begotten of the Father, as the plenitude of grace and truth enshrined in the Incarnate Word, as a realized ideal in which the imperfect negative and finite element of the law given by Moses absolutely vanishes away. The Logos rising as the Principle of Light and Life on the inherent contest of Light and Darkness attracts all related natures, and opposition disappears in a faith which unites them to him, and which is at once belief and action. Instead of the old psychology, with its antithesis of flesh and spirit, nature and grace, which was taught by St. Paul, we have in St. John a metaphysical speculation which asserts the objective opposition of the two principles of Light and Darkness, which embraces the physical and ethical world, and which represents the conflict of the Logos with this prevailing mundane unbelief, his glorification through that very conflict, and his return in that glorification to original absolute self-identity.*

A speculation so refined and a terminology so marked excite surprise and challenge investigation. The Logos doctrine of the

* Baur, *Die Kanonische Evangelien*, 311-314.

Prologue here attributed to a fisherman of Galilee is not the doctrine of the earlier Christian writers. The representation of Jesus in the Apocalypse as the Word of God does not coincide with the representation in the Gospel which designates him God the Word. The pre-existence of Christ, indeed, is taught in the Epistle to the Hebrews; and his superiority to the angels, not his deification, is there affirmed. In none of these writings do we find the doctrine of the Prologue. For the definite conception which we meet with in St. John we must go back to Philo. The Logos idea of this Alexandrian theorist had a double origin. It was partly Greek and partly Jewish. On its Greek side it was derived from Plato; on the Jewish side it is to be referred, as Strauss thinks, less perhaps to the *Memra*, or Word, of the Targums, than to the personification of Wisdom in the Old Testament and Apocrypha. When scandalized by the anthropomorphic representations of God in their sacred books, the Jews of Alexandria took refuge in allegorizing interpretation, the Word, the first-begotten or angel of the Lord, became his accredited agent, and God himself ceased to come into direct contact with an impure world. Of this creative Logos, this eldest son of the Eternal, this conserver and vivifier of physical nature, this redeemer and restorer of human nature, this spiritual manna and sustenance of the soul, this glory of God, this generated though not self-existent God (for so is he described in Philo), there is no mention in any book of the New Testament but the Gospel of St. John. Jesus is not the instrument of creation in the Synoptics, nor in the Apocalypse, nor in the Epistle to the Hebrews.

It was not till after the rise of Gnosticism that Christian speculation identified Jesus with the Logos. Gnosticism was a consequence of a reaction against the narrow Jewish anthropomorphism of an earlier age. The recoil before the acknowledged imperfection of a Creator who worked six days and rested on the seventh lent a basis to Gnosticism.* The grossness of the Biblical conceptions compelled those who worshipped God as a spirit to refer the actions ascribed to him by ancient Jewish writers to a being inferior to the God whom Jesus came to reveal. The Gnosticism of Cerinthus, in the first century (?), consisted in distinguishing the God of the new dispensation from the Maker of the world. But there is no Logos in the system of Cerinthus, nor shall we discover the desired traces of resemblance till about the middle of the second century. The system which appears to be reflected in the Prologue of St. John is that of Valentinus, —not necessarily in its matured, possibly in some rudimentary form. If it be objected that the Valentinians derived their

* John v. 16, 17.

nomenclature from St. John, we reply that this hypothesis is not consistent with the quasi-polemical attitude of the writer in the Prologue, which presupposes the existence of a mode of thought that it does not so much attack as endeavour quietly to supersede. Another reason for thinking that the originality was on the side of the heretics is derived from the silence of Irenæus, who, while enumerating the citations by which they supported their system of emanation, adduces many passages from Paul and the Synoptics, but none from St. John. If we examine the Prologue closely, we shall see that not only does the Logos doctrine which it embodies recall the predicates of Alexandrian Platonism, but that it adopts also the vocabulary of the Valentinian gnosis. Like that gnosis, it recognises in its own peculiar way a *Logos* or Word, a *Zoe* or Life, a *Charis* or Grace, an *Aletheia* or Truth. In both we find a *Monogenes* or Only Begotten; in both a *Pleroma*, plenitude or fulness, and even the Arche of Valentinus may have suggested the *Beginning* of St. John. Thus, as Schwegler puts it, the speculative introduction of one Gospel looks very like an attempt to remodel the Gnostic doctrine of *Æons* or Emanations, and adapt it, in a spiritualized form, to the consciousness of the Church.

Another and related peculiarity of the Johannean Gospel is its doctrine of the PARACLETE, Advocate or Comforter. This doctrine was unknown to Paul, unknown to the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews, unknown to the Synoptics. The Paraclete of St. John, according to Hilgenfeld, is a distinct and independent personality, commissioned by Christ the Logos on his return to the glory of celestial pre-existence, and invested with didactic and other functions. The notion of a Paraclete is found in Philo no less than that of the Logos. Once at least he distinctly applies this term to the Logos himself, when speaking of the High Priest, he says that he who is consecrated to the Father of the world must necessarily have recourse to his perfect Son, the Logos, as a Paraclete. In the Valentinian system the Paraclete appears as one of the thirty *Æons* or eternal Existences that make up the plenitude of Divine Existence. Theodotus says expressly that these platonizing Christians called Jesus the Paraclete; and in the First Epistle of St. John, Jesus receives the same designation. If with some critics we suppose the Epistle to be anterior in date to the Gospel, and hence obtain an additional reason for regarding Jesus as the original Paraclete, the contrasting expression (John xiv. 16) which describes the Spirit of Truth as *another* Paraclete assumes a remarkable propriety. In any case the theory of the Paraclete in the fourth Gospel, which definitively separates the Spirit of the Old Testament from the Alexandrian Logos, and exalts the former into an independent

Hypostasis after the death of Jesus, making it the presiding agent or vicegerent in the succeeding period of Christianity, brings it into close relations with Montanism, both being alike spontaneous outgrowths of Asiatic theology, with its double type of metaphysical reflectiveness and prophetic millenarian enthusiasm. The recognition in the fourth Gospel of an elementary Trinity—the Father, the Word, and the Spirit or Comforter—suggests as the probable period of its composition the interval between the so-called Christian Apologists, of whom the first was Quadratus, and the confuter of heretics, Irenæus, or A.D. 123-177.

A still more decisive indication of the late origin of the Gospel is afforded by the famous Paschal controversy. In the second century the Western Church, acting on the prevailing Pauline notion that Christ was the true Passover, commemorated the great festival of the Resurrection on Easter Sunday, observing a fast on the preceding Friday as the anniversary of the death of Christ. The Christians of Asia Minor, on the contrary, in conformity with synoptical precedent, were accustomed to celebrate the Supper instituted by Christ on the evening of the 14th of Nisan, the day on which the Jewish Passover was observed. About the year A.D. 160 the Roman bishop Anicetus, and Polycarp, bishop of Smyrna, made an attempt to come to an understanding on this point. Unfortunately the attempt proved unsuccessful, Polycarp supporting his view on the subject by an appeal to the personal authority of St. John and the other apostles of the Lord, and Anicetus fortifying his position by a counter-appeal to the unvarying usage of his Western predecessors. Within ten years after the interview of these illustrious men the Asiatic Church was profoundly disturbed by the agitation which the question provoked. In the controversy which arose at Laodicea, Melito, the bishop of Sardis, represented the Eastern, and Apollinaris, the bishop of Hierapolis, the Western view. On a third occasion, A.D. 190, or somewhat later, when Polycrates, the bishop of Ephesus, vindicated the Asiatic usage against Victor, the bishop of Rome, he justified his opposition to the Western practice by adducing the authority of Melito, Polycarp, Philip, John,—all of whom, he said, observed the 14th day of the month, according to the Gospel. It is quite clear, then, that in Asia Minor the orthodox opinion was that Jesus instituted the Supper on the 14th and died on the 15th; while in the West it was as confidently maintained that he instituted the Supper on the 13th and died on the 14th. The inner ground of the difference, says Ebrard in the statement he gives us of his opponent's view, lay in this, that the Asiatics infected with Petrine Ebionitism adhered to the outward Jewish element and to the synoptical tradition, and regarded the rite of the Lord's Supper as the Christian substitute for the rite

of the Passover; while those in the West, following the Pauline tendency, had the resolution of Judaism into Christianity in their eye, and in Christ the crucified saw the New Testament Paschal lamb. This view of the Easter controversy is attended with such formidable consequences to orthodoxy, that Ebrard, to escape them, denies its tenability. He maintains, against Baur, Mosheim, and others, that the three discussions of the second century did not turn upon the same point. He asserts, if we rightly understand him, that while the first and the third had reference to a similar topic, the second, that in which Melito opposed Apollinaris, was entirely different. He declares that the opponents of Anicetus and Victor were worthy Catholics, whose only error was some slight ritual distinction, while those of Hippolytus, and, by implication, of Apollinaris, were coarse, heretical Judaists. But in answer to this it may be shown that Hippolytus, while stigmatizing his Quartodeciman opponents as contentious, ignorant, and quarrelsome, expressly allows that in other respects they agree with everything delivered to the Church by the Apostles. Moreover, the appeal made by Polycrates, in the third controversy, to the confirming authority of Melito, who opposed the Western practice, establishes its identity with the second. The interests involved in the determination of this question are so weighty that we are not surprised at the attempts made to impugn the view of Baur, Schweigler, and their adherents. That Neander, who, before he saw the consequence of his admission, allowed the genuineness of the fragments of Apollinaris, should, when he became conscious of the damaging effect of this admission on the fourth Gospel, retract it, is perfectly intelligible. For not only is there a very high probability that the Paschal question—which perhaps began to have a potential existence when the Roman bishop Xystus (120-129) relinquished the Oriental Passover observance—supplied one of the motives which led to the composition of the fourth Gospel; but the argument suggested by the contradiction between the personal authority and recorded practice of John, as asserted and reasserted by the Asiatic bishops, and the distinct declaration of that Gospel, is fatal to the hypothesis which attributes its authorship to that Apostle. For while the Johannean tradition of Asia Minor represents Jesus as eating the last evening meal on the 14th of Nisan and dying on the 15th, the Gospel which bears his name represents Jesus as eating the Last Supper on the 13th and dying on the 14th. The writer had evidently a motive for opposing both the traditional and synoptical testimony. What this motive was it is impossible to mistake. The conservative party in the Church maintained with Matthew that Jesus ate the Passover on the 14th, the progressive party insisted that he ate it on the 13th, and Clemens Alexandri-



nus goes so far as to say that Christ ordered his disciples, when he was about to be sacrificed as *the Lamb of God*, to eat it on the 13th. This notion, founded on the Pauline announcement (Christ our Passover is sacrificed for us, therefore let us keep the feast), was the true occasion of the controversy. Jesus became the reality of which the ceremonial lamb was the shadow, and the Christian consciousness separated itself irrevocably from Judaism when it had once embraced this idea in its full significance. This separation it was that characterized the Christian party of progress in Asia Minor, which started into vigorous life about the middle of the second century. It was this idea of the identity of Jesus with the Paschal lamb for which Apollinaris, the leader of that party, contended, forcing Matthew and the other Synoptics into harmony with John. The argument speedily assumed the following shape. Starting with the assumption that Jesus was the Paschal Lamb, the advocates of the new usage contended that he must have inevitably died on the same day as the typical victim. As the Passover lamb was killed on the 14th, it was argued that "Christ our Passover" was crucified on the 14th too. It was further argued that if he suffered as the Paschal lamb on the 14th, he could not have eaten the Paschal lamb on the 14th. Hence the last meal was antedated also, and as the death of Jesus was transferred from the 15th to the 14th, so the Supper was transferred from the 14th to the 13th. Thus, in the fourth Gospel the Last Supper is not in any way connected with the Passover. The sacrament of commemoration is instituted in a mystic ideal fashion, not as an addition to a Jewish festival, but as a new festal rite, in which the older one symbolically disappears. Hence, in St. John, the death of Jesus takes place, not as in Matthew and the other Evangelists, on the day after, but on the very same day as the immolation of the *Paschal lamb*; hence John alone of all the Evangelists particularizes the *Paschal hyssop* of Exodus xii. 22. And hence the identifying fulfilment of the *Paschal prescription*, "neither shall ye break a bone thereof." This last trait is altogether peculiar to the author of the fourth Gospel; and hence, to find a motive for this exemption, the introduction of the *crurifragium*.* For the fiction of the broken legs of the malefactors was a necessity of the new theory. Without it the statement that the legs of Jesus were not broken would have been unmeaning, and in that case the prediction would not have been fulfilled: Jesus would not have been the true Passover Lamb

* "The crurifragium appears nowhere else in connexion with crucifixion among the Romans, but only as a separate punishment for slaves, prisoners of war, and the like."—*English translation of the "Life of Jesus,"* vol. iii. p. 296.

whose death abrogated for ever the shadowy, unreal observance of the old Mosaic ritual.

The ideal character of the fourth Gospel is placed beyond doubt by the free symbolical treatment of this transaction. But further, not only does the emphatic sanction given in the Gospel to the Western practice indicate a late period for its composition, not only does the testimony of the great Asiatic ecclesiastics negative the idea that it is the production of the Apostle John, who is said to have followed the opposite Eastern practice, but a literary peculiarity first disclosed by the controversy of the second century militates strongly against the received view of the origin of the Gospel. Apollinaris contends that the result of the Quartodeciman reasoning was to set the Gospels at variance—"they say that on the 14th day the Lord ate the lamb with the disciples, and that on the great day of the feast of unleavened bread he himself suffered, and that Matthew says as much, as they understand him. Hence it is evident that their interpretation is contrary to the Law, and according to them the Gospels disagree." How Apollinaris himself contrived to harmonize Matthew with John we are not able to say; but we are disposed to agree with Strauss against Baur and Schwegler that he was acquainted with the fourth Gospel, and, by some ingenious process, forced the synoptical narrative into seeming accord with it. The contradiction, however, resists all theological solvents. Not only does De Wette concede that the discrepancy cannot be exegetically explained, but even Ebrard candidly acknowledges that the arguments which were carried out with such dazzling brilliancy, by Wieseler especially, have been refuted with such thoroughness by Bleek that no false shame shall prevent him from confessing openly and honourably his return to his original admission of the actual difference in the two accounts. Here, then, is an irreconcilable contradiction between the fourth Gospel and the other three, arising not in an accidental inaccuracy, but in a deliberate dogmatic preference. Whatever the two theologians just cited may say to the contrary, the author is convicted of an intentional departure from the received traditional account, and the motive for this alteration is discovered and assigned.

But this is not the only instance in which the idealism of the writer sets him at variance with his predecessors. His antagonism is genuine and pervading. We will continue to illustrate the direct contradictions, and then adduce numerous examples of opposing and differently classified characteristics in the Gospel before us.

According to the fourth Evangelist, the Baptist identified Jesus as the pre-existent Messiah in the famous interview on the banks of the Jordan. He then proclaimed him to be the Lamb of universal expiation, and solemnly attested that he was the Son of

God. On one occasion two of his disciples, Andrew and John the son of Zebedee, hear him speak, and from henceforward leave their master and attach themselves to the party of Jesus. Further, we are told that an official embassy, consisting of priests and Levites from the sacred city of the Jewish people, were sent to the Baptist to inquire whether he was the Messiah, or the mystical Elias, or the expected Prophet. We are told, moreover, that John did *not* know Jesus till he saw the celestial and promised token. In the sequel he reappears in full possession of the true Messianic doctrine, and descants on it in language which is an echo of that of Jesus in the preceding conversation with Nicodemus (iii. 33-36), which in its turn betrays its ideal character by its obvious resemblance to the Evangelist's own phraseology. Now, how are we to harmonize the narrative of St. John with the narrative of St. Matthew, which supposes an immediate recognition of Jesus by his so-called precursor, and which places the dove-like descent of the Spirit *after* instead of *before* that recognition? How are we to reconcile the statements of the fourth Gospel which ascribe to the Baptist a formal certifying mission (John i. 7), the public identification of Jesus as the Messiah, the mature knowledge of his divine pre-existence, with the statements in the first and third Gospels, which plainly demonstrate that the Baptist had doubts of the Messianic claims of Jesus (Matt. xi. 2, 3; Luke vii. 19, 20). To suppose that in the brief interval between the scene on the Jordan's banks and the commencement of the ministry of Jesus, John could have forgotten the celestial sign, the public attestation, and his own advanced Messianic theology, is impossible. If it be objected that Matthew is inconsistent with himself, we allow the inconsistency. We simply point out the incompatibility of the two accounts.

And this leads us to notice another contradiction in the same passage of the life of Jesus. The fourth Evangelist, says Strauss, whose words we shall now appropriate, narrates (i. 35-51) how the first disciples came to attach themselves to Jesus, and among them we find Peter and Andrew, and in all probability John, for it is "generally agreed that the nameless companion of Andrew was that ultimately favourite Apostle. James is absent from this account, and instead of his vocation we have that of Philip and Nathanael. But even when the persons are the same, all the particulars of their meeting with Jesus are variously detailed. In the two synoptical Gospels [Matthew and Mark] the scene is the coast of the Galilæan sea; in the fourth, Andrew, Peter, and their anonymous friend unite themselves to Jesus in the vicinity of the Jordan: Philip and Nathanael on the way from thence into Galilee. In the former, again, Jesus calls a pair of brothers; in the latter, it is first Andrew and his companion, then Peter,

and anon Philip and Nathanael, who meet with Jesus. But the most important difference is this; while in Matthew and Mark the brethren are called from their fishing immediately by Jesus, in John nothing more is said of the respective situations of those who were summoned, than that they *come* and *are found*, and Jesus himself calls only Philip: Andrew and his nameless companion being directed to him by the Baptist, Peter brought by Andrew and Nathanael by Philip.* In St. John, again, the significant name of Cephas is given to Peter by Jesus on his first introduction; whereas, according to Matthew, it would appear that it was not till towards the close of his ministry that Peter's confession of the Messiahship of his Master (revealed not by the *Baptist*, but by God himself) procured for him this honourable designation (Matt. xvi. 13-20). Place, time, and occasion are all alike different. In Matthew we have the Sea of Galilee, in John the waters of Jordan, in Matthew the neighbourhood of Cæsarea Philippi, in John that of Bethany,† in Matthew the period *after* the Baptist's imprisonment, in John the period *before* (Matt. iv. 12; John iii. 24).

In the above report of the Call of the Apostles, the relative positions of two of the more important of their number, Peter and John, are quietly determined at the opening of the Gospel. Let us see how curiously the subject is treated in the sequel. The writer's prepossessions evidently modify the more historical representation in the interest of the new-risen theology. Peter, the apostolic chief of Judaic Christianity, though allowed to retain some traces of his original brightness, appears, like the ruined angel of the poet, with "the excess of glory obscured." His claims are postponed to the claims of John. It is John who is first called; John whose assistance is necessary when Peter would learn the name of the traitor; John who brings Peter into the high priest's palace; John who, when all the disciples forsake their Master, stands by the cross of Jesus, "among the faithless faithful only found;" John who receives the highest mark of the confiding love of his dying Lord, and who, in his recognition as the spiritual Son of the Virgin mother, is placed on a level with James "the Lord's brother." It is John who, in the alternative distribution of advantages in the singular race to the sepulchre, now abreast of Peter, now before him, and in the ensuing scene, now before, now behind him, outstrips his rival on the way, enters first and carries off the honours of a laudable though still immature faith, being the *first* to see and believe; it is John who lies in the bosom of Jesus, the depositary of the divine mysteries of Christian gnosis; John who is the selected attestor of the suffer-

* English translation of the "Life of Jesus" by Strauss, vol. ii. p. 51.

† The common reading is Bethabara, but this is an arbitrary alteration.

ings of Jesus; John who, in virtue of his superior spiritual insight, is the first to discern the Lord standing on the shores of Tiberias (ch. xxi.); and finally, it is John who surpasses Peter in the grandeur of their respective destinies, as imaged in a prediction attributed, in legendary wise, to Jesus himself (ch. xxi.).

But let us return to the banks of the Jordan, where a still more startling discrepancy awaits us. For whereas in Mark, after the baptismal scene on the river, of which the interview in John is the equivalent, Jesus is *immediately* transported into the wilderness to be tempted of the devil, John not only omits but absolutely extrudes the Temptation, for he makes Jesus linger for a few days in the sphere of the Baptist's activity, then go into Galilee after a brief residence at Capernaum, thence proceed to Jerusalem, then follow John to Ænon in Judæa, and return to Galilee *after* the Samaritan conversion, the call of the Apostles, the purification of the Temple, the miracle in Cana, the conversation with Nicodemus, the institution of baptism—in a word, after the solemn official demonstration of his Messianic glory. How, we ask again, are we to reconcile this historical presentment with that of the Synoptics, in particular with that of Matthew? Matthew implies that the residence at Capernaum was deliberate and habitual, instead of accidental and transient; he excludes the ministration in Judæa; he places the commencement of the public career of Jesus, the call and commission of the Apostles, after John's imprisonment; and so far is he from knowing of the conversion of the Samaritans of Sychar, or recognising their superior knowledge of the vocation of Jesus as the Saviour of the world, that (perhaps influenced by Ebionitish prejudice) he makes Jesus expressly forbid the Twelve to go into the way of the Gentiles or enter into a city of the Samaritans, and commands them to reserve their instructions for the lost sheep of the house of Israel (Matt. x. 6-23).

An extremely significant transaction in the life of Jesus, that known as the purification of the Temple, requires more than an incidental notice. St. John places it at the beginning, the Synoptics at the end of his career; and the violent conduct attributed to him on that occasion, together with his passionate invectives against the Jewish authorities, represent in them the overt act of the religious revolutionist, whatever it was, that induced the sacerdotal order to attempt the arrest and destruction of their dangerous opponent. Closely connected with this incident is the last example we shall give of direct historical contradiction or unbecomable narrative. The omission of the miracle of the resurrection of Lazarus in the Synoptics, astounding as it undoubtedly is, cannot in itself be pronounced a discrepancy. The collateral circumstances, however, make it more and worse

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than a discrepancy. According to the Synoptical account, Jesus was unknown in Jerusalem (Matt. xxi. 10, 11); according to that of John, Jerusalem had been from the very first the main region of his ministry. Now, not only do the three Evangelists know nothing of that miracle which is the typical embodiment of the principle that Jesus is the resurrection and the life, the grand representative and testimonial miracle of his entire career, but they are wholly ignorant of the circumstances accompanying or resulting from it. They are not aware of the retirement of Jesus to Ephraim in Judæa (John xi. 54), the consequence of the determination of the authorities to put him to death. They bring him openly from Galilee through Jericho to Jerusalem, and he leaves the city only during the night, and always returns the next morning (Luke xxi. 32, 33). St. John brings him from his enforced concealment in the wilderness to Bethany six days before the Passover. The triumphal procession of Matthew, Mark, and Luke precedes, follows, or attends Jesus on his Messianic entrance into Jerusalem. In St. John the procession consists of persons who set out to meet Jesus because they have heard of the miracle performed on Lazarus. The whole account is different: it is not a variation or an omission, but an excluding representation. For, according to the fourth Gospel, the resurrection of Lazarus accelerates and introduces the catastrophe, and colours and modifies the historical circumstance. It is the crisis of the fate of Jesus. To omit the miracle as a miracle would have been surprising, but to omit it as the antecedent of the sublime tragedy approaching, to leave out the important link in the chain of events, implies either an ignorance or stupidity on the part of the Synoptics absolutely disqualifying them for biographers of Jesus, or an idealistic invention on the part of the fourth Evangelist which shows that, whatever he may have undertaken to do, he has produced, not a narrative of what did occur, but a narrative of what might have occurred—not a history, but a religious romance. We shall see in the sequel which is the inevitable alternative.

But the divergence of view, doctrine, and historical representation which exists between John and the Synoptics shows itself, not only in occasional and conspicuous contradiction, but frequently and pervadingly in what we have already termed opposing characteristics. In the earlier Evangelists Jesus is a man begotten by the Holy Spirit; in John he is the incarnate creative Word. In Matthew Jesus is an exorcist, and peculiar prominence is given to his preternatural command of spirits that are said to enter into the bodies of men and even inferior animals; in John there is not a single devil cast out from the first chapter to the last. In

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the Synoptics Galilee is the theatre of the activity of Jesus ; in John Jerusalem is his centre of action : in the former he appears in Jerusalem only once, and his ministry is limited to a single year's duration ; in the latter he appears in Jerusalem five times. On four occasions when he leaves it or its neighbourhood, a special reason is assigned for his departure, and his ministry is extended over a period of three years. The story of the birth and infancy recorded by Matthew and Luke has no counterpart in the narrative of John, the supposed protector of the mother of Jesus (xix. 27). The kingdom of heaven, the announcement of which in the Synoptics is the distinctive office of Jesus and his forerunner, and which is the perpetual theme of his discourses and the object of anxious inquiry and expectation, is not even mentioned in St. John.* The theocratic vision has faded before the dream of a universal restoration, and the prophet of Nazareth is no longer pre-eminently the Messianic king, but an ante-mundane being with an extraordinary power of self-demonstration and self-concealment, recognised even by Samaritans as the Saviour of the world. His advent in the clouds of heaven is no longer anticipated ; he has no genealogical table to prove him the son of David ; he institutes no Lord's Supper, but teaches an eucharistical mysticism in obscure and enigmatic language ; he no longer talks of the "kingdom" to the common people, who hear him gladly, employing proverb and parable as in Matthew, where "without a parable he spake not unto them" (xiii. 34) ; but he disputes or speculates in dark, metaphysical, unintelligible phraseology, substituting allegories for parables, not one of which occurs in the whole of the Gospel. But the *Discourses* of Jesus, as reported by the fourth Evangelist, constitute one of the most characteristic unconformabilities of his narrative, and require separate examination.

Such grave suspicions attach to these Discourses that even De Wette complains of the absence of historical reality, pronouncing them free representations of Christ's actual utterances. Rénan, too, with all his preference for the fourth Gospel, is too clear-sighted not to see that they are in no sense "historical, but are compositions intended to cover with the authority of Jesus certain doctrines dear to their compiler." Absorbed in the Logos-idea, John reproduces the doctrine of the ante-mundane existence of Jesus on every occasion. The Baptist preaches it, Jesus preaches it, the Évangélist preaches it in season and out of season. That Nicodemus is unable to understand him is no

* In ch. iii. the expression "kingdom of God" occurs, but in a different sense.

check to his sacred eloquence. Though he perceives that he is not understood even by a master in Israel, he continues to iterate this strange transcendentalism. His precursor, as we have seen, re-echoes the same doctrine in the same chapter, to disciples who could not possibly understand its import. Jesus repeats it to the people of Capernaum, to the Jews in the Temple, in his prayer to the Father (ch. xvi.). His sole object is his own glorification as the Logos or Divine and Pre-existent Word. These eulogistic utterances form, as Strauss says, one continued doxology, translated from the second person into the first, and thus betray their origin as the expression of the enthusiastic admiration of the composer, who attributes to his ideal Jesus sentiments and language that emanate only from himself. This self-exaltation, so unnatural, so forced and mechanical, cannot be historical. That Jesus adopted the enigmatical and perplexing didactic system ascribed to him by St. John, is intellectually and morally improbable. It is intellectually improbable because it implies inability to achieve the first object of every public teacher, the edification of the audience whom he addresses. It is morally improbable because the deliberate and continued employment of a mystifying dialectic is incompatible with human sympathy and destructive of personal integrity. But further, the unreality of some of these discourses is demonstrated by the artifice almost invariably adopted for the evident dogmatic purpose of aggrandizing Jesus and exposing the spiritual inaptitude of his interlocutors. Jesus speaks in figures which it is impossible that his auditors could understand; but instead of mere *non-comprehension*, a ludicrous *mis-apprehension* is attributed to them. Jesus is represented as the unique personification of wisdom, contrasted with various personifications of folly. The persons of this curious drama in dialogue have all the same family likeness, are all constructed on one and the same model of uniform and portentous dullness. Nicodemus, the woman of Samaria, his own disciples, the people of Capernaum, the hostile Jews, have all the same part to play, they all make replies or express objections of the same set type, and with the same intended result. Jesus speaks as if he wished to be misunderstood, and he always is misunderstood (John iii. 4; iv. 15, 33; vi. 34; xvi. 17). How different is the riddling dialectician of St. John from the lowly aphoristic preacher on the Mount; how different the audience of the first three Evangelists to the audience of the fourth! A philological examination confirms what this general analysis sufficiently establishes. We have already glanced at the relation which exists between the thought and language attributed to Jesus and the thought and language of the Evangelist himself. The further consideration that a third party, the Baptist,

expresses similar ideas in similar words, that he as well as John and Jesus reiterate the doctrine of the premundane existence of the Messiah in analogous phraseology, compels us "to admit that the Evangelist has lent his own style to the principal characters in the narrative." One common flow of language, with one prevailing antithesis—father, son—life, death—light, darkness—above, beneath—flesh, spirit—betrays one common source. It is the author who makes Jesus and his forerunner the vehicles of a forced and foreign inspiration. Instances of this free invention may with certainty be indicated. In ch. xii. the public ministry of Jesus is brought to a formal conclusion. Jesus himself retires (ver. 36), and a sort of commentary on the result of his miraculous career is appended to the passage which announces his retirement. But in the forty-fourth verse the author, probably reminded by his own remarks of discourses which he had already recorded, and "unable to resist the temptation of recapitulating them in a parting harangue," summons back the vanished teacher, and puts into his mouth a discourse composed of reminiscences out of previous chapters. A similar inference must be drawn from the passage which signalizes the mysterious sign or token of chapter ii. verse 19. In this passage Jesus bids the Jews destroy the Temple at Jerusalem, and undertakes, when they have destroyed it, to raise it up again in three days. It appears from the context (ver. 21) that the meaning the speaker intended these words to bear was a very different one from that which they must have conveyed to the bystanders. For Jesus, with the material Temple before him, spoke of the *temple of his body*! The Jews could not possibly have understood such a riddling, evasive speech; for we are expressly told that his own disciples did not comprehend it until after he had risen from the dead. The unreality of all this is rendered still more conspicuous when we observe that this conversation occurs in the anti-synoptical account of the career of Jesus, an account which antedates the purification of the Temple, makes his mission open in Jerusalem, and inaugurates it not by the conversion of the lost sheep of the house of Israel (Matt. xv. 24), but by that of the Samaritans, with whom, however, strange to say, "the Jews had no dealings"!

The same opposition to the Synoptics is exhibited in the later no less than in the earlier discourses of Jesus. After the conclusion of the last meal and the singing of a hymn, the *Galilean* Jesus goes with his disciples to the Mount of Olives. The *Jerusalem* Jesus of the fourth Gospel, on the contrary, interposes a series of valedictory discourses, in which we have a prayer intruded for the celestial antemundane glorification of the Logos (ch. xvii.), an announcement of the subsequent advent of the

Paraclete, and an exposition of the functions of that mysterious agent; a recognition of the devil as the prince of this world, an equivalent of the Valentinian Cosmocrator, and lastly, an adaptation of the earlier narrative of Matthew, so singularly instructive as to justify a distinct examination. In John, chapter xiv. verse 31, Jesus is represented as discontinuing his address to his disciples, and inviting them to leave the guest-room in company with himself. Notwithstanding the preparation for departure thus intimated, on turning to the following chapter we find that the address is resumed. In fact, Jesus and his disciples remain conversing in the same place till the commencement of the eighteenth chapter. The orthodox divine who believes in plenary inspiration, or the rationalist who believes in the presence of a shorthand reporter, or the harmonist who reconciles difficulties by the canon of "remote possibilities," may each explain this lame and impotent conclusion in a way satisfactory to himself. The true explanation is that given by Strauss. In Matthew (xxvi. 46) Jesus exclaims, "*Rise, let us be going: behold, he is at hand that doth betray me.*" Now this is said, in Matthew, after the agony in Gethsemane, and refers to Judas, who immediately appears on the scene. In the Synoptics the Agony is placed between the Last Meal and the Arrest. In John the Agony, which, like the Transfiguration, is a *Galilean* crisis in the life of Jesus, is entirely omitted in the report of the *Hierosymite* Christ. That the deified Christ, that the Logos-Messiah should be the subject of this terrific internal conflict, was not in the spirit of the glorifying fourth Gospel. Raised above all earthly fears, he has conquered the slight passing emotion which is all our Evangelist can persuade himself to attribute to him (chap. xii.), and is absorbed in blissful anticipation of reunion with the Father in a primæval glory (chap. xvii.). But there was a *ring* in the exclamation of Jesus, as given by Matthew, that fascinated his successor. He wished to transfer this trait to his own narrative, and he spoiled it in the transfer. Altering the circumstances, he had to alter the significance of the formula. In St. John it is not the *treacherous Judas*, as in Matthew, who is at hand. The Creative WORD has his more appropriate foe in the destroying Spirit of Evil. Therefore it is that we read, "*The prince of this world cometh. . . . Arise, let us go hence*" (John xiv. 30, 31)—the dislocating accommodation of the corresponding phrase in St. Matthew. The idealizing treatment of the Synoptical narrative, so strangely illustrated in this instance, distinguishes the dialectical exhibition of Jesus from beginning to end. Time, place, circumstance are all more or less unreal. The interlocutors themselves have often every appearance of deriving their *raison d'être* from the exigencies of the dialectics and theosophy of

"St. John." Truly, Rénan has said, "we have here the variations of a musician improving on a given theme." Well may he qualify his assertion that the theme is not without some authenticity by the remark that, in the execution, the imagination of the artist has given itself full scope.

But it is not only in the arbitrary composition of these *Discourses* that the imagination of the artist has an appropriate sphere. We trace its wonder-working influence equally in the fanciful delineation of the *dramatis personæ* of these immortal dialogues. Thus we have a visionary Jesus and a visionary John the Baptist. We have a Nathaniel, whose name does not occur in the Synoptics, as the type of a true Israelite, who no sooner receives a supernatural sign or token from a stranger than, like Andrew, John, Peter, and the Samaritans, he immediately acknowledges the Messiahship of that stranger. We have a Nicodemus, who, although a master in Israel, is so ignorant that he does not understand what is meant by the New Birth (a current Jewish notion), but whose simplicity does not deter his instructor from communicating to him a full revelation of all the Messianic mysteries, *not* in the language of the Synoptical Jesus, but in that of the author of the Gospel before us (i. 5, 9. ; iii. 19). What are we to make of this darkling adherent of Jesus, whose native opacity could only be increased by a conversation which begins in bewilderment and drops away into a Coleridgean monologue? An interview which commences in physical darkness and mental obscurity, and which comes to an end but has no conclusion, is, we submit, suggestive of allegory and unreality. A personage who, although a ruler of the Jews, is unknown to the first three Evangelists, whose nocturnal visit is suspiciously emphasized in the triple record of it contained in this Gospel, and whose benighted condition presents a fitting contrast to the divine light that was to come into the world, renews and confirms the suspicion. And finally, the performance of a part assigned to him by our author at a juncture when he conveniently reappears for the purpose of doing what is designed, but not accomplished in the Synoptics—embalming the body of Jesus—inspires the gravest doubts as to the objective existence of a ruler of the Jews so "irrecoverably dark" amid the blaze of the Messianic noon.

An equally visionary creation next confronts us in the person of the Woman of Samaria. We have already noticed the anti-synoptical character of this part of our Gospel, and its incongruity with the Gospels of Matthew, Mark, and Luke, all of which confine the personal and habitual labours of Jesus to Galilee, Judæa, and Peræa. This story of Jacob's well is distinguished by the same peculiarities that we have remarked in

those already investigated. We have the same mechanical simplicity in the woman that appeared in Nicodemus. The question of the ruler, "How can a man be born when he is old?" has its counterpart in the demand of the Samaritaness, "Sir, give me that water, that I thirst not, neither come hither to draw," when Jesus speaks of the water of a spiritual life. That a woman, still apparently far from old, should have had five husbands, and have since formed an irregular attachment, is so improbable that we cease to look on her as a real, and see in her only a symbolical woman, and our thoughts advert to the prophetic allegory (Ezek. xxiii.), in which Aholah, the unfaithful wife of Jehovah, who dotes on her many lovers, is the acknowledged type of Samaria, whose impure population "worshipped they knew not what." The fact that this woman's domestic life is represented as known to Jesus expressly to illustrate his Messianic prescience, and that the conversion of the Samaritans is foreseen by him, and the merit of their conversion appropriated by herself, is an additional reason for regarding the woman of Jacob's well as a poetical representative of her countrymen, and the ministry of Jesus among them as "a legendary prelude to the propagation of the Gospel in Samaria" after his death. It is observed by Strauss that the ancient commentators were accustomed to interpret allegorically this interview of Jesus with the woman of Samaria on the ground that "the entire scene has a legendary and poetical colouring." Were they not right in so doing?

These idealized individualities are the *dramatis personæ* to an equally ideal chorus. The Jews of the fourth Gospel are products of the author's imagination. Unlike the Jews in the earlier narratives, they are represented as from the very first the implacable opponents of Jesus. They move about in Jerusalem, the metropolis of unbelief, or appear in Capernaum in a wholly ideal manner; from the first they form a design, as the children of the devil, to destroy Jesus, and are only prevented by the action of a divine predestination, quite foreign to the synoptical report, announced in the frequently-recurring expression, *His hour is not yet come*. They enter into a long argument with him, in which the argumentative dexterity of the Logos-Christ is displayed, and they are set forth as the miserable examples of a self-refuting sophistical dialectic. Their law, their customs, their ritual are regarded as obsolete, indifferent, or alien institutions. The Jews, once the peculiar possession of the Logos, have rejected him; they have become the incarnation of darkness, the embodiment of blind, conceited unbelief; in a word, they are not historical but ideal Jews.

Having thus shown how the imagination of the artist creates or modifies the dialogue and the persons of the dialogue, we pass

to the consideration of the miraculous element in the fourth Gospel. *Negatively*, this Gospel is distinguished from the other three by its obviously designed suppression of the dæmoniacal prodigies so conspicuous in the career of the Galilean Jesus, a suppression which has been attributed partly to the anti-Jewish conception of the Logos-Christ, and partly to the indifference of the age and community in which it was written for such cheap and easy exhibitions of thaumaturgic skill. *Positively*, the Johannean miracles may be considered as representative miracles. Seven in number, the number of perfection, they are a sort of distilled essence of synoptical supernaturalism, intended as so many practical signs and sensible illustrations of the glory of the God-Christ.

The miracle through which this demonstration of divine splendour was first inaugurated, was wrought at the marriage feast in Cana of Galilee. A marriage feast is a favourite image with the other Evangelists, of the happiness of the Messianic kingdom. To make Jesus himself the bridegroom would have been obviously impossible; the marriage is therefore a marriage of some friends of Mary's, and Jesus attends as a guest expressly to furnish wine for the occasion. Mary, to whom is attributed a mysterious sense of the power of her son, offers a suggestion which is silenced with an abrupt rebuke, as though it derogated from the dignity of so transcendent a being to regulate his actions in accordance with human dictation. But although in this, as in an analogous case, he replies that his hour is not yet come, he almost immediately proceeds to a display of his divine energy. To supply a motive for the miracle, the quantity of wine provided for the feast is represented as insufficient. Jesus begins his career with a six days' initiation; he ends it with a six days' preparation. Fond of the number six (the double of the first odd number, *three*), the Evangelist brings into his narrative, as a natural groundwork for the miracle, six water-vessels of large dimensions—so large, indeed, that the amount of wine into which the water was transformed has been estimated at about ninety dozen. According to any estimate, the quantity must have been enormous; but in this prodigal expenditure of power there lay a Messianic propriety. So magnificent a provision for human want did honour to the son of that Being who "giveth not his Spirit by measure;" it exemplified the inexhaustibleness of that pleroma, or fulness, of which (ch. i. ver. 16) "we have all received." Wine of so exalted an origin must necessarily surpass that of human manufacture. Its transcendent excellence is proclaimed in an eulogium that has perplexed commentators, but which Strauss, we think, has adequately explained. Where, it has been asked, did the usage prevail of producing good wine at the com-

mencement of a feast, and replacing it with wine of inferior quality when the guests were drunk? Nowhere but in the imaginary banquet-room of St. John. That this is the true answer is proved by the significant conclusion of the president's encomium—"Thou hast kept the good wine until now." The superior excellence of the wine of Jesus is the evident moral of the tale. Accordingly the pretended custom is explicable as a capricious adaptation of the metaphor in Luke: "No man having drunk old wine straightway desireth new, for he saith the old is better,"—a metaphor which implies the fancied superiority of time-honoured Judaism over its young and untried competitor. The aphorism of St. Luke is grounded on every day's experience. St. John, whose object is to show that the new religion of Jesus is preferable to the old religion ("for the law was given by Moses, but grace and truth came by Jesus Christ"), is driven by a literary necessity into the grotesque representation in the text. For as the circumstances of the case precluded the employment of the earlier comparison, founded on the *age* of the wine, our author attempts to reach his end by describing that belonging to the bridegroom as inferior, and that produced by the bridal guest as superior in *quality*. Subsequently (ch. iii. ver. 29) Jesus is reinstated in his proper position as the bridegroom, which for the symbolical purpose of this narrative he had temporarily abandoned; and the Baptist, the last representative of the old dispensation and the herald of the new, who decreases as Jesus increases, is represented as the friend of the bridegroom. Moreover, that a sort of cryptical allusion to the eucharistical wine is intended here is not improbable, for Jesus had promised his disciples to drink the new fruit of the vine with them in his Father's kingdom, where he will be the bridegroom and the Church the bride, directly after he had selected the wine as the symbol of his blood.

This miracle of drinking has its parallel in a miracle of eating, where the allegorizing intention is openly avowed, for the Evangelist betrays his purpose when he previously announces that Jesus knew beforehand what he would do, and confirms our view by the formal mystical explanation that Jesus is the bread from heaven which Moses or the old dispensation could not give—where the food that perishes is contrasted with the food that endures to everlasting life; food which is given only by the Son of Man. In the feeding of the multitude (ch. vi.), the sacramental significance of the miracle is presupposed; the dogmatical declaration, "my flesh is meat indeed, and my blood is drink indeed," including, as it does, a recognition of both the sacramental elements, may well carry back our thoughts to the miracle of Cana, where the "good" wine given by Christ seems to correspond with

the heavenly bread of the discourse at Capernaum. And thus the author, who purposely avoids any direct mention of the institution of the Lord's Supper, that his narrative (ch. xiii.) may not be in glaring contradiction to that of his predecessors, contrives to recognise both its emblematical signs in his own shadowy, "dim-religious" style. The miracle itself is derived, according to all appearance, from Mark, for Mark is the only one of the Synoptical writers who has the Greek words answering to the English, "two hundred pennyworth of bread." But John has turned it to account in his own way; to use his own language, "he himself knew what he would do" when he made Jesus experiment upon Philip (John vi. 6; Mark vi. 34), instead of describing him as moved with compassion for the multitude. The miracle was designed as a fresh demonstration that the wonder-working Jesus was the expected prophet; it was meant to supply an occasion for the allegorical discourse, in which again we find the language of the composer put into the mouth of Jesus, his pre-existence reasserted, the same obscurity in the teacher, and the same perplexity in the taught.

Passing over the further difficulties of the miracle, with its wholly inconceivable multiplication of two artificially prepared natural productions, we come now to the walking on the sea—the fourth sign or display of divine power in the Johannean series of wonders. And here, in addition to the prodigies common to the older narrators, their successor, according to an interpretation which is at least plausible, inserts two instances of supernatural locomotion, which are not found in Matthew or Mark. With these Evangelists Jesus, on reaching the ship which bears his disciples, is received into it, and after allaying the storm they arrive on shore in the natural way. In John, no sooner do the disciples purpose to take Jesus on board, than in a moment the ship reaches the land, and we are allowed to conclude that the reception, though contemplated, did not take place. This, at any rate, is the view not only of Strauss, and Hilgenfeld, but of the orthodox Chrysostom, who thinks that Jesus refrained from entering the ship in order that the miracle might be greater. The original Greek more than admits, and the context favours this view.* The multitude whom Jesus had fed are emphatically cited as witnesses of some portent. Observing (ver. 22) that Jesus did not enter the boat with his disciples, but that his disciples were gone away alone, they determined to follow him across the lake. At their arrival at Capernaum they find Jesus already there, and if he did not go in the boat, and if sufficient time had not elapsed to allow of his reaching it by land, the inference is

* See the Greek, ch. vi. ver. 21.

plain that we have here two instances of undisguised magical operation. And as if this were not enough to try one's faith, the multitude, five thousand men, take shipping (a fleet would have been required for the purpose), and cross the water in search of their mysteriously vanished Entertainer. Of this transaction the Synoptics know nothing. In Mark, directly Jesus reaches the land of Gennesaret, the people recognise him, and bring their sick to him from the surrounding district. No hint is given even of the embarkation of the multitude, and the fourth biographer of Jesus is obliged to invent the means of transport as best he can. To do honour to the subject of his history, he had said that there was no boat there but that in which the disciples had gone; but to convey his ideal passengers over the lake to hear the mystical discourse of Jesus, John brings an ideal fleet from Tiberias, where they had eaten bread. In another seapiece (Mark iv. 36), where the multitude is sent away and Jesus accompanies the Apostles, Strauss has discovered the origin of this fleet. There to a certainty we find the *other little boats* (καὶ ἄλλα δὲ πλοῖάρια) which came so opportunely to the multitude's and the Evangelist's assistance.

The second miracle which Jesus performed when he was come out of Judæa into Galilee, the cure of the nobleman's son at a distance, is also derived from the Synoptics. A comparison of the three identical, yet differing narratives of Matthew, Luke, and John will show the important divergencies in time, place, person, and treatment in the third of these writers. In Matthew, the cure is effected after the sermon on the mount; in John, on Jesus's return from the first passover and the ministry in Samaria; in Matthew, the place is Capernaum, in John it is Cana; in Matthew the supplicant is a centurion and a Gentile, the patient a servant; in John, the supplicant is a nobleman and a Jew, and the patient a son. The importance of this, as of the former miracle, is curiously enhanced by St. John. The distance from Cana, the point of departure of the curative energy, to Capernaum, the place where it takes effect, is so great that the returning applicant is not met by his servants till the second day; an inquiry is thus suggested as to the time at which the amendment became observable. The result of the inquiry is to establish the fact that it was the seventh hour, the very hour at which Jesus had proclaimed the recovery. The coincidence naturally leads to the acknowledgment of Jesus as the Messiah by the nobleman and his whole family.

In the narrative of the fifth miracle the presence of design is too obvious to be overlooked, and the symbolism almost too apparent to be denied. The subject of it is a man blind from his birth. In a preliminary dialogue the correctness of the prevalent Jewish

notion that disease is a punishment for sin, and that the sufferer may sin before he is born, is assumed by the disciples, and has the tacit concurrence of the pre-existent Logos-Christ. In this particular instance, however, Jesus decides that neither the blind man nor his parents were in fault. The privation of light was the effect of divine predetermination. The afflicted man was born blind purposely, that he might prove an instrument of Messianic glorification by the recovery of his sight. The miracle is pre-faced by the solemn announcement that Jesus is the Light of the World. By recourse to a false etymology, the pool in which the patient is directed to bathe is made to have a symbolical significance, as though by special providence it had, on some former occasion, received the name of *Sent*, because it was foreseen that long years after he would be sent thither, by the word of Jesus. In addition to all this, we have a magical pharmacopœia derived from a corresponding passage in St. Mark (ch. viii. ver. 23), but much more elaborate; we have the same ideal Jews, emblems of intellectual night, as foils to the figurative blind man, whose spiritual insight is evoked concurrently with the removal of his physical darkness; and lastly, we have the appropriate moral pointed by the appropriate person:—"For judgment am I come into this world, that they which see not might see, and they which see might be made blind." The miracle has a curious resemblance to that wrought by Vespasian at Alexandria. In both cases there is the same traditional therapeutic saliva; the same notorious blindness; the same public and authenticated cure.

We approach the seventh and last of the miracles in St. John, the resurrection of Lazarus, the culminating exhibition of the supernatural energy of the Logos-Christ. Jesus had already caused the blind to see; he will now cause the dead to live. The voice with which he calls Lazarus forth from the grave is the typical anticipation of the voice already promised (ch. v. ver. 25) as the herald of a general resurrection. "The hour is coming, and now is, when the dead shall hear the voice of the Son of God, and they that hear shall live." This supreme miracle has the same symbolical aspect, and is attended with even greater moral difficulties than the others. As in a former case a man was purposely born blind to show the glory of God, so now a man is deliberately destined to die that the Son of God might be glorified by his death. As Jesus, before he restored sight to the blind, announced that he was the light of the world, so now, before he raises and reanimates Lazarus, he announces that he is the resurrection and the life. The death and revivification of Lazarus, moreover, may be considered as a sort of adumbration or rehearsal of the death and resurrection of Jesus, these inevitable antecedents of the return of the Logos to pre-existing glory (John ii. 22; xii. 23).

The one event is immediately connected with the other, and grows out of it. For the publicity which attended the revival of Lazarus led (xi. 46-57) to "the consultation of the Sanhedrim, in which the sanguinary counsel of Caiaphas was given and approved." The whole narrative has about it the appearance of an allegorical fiction. The very incidents look as if they were made to order. Jesus knowingly allows Lazarus to die for the glory of God: he perplexes his disciples by calling death sleep, and tells them he is glad that he was not with his sick friend, to the intent that they might believe: he purposely defers his advent to the fourth day (ver. 17), till, in accordance with Jewish mortuary ideas, the soul that for three days hovers round the tenement of clay had deserted its old companion and decomposition had set in. Thus the Evangelist as closely as possible assimilates the case of Lazarus to that of the dead at the general resurrection, making the miracle, so to speak, still more miraculous. On Christ's arrival at Bethany, when he sees the tears of the Jews, the outward signs of their incredulity, he chafes inwardly (*ἐνεβριμήσατο*, xi. 33-38). At the grave he puts up a prayer to his Father, but in the very act of praying openly avows the futility of his devotion, affirming the prayer to be but a seeming prayer, intended not for his own advantage but for the popular edification,* *i.e.*, as an expedient for impressing the bystanders with the conviction that the coming resurrection of Lazarus was a direct and practical answer to it, and so to produce belief in his own divine mission. Surely this last trait, which degrades instead of glorifying Jesus, must be an artifice invented by the author. Surely the idealism of the whole representation, the calculating deliberativeness of the preliminary arrangements, and the incongruity of the accompanying incidents, are too transparent to be denied. M. Rénan, who allows that the biographer of Jesus has transformed his master in wishing to transcribe him, should have seen that here, if anywhere, he has falsified his character; he should have carried his general suspicion of that biographer's occasional want of literary honesty a little further, and have drawn the conclusion that if a transaction is not recorded in the three earlier annalists of the New Testament which is yet, according to the fourth, the crowning act of Messianic manifestation, the symbolical presentment of Christianity as life and doctrine, the provocation to the final judicial unbelief of official Judaism, and the declared crisis of the drama terminating in the intended glorifying death of Jesus—the transaction, even when explained as the result of collusion, could never have taken place at all. It is preposterous to say with the orthodox vindi-

* "Because of the people which stand by, I said it," ver. 42.

cators of the Gospel, that the Synoptics were unacquainted with an event which was known to all the people in Jerusalem, which compelled Jesus to fly from the machinations of the hierarchical party, which brought wondering strangers to Bethany to see not only the lord and giver of life, but "the reanimated corpse," which sat "in vernal bloom" at that strange supper-table in the village of Lazarus. The Apostles were present, Matthew among them, and must have known it. The resurrection of Lazarus was the death of Jesus; and if all the world went after him, as John says it did; how could Luke, who blazons his historical research, and boasts of the accuracy of his knowledge, remain unacquainted with this miracle of miracles, this consummation of the career of Jesus, this crisis of his fate and crowning proof of his glory?

The secret of this wonderful fiction, for such it must be pronounced, has, we think, been satisfactorily traced. The explanation, which we owe mainly to Zeller, curiously exemplifies the ingenuity with which the synoptical narrative has been metamorphosed into a kind of religious allegorical drama. But before we point out the source from which the author derived the material for the story of the Resurrection of Lazarus, we will endeavour to discover the origin of the entire narrative in which it forms the chief incident, and show where he borrowed the pencil which has delineated the features of the little family at Bethany; the family of which Lazarus was a member, and which plays so important a part in the closing scenes of the life of Jesus.

If we turn to the records by his three predecessors, we shall find no exactly parallel passage to that in which they are described in St. John. Nevertheless, they contain various scattered intimations, out of which a definite whole might, by skilful combination, be put together. Thus, Matthew and Mark have an anonymous woman who anoints Jesus in Bethany. Luke also has an anonymous woman who anoints Jesus, but *not* in Bethany. He has, moreover, a Mary and Martha, sisters, living in a certain village, probably in Galilee or Samaria, but not within the circle of Jerusalem. These are evidently the "disjecta membra" out of which John has fashioned the body of his narrative. For the nameless woman who anointed Jesus he finds a name in Luke. As synoptical tradition made Bethany the scene of the holy unction, he had nothing to do but transfer Mary and her sister Martha to Bethany. In Luke there exists no such affectionate intimacy as is described by St. John; but precisely the same characteristics which appear in the former reappear in the latter narrator. If, at the supper sketched by St. Luke, Martha is cumbered with much serving, and Mary sits at the feet of Jesus and hears his word, at the supper described by St. John the same relation is faithfully preserved. It is still Martha who serves and Mary who anoints

the Master's feet. Of the identity of the two stories of Matthew and Mark on the one hand, and John on the other, there can be no reasonable doubt. The peculiar phraseology of John argues a close consultation of Mark. He has borrowed his "three hundred pence;" he has borrowed, with a trivial alteration suggested by Matthew, his *μύρου νάρδου πιστικῆς πολυτελοῦς* (ointment of spikenard very precious). The rare and ambiguous word *πιστικῆς*, which probably means *genuine*, but possibly *liquid* (potable), is in itself a proof of the correctness of our assertion.*

Having succeeded in discovering the sisters Martha and Mary of the fourth Gospel in a passage of the third, we will now see if we shall be equally fortunate in our search after their brother Lazarus. If Lazarus had really been the brother of the sisters in St. Luke, that that Evangelist should have been ignorant of his existence would have been strange indeed. Still stranger would it have been if he had been ignorant of his resurrection. But although St. Luke has no Lazarus who is a brother of Martha and Mary, he has yet suggested to his successor the third portrait in his family picture.

When Luther was asked whether the history of the Rich Man and Lazarus was a parable or an actual fact, he replied: "The earlier portion of the story is evidently historical; the persons, the circumstances, the existence of the five brothers, all this is given in detail." The minuteness of the description, it would appear, convinced Luther of the objective reality of what we can only regard as a fictitious creation. The same reasoning which satisfied the great reformer, may have produced a similar conviction in the minds of men who lived long before he did. Perhaps even before the days of the author of the written story of Lazarus in St. John, the realizing process may have commenced, so that the legend may have had a previous, a rudimentary existence in an indeterminate popular impression, and its recorder may have seen in the recital of St. Luke a documentary proof of some corresponding reality, and that all the more readily as it has no explanatory preface and is not even given as a parable.

However this be, the fourth Evangelist found in St. Luke exactly what he wanted. The ruler's daughter in his predecessor's Gospel was still lying in the house where she had died when Jesus raised her from death. The widow's son was dead, but not buried, when Jesus commanded him to arise; the fitting hero of such a miracle as St. John contemplated would be a man who had long been dead. In the Lazarus of the parable John found the object of his search. He found there a Lazarus who had

* The Received Version has spikenard only, as though it derived the Greek word *πιστικῆς* from the Latin *spica*.—John xii. 3.

been sick, who had died, been buried, and become an inhabitant of another world. He found there not indeed a Lazarus who had actually been raised from the dead, but a Lazarus whose resuscitation had been requested and refused. And why refused? Because the sagacious Abraham foresaw that though one went unto them from the dead, the surviving brothers would not repent. The patriarch's presentiment was justified by the event. Dives, the emblem of pharisaical Judaism, ultimately witnessed the miraculous interposition he desired: Lazarus *was* raised from the dead, and the Jews who heard not Moses or the prophets were not persuaded though Lazarus *did rise* from the dead.

The general reasons which recommend this solution of the problem of Lazarus to our acceptance are obvious and cogent. The peculiar language of the exordium, "there was a certain man named Lazarus, of Bethany, the village of Mary and Martha her sister," is an additional warrant of its correctness, for not only does this commencement recall the passage in Luke (ch. ix.) which mentions a Mary and Martha who are sisters, and designates their place of residence a village; not only does it place before our mind's eye the picture of a *certain poor man* named Lazarus, who was sick and died (ch. xvi.), but the very indefiniteness of the introduction betrays the author's consciousness that he was creating or developing a new character in evangelical story. If Lazarus had been an historical character, if he had really been the friend of Jesus, if he had been the object of the greatest of all miracles, and as such, the observed of all observers, he would never have been called "a *certain man*," or introduced as the brother of the better-known Mary and Martha.

Our previous survey of the Gospel history as rewritten by St. John gives us some insight into the secret of its composition. In each of the leading categories to which we have referred the characteristic constituents of this remarkable production, we have detected the presence of an idealizing and unhistorical purpose. In the narrative, in the discourses, in the miracles, in the characters, we have seen evidences of a persistent and consistent revision of the earlier synoptical tradition. This revision not only implies systematic divergence, but it often betrays an excluding opposition; and even where it does not openly exclude, it modifies and alters so as to give a religious ideal absolutely unknown to the older reporters of the deeds and words of Jesus and his companions. The incongruity is generic. John's type is not the type of the Synoptics. But it may be said, "The Synoptics are wrong, and John is right." If the champions of the authenticity of the fourth Gospel could be content to save its credit by a merely arbitrary preference, involving the sacrifice of the credit of the other three, orthodoxy would gain little in

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the end. Besides, though it is quite true that Matthew is mythical and incorrect, Luke the same, and Mark their copyist an exaggerating mannerist, still, with all its inaccuracies and misrepresentations, the synoptical narrative is a proximately faithful reflex of the life of Jesus. The common agreement, within certain limits, of two of the narrators who stood in the full stream of apostolic tradition, the acceptance of their report by the third, the matter-of-fact style and Palestinian colouring of the earlier presentment, establishes its relative credibility; while the marks of literary purpose, of pre-occupying conception, and pervading symbolism which subordinates the outward fact to the inward significance, and constantly hints that more is seen than meets the eye, show that the historical sense of the fourth Evangelist was exceedingly defective. The circumstance on which we have already laid so much stress, the omission by his predecessors of the historically and dogmatically paramount miracle of Jesus—the resuscitation of Lazarus—is a crucial instance of the truth of this proposition. It is infinitely more probable that John invented the miracle, than that, if it happened, they left it unrecorded.

But an analysis independent of all objective comparison establishes the almost purely imaginative treatment of John. He moves about in worlds which he vainly endeavours to realize. Starting with a foregone conclusion, he presents an idea of the nature of Christ, to which all facts are to be made conformable. From the Baptist who announces him, to Judas who betrays him, every personage in his narrative accommodates his words or his actions to the central figure of the Logos-Christ. The fourth Gospel is, in fact, a readaptation of the old one, with persons, doctrine, manner, and dialect all revised in accordance with the new spirit of a later age. Its evident aim, as Strauss many years ago remarked, is to spiritualize the common faith of Christians into the *Gnosis*—the fashionable philosophy of the times—to give it a scientific aspect: an attempt resembling that which, at a recent period, was made in our own country by S. T. Coleridge. This it achieves principally through its *Christology*, incorporating the Jewish idea of the Messiah with that of the Alexandrian Logos, the creative Word or Reason, and employing as its own peculiar vocabulary the epithets of a Valentinian or proximo-Valentinian nomenclature. Traces of the influence of Gnostic speculation are striking and numerous. Thus, as in the Gnostic system, the Father or Absolute God of St. John is not the creator of the world, the work of creation being attributed to the Logos or Son of God. Again, we have a recognition of the Gnostic Dualism. Basilides, about A.D. 125, asserted the doctrine of a pervading antithesis, or dualism, instancing light and darkness, life and

death, spirit and matter, goodness and evil, as natural counterparts. Now, this notion of two contrary principles reappears in the Gospel of St. John. We have spiritual light opposed to spiritual darkness; we have Christ, whose kingdom is not of this world, opposed to the devil, the prince of this world; we have the children of God and the children of the devil, not as mere metaphorical and occasional counterparts, but as inherent metaphysical opposites. The relation in which the Gentile world stands to Jesus is another illustration of the highly idealized composition of the fourth Gospel. Though Judaism is the only pre-Christian religion recognised by the Evangelist, and the Jews are the acknowledged channel through which salvation comes, yet it is the Gentile world that is eulogized by the Evangelist, and the Jewish race that is the object of his reprobation. The Jews are the rigid, uncompromising opponents of Jesus; their God is not his God, nor their law his law. The dialectical campaign between Jesus and the Jews, in reality typifies the long-continued opposition between Christianity and Judaism. On the other hand, Jesus flies from Jewish conspiracy into Galilee of the nations: he finds in the despised Samaria, the type of believing Heathendom, that acknowledgment of his claims which his own countrymen denied; and in the hour when he anticipates the glorifying death which so soon awaits him, the Gentile recipients of Christianity are personified in the Greeks who desire to see Jesus (ch. xii. ver. 21). Finally, we have in the emphasis given to the effort of the Roman governor to save the accused, and in the equally emphatic incrimination of the Jews, a fresh exemplification of the symbolizing conciliating method of writing history, and perhaps an additional argument that the Gospel was written in the period of the Apologists—a period which began with Quadratus, A.D. 123.

Thus by a different track we again arrive at the same common point. The Logos doctrine was the doctrine of Justin Martyr and other writers in the second century; the Paraclete doctrine was the doctrine of the Oriental theology of the second century; the Valentinian nomenclature, again, takes us into the second century; and lastly, the Paschal controversy was the distinctive controversy of the second century. But if the fourth Gospel was a production of the second century, it follows as a matter of course that John the son of Zebedee was not its author. Let us, however, examine this question of authorship on its own merits. We will begin with the internal evidence.

The Gospel which bears the name of St. John asserts, in contradiction to the synoptical narrative, that Jesus took his last evening meal on the 13th of Nisan and died on the 14th as the true Passover Lamb. The tradition of Asia Minor, represented

by Polycrates, Melito, and Polycarp the friend of the Apostle St. John, agreeing with the synoptical tradition, maintained that Jesus took his last meal on the 14th, the day of the Jewish Passover, and died on the 15th. At the date of the composition of the earlier Gospels, and in the East, where the memory of Paul had faded before that of John, an apostle of the circumcision, an ideal theory had not superseded historical fact; whereas, in the West, where John was personally unknown, Paul's figurative theology had triumphed, paschal reminiscences had been in process of obliteration since the time of Xystus (120-129), till at length the typical victim of Jewish observance had been forgotten in the Lamb of God, "Christ our Passover, who was sacrificed for us" (1 Cor. v. 7, 8; John i. 29-36), and the Eastern practice was seen to clash with the Western practice. Now, it may be confidently affirmed, if the Apostle John had written the Gospel which bears his name, the Asiatic usage would not have lasted a single day. We conclude, then, that if the *book* sanctioned the Western, and the *Apostle* authorized the Eastern practice, the book was not the composition of the Apostle.

Another argument against the received authorship of this Gospel is drawn from the fundamental dissimilarity which exists between its language, doctrine, and literary characteristics, and those which we should have expected to find in a constant attendant on Jesus, such as John. Is it likely that a Galilean fisherman would have indulged in theosophical speculations and a theological dialect such as we encounter in Philo? Is it likely, *if* the synoptical statement be correct that Jesus habitually taught the people in parables, that there should not be a single parable, but only a diluted allegorical substitute, in the whole of the book? Is it likely that if, as we are assured by the other biographers of Jesus, the cure of dæmoniacs was repeatedly practised by him, not one such case should occur in this Gospel, from the first page to the last? Is it likely that if Jesus proclaimed the Baptist to be Elias, the Baptist, who was acquainted with the whole mystery of the incarnation and redemption, and knew that he was sent to bear witness to the Messiahship of Jesus, should have denied that he was that mystical precursor of Christ? (John i. 21). Would a beloved disciple have omitted all mention of the Temptation, the Transfiguration, the Agony in Gethsemane, and, what we should have prized above all, a narrative of the Ascension; supplying the deficiency in Matthew, explaining the bewilderment of Mark, and correcting the contradictory reports of Luke? Would the Apostle of the Circumcision have committed the anachronism which anticipates the conversion of Samaria? Would he who lived and worshipped long years in Jerusalem have represented the beloved city as a sort of city of

destruction, and called his countrymen the children of the devil? Would he who was one of those who held by the initiatory rite of Judaism, have spoken of the Mosaic code as "your law," and the Passover, which he himself probably observed in Asia, as "a feast of the Jews?"

The geographical and archæological difficulties in this Gospel constitute another very strong argument against the authorship by St. John. In what sense is it true that all who ever came before Jesus were thieves and robbers? (John x. 10.) Surely the Baptist and the prophets were not thieves or robbers, and the pseudo-Messiahs did not appear until long after the time of Christ. Again, how could a native of Palestine have written of a Bethany beyond Jordan, when in all probability no such place ever existed out of the excitable brain of the imaginative author? How could he have invented that fabulous description of the pool of Siloam, a locality unknown to Josephus, and mistaken a Hebrew word which means an aqueduct or flow of water for a word which means *sent*? How could a Jew, familiar as John must have been with the spots frequented by Jesus, have adopted a mistranslation from the Alexandrine version (2 Sam. xv. 23), and described the *dark turbid* Kedron as the *brook of cedars*? How could a Galilean like the son of Zebedee have attributed to the learned members of the great Jewish council the flagrantly untrue canon, "out of Galilee ariseth no prophet"? (vii. 52).^{*} Above all, how could a native of Judæa have fallen into the extraordinary and fatal error of supposing the high priesthood to be held on the "sometimes one and sometimes the other" principle of the Cambridge undergraduate—Caiaphas and Annas taking it by turns? Finally, how could he have aggravated the original error which makes Caiaphas high priest for that same year (xi. 49; xviii. 13, 14), by connecting it with the strange representation that the hierarchical dignity carried with it the prophetic gift, as at a later day a particular grace was supposed to accompany the episcopal office?

Another strong presumption against the genuineness of the Gospel is afforded by the subordinate position accorded to Peter, the unquestionable primate of the early Church, his own exaltation as our Lord's brother and Peter's superior, and the traces of Asiatic ecclesiastical hero-worship in the prominence given to Philip, Andrew, contained in the Gospel. Had it been written by a son of Zebedee, would he have omitted all mention of his martyred brother, and all reference to the pillar-apostle, who with Peter and himself formed the great apostolical triumvirate?

^{*} *Has arisen* (ἔγρηραι). Jonah and Nahum were Galileans. See Bretschneider's *Probabilia*, pp. 92-100.

Had the Gospel been written by John, one of the Apostles of Judaism or the Circumcision, who so reluctantly recognised the pretensions of the intrusive Paul, would it have gone beyond that advocate of universalism in its professions of ethnic liberality, and have repudiated his patriotic sympathies by its unqualified reprobation of the Jews? (Rom. ix.)

That the son of Zebedee, whom we see in his true character as a Jew apostle in the Epistle to the Galatians, was the author of the Apocalypse, is a proposition generally allowed, is one that has unusually good historical evidence in its favour, and may be supported by arguments of considerable weight. The recognition of this claim, however, supplies a new and formidable argument against the Johannean authorship of the Gospel. No conclusion of modern criticism, says De Wette, a defender of the genuineness of the latter, stands more firmly than this—"If the Apostle wrote the fourth Gospel and the Epistles which bear his name, he did not write the Apocalypse; or if the Apocalypse be his work, he is not the author of the other writings." Of all the New Testament books, the *Revelation* is the most, the fourth Gospel the least Jewish. In the Revelation Jerusalem is the holy and beloved city, the capital of the Millennial kingdom—its temple is preserved, one-tenth only of it is destroyed by the mystical earthquake, the majority of the inhabitants are converted, the Jews are believers of the purest type, the peculiar people, distinguished by a strange obnoxious act, the virgin nation that follows the Lamb! The Gentile contingent of Christians, on the other hand, form a mere supplement to this celestial population. The Gentile world, and Rome conspicuously, is the realm of unbelief and anti-Christian opposition, and in the splendid period of a restored Paradise, the divine city bears the name of Jerusalem, its walls are inscribed with the names of the twelve tribes, its foundations with the names of the twelve Jew-apostles only, and while the fruit of the tree of life with its twelve varieties is reserved for the immaculate and privileged posterity of Abraham, its *leaves* are the gracious provision accorded to the spiritual wants of the less aristocratic nations.

How contrary is the representation here given to that of the Gospel where the Jews are the embodiment of the spirit of anti-christ, the Greeks and Samaritans types of high spiritual capacity, and Jerusalem, *not* Rome, the imperial residence of malignant, ignorant, and persecuting irreligion! How could such conflicting representations have emanated from one and the same person? Is it possible that the same artist could have painted both these pictures?

But let us now advert to the external evidence for the authorship. It is acknowledged that no direct testimony even to the

existence of the Gospel is afforded either by Papias or by Polycarp, of whom one at least is said to have known the Apostle John. Their silence is a strong negative presumption against the usual hypothesis of authorship. The silence of Justin, who teaches a Logos doctrine, similar but not identical to that of the fourth Gospel, is even more significant; for that he should have made no attempt to gain credit for his teaching by appealing to the authority of St. John, that while he mentions him by name, and attributes to him the authorship of the Apocalypse, he should not have affirmed or denied that he wrote also the Gospel that is called after him, argues either that he was not acquainted with it, or that if acquainted with it, he did not believe it to be the work of an Apostle. There is no proof that it was known to Basilides, none that it was known to Valentinus. That Marcion used the Gospel according to St. Luke, when that according to St. John would have been infinitely more available for his purpose, warrants a similar conclusion. The first undoubted quotation from this Gospel—if it be indeed undoubted—occurs in a supposititious work, the Clementine Homilies, about A.D. 160. Theophilus, the bishop of Antioch, A.D. 180, is the first recorded assenter of its Johannean origin. Of the indirect evidence in its favour we shall say nothing, partly to economize space, chiefly because of its feebleness and inconclusiveness. Even supposing that Justin knew and cited the Gospel (and there is strong counter-evidence to weigh down the plausibilities of this supposition), we should have no proof that he attributed it to the Apostle St. John, or even that he regarded it as authentic and authoritative. On the other hand, the testimony of the so-called fragment of Muratori referred to the year 170, is rather damaging than otherwise to the orthodox hypothesis. If it recognises the Apocalypse of John, it recognises the Apocalypse of Peter, which shows that its test of canonicity was not very discriminating; and if it states that the son of Zebedee was the author of the fourth Gospel, its evidence is deprived of what little value it has by the legendary notification that John requested his fellow disciples to fast with him for three days, engaging that whatever should be revealed to every one of them they would mutually relate; and that the same night it was revealed to Andrew that under the common revision of all the Apostles, John should describe all things in his own name. The suspicion to which this strange story gave rise is strengthened by another passage in the same document, in which the two Epistles of John are said to have been written, like the Wisdom of Solomon, by friends, with the intention of conferring honour on their master, as, out of a similar motive, the works of Pythagoreans were published, not in the names of the authors, but in that of the founder of their sect.

Finally, we come to the testimony of the Gospel itself. Some stress has been laid on the attestation in the appendix: "This is the disciple that wrote these things, and we know that his testimony is true." But the attestation is really nugatory, for it is anonymous. If it were added by the author of the Gospel himself or the author of the appendix—if the appendix be not genuine—the self-certifying addition is evidently valueless. If it be the interpolation of an unknown editor, it equally loses its importance. For how can we be assured that it was not inserted by one of the Johannean "Amici" of Asia Minor, or of Rome, or of North Africa? The assertion of Apostolic authorship is nowhere distinctly made in the twenty undoubtedly original chapters of the Gospel, as it is in the Apocalypse. The testimony of the beloved disciple is appealed to, and there are references not to individual knowledge, but to general Christian consciousness, and that is all. But though the authorship is not directly attributed to St. John, the fact remains unquestioned, that if we once identify the disciple that lay in the bosom of Jesus with the son of Zebedee, that Apostle is claimed by the writer as a sort of literary bail or historical security. It then becomes impossible to doubt that the impression intended to be conveyed in certain phrases of appeal is, that the writer claimed the authority of the Apostle St. John for what he narrated.

That a direct personal authorship is prominently asserted in the Apocalypse, while in the Gospel only an indirect address is given, and the name itself carefully suppressed, is an argument against the correctness of the verdict which attributes both works to the same writer. There are, however, certain relations common to both. And the presence of elements in the Gospel, which recall kindred elements in the earlier work, helps to explain the secret of its composition. The fourth Gospel is, in fact, an Apocalypse. It is a revelation or *φανερωσις* of the Son of God; it is a manifestation of the Incarnate Logos, and a demonstration not of the Latter-day magnificence of the Jewish Messiah, but of the eternal glory in time of the Divine Reason that was before time. A certain ideal unity distinguishes both productions. Each resembles the other, though each is profoundly at variance with the other! The author of the Gospel, who had read the Apocalypse and perhaps the First Epistle of St. John, has borrowed many expressions and some representations from his enthusiastic predecessor. He has not dipped his pencil in its hues of earthquake and eclipse, but he has plagiarized something of its gentler tones and softer colouring. If there is a chasm between the two compositions, it is bridged over by a continuity of general conception. The concrete imagery of the old material Apocalypse is idealized into the abstract symbolism



of the new spiritual Apocalypse. They differ only as the root differs from the fruit. The Gospel is a sublimation of the Apocalypse; a Revelation of Jesus Christ in accordance with the purer, loftier, speculative Christianity of a riper age. In both alike we have the same testimony of Jesus, the same spirit of prophecy, the same advent of the Son of God—the same, yet how different! The voices that sound so mysteriously in the close of the earlier Revelation announce the immediate coming of the cloud-borne Messiah; the last proclamation of the Jesus of the Gospel is only an uncertain echo of a legendary tale—"If I will that he tarry till I come;" or if we reject the appendix as ungenue, we have no longer the open vision of the New Jerusalem, no longer the exulting cry—"I, John, saw the holy city," "I saw the things that must shortly come to pass,"—but an eternal life which consists in the intuition or gnosis of the Divine, and a faith which is eulogized because it is supported on an inward sentiment and requires no historical evidence: "Blessed are they that have not seen and yet have believed."

The two works, then, have a common object, not a common author. As the composer of the Gospel converted the Synoptical narrative into symbolical history, so he drew on the Apocalyptic delineations for his own religious or dogmatic purposes. The credit which he claims for his own recital may, after all, be little more than the credit which any one might claim for a history grounded on the documentary evidence of predecessors. For instance, the passage in which he makes his most solemn appeal to an anonymous eye-witness may refer directly to the written testimony of the author of the Apocalypse or the First Epistle ascribed to St. John (John xviii. 37; Rev. i. 7, 9; 1 John v. 8).

But we do not feel called on to defend the absolute literary integrity of the fourth Evangelist. If the Apostle John did not write the Gospel to which his name is prefixed, we do not reflect on the character of a personal disciple of Jesus, but on that of an unknown biographer. That a man who was habitually honourable, who was even an enthusiast for what he believed to be the highest religious truth, might allow himself to secure popularity for a work that he regarded as having its basis in a Johannean version of Christianity, by claiming the Apostle's authority for some or all of his statements, when he was not personally responsible for them, is a contingency that we have no difficulty in admitting. Pseudepigraphy or eponymous literature was common before Christ, and very common after him. Ecclesiastes was not the production of Solomon, nor Deuteronomy that of Moses. The Second Epistle of Peter is generally acknowledged to be spurious. Salvian, who bore the proud distinction of Master of

Bishops, wrote a treatise, in the fifth century, for which he arrogated the titular patronage of Timothy, the companion of St. Paul. A presbyter of Asia Minor, in the second century, composed a religious romance—*The Acts of Paul and Thecla*—in honour of the Gentile Apostle. The Christians in or about Justin Martyr's time frequently falsified the Old Testament, and Justin not very creditably charged their adulteration of Holy Writ on their innocent rivals the Jews. In later days pious frauds have been committed by men celebrated for their devotion to the cause of religious truth. The Jesuits who undertook the conversion of Hindostan assumed the character of Brahmins, and composed a pretended *Veda*, in which they sought to insinuate the doctrines of Christianity in the language and phraseology of the sacred books of the Hindoos.* Farel, a strict Calvinist divine of 1534, wrote an account of his controversy with Fürbity, which he gave to the world as the production of a Catholic notary in Geneva, and to render the deception perfect, inserted a panegyric on a man he despised. Recent research has shown that the Waldenses, the precursors of the Reformation, were not above altering or interpolating ancient writings, with the view to produce or strengthen the impression of the original accordance of their own principles with the principles of Protestantism.†

The second century, it must be remembered, was not like the nineteenth. The sense of literary propriety was not very delicate. The practice of eponymous superscription was not uncommon. It was a necessity of the times, which sought a sanction for what a conviction of his own spiritual illumination assured a devotee was absolutely and universally true. Our author, perhaps, reasoned that the same Spirit of Truth which presided over the age in which he lived, the same divine Paraclete that taught and illuminated him by a process of didactic reminiscence (John xiv. 26) must have inspired John also; and thus a Gospel really written by some elder or bishop of Asia Minor might, in the judgment of a devout but uncritical dreamer, appropriately and justifiably bear the title of the Gospel according to St. John, because, as he persuaded himself, it contained theological speculations such as that Apostle must have approved.

If it be objected that a supposititious production would at once have been discovered and exposed, as in the case of the romance of Paul and Thecla, we answer that discovery in such cases is not invariably made, nor exposure instantaneously effected. Who, in remote centuries, discovered the author of the Second Epistle of St. Peter, or the interpolator of the text of the Three Heavenly

* Sir J. E. Tennent's "Christianity in Ceylon."

† Zeller's work on the Acts of the Apostles, p. 461.

Witnesses in the First Epistle of St. John? Who, in the days of the early fathers, detected and exposed the factitious character of the Sibylline Oracles—those oracles to which, we have lately been told, Christianity owes some portion, however trifling, of its success, though they form no part of its general credentials? Or to descend to our own age, who, before Mr. Grosart, restored to their rightful owner, Herbert Palmer, the famous "Paradoxes," which for two hundred years have been printed in the works and regarded as the composition of no less distinguished a writer than Lord Bacon?

We have now completed our task as far as it is possible to complete it, where the desired "ample room and verge enough" cannot be secured. We have done our best within our prescribed limits to establish two points:—First, that John the Apostle did not write the fourth Gospel; and secondly, that it is not a production of the first century. For the reasonings and illustrations employed by us we are almost entirely indebted to Baur, Zeller, Schwegler, and Strauss. We do not ask M. Rénan, or his readers, or our readers, to accord to the conclusion at which we have arrived an immediate acceptance, but we *do* ask them to reconsider the subject, to examine the irresistible arguments of these really great critics; convinced that all sincere and competent inquirers who do not belong to what has been happily termed "the generation of the prepossessed," will ultimately ratify that conclusion. If there is any proposition that a general constructive criticism can be held to have established, it is that the son of Zebedee never wrote the Gospel which bears his name,—that it is the production not of the century in which Jesus and his Apostles lived, but of the succeeding century, the author unknown, the most probable proximate date A.D. 150, though it may possibly have been written a decade or two before.

* By C. Merivale, B.D., Rector of Lawford, and Chaplain of the Speaker of the House of Commons, in the Boyle Lectures for the year 1864.

ART. III.—THE STATE OF ENGLISH LAW:
CODIFICATION.

1. *Speech of the Lord Chancellor on the Revision of the Law.*
Edited by JOHN FRASER MACQUEEN, Q.C. London:
W. Maxwell. 1863.
2. *Address of Sir J. P. Wilde, delivered before the National Association for the Promotion of Social Science.* The
"TIMES," September 24, 1864.

NEARLY half a century has passed away since Bentham wrote his celebrated "Papers relative to Codification," which, though in some respects crude and imperfect, may be regarded as having given the first impetus in this country to the modern ideas on this the most important branch of law reform. And although up to this time but little of tangible result has been obtained, yet symptoms are not wanting that the views propounded by Bentham and enforced and developed by Sir S. Romilly, J. Austin, and H. S. Maine, are gradually forcing themselves upon the attention of our leading lawyers and jurists. The seed has fallen on a soil not altogether barren, and after a long period of germination, has at length given signs of bursting into blossom. The conviction is getting more and more universal that something must be done to rescue the law from its present chaotic condition, and to control its future growth. It is felt to be a reproach that the country which assumes to be the leader in civilization can point to nothing for her laws but some eleven hundred volumes of well- and ill-decided cases, supplemented by a huge pile of partly operative, partly repealed statutes, the whole arranged on that worst of all possible plans—a chronological one. It is seen that legal principles and legal rules which are daily enunciated by counsel at the bar and by judges on the bench must, from the nature of the case, admit of being expressed in intelligible language, and of being grouped in an accessible form. On the other hand, the real difficulties to be overcome in recasting the law are, perhaps, not sufficiently appreciated by many of those who feel most strongly that the law ought not to remain in its present shape. It is not uncommon for those who have had no practical experience, who have never tried their hands at framing a rule of law, to suppose that the task is a simple one, and to suspect that the difficulties are created by those whose interest it is that the law should not become too readily *cognoscible*. Those who think thus would do well to ponder the words of the late Mr. Austin,

whose competence as an authority will not be questioned. Mr. Austin writes—

“Whoever has considered the difficulty of making a good statute will not think lightly of the difficulty of making a code. To conceive distinctly the general purpose of a statute, to conceive distinctly the subordinate provisions through which its general purpose must be accomplished, and to express that general purpose and those subordinate provisions in perfectly adequate and not ambiguous language, is a business of extreme delicacy and of extreme difficulty, though it is frequently tossed by legislators to inferior and incompetent workmen. I will venture to affirm that what is commonly called the *technical* part of legislation is incomparably more difficult than what may be styled the *ethical*. In other words, it is far easier to conceive justly what would be useful law than so to construct that same law that it may accomplish the design of the lawgiver.”*

Such is the opinion of one of the acutest of thinkers and most ardent of law reformers, and there can be little doubt that every practical draughtsman will add his testimony on the same side. Indeed, it is probable that a sense of the magnitude and difficulty of the undertaking has operated fully as much as any other cause to deter our lawyers from attempting the consolidation and rearrangement of our statute and case law. However, there are signs—and among them none more noteworthy than the remarkable addresses which form the subject of this paper—that the attempt will be made, and at no distant period. The present, therefore, seems a suitable time for drawing attention to the subject, and for giving a fair consideration to the arguments of those who are opposed to codification. For it is the fact that some lawyers of eminence have doubted and still doubt the possibility of success in this work. It is argued that a code will introduce greater evils than those it cures; that the wisest legislator can foresee only a small part of the combinations to which human affairs will give rise; and that the infirmities of language will not allow him adequately to provide for the cases he does foresee. Appeal is made, in confirmation, to the actual working of existing codes, all of which, it is said, are in fact supplemented by a mass of comment and traditional interpretation far exceeding in bulk the codes themselves. We shall examine in due course the value of these arguments. We believe it will be found that the objections raised apply rather to a code in the form in which it is commonly proposed that it should be cast, than to a code in the best form in which it is possible to cast it. We think the error of most codifiers has been to rely on the exclusive use of tersely-worded abstract propositions, each intended by force of the language used to indicate with accuracy its own scope—to

* “Jurisprudence,” vol. ii. p. 370.

strive against the imputation of repetition—to be sparing of illustration—to dispense almost entirely with explanation, and generally to render their productions dry and colourless collections of formulæ, rather than clear statements of principle expounded and explained by comment and by example.

In order to substantiate our position, as well as to convey some idea of the real work which has to be done and the advantages which will result from its accomplishment, it is necessary to exhibit the actual state of our law, the process by which it has been developed into its present shape, and the mode in which the vast and intricate storehouses of legal knowledge are made available. We shall therefore, in the first place, offer such a sketch as is necessary to the comprehension of the questions to be discussed, avoiding as far as possible the use of technical language, and availing ourselves freely of the materials which the Lord Chancellor and Sir J. P. Wilde have provided.

The law of this country may be divided into two classes:—the law which has been expressly enacted by the Legislature, called the written or statute law; and the law which has grown up without express legislative sanction, and which is sometimes called the unwritten law. The latter class comprises what is designated the Common Law, and also a body of law known as Equity or Chancery Law, of comparatively modern origin, and intended to supplement and correct the Common Law. The origin of the Common Law is thus described by the Lord Chancellor:—

“Of the Common Law, much, no doubt, consisted originally of customs and usages, recorded only in the memories of men; much of rules embodied in acts of the Great Council, of which no record now exists; much was derived from the Civil Law, relics of the old Roman jurisprudence, which remained so long through the land; and much was deduced from general maxims and principles handed down from one generation of lawyers to another. Thus, the sources of the Common Law were in ancient times of the most indefinite character, and the power or liberty of judicial decision was equally unlimited.”—p. 5.

In the reign of Edward I. the practice of reporting the decisions of the judges began, and thus was added a fresh authority which might be referred to as evidence of what the Common Law was. Gradually arose the habit of appealing to a reported decision as a sufficient ground for deciding a parallel case in like manner, and precedent was allowed to rule, in some cases to the exclusion of justice.

It may not be out of place here to say a few words concerning the use and abuse of precedent. To many persons the practice of following precedents seems wholly indefensible, and indeed, little short of absurd. Because a judge a hundred years ago de-

decided a case improperly, why, it is asked, should a judge of the present day feel bound in a parallel case to follow the ancient decision? Thus stated, the argument sounds plausible enough, but a little consideration will show that there is more to be said in defence of precedent than at first sight would appear, and that the indignation expended on the judges might with more propriety be directed against the Legislature. The root of the popular misconceptions on this subject lies in the supposition that every rule of law ought to carry its own justification—that there cannot, in fact, be two rules of law on the same point, both of which shall be equally just. If this supposition were correct, there would be no need for any rules of law at all, since an upright and intelligent judge would always be able to do justice on the facts presented to him without appealing to any authority. But the fact is that a very large part of every system of law is composed of rules which, while consistent with the principles of natural justice, are not plainly deducible from those principles to the exclusion of all other rules. The laws of two civilized communities may differ most widely in their details, and yet both codes be substantially just. One or two simple examples will suffice to explain our meaning, and to show to how large an extent rules of law are and must be arbitrary. Take, for instance, the case of succession to property. What, according to the dictates of justice, ought to become of a man's property on his dying intestate? The opinion of all civilized nations, no doubt, points to his widow and children or kindred. But what are to be the exact shares and the precise order in which they are to be entitled? The question obviously admits of a dozen solutions, not one of which shall be repugnant to natural justice. If the decision of such a point were left to the conscience of the judge, it is manifest that endless litigation would be the inevitable result. As another example, take the following:—A person by his will gives to the two children of J. S. 50*l.* each. It turns out that at the time the will was made J. S. had three children, and there is nothing on the face of the will to show which children are referred to. A judge is called upon to decide how the intention of the testator is to be carried out. Various courses suggest themselves. He may decide—

1. That the testator meant to give 100*l.* among *all* the children of J. S. living at the date of the will, but made a mistake as to the number of the children; or,
2. That the testator meant to give 50*l.* to *each* child of J. S. living at the date of the will, but made a mistake as to the number of the children; or,
3. That the testator must be taken to have meant the two eldest children of J. S. living at the date of the will; or,
4. That it is impossible to ascertain from the will what the

testator meant, and that the gift must therefore altogether fail for uncertainty ; or,

5. That the intention of the testator should be ascertained, if possible, by extrinsic evidence—such as letters written by the testator, casual expressions dropped by him, his intimacy with the different children, and so forth.†

Our judges have adopted the second of these rules, but any one of the five might be selected without any striking violation of justice ; and other solutions, not less just, might, no doubt, be suggested. Here, then, we have an illustration of the fact that the rules of every system of law are, within considerable limits, arbitrary. In very many instances substantial justice may be arrived at in a variety of ways, and the important thing is that some rules or other should be selected and made permanent. Legislation of some kind is almost a necessity, and if parliaments are remiss or incompetent, the duty of saving the administration of justice from the reproach of uncertainty devolves upon the judges. In this country nearly everything has been left to them. The bulk of our law is built up of decisions, and it may safely be affirmed that, were the authority of precedent to be withdrawn and no legislative substitute provided, the amount of litigation would instantly be increased tenfold.

We see, then, how naturally and with what propriety a judge, in the absence of legislative provision, would allow himself to be guided by precedent. A point comes before him insoluble by an appeal to the principles of natural justice. Various modes of decision present themselves to his mind. He finds that an equally acute judge, assisted by equally acute counsel, has already adjudicated in a similar case. He follows that decision unless he sees a very good reason for dissenting from it, and the rule becomes fixed. In this manner, with an almost inappreciable sacrifice of justice, the community gets the enormous advantages of certainty and of freedom from excessive litigation.

It may be answered, "There are, no doubt, precedents of the kind described, and to these there is no objection ; but there are also many precedents which, if followed, tend to work injustice or perpetuate absurdity, and these should be unhesitatingly rejected." So they are rejected whenever the injustice or absurdity rises to a sufficient pitch. It must be remembered that rules of law cannot be divided into two sharply-defined classes, just and unjust, or rational and absurd. A rule may fall short of the best possible without being glaringly unjust ; and when such a rule has been acted upon for a length of time in confidence that it will be upheld, a judge who should overthrow it would do a serious mischief, even if the new rule he introduced were a clear improvement on that which he suppressed. The Legislature

alone can properly interfere in such cases, since the Legislature alone can make new law, and at the same time protect those who have acted on faith of the old. Again, rules which are both just and rational in one age may become the reverse, owing to slow and unnoticed social changes. At what precise epoch is a judge to decide that an ancient rule has ceased to be suitable to the altered state of society? To weigh the advantages of certainty against those of a more perfect theoretical justice is one of the most delicate and difficult tasks of the judge, and, as a matter of course, some judges have succeeded better than others. In one respect only have they been disposed, as a body, to carry the use of precedent beyond its legitimate bounds. Actuated by a pardonable anxiety to avoid the open assumption of legislative powers, they have adopted the fiction that they were simply the expositors of laws supposed to have been made ages ago by nobody knows whom, and transmitted by course of tradition. Hence they have preferred to decide entirely new points by resorting to analogy rather than to considerations of expediency, and have thus introduced many of the highly technical doctrines which disfigure our law. Still, on the whole, the work has not been done badly. With very small assistance from the Legislature, an immense superstructure of clumsy-looking but not unserviceable law has been reared, containing, no doubt, much that is cumbrous and inconvenient, but very little indeed which, according to the views current among the ruling classes, could be accounted unjust.

Returning to our sketch, we will now leave the Common Law and direct our attention to Equity or Chancery Law. The growth of Chancery Law is a striking illustration of the means to which recourse is had when the Legislature neglects its obvious functions. At a period when the nation had outgrown the old Common Law, and the judges of the Common Law Courts were too narrow or too timid to assume the requisite legislative powers, the Chancellors, as keepers of the King's conscience, undertook to supply what was wanting, and to correct what was amiss out of the reserve-fund of Equity supposed to reside in the royal breast. It was in the nature of things that the establishment of this right of interference should introduce uncertainty. The effect was thus described two centuries and a half ago:—

“Equity in Law is the same that the Spirit is in Religion—what every one pleases to make it. Sometimes they go according to Conscience, sometimes according to Law, sometimes according to the Rule of Court. Equity is a Roguish thing; for Law we have a measure, know what to trust to; Equity is according to the Conscience of him that is Chancellor, and as that is larger or narrower, so is Equity.

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'Tis all one as if they should make the standard for the measure we call a Foot, a Chancellor's foot; what an uncertain measure would this be! One Chancellor has a long Foot, another a short Foot, a third an indifferent Foot; 'tis the same thing in the Chancellor's Conscience.'*

So defective, however, was the Common Law, that it is impossible to doubt that the interference of the Chancellors has, on the whole, been salutary; and the authority of Chancery precedents having long been fully established, the uncertainty of which Selden complained has ceased to exist. The Courts of Common Law did not adopt the Chancery doctrines, and the only mode the Chancellor possessed of enforcing his decrees was to imprison those who refused to submit to them. Thus arose the remarkable anomaly of two legal systems in many respects antagonistic, existing side by side in the same country. To this day a man may win his cause at Westminster and lose it at Lincoln's Inn. To this day a person with an unquestionable right may have no means of asserting it except by asking the Court of Chancery to prevent another from disputing it. Truly a singular spectacle in this nineteenth century, a Lord Chancellor restraining a subject, under pain of imprisonment, from appealing to the ordinary Courts of Justice!

To complete the picture of our legal system, we have the Statute Law or Parliamentary legislation commencing with the 20th Henry III., and contained in some forty-five thick quarto volumes. "The statutes are printed without the least regard to order; there is no system or arrangement. They are printed just as they have been passed, chronologically. There is of course a great variety of subjects, and enactments on the same subject are dispersed and scattered over an immense extent of ground."—p. 22. Many of the statutes were temporary in their nature, or have been wholly or partially repealed, some by express enactment, others only inferentially, so that it is often a work of difficulty to discover what provisions are in force on a particular subject.† When the provisions still in operation have been ascertained, there remains the task of interpretation, which requires for its performance a competent knowledge of the Common and Chancery Law, and also of the particular judicial decisions on the construction of the clauses under consideration. Every decision on the construction of a statute is virtually incorporated

* Selden's "Table Talk," Singer's edition, p. 49.

† A valuable act was passed in the session of 1863, repealing a large body of obsolete Statute Law; and a further act of the same description is promised for the present session. These acts, however, go but a small way towards curing the evils referred to.

with the statute to which it refers, and in this way many statutes have become so loaded with commentary that their original features can with difficulty be recognised.

Such, then, is England's code. We have the *lex scripta*, or Statute Law, and we have the *lex non scripta*, consisting of a body of rules nowhere stated in express terms, but to be inferred from the many thousand decisions contained in the reports. There can be no doubt wherein lies the most palpable defect in our legal system. It is that our laws are accessible with difficulty even to the trained lawyer, while to the public they are almost a sealed book. When a case is laid before a lawyer for his advice he has no authoritative text to which he can refer for the principle which is to guide him. Beyond the maxims with which, through long experience, his mind has become impregnated, he can rely on nothing but such light as the decided cases may afford. Frequently he will have to wade through the tedious details of twenty or thirty cases in search of a single rule—cases, be it remembered, not manufactured for the purpose of illustrating legal principles, not reduced to their simplest possible forms, but presented with all the complexities with which matters of actual experience are commonly surrounded. Not unfrequently, in order that the precise grounds of a single decision may be understood, it is necessary to peruse also the cases cited in the judgment or referred to in the argument. Not until the lawyer has gone through the laborious process of comparing case with case, eliminating and rejecting what is immaterial from each, can he arrive at a satisfactory conclusion. But his labour is not confined to the mere examination of specified cases. He has, as a necessary preliminary, to find out what cases are worthy of being consulted with reference to the subject in hand, and must satisfy himself that every case of importance has been included in his examination. This part of the task alone would be well nigh impossible but for the assistance he derives from treatises—that is, from the labours of unauthorized codifiers. And valuable though the help obtained from these sources is, yet no treatise can relieve the lawyer from the necessity of consulting the original records. The dictum of a text-writer has no authority binding on a judge; it can only be regarded as the opinion of the author—an opinion, in many instances, entitled to high respect, but still an opinion only. Even the propositions laid down by writers accounted of almost judicial authority require to be explained and limited by reference to the cases from which they have been extracted before they can be acted on with confidence. A text-book is, therefore, little more than an elaborate index to the cases, accompanied by suggestions, often of the greatest value, as to the rules and principles which the cases may be made to yield up.

The difficulty of discovering the law which is felt by the experienced lawyer, nay, even by the judge on the bench, weighs with tenfold force upon the student. To him the area of the law is indeed a "tangled thicket," requiring the application of unceasing energy and untiring industry before it can become in any sense a "district set out in order." After he has mastered a few elementary treatises, sufficient to put him in possession of the technical terms, and of a certain number of rules of every-day application, he can do little beyond watching the course of business in the chambers of a practitioner, and reading the fresh decisions as they make their appearance. These he has to arrange and classify for himself as best he can, trusting to time and experience to weld together into an harmonious whole the accumulated fragments. Can it be wondered that with these drawbacks many should abandon in despair the attempt to grasp the law as a science, and should content themselves with committing to memory isolated precepts and with mastering the petty details of every-day practice?

In short, the process of discovering and acquiring the law is one which involves a wasteful expenditure of time and labour—wasteful because admitting of enormous reduction. That which should be settled and proclaimed by authority once for all, has to be worked out by hundreds of individuals, each for himself. Did we possess a systematized body of law, we should have more earnest students, more skilful lawyers, and better and cheaper justice. That the acquisition of the law can ever be an easy task, or its administration otherwise than burdensome, it were folly to expect; but there can be no reason why an effort should not be made to aid the practitioner and to ease the suitor. The two results go hand in hand; whatever tends to simplify the law and to render it cognoscible and easy of access, tends also to diminish the heavy fees, the vexatious delays, and the occasional miscarriages which are now so justly complained of.

There is a further evil, scarcely less prominent than those we have been discussing, arising from the same fundamental vice of inaccessibility. We mean the difficulty—almost amounting to impossibility—of carrying out comprehensive reforms in the body of the law itself. Consider, for example, the great question of the fusion of Law and Equity, or, more properly, of Common Law and Chancery Law. Beyond doubt the law of the country ought to be single. That there should be two conflicting systems coexisting in one realm is both absurd and mischievous. It may be right, and probably will be found expedient, to maintain the exclusive jurisdiction of particular courts over particular classes of cases, but it can never be right that a judge of one court should be bound to assert doctrines which a judge of another court is

bound to repudiate. The problem of fusion would appear therefore to involve, first, the establishment of a body of doctrine common to all the courts; and secondly, the separating and defining the branches which should fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery and the Courts of Common Law respectively. It is needless to say that, as matters at present stand, there is not the remotest probability of such a work being undertaken. Success could only be looked for from the combined efforts of a body of men possessing a thorough knowledge of both systems, and such knowledge is, at present, all but unattainable. But let the two systems of Law and Equity be exhumed from the mass in which they lie buried, and presented in an orderly form; let their differences and points of antagonism be dragged from their hiding-places and exposed to the broad light of day; let this preliminary task be accomplished, and the work of fusion is no longer beyond the reach of human industry.

Again, look at the laws relating to land. The expense attending on transfers and mortgages is sufficiently onerous to the large proprietor; to the small holder it is simply ruinous. Those who are loud in asserting that the extinction of small estates is the inevitable result of economical causes, commonly forget that the economical disadvantages under which the small holder labours are immensely aggravated by the cumbrous character of the law. What small capitalist could dream of investing his earnings in land with a view to gaining a subsistence from it by his labour, with the knowledge that the investigation of the title followed by a mortgage or two would swallow up a sum equal to the entire purchase money? Lord Westbury's act for the registration of titles will, in the course of time, do something towards removing this reproach, but much also is wanted in the way of rooting out the highly technical and inconvenient doctrines with which this branch of the law is infested. What, for example, can be more clumsy than an ordinary mortgage? One would think that the pledging of land as a security for money advances ought to be a tolerably simple matter. What is the fact? A mortgage of the only kind which a prudent lender will accept, is, in form, an absolute transfer of the property to the lender—a transfer which the Courts of Common Law would recognise as irrevocable; but the Court of Chancery steps in and confers on the borrower the right to redeem the land, and to require a retransfer on payment of what is due within a reasonable time. Was there ever such a roundabout process? Putting out of sight the disadvantageous position in which the owner is placed in respect of future loans (owing to peculiar doctrines of the Court of Chancery, into which it is needless here to enter), the mere expense of this conveying and reconveying is a serious tax, and one which in the nature of

things is plainly unnecessary. There is no reason why the pledging of land should not be made as simple and cheap a process here as it is on the Continent. But while strenuously asserting the grave defects of our law of land, we are at the same time persuaded that the cure is a matter calling for the utmost skill of the legislator. Piecemeal reform has effected, and can effect, but little. The disease lies in the heart and core, and needs a searching remedy. Is it probable that appropriate legislation will be forthcoming while the existing law relating to land is hidden from all save from the diligent and curious student willing to devote years of labour and research to the not very profitable task of acquiring it? First let the law on this subject as it stands, deformities and all, be brought together and plainly exhibited, and then it may be possible to see in what way it may best be set straight.

We have given evidence, we trust of a sufficiently cogent character, in support of the view that inaccessibility is the master-vice of our legal system. It remains to be added that the mischief is multiplying at an alarming rate, and bids fair at no distant date to expand into truly formidable dimensions. The Case Law is stated by the Lord Chancellor already to occupy between 1100 and 1200 volumes, and is growing with constantly increasing rapidity.

"At this time there are at least forty or fifty distinct sets of reports pouring their streams into the immense reservoir of law, and creating what can hardly be described, but may be denominated a great chaos of judicial legislation."—p. 8.

Sir J. P. Wilde also bears testimony to the vast increase of reported cases in modern times:—

"I do not stop to inquire into causes, but the fact is that the present century has added more decided cases to the law than are to be found in the records of the five preceding centuries put together. This vast agglomeration breeds not only confusion in those who are bound by the law, but inconsistency in those who administer it. No power of assimilation can keep pace with such production, and the tribunals, occupied to the full with the business before them, have little time to master the results of contemporary decisions."

A second defect in the law as it is, though in our view one of which the extent is somewhat overrated, is want of certainty. The system of precedent, which on the whole tends to fix the law even down to minute details, works in some instances in the contrary direction, and instead of removing doubt, introduces it. This result is brought about through the agency of vicious precedents. Judges are not infallible, and though actuated by the purest intentions, they sometimes decide wrongly. Such decisions are nevertheless available for citation, like all other precedents.

Now, when an erroneous decision in the past comes to be pressed upon a judge in the present, one of two things must happen—either the precedent must be followed, or it must be disregarded. The traditions of the profession point in one direction, while the instinct of justice exercises its influence in the opposite. The result is oftentimes a compromise. The decision is in effect disregarded, but its authority is saved by recourse being had to some shadowy and fictitious distinction. This practice was recently satirized by a living judge, who, on a case which we will call "*Brown versus Robinson*" being cited in argument, informed the bar that he should not feel himself bound by that case unless a suit were before him in which the facts were precisely similar; "indeed," added his lordship, "unless the plaintiff's name were Brown and the defendant's Robinson."

In this way an erroneous judgment, though outwardly treated with respect, may get undermined with distinctions which render it practically inoperative; and at this crisis it commonly happens that some judge, bolder than the rest, deals a death-blow to the tottering structure by declaring that "that case has long since been overruled." A striking instance of an important modification of the law by a single decision occurred quite recently. Five years ago it was universally believed among lawyers that, if A lent B a sum of money to be employed by him in business, A's remuneration for the loan being a certain share of the profits, that agreement rendered A liable to the creditors of the business to the last farthing of his property; in other words, that, in favour of creditors, participation in profits was a criterion of partnership. Such was the distinct tenor of a long series of cases, "because," as it was sagely said, "the profits are the source to which the creditors look for payment; and therefore, he who shares the profits must also share the losses." However, the House of Lords, by a recent judgment, has gone far towards demolishing the old doctrine and substituting the reasonable principle that partnership or no partnership is simply a matter of agreement between the parties, that creditors have no concern with the question except so far as they have been induced to believe that a partnership really subsisted, and that participation in the profits is only to be regarded as *prima facie* evidence of a contract of partnership. Here we have an example of a sudden and unexpected change of the law. More commonly, however, the elimination of a well-rooted but vicious precedent is effected by slow degrees, and while the process is going on the point of law under treatment is necessarily to some extent in a state of uncertainty.

It is, then, impossible to deny that on many points there is a conflict of authority, and also that there is danger in trusting too

implicitly to decisions of which the propriety may appear doubtful. Still, on the whole, it cannot be said that the uncertainty due to these causes is practically felt to any great extent. The able and experienced lawyer who is willing to devote the necessary time and labour to the consideration of the points submitted to him can, generally speaking, arrive at a trustworthy conclusion. The cases are comparatively rare in which he will find it difficult or impossible to decide with confidence on the relative values of competing authorities.

How, then, it may be asked, is it that the "glorious uncertainty of the law" has passed into a proverb? The answer is not difficult. In one-half of the cases in which the phrase is used the meaning is simply the glorious difficulty of proving a disputed fact, and in the other half the expression as often as not has reference to the large discretion which is necessarily entrusted to juries. How, for instance, would it be possible to lay down a body of rules which should be applicable without fail to the measure of damage in every instance? Manifestly a discretion must be reposed in the jury, and their verdict must often be a matter of uncertainty. Nor should it be forgotten that points of real doubt and difficulty must frequently present themselves, and that such cases are precisely the ones which are litigated. It would therefore be unfair to judge the law, as is often done, solely by the litigated cases, without taking into account the overwhelming majority of cases in which its work is done effectually, though in silence and secrecy. Much, then, of the uncertainty of the law is in the nature of things inevitable. It is found under every legal system, and will remain even though our code were as perfect as human ingenuity could make it. On the other hand, there can be no reason why such of the uncertainty as is due to the conflict of authority should be permitted to remain. The suppression of erroneous precedents is plainly a desideratum, and can be attained only by means of such a survey of the entire field as, for other and more important ends, we desire to see undertaken.

We have endeavoured to depict the principal inconveniences to which our legal system gives rise; it remains to consider whether a remedy can be found. Is it possible to recast the existing law in a more intelligible, more certain, and more accessible form, without sacrificing anything that is valuable in the present system? We do not hesitate to answer this question in the affirmative. The rules of law exist, though they are only to be discovered by a process of comparison and inference. It must therefore be *possible* to extract them from the mass in which they lie imbedded, and to arrange them systematically. In the words of Mr. Austin—

"Rules of judiciary law are not decided cases, but the *general* grounds or principles (or the *rationes decidendi*) whereon the cases are decided. Now, by the practical admission of those who apply these grounds or principles, they may be codified or turned into statute laws. For what is that process of induction by which the principle is gathered before it is applied, but this very process of codifying such principles, performed on a particular occasion, and performed on a small scale? If it be possible to extract from a case or from a few cases the *ratio decidendi*, or general principle of decision, it is possible to extract from all decided cases their respective grounds of decision, and to turn them into a body of law abstract in its form and therefore compact and accessible. Assuming that judiciary law is really law, it clearly may be codified."*

"Not so," reply the opponents of codification; "it is impossible to frame rules which shall with certainty catch just all the cases which the legislator intends to include and no more. Language is not sufficiently definite for the purpose, and rules which seem perfectly plain and satisfactory to the draughtsman (who, of course, knows his own meaning), will be found open to numerous doubts and susceptible of a variety of interpretations when they come to be tested before the judges." Now we are perfectly willing to admit that, so long as a code consists only of general rules, formidable difficulties of interpretation will assuredly present themselves, but we contend that this objection may be effectually surmounted by the simple expedient of appending to the rules a sufficient sample of the special instances which suggest them. Rules so illustrated carry their own interpretation; the illustrative cases are, in fact, precedents, and the rules no more than a statement of that which the cases involve. No greater difficulty could therefore be felt in applying the rules than in applying the precedents, as at present, apart from the rules. Indeed, we have positive proof of the ease with which illustrated rules are applied. For what are the dicta of eminent judges and text-writers but illustrated rules? Many of these dicta have the authority of settled law, and no serious difficulties are found to arise in the process of interpreting them. Why? Simply because such dicta are always viewed with reference to the cases which give birth to them. Manifestly the same result would follow if the rules were laid down by an authority higher than either judge or text-writer—provided, that is, the rules were still united to the illustrative cases, and interpreted by reference to them.

But, it is argued, granted that by means of the free use of illustration the legislator can include all the cases he has in his mind, how is he to frame his rules so that they may be applicable to *unforeseen* combinations of facts? So long as a rule of law

* "Jurisprudence," vol. ii. p. 377.

exists only by implication in a series of decided cases, it possesses more or less of an undefined or elastic character, and in applying such a rule to new cases a judge has present in his mind the principle of expediency by which the rule is justified, and thus a safeguard is provided against a too rigid adherence to the rule in cases which might fall within it if it were reduced into set terms. However carefully the codifier may frame his abstract propositions, there is perpetual danger that his words, legitimately interpreted, will extend to cases which, if they had originally fallen within his contemplation, he would certainly have excluded. In the words of an able writer—

“We defy the ablest extractor of principles to codify any single branch or subject of judiciary law in such a manner as to anticipate and provide for future cases with a tithe of the completeness and certainty with which they are anticipated and provided for by the uncoded precedents; and this for the reasons already given—that the precedents are not bound in the fetters of set terms, and that their full import and application are inexhaustible and unknown even to those who make them, and can only be brought out step by step as new cases arise.* The history of every head of judiciary law is, that first a case arises in which a general principle is established and applied; then cases arise which determine the limitations and exceptions. A principle caught by a codifier in the first stage of its development would be enacted in all the generality of a neat rule, without qualification or exception, and capable of none save by very rough nursing in the courts.”†

This argument is certainly plausible, and has appeared to many conclusive. We conceive the answer to be that no code should attempt to provide for unforeseen cases by means of detailed rules. It is perfectly obvious that any such attempt must be unsuccessful. It would, no doubt, be practicable to include all possible cases in a set of highly general principles or maxims, but such maxims would be valueless from their vagueness. In order that the rules of law may be useful, they must enter into considerable minuteness of detail; and, as a necessary result, much must be left unprovided for, because unforeseen. But, it will be asked, if the code does not provide rules which will take in unforeseen cases, how are such cases to be decided? We reply, in the same way as they are now decided, namely, by an appeal to considerations of equity and expediency. At present every judge holds himself justified in resorting to these fundamental principles so long as his decisions are not inconsistent with the general spirit or the details of the settled law, and we are unable to see that this liberty would be in any degree interfered with by a new

* “The Jurist,” New Series, vol. ix. part ii. p. 341.

† *Ibid.* p. 340.

arrangement of the settled law on a different plan. So long as the spirit of the law as shown by the illustrative cases is taken as the guide to interpretation, there can be no danger that a code will give rise to narrow and hurtful decisions. It may be urged that in addition to the mere decisions our books contain the reasonings of the judges, and that the study of these is of material assistance towards grasping the true spirit of the law. To this we fully assent, and we would therefore add to the code, wherever needful and practicable, the reasons by which the rules are justified. We cannot but think that this element would be found of great value, both as affording an indication of the limits of the various rules, and as guiding to the decision of unforeseen questions. The maxim, *cessante ratione legis cessat ipsa lex*, would be applicable then as now, and the judges would still retain the liberty they now enjoy of resorting to first principles when occasion required.

We think, then, it is clear that the sacrifice of the power of development—so far, that is, as development consists in the application of old principles to new instances—is not a necessary consequence of a rearrangement of the law in the form of a code. We are aware that there is another kind of so-called development—namely, that which consists in the actual alteration of established rules. To this species of development a code would, no doubt, prove a serious obstacle. This we are far from regarding as a mischief. On the contrary, we count it not one of the least advantages of a code that it proclaims the law as it is, be it good or be it bad, throwing the responsibility, where it ought to fall, on the Legislature. Among less advanced communities Fiction and Equity may be the appropriate modes of counteracting hurtful laws. In this country their day is well nigh over, and for the future direct legislation must be looked to as the only source of improvement.

To recapitulate: a good code should, in our view, comprise three elements—rules, illustrative cases, and comments or reasons; the rules serving to formulate the law and to give it expression in concise terms; the cases and comments serving to explain the rules and to secure to the law the attribute of elasticity. We would incorporate into our code such of the reported cases as appeared to be of value as precedents—not, indeed, in their present shape, but stripped of all unnecessary complexities and trimmed into manageable dimensions. We would add such further cases as might suggest themselves and as were calculated to throw light on the text. We would exhibit the reasons of the various rules, their origin and interdependence, wherever such a course seemed necessary for enabling their meaning and spirit to be fully grasped; and for this purpose we would avail ourselves of the labours of our judges and of our text-writers. In short,

our code should be modelled after the fashion of the best treatises, equalling them in point of clearness and logical arrangement, and far surpassing them in authority and in completeness.

The plan of codification here suggested coincides substantially with that proposed by Sir J. P. Wilde, as we understand him. Sir J. P. Wilde expresses his views in these words:—

“I cannot resist the belief that within the bounds of reasonable labour and time the general principles and broad bases on which our Common Law reposes, and which tacitly guide the decisions of our courts, might be brought to the surface, grouped together, subordinated in their several relations, and contrasted in their differences. An attempt of the kind, and not without great success, was made by the late Mr. Smith in his ‘Leading Cases.’ And those who have studied the notes of that book will not fail to perceive how easily and with what success large groups of cases treated and handled together have been made to yield up short and succinct propositions of law. What I desire to see is a similar attempt made with authority, and on a much larger scale, to be finally confirmed by Act of Parliament. . . . If there be those who fear to handle a body of laws which, on the whole, work so well, I would observe to them that I propose to displace nothing. I would not that the authority of the cases should necessarily be extinguished by the authority of the digest.* Unless expressly set aside, and inconsistent with other decisions better approved, I would have all decisions remain of authority, content to await the time when the life shall have passed into their offspring, and they fall away of themselves and pass into a sure decay.”

It appears from these extracts that Sir J. P. Wilde is in favour of an authorized text, illustrated by the whole of the cases, arguments, and judgments in our books, except such as may be authoritatively condemned. Now, while thoroughly agreeing with this scheme in its essential features, we cannot but think that far better and far more concise illustrations could be given than those contained in the reports. As a general rule, the pith of a reported case—all that is really valuable in point of illustration of legal principles—can be set down in one tenth part of the space that the report occupies. The reporter, of course, takes the cases as they come to his hand; it is no part of his province to depart from the actual facts in order to make a case less complex and more serviceable as a precedent. Neither can he materially curtail

* Sir J. P. Wilde employs the word *digest* in contradistinction to the word *code*, and expresses the opinion that a code is undesirable. To us it appears that an embodiment of the law in a series of authoritative propositions is essentially a code. The word *digest* is more properly used of a rearrangement of the cases according to subjects, accompanied, it may be, by omission and curtailment, but without any attempt to extract from the cases the principles they contain. This is the sense in which the word is used by the Lord Chancellor. Sir J. P. Wilde's objections apply not to a code as such, but to the form in which codes have hitherto been cast.

the judgment, a large part of which is often occupied in analysing the facts or discussing the authorities, and is, therefore, of no value as illustrating a code. To retain, then, the main bulk of our cases would be, as we conceive, to maintain one of the most prominent and most rapidly growing evils of the present system. There would be no objection to stamping as authoritative a limited selection of the reported cases, chosen on account of the lucidity and instructiveness of the judgments, and such a collection, published separately, might be a valuable adjunct to the code. But we think the bulk of the examples should be constructed *de novo*. In this way alone is it possible to secure all that is valuable in the reports, while avoiding the evils of proximity and repetition.

The idea of an illustrated text is not a new one. It was first brought prominently forward by the framers of the Indian Penal Code, whose opinion on the great value of illustrations in aid of the written law is thus expressed in a letter to the Governor-General in Council of the 14th of October, 1837, accompanying the draft of the Penal Code :—

“One peculiarity in the manner in which this code is framed will immediately strike your lordship in council. We mean the copious use of illustrations. These illustrations will, we trust, greatly facilitate the understanding of the law, and will at the same time often serve as a defence of the law. In our definitions we have repeatedly found ourselves under the necessity of sacrificing neatness and perspicuity to precision, and of using harsh expressions because we could find no other expressions which would convey our whole meaning and no more than our whole meaning. Such definitions standing by themselves might repel and perplex the reader, and would perhaps be fully comprehended only by a few students after long application. Yet such definitions are found, and must be found, in every system of law which aims at accuracy. A legislator may, if he thinks fit, avoid such definitions, and by avoiding them he will give a smoother and more attractive appearance to his workmanship; but in that case he flinches from a duty which he ought to perform, and which somebody must perform. If this necessary but most disagreeable work be not performed by the lawgiver once for all, it must be constantly performed in a rude and imperfect manner by every judge. . . . We have therefore thought it right not to shrink from the task of framing these unpleasing but indispensable parts of a code. And we hope that when each of these definitions is followed by a collection of cases falling under it, and of cases which, though at first sight they appear to fall under it, do not really fall under it, the definition and the reasons which led to the adoption of it will be readily understood. . . . The definitions and enacting clauses contain the whole law. The illustrations make nothing law which would not be law without them. They only exhibit the law in full action, and show what its effects will be in the events of common life.”

The example thus set has been followed by the eminent lawyers appointed to prepare a body of Civil Law for India, who quote with approbation the above forcible passage in their first report lately presented to her Majesty. But we conceive that the full value of illustration and comment, and especially of the latter, has not yet been adequately recognised. Hitherto the experience of those who have undertaken the task of constructing law for India has been confined to those branches which most readily admit of being reduced to definite rules. Here illustration is valuable, but comment is scarcely needed. But when the process comes to be applied to more complex branches, and especially to branches where the limits of the rules cannot be laid down beforehand with absolute precision, the free use of comment will be found almost indispensable. So, again, where a knowledge of history is requisite for the full understanding of the law, as is the case with our law of land, example alone will not suffice to render the rules intelligible. From some source or other the historical information must be acquired by any one who would master the law relating to this subject, and if the requisite information be not supplied to him in the pages of the code, it must be sought for elsewhere, and thus the mischief of supplementing the law by the contents of scattered and unauthorized volumes is introduced. We hold, then, that the use of illustration thus far has been an important step in the right direction. At the same time we believe that the future will witness a yet wider departure from the ordinary conception of a code than has hitherto been attempted, and that legislators will hereafter resort to every mode of explaining the law which is now employed by unauthorized writers.

There is one argument against immediate codification which we have not yet mentioned, but which calls for notice as it has apparently received the sanction of no less an authority than the Lord Chancellor. It is this: that codification cannot be successful until the body of the law has been purged of the grave inconsistencies by which it is now disfigured. On this ground Lord Westbury advocates for the present no more than the weeding of the statutes and cases, and the rearrangement of the purified material, without alteration in point of expression, according to the subjects—that is, the formation of a digest.

“This, then, being the state of the law and of the statute-book, what I propose is the course dictated by natural good sense,—that it shall be revised and expurgated, weeding away all those enactments that are no longer in force, and arranging and classifying what is left under proper heads, bringing the dispersed statutes together, eliminating jarring and discordant provisions, and thus getting a harmonious whole, instead

of having, as at present, a chaos of inconsistent and contradictory enactments.

“When this is done, when the statute-book has been cleared of superfluous and unnecessary matter, I hope to propose that another process be gone through, to which the previous labour is merely introductory. The enactments spread through the statute-book relating to different subjects must be brought together in a collected form. I shall propose, therefore, to have a systematic classification of the subject-matter of your legislation, preserving, however, the order of time, because the order of time in regard to enactments is most material for the proper understanding of the law, but arranging the different portions of the statute-book under appropriate heads, so as to present an accurate and methodical analysis of the law comprised under each head. And I hope, concurrently with this, that the corresponding parts of the Common Law extracted from the reports may be added, so that in that shape you may have a digest of the present law, both common and statute. I use the word digest advisedly, because your lordships may frequently hear any procedure of this kind described as an approach to codification.

“Now, I am not at all disposed to disguise my own individual opinion that it is to the form of a code that the law of any advanced nation ought ultimately to be reduced; but I am not at all prepared to say that the law of England is now in such a state that it may be codified with advantage and success, and for this reason, that a codification of the law is the last result which it attains when it has been perfected and has reached its maturity. But if the law is still in a transitory condition, it is not fit for that process. I regard the English law as still in a state of progress, because you have still in it the relics of barbarous times—you have still got that absurd division between the province of Common Law and the province of Equity, not the distinction which is inherent in the nature of things between the written rule and the equity required for its just application, but two antagonistic systems; because, my lords, you still have cases which would be decided one way on one side of Westminster Hall, and another way on the other side of Westminster Hall. Therefore, until you have got over that, and are in a condition to tell your statesmen and jurists that there is now unity and concord and certainty in the law of England, and unity in its forms of procedure; until you have attained to that, which the process of digesting will, I hope, facilitate, and of which it will be the introduction, you are not in the position to approach the formation of a code.”—pp. 23-27.

Now, we could fully assent to this reasoning if it were necessary to aim at the construction of an approximately perfect code in the first instance, but we cannot see that any valid argument is adduced against codification in the sense of a *re-expression of existing law* with such alterations only as the conflict of authorities may render desirable. We do not dispute the utility of Lord Westbury's plan, but we are unwilling that the work of co-

dification should be postponed, as it appears to us, unnecessarily. We consider that a preliminary digest would be a good thing, but a preliminary code a better, and for this reason, that a code tells us what the law is, and in the shortest form compatible with clearness, while a digest still leaves the law to be inferred, and still leaves the mass of material bulky, complex, and, save to the initiated, incomprehensible. The example of text-writers proves conclusively that a digest is not *essential* as an intermediate step, since all the best text-writers attempt, and many of them with marked success, to discover and arrange the rules and principles which are involved in the decided cases.

That which has been done successfully by text-writers, we desire with Sir J. P. Wilde to see attempted on a large scale and by authority, and we concur with him in thinking that the work may be accomplished piecemeal. It would be necessary to repeal nothing expressly, though of course some existing precedents would be rendered nugatory by the adoption of others inconsistent with them. On the completion of any section it would be sufficient to enact that its provisions should be conclusive as to all matters falling within their scope, leaving all matters not falling within the provisions of the completed sections to be decided in the same way as they are decided at present. Step by step every branch of the law could be added, except such—constitutional law, for example—as it might be considered inexpedient to meddle with. When all the sections were completed, we should have an authority sufficient for all ordinary purposes. The first question for the lawyer would be, Can the point under consideration be solved by an appeal to the code? If, as would occasionally happen, the provisions of the code proved insufficient, then, and then only, should recourse be allowed to other authority. In this way the law would be rendered easy of access, while an efficient safeguard would be provided against the consequences of unavoidable imperfection or intentional omission. We see no reason why an attempt should not at once be made at codifying certain branches of our law in this manner, and by the success or failure of the first experiment the practicability of extending the process could be judged. Take, for instance, the body of rules applicable to the interpretation of wills or of written instruments generally. We make no doubt that the whole of these rules, together with all necessary explanation and illustration, could be comprised within a single volume of moderate size; and that if this were done by competent men, and the collection made an exclusive authority as to all cases falling within its scope, the necessity of referring to a large quantity of decisions scattered through several hundred volumes would practically cease.

It forms no part of our present purpose to enter into a minute discussion of the precise machinery by which the work of codification may be carried on. It is sufficient to state that it would certainly be necessary to secure the exclusive services of six or eight highly-skilled and of course highly-paid men to prepare the necessary measures for Parliament. To such a body might fitly be assigned the permanent duty of a general superintendence of the form of our legislation, and of a periodical revision of the fresh cases, so as to keep the code on a level with the later developments. At present the staff employed in the task of revising the statutes is ridiculously inadequate.

"The work that has been done has been the work of four years; yet you will not be surprised at that period having been occupied by it when I tell you that the services of two gentlemen only are at the command of the Lord Chancellor and the law officers of the Crown, and those two gentlemen receive such inadequate salaries, that they are enabled to give up only such hours to this employment as they can subtract from their ordinary professional avocations."—p. 29.

We cordially concur in a hope expressed by the Lord Chancellor, that Parliament will enable the work of remodelling our law to be prosecuted with more effect. Looking to the enormous advantages to be realized, the really insignificant annual sum requisite for securing the services of a sufficient staff of able men ought not for one moment to offer an obstacle. In a merely pecuniary point of view a good code would pay its expenses in the shape of labour saved twenty times over. To those who know the vast influence for good or for evil that the legal system of a country exerts upon the mental habits of its practitioners and of the educated community generally, the pecuniary advantage will appear the smallest part of the gain. Such persons look for the period when practitioners shall no longer be classed as Real Property lawyers, Equity lawyers, and Common Law lawyers, the members of each group skilled only in their own department, and hope for the day when a knowledge of the laws of his country shall form part of the possession of every educated Englishman.

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ART. IV.—MODERN NOVELISTS: SIR EDWARD
BULWER-LYTTON.

1. *The Novels of Sir Edward Bulwer-Lytton, Bart., M.P.* Library Edition. 41 Vols. Edinburgh: Blackwood and Sons. 1859-62.
2. *A Strange Story.* By the author of "Rienzi," "My Novel," &c. London: Sampson Low, Son, and Co. 1862.

SIR EDWARD BULWER-LYTTON is a man of many titles and various accomplishments. He is a member of Parliament, a baronet, an ex-Minister of State, a poet, a dramatist, and an historian, and he has written in the whole forty-one volumes of novels, which have been very nicely printed by Messrs. Blackwood. In regard to mere quantity of work his life has not been unproductive, and as he owes something to the gifts both of nature and fortune, he occupies a considerable place among the literary men of the day. Nor will any candid person deny that he deserves a place. He has arrived at a certain degree of excellence in several different directions. He took to parliamentary life, and became a member of Lord Derby's Government. Of course no one thinks of him as the man who was Secretary to the Colonies in 1858; but the ambition of many a country gentleman is satisfied with a less reward than a seat in the Cabinet, even for a short time and in a weak administration. He roused some attention as a political pamphleteer. Although his public life has not been eventful, yet as Chairman of the Committee of Inquiry into the state of the Drama, and as an occasional speaker in the House of Commons, it has not passed entirely without distinction. In the field of letters his good fortune has been more unequivocal. We distinguish four separate lines of endeavour—drama, history, poetry, and romance—and in three out of the four the endeavour has been crowned with success. Few modern plays are greater favourites with managers and the public than the "Lady of Lyons," "Richelieu," and "Money," and whatever may be their faults they are admirably suited to the stage. Of Sir Edward Bulwer-Lytton's more ambitious efforts it is impossible to speak with praise. His "History of Athens" is a very bad history, no doubt—flashy, superficial, and pretentious; but then it should be remembered that it is one of his earlier works, and that a young man of fashion may spend his mornings in worse occupations than writing gushing nonsense about Athens. Of his poetry we

can scarcely speak as a thing apart; the rhymed matter which is printed and published as such is the least portion of it, and to tell the truth, has attracted little attention among the curious. But Sir Edward B. Lytton's whole life is a poem—his speeches are poems—his novels are all poems—we do not doubt that his Colonial administration was a poem also. Since the world began there has not been a more devoted worshipper of the Genius of the Beautiful and the Sublime. Passionate, imaginative, ideal, the right honourable baronet is unquestionably a poet. He may not be a striking or even a good one; but he has an undoubted right to the title. It is as unfair to deny that a man is a poet because he writes weak poetry, as to deny him to be a tailor because he makes bad coats. But whatever fame this versatile writer has acquired from these various occupations, it is on his prose fictions that his reputation rests. They were his earliest, and they have been his latest effort. He has devoted to them the greater part of a laborious life. They contain the substance of whatever he has done or attempted elsewhere. We may read in them the changes of his political faith, from the ardent radicalism of the member for St. Ives to the easy conservatism of the member for Hertfordshire. From them may be extracted the most favourable examples of his poetic and dramatic genius. They are crowded with his theories on art, with his philosophic opinions, with his historical and classical learning, and with his religious aspirations :

“————— quo fit, ut omnis,
Votiva pateat veluti descripta tabella,
Vita senis.”

If any one wishes to understand Sir Edward Bulwer-Lytton *au fond*, and thinks it worth while to read forty-one volumes of novels, the materials are ready to hand.

Within the last few years these works have been revised by their author: the faults which sprang from hasty writing and the extravagance of youthful thought have been corrected, and we are presented in a complete form, and with every advantage of careful editorship, with the substance of the labours of one of our most celebrated writers during the last thirty-five years.

The publication of this “Library Edition” of Sir Edward Bulwer-Lytton's novels gives us an opportunity of inquiring whether they possess the qualities which are commonly attributed to them, and which we have a right to expect in books which claim a place on our library shelves.

In attempting to form a judgment on the point, we do not forget that the author has placed those who pronounce an opinion on his writings in a position of some difficulty. He has no objection to criticism provided only it be favourable, but to blame of any

kind he has the strongest possible distaste. Like Ahab, he will hear the sons of the prophets, but if they presume to prophesy of him at all they must prophesy good continually and not evil. If a reviewer overrates his success, the fault is attributed "to that generous courtesy which characterizes the true scholar in referring to the labours of a contemporary."* But if the error should happen to be on the other side, we get a gloomy picture indeed of the state of critical morality. A well-known literary journal handled Sir Edward Bulwer-Lytton's earliest works rather roughly. The author replied by the sketch of MacGrawler in "Paul Clifford."† Mr. MacGrawler is described as the editor of the *Asinæum*. He is wholly illiterate, haunts the lowest public-houses, is a drunkard, a profligate, and, above all, a Scotchman. He explains to a young pupil the whole mystery of criticism as applied to romances; and as his instructions include an example of that "loftier and more erudite style which may be reserved for one of the Quarterly Reviews,"‡ we have no excuse for not profiting by his lessons. "Paul Clifford" was written when Sir Edward was a young man; but some years afterwards, when his popularity was fully established, he reverts to his old grievance. In the preface to the "Sea Captain" we hear "of that spirit of depreciation and hostility which it has been my misfortune to excite amongst the general contributors to the periodical press," and we have a plaintive acknowledgment that "the consciousness that every endeavour will be made to cavil, to distort, and, in fine, to *run down*, will occasionally haunt even the hours of composition to check the inspiration and damp the ardour." This tone is neither dignified, nor, indeed, becoming. Sir Edward Bulwer-Lytton must have lived long enough to know that there are few books or men on whose merits opinions may not fairly differ. In revising his own works he must have observed numerous blunders, extravagances, and faults of construction and language. He admits, in fact, that this is so. There may possibly be other defects of which he is less conscious. It is difficult to see why a critic should not point out these defects, or even think more lightly of Sir Edward Bulwer-Lytton's general merits than he does himself, without being influenced by unworthy motives or malignant passions.

With certain restrictions to be mentioned hereafter, we fully adopt that theory of criticism which the author of "Paul Clifford" implies to be the true one. To judge a work fairly, it should be looked at from its own proper central point; we should recognise what is essential, and distinguish it from what is acces-

* Preface to "Harold," p. i.

† "Paul Clifford," vol. i. p. 62 sqq., vol. ii. p. 113 sqq.

‡ "Paul Clifford," vol. i. p. 67.

sory; nor should mere faults of execution, or defects in working out a secondary design, be allowed to interfere with the appreciation of beauties which belong to it when viewed with reference to its end and aim. As it has been neatly expressed, we should seek not only to see into a man, but to see out of him. Everybody agrees that criticism of this kind, especially if it embrace works produced in another age and under conditions dissimilar to our own, requires aptitude and education of no ordinary kind. It is a very different thing from that mere cleverness of fault-finding which is too often mistaken for it. Without some quickness of sympathy and flexibility of mind, no one can get sufficiently out of himself to do justice to ideas with which he may be presumed to be familiar. But if the ideas are not familiar—if we have before us an ancient system of philosophy, for example—we must not only throw off the greater part of our own acquired opinions, but we must put on the thoughts habitual to the men of that age and country. Critics, like Schlegel, who succeed in renouncing their own personality, and who are ready to look at everything through its proper medium, are no doubt very superior beings to the MacGrawlers of the periodical press.

But let it be granted that we have once got at a man, or, as Mr. Carlyle would say, that we have deciphered the whole heart of his mystery; it by no means follows that we shall be prepared to like him. It may be supposed that there are such things as bad books in the world: the better they are known, the worse they will appear. No amount of sympathy between author and critic, short of that which makes one as blind as the other, can conjure an indifferent writer into a good one. This seems so obvious that we are almost ashamed to say it. But the fact is, that the German school of critics have misled their more incautious followers into the belief that to appreciate a thing, that is, to weigh it at its value, is necessarily to admire it. There were so many productions of sterling worth which had been overlooked or misjudged until they had been placed in a proper light by means of a sympathetic interpretation, that people began to think that if they were only sympathetic enough everything would turn out to be worth something.

Now, what is the point of view from which Sir Edward Bulwer-Lytton's novels can be most properly regarded? Here we have a number of apparently independent works, ranging over a variety of subjects—dealing with the natural and the supernatural worlds, with the early Roman Empire, with mediæval Europe, and with the England of to-day. Is there any coherence in this mass of heterogeneous materials? If so, they may be embraced under a general survey; but if not, in justice to their author and themselves, they must be disengaged and considered separately. It must be confessed that it is difficult to see anything in common

between "Pelham," for instance, and "Paul Clifford," "Eugene Aram," and the "Last Days of Pompeii"—that is, anything essential, anything beyond certain peculiarities of style and the recurrence of some well-known types of character. But we are assured by the writer that a point of connexion does exist. They represent various phases in his self-education. In "Pelham," in the "Disowned," in "Devereux," and in "Paul Clifford" we are shown his mind in the earliest stage of its growth, when it was observing rather than imagining, and chiefly occupied with those questions which lie on the surface of human life.* "From depicting in 'Paul Clifford' the errors of society, it was almost the natural progress of reflection to pass to those which swell to crime in the solitary human heart—from the bold and open evils that spring from ignorance and example to trace those that lie coiled in the entanglements of refining knowledge and speculative pride. Looking back at this distance of years, I can see as clearly as if mapped before me the paths which led across the boundary of invention from 'Paul Clifford' to 'Eugene Aram.' And, that last work done, no less clearly can I see where the first gleams from a fairer fancy broke on my way and rested on those more ideal images which I sought with a feeble hand to transfer to the 'Pilgrims of the Rhine' and the 'Last Days of Pompeii.'" As we have this statement on the best authority, there is no alternative but to accept it. No one can be supposed to know so well as Sir Edward Bulwer-Lytton himself the stages of his self-education. The human mind unquestionably observes before it imagines. Not less certain is it that the "Disowned" and "Devereux" were published before "Eugene Aram" and the "Last Days of Pompeii." But it would never have occurred to us to connect those facts, any more than, left to ourselves, we should have thought that it was the natural course of reflection to pass from social problems to the consideration of the solitary human heart. If we wished to give an example of Sir Edward Bulwer-Lytton's power of observation, we should turn at once to his latest works—to "My Novel" or "A Strange Story," rather than to "Pelham," the "Disowned," or "Devereux." On the other hand, in his earlier novels we seek and find the wildest luxuriance of imaginative power. To take an instance from each of the first three: Glanville in "Pelham," Algernon Mordaunt in the "Disowned," and Montreuil in "Devereux" are so elaborately unlike anything that can have been presented in the actual world that they must have been evolved altogether out of the materials in the author's brain. As to Algernon Mordaunt, we have a direct admission that this was so. "I was deeply engaged," says

* See the Preface to "Paul Clifford," p. xii.

Sir Edward Bulwer-Lytton, "in the study of ethics and metaphysics at the time, and out of that study grew Algernon Mordaunt." Any one who remembers the "Disowned" will acknowledge that it must have required unusual powers of fancy to have evolved the character of Mordaunt out of anything to be found in an ethical treatise, to say nothing of a metaphysical one.

However this may be, in justice to Sir Edward Bulwer-Lytton's own conception, we must waive all objections and consent to look at his works from the point of view he has himself chosen; we must regard them as the spontaneous outgrowth of a mind in successive stages of its development. For he tells us that this is at once the true central point and the idea which, underlying all, binds together these scattered fragments into an organic whole.

We confess that we are not very fond of philosophical criticism in art. Of all inquiries, that into the *idea* or inner meaning of the artist is the most exhausting and profitless. His object is, or should be, to give us pleasure. If he produces something which we can enjoy, his work is relatively good; if something which all enjoy, it is as absolutely good as such things ever are. His duty is by no means to teach. He may make us happier, and perhaps better in being so, but he will never make us wiser. No one can be a poet without a certain partiality and incompleteness of character—without that tendency to falsehood which Aristotle has impolitely expressed by saying that "poets tell many lies."* And, on the other hand, no one can be a philosopher without a tenacity of grasp and breadth of view which are fatal to artistic effect. From such men we may learn much and get that subdued enjoyment which follows the consciousness of acquisition, but of the strictly emotional pleasure which is produced by successful art we shall feel nothing. Therefore, to search out the meaning of a poem or the idea of a picture, above all to plunge into the mind and soul of the poet or painter and consider their work from within, is a confusion of two distinct sets of faculties, and is as prejudicial to philosophy as it is to art. We may learn the value of this exegetical criticism by considering what it has done for us in a few well-known instances. Does anybody enjoy "Hamlet" more by the aid of Gervinus or Coleridge? Does the library of commentaries which the ingenuity of Germany has produced increase our appreciation of "Faust"? Do the admirers of the "Excursion" care to be told in a preface that it contains the record of the origin and progress of Mr. Wordsworth's own powers? We are assuming these works to be poems. A person is at liberty to say that they are not poems, but systems of philosophy, and in

* *Metap. i. 6, πολλά ψεύδονται οἱ ἀοιδοί.*

that case their inner meaning is important ; but assuming them for the moment to be art and not science, we are humbly of opinion that the less we go behind and beneath them, and the more we get in front of them, the better. As regards Sir Edward Bulwer-Lytton's novels, in the absence of the author's instructions, no one would have felt any doubt. They are in form stories turning principally upon passion, with their proper complement of heroes, villains, and walking gentlemen, and containing, in addition to the ordinary incidents of a romance, sundry intercalated reflections on things in general. They are better worth reading than most books of that kind are, and the English public has testified its approval by paying down several thousand pounds sterling, and making their author a baronet. But it is surprising to be told that they are types and symbols, and that what looks like a creditable love-story is in fact a history of the growth of Genius. Here is "Ernest Maltravers" and its continuation, "Alice." We take up the book with a certain awe. It is dedicated to the German people ; it is called "Eleusinia, or The Mysteries;" there is a Greek quotation on the title-page ; and the preface informs us that it is the most mature, and, on the whole, the most comprehensive of all that the author had then written,* and above all, that it is an attempt to work out the philosophical design of a moral education or apprenticeship. The German people have seen so much in "Wilhelm Meister" that they may be able to detect something in "The Mysteries." To an English reader nothing can well be less mysterious or, speaking ethically, less instructive. Ernest Maltravers, the type of Genius, is one of those extraordinary men who, at the age of eighteen, have managed to learn everything. Returning home from Germany he meets in a roadside hovel the daughter of a burglar, Alice Darvil. He is much struck with her beauty and goodness, and especially with the exquisite simplicity of her character. Alice escapes from her father's house and accompanies the type of Genius to a pretty cottage some distance off, where they live together and are very happy. This is the first stage of Maltravers' moral apprenticeship, and it can hardly be considered a good beginning. Soon, however, the burglar finds them out, and taking advantage of the temporary absence of Maltravers, carries his daughter away. To the ecstasies of youthful passion succeeds the gloom of utter despair ; Maltravers becomes an altered man, and goes abroad. At Naples he meets with a celebrated beauty, one Madame de Ventadour ; his heart was immediately softened—old memories were recalled—in a word, he became dangerously in love. It was not his fault that he did not commit a second

* In 1840.

extravagance, but he was rescued from it by the straightforward conduct of Madame de Ventadour herself—a very spirited, attractive, sensible woman. On this he leaves Naples for Como, where he meets the family of the De Montaignes. We are to see here Genius brought within the sphere of home influences. The contrast between the gloomy selfishness of Castruccio, the pseudo-poet, and the frank, generous enthusiasm of his English companion, is not ill worked out. Maltravers makes love to no one at Como, but he has several long arguments with M. de Montaigne, who is the type of Good Sense, and who generally has the best of it. After a time the hero returns to London and writes a poem which immediately makes him famous. One of its most enthusiastic admirers is Lady Florence Lascelles, who is herself a genius, and in addition to that, an heiress and a beautiful and accomplished young lady. Maltravers becomes engaged to her, and the first part of the book closes with his despair at her untimely death. Meanwhile, Alice, after several adventures, has attracted the regards of a banker of the name of Templeton, who marries her, obtains a peerage with the title of Vargrave, and then dies, leaving behind him his widow and an only daughter who is his heiress. Evelyn Cameron—so this young person is called—is understood not to be the daughter of Lord Vargrave, but of Alice by some former husband, and we are led to suppose that her real father is Ernest Maltravers. Maltravers, meanwhile, is sated with triumph and wearied of civilization. He desired to overpass the limits of the Great and Good, and having naturally failed in that, goes abroad again—to Africa, to the East—no one knows where. He is not much improved by wandering in the desert of Sahara, for he returns to England with a supreme and wholesale contempt of all other men and of all their objects. In this frame of mind he meets with Evelyn Cameron, and at once conceives a passionate affection for her. His rival is a scheming and thoroughly unprincipled man—Lumley Ferrers—who has succeeded to Lord Vargrave's title, and who is anxious to succeed to his estates also. But what chance has the Worldly against the Sublime? Maltravers' suit prospers, and he is promised the hand of Evelyn. At this juncture some disclosures are made by Lord Vargrave which convince Maltravers that Evelyn Cameron is his own daughter and the child of his long-lost Alice. The situation is repulsive, and ought not to have been presented, even for a moment, to the imagination of the reader, but it gives Sir Edward Bulwer-Lytton the opportunity of drawing a vigorous picture of despair, and of quoting the "*Œdipus Tyrannus*." Before very long everything is cleared up: it turns out that Alice's own child died, and that Evelyn was substituted in its place by the late Lord Vargrave. Justice is done upon Lumley Ferrers, who is

murdered; Evelyn is happily married to a colonel in the army, and Maltravers is free to return to Alice, which he does amid the tears of everybody. "Stage after stage we have proceeded with Maltravers through the MYSTERIES OF LIFE. The Eleusinia are closed, and the crowning libation poured."*

Such, considerably softened in outline, is the plot of what we must consider a most objectionable book. However, our quarrel at this moment is not with its teaching, but with its extravagant pretentiousness. It is an ordinary novel—neither more nor less, in execution not better than hundreds of novels, and in its idea much worse. Why it should be dedicated to the German people; why it should be called "THE MYSTERIES;" why it should be "an experiment in typical fiction," and have an æsthetic intention and a philosophical design, no human ingenuity can discover. It is very easy to say that Maltravers is a type of the poetic intelligence and that his history symbolizes the probation of Genius through sorrow; that Alice is the type of Nature, and that from their early love, their long separation, and their union at last we may learn the source whence poetry is inspired, and the only object on which it can permanently rest. When all this is granted, what is gained either for the reader or the story? Nothing can be easier than to describe a particularly insipid and ill-educated person, and call her Nature. A man who makes violent love to four women in about twelve years, who is engaged to two of them, and ends by marrying a widow, may be a good representation of a poet, but he does not become more striking by being described as a type, nor is a gross story refined by being called an allegory. We have no concern with what the author meant; we wish to enjoy, if we can, what he has done. All this idle talk about the *idea* of Ernest Maltravers is a mere attempt to make a very ordinary book go off on the pretence of its having a meaning which does not meet the eye. It is compared by its author to "Wilhelm Meister." A very far-seeing critic says of "Wilhelm Meister" that its idea is that it has no idea at all. And this is precisely our opinion of "The Mysteries."

This tendency to idealistic symbolism is one of the great characteristics of Sir Edward Bulwer-Lytton's mind. A man, with him, is not a man, but the personification of something beginning with a capital letter. Any attribute he may possess is generalized into the name of a class to which a kind of individual existence is given by the aid of the article. Thus courage is "The Brave;" truth, "The Truthful;" beauty, "The Beautiful;" and so on. And this is probably the reason why a novelist is necessarily a philosopher, and why novels themselves are such important affairs as we find them to be. Dealing with

* "Alice," vol. ii. p. 333.

the essence of things, with matter sublimed to its highest and purest form, they are a revelation of what Sir Edward calls "poetic truth," and by no means the trifles that careless people imagine. We get quite frightened as we read what overwhelming power for good or evil lies concealed in the three apparently innocent volumes we take with us to the sea-side. Listen :—

"Between the literature of imagination and the practical interests of a people there is a harmony as complete as it is mysterious. The heart of an author is the mirror of his age."* "Providence has appointed literature as the sublime agent of civilization, of opinion, and of law; has endowed the elements it employs with a divine power of self-purification."† "It must require," said Lady Roseville, "an extraordinary combination of mental powers to produce a perfect novel." "One so extraordinary," answered Vincent, "that although we have one perfect epic poem and several which pretend to perfection, we have not one perfect novel in the world."‡ "Every good novel has one great end—the same in all—viz. the increasing our knowledge of the heart. It is thus that a novel-writer must be a philosopher. Whoever succeeds in showing us more accurately the nature of ourselves and species, has done science and consequently virtue the most important benefit."§ But it is not given to everybody to further the march of civilization, promote the welfare of the world, and extend the bounds of science by means of romances. Those who are to be members of the glorious company of novelists receive a special call and mission thereto. "For with some, to write is not a vague desire, but an imperious destiny. The fire is kindled, and must break forth—the wings are fledged, and the birds must leave their nest. The communication of thought to man is implanted as an instinct in those breasts to which Heaven has entrusted the solemn agencies of Genius."|| Even this is not enough. To inspiration from above must be added a large share of sublunary learning. "Before he (that is, the novel-writer) touches his tale, he should be thoroughly acquainted with the intricate science of morals, and the metaphysical as well as the more open operations of the mind. If his knowledge is not deep and clear, his love of the good may only lead him into error, and he may pass off the prejudices of a susceptible heart for the precepts of virtue. Would to Heaven that people would think it necessary to be instructed before they attempt to instruct!"¶ Very heartily echoing this pious ejaculation, we now proceed to consider how far Sir Edward Bulwer-Lytton himself has satisfied the requirements upon which he insists.

* Preface to "Paul Clifford," p. x. † "Alice," book vi. ch. ii. vol. ii. p. 22.

‡ "Pelham," vol. i. p. 324.

§ Ibid. p. 325.

|| "Ernest Maltravers," vol. ii. p. 181.

¶ "Pelham," vol. i. p. 326.

Whether he has been entrusted by Heaven with the solemn agencies of Genius it is difficult to say ; but he has certainly received an unlimited commission to talk nonsense about it. And it must be confessed that he is not the only one who does so. The word Genius has been defined, and explained, and rhapsodized upon until it has almost lost what little meaning it once possessed. The excellent Dr. Johnson is of opinion that it is a large general power operating in a particular direction—a definition which must have occurred to him some evening when he had been drinking seventeen cups of tea at Mrs. Thrale's. Schlegel will have it to be taste, and Coleridge reduces it to a power of being astonished at what is familiar. Mr. Disraeli will not say that it is Youth, but he will (and does) say that Genius, when young, is divine, and as he devotes a page and a half of "Coningsby" to the proof of this proposition, he may be supposed to consider it important. So that the word is evidently one which sets people on their hobby, and excites them to talk a certain quantity of exalted nonsense. Sir Edward Bulwer-Lytton, however, has contrived to think and print on this subject more pure unalloyed twaddle than we ever saw out of a schoolboy's exercise. We first of all observe that, with few exceptions, all his novels contain a Genius, *eo nomine*. Glanville, Eugene Aram, Ernest Maltravers, Lady Lascelles, Adam Warner, Zanoni, Pisani, Viola, Ione, Leonard Fairfield,—all have the gift. But what is it? It is little to know that these people are genii, for there is scarcely anything in common between them. Genius comes of high parentage. It is "the beautiful offspring of Eros and Psyché ;" * it is "the Sublime Missionary which goes forth from the serene Intellect of the Author to live in the wants, the griefs, the infirmities of others, in order that it may learn their language ;" † it is "one of the two movers of the ALL that continues the airy life of the Beautiful from age to age." ‡ "Between God and Genius there is a necessary link ; there is almost a correspondent language." § Apollo is its type ; || and "its highest achievement is pity." ¶

One would suppose that in this extraordinary series of images Sir Edward Bulwer-Lytton had worked off, so to speak, his enthusiasm. We confess we should like to know what some of it means, and especially the passage about the ALL and the Beautiful, which is more poetical than clear. But as this is impossible, we turn to "My Novel"—one of the latest and perhaps the most

* "Zanoni," book ii. ch. vii.

† "Ernest Maltravers," book viii. ch. ii.

‡ "Last of the Barons," book iii. ch. i.

§ "Zanoni," book ii. ch. vii. vol. i. p. 137. || "My Novel," book iv. ch. vii.

¶ "Ernest Maltravers," *loc. cit.*

mature work of the author, in the hope of finding something intelligible upon a subject on which he evidently feels deeply. And we read as follows:—

“Genius, that, manly, robust, healthful as it be, is long before it lose its instinctive Dorian modesty; shamefaced because so susceptible to glory—genius, that loves indeed to dream, but on the violet bank, not on the dunghill. Wherefore, even in the error of the senses, it seeks to escape from the sensual into worlds of fancy, subtle and refined. But apart from the passions, true genius is the most practical of all human gifts. Like the Apollo whom the Greek worshipped as its type, even Arcady is its exile, not its home. Soon weary of the dalliance of Tempé, it ascends to its mission—the archer of the silver bow, the guide of the car of light. Speaking more plainly, genius is the enthusiasm for self-improvement; it ceases or sleeps the moment it desist (*sic*) from seeking some object which it believes of value, and by that object it insensibly connects its self-improvement with the positive advance of the world.”*

It is certainly disappointing to find that when we come to speak plainly, and forget all about Eros and Psyché and the Archer of the Silver Bow, and the instinctive modesty of the Dorians, genius should become such a very commonplace quality as the wish to improve oneself and to get on in life. And why, on this supposition, it should have been given to Zanoni, who held commune with Adon-Ai and could do anything; or to Adam Warner, who cared only for his steam-engine; or to Ione, who had no thought beyond her lover, is a mystery. But it is very clear that when Sir E. Bulwer-Lytton uses the word “genius,” no human being can any longer guess what he means by it. He may intend to describe a power purely rational, as in the case of Warner; or one purely æsthetic, as with Pisani; or one purely emotional, as with Ione; or a general capability of doing anything, as with Maltravers; or a merely unrealized desire for doing something, as with Leonard Fairfield. All that we are sure of is, that whenever we meet with the word “genius” in Sir Edward Bulwer-Lytton’s pages, not many lines off will be found some signal instance of his own genius for mystification and fine writing.

This leads us to remark upon the general style in which these novels are written. It is not, in our judgment, either appropriate or striking. It would be difficult to extract a dozen pages which show any real command over the resources of the English tongue. The language is never bold, vigorous, or terse; it is sometimes eloquent, more rarely picturesque; very often it degenerates into mere bombast, or into a dilute mock-heroic. And there is

* “My Novel,” book iv. ch. vii.

throughout a manner, more easily felt than described, which educated people in general most carefully eschew. This, which we may call the "ever and anon style," would of itself prevent Sir Edward Bulwer-Lytton from being a great writer. We hardly like to call him vulgar; but he tries to be so superfine that he always reminds his readers of the "Court Journal" and of tradesmen's circulars. Why, for example, does he prefer "inly" to "inwardly," "murtherous" to "murderous," "coronal" to "coronet"? Why need a man "lave his face" instead of washing it? Why is a single servant a "solitary domestic," and a cabman "a ministrant of Trivia"? The last expression looks like a parody on Johnson, but there are several others of the same kind. Thus we have "pomarian crudities" instead of apples; the vulgarism "calligraphy" for writing, and "somnia-bular accommodations,"* for bed-rooms—Sir Edward Bulwer-Lytton being apparently under the delusion that somnambulism is the Latin for sleep. There are also very many such slipshod expressions as these: "although she refused to accept of freedom;" † "betaking himself punctually to his engagement;" ‡ "the Athenians were beat by the Spartans;" § "As, to-day, the common mechanic may equal in science, however inferior in genius, the friar whom his contemporaries feared as a magician." ¶ And we have noticed a confusion between "shall" and "will," which is happily rare in south-country writers. Here is an instance of it:—

"'Well,' said Talbot, 'if we now rightly understand each other, we shall be the best friends in the world. As we shall expect great things from each other sometimes, we will have no scruple in exacting an heroic sacrifice every now and then; for instance, I will ask you to punish yourself by an occasional *tête-à-tête* with an ancient gentleman; and as we can also, by the same reasoning, pardon great faults in each other, if they are not often committed, so I will forgive you, with all my heart, whenever you refuse my invitations, if you do not refuse them often.'"*

If Clarence kept his countenance during this lucid address, he was very well fitted for the diplomatic appointment he afterwards received.

Speaking of Sir Edward Bulwer-Lytton solely as a master of language, little can be said in his favour; but we think he deserves to have been made a baronet if only for this reason—that he has perfected the valuable art of talking nonsense becomingly. At a time when universal attention is being paid to economising our products, the man who teaches us to use ideas which have

* "Paul Clifford," ch. xvi. † "Last Days of Pompeii," book iii. ch. iv.

‡ "Paul Clifford," ch. xv. § "My Novel," book iv. ch. xix.

¶ "Last of the Barons," book iii. ch. ii. ¶¶ "Disowned," ch. xii.

been hitherto rejected, is a real benefactor. It is painful to think how much available material must have been wasted through ignorance of the great Bulwerian process for the utilization of twaddle. Like all discoveries worth anything, it is very simple. Let us try to explain it. Suppose Sir Edward wishes to make a remark : he takes the first platitude which occurs to him ; say he lays his hand on a copy-book, and turning over the leaves, lights on this aphorism—"Knowledge is commendable." Here is our waste material, a proposition perfectly useless in its present shape—one of the waifs and strays of literature. What does Sir Edward Bulwer-Lytton do? He first gently manipulates "knowledge" into "to know." "To know is commendable," is already an improvement ; but the predicate is still feeble : a substantive is wanted to give it weight ; "desire," or indeed almost any word, will do, this being merely an intermediate step. "To know is a commendable desire : " there is a flavour of meaning in this which was not detected in the original maxim ; but it is as easy, and much more striking, to say of a thing that it is a raging impulse, an impetuous want, a glorious fever, as to call it a commendable desire. Selection being made of one of these expressions, a few touches only are wanted. By inverting the sentence, Sir Edward imparts a deeper and more solemn meaning thereto, he gives dignity to the infinitive by capital letters, throws in a word to balance it, and presents us with the maxim in "My Novel"—neat, finished, and as good as new—"Certainly it is a glorious Fever that desire TO KNOW."

The object of this process is obviously to bring out an idea : a variation occurs where it is desired to conceal one. In this case mere fine language is used, as when the House of Commons is described as "the turbulent but sublime arena in which truths are vindicated and mankind advanced ;"* or when Randal Leslie "invokes the grand spirit of knowledge, and bids the Celestial Still one minister to the commands of an earthly and turbulent ambition."† The weaker or more obscure the original idea, the more ornament and support it requires. No one would bear to be told that political life promotes honesty and beauty. That is rather too strong ; as M. Jourdain's teacher says, "*Il faut bien étendre un peu la chose.*" So it becomes "a medium of upholding the glorious Priesthood of the Honest and the Beautiful."‡ And when, as very often happens, there is no meaning at all, the aid of metre is invoked, as in the following quotation from the Sea Captain :—

"The love that trifles round the charms it gilds,
Oft ruins while it shines."

* "Alice," vol. i. p. 221.

† "My Novel," book viii. ch. v.

‡ "Ernest Maltravers," book iii. ch. iv.

We think it was Mr. Thackeray who first pointed out that these beautiful lines may be read any way. Thus, we may either say, as in the original—

“The love that trifles round the charms it gilds,
Oft ruins while it shines.”

Or,

“The charms that trifle round the love it gilds,
Shines while it ruins oft.”

Or,

“The ruins that love gilds and shines around,
Oft trifles where it charms.”

Or,

“The trifles that love gilds while oft it shines,
It charms the ruins round.”

And whichever way they are read they yield exactly the same amount of meaning.

The value of the process we have described is best seen by observing the effect of neglecting it. Sometimes we happen upon a thought in its original and crude state. Thus in “*The Mysteries*” we read, “What a complex thing is education!”* in “*Devereux*,” “The precepts of knowledge it is difficult to extricate from error;” and in the “*History of Athens*,”† “Solitude may exalt the genius of a man, but communion alone can refine the taste of a people.” There is no excuse for this practice, which is lax and inartistic, besides being dangerous. The latter passage especially lays itself open to the remark which Mr. Weller once made when some one observed that company was a very different thing from solitude. “That’s what I call a self-evident proposition,” said Sam, “as the dogs’-meat man said to the housemaid when she told him he wasn’t a gentleman.”

We have implied that a novel ceases to be a novel when it aims at philosophical teaching. It is not the vehicle for conveying knowledge. Its business is to amuse, and give us that insight into human affairs which is obtained by the observation of character. When this is well done, we may no doubt learn much which will be of service to us in practical life. Every one knows more of social adventurers since Mr. Thackeray described Colonel Crawley and Becky Sharp: we are much more at home with bishops and their associates since Mr. Trollope painted Dr. Proudie and the Archdeacon; but the higher kind of mental cultivation comes not from observation, but from thought. And it may safely be laid down that not one reader in five hundred, after he has closed a novel, sits down to reflect seriously on the philo-

* “*Alice*,” vol. i. p. 14.

† “*Athens*,” vol. ii. p. 15.

sophical problems it contains. It would be a great waste of time to do so ; for, in the first place, novelists are not usually deep thinkers ; and if they were, they would be compelled to dilute their ideas with so much irrelevant matter, that it would be labour ill bestowed to disengage the gold from the dross. The Platonic dialogues are, perhaps, as near an approach to a philosophical novel as is consistent with a serious intention, and not many people read the Protagoras or the Gorgias for amusement. It is, therefore, almost unnecessary to ask what effect Sir Edward Bulwer-Lytton has produced by the manner in which he has carried out his philosophical designs. We may safely assume that the readers of the "Railway Library" skip all the reflections, and prefaces, and arguments, such as they are. But so much stress is laid on the inner teaching and the truths inculcated in this series of stories, that it would be scarcely fair to ignore what the author considers the really valuable part of his writings. Let us attempt, humbly and with reverence, to draw aside the veil which shrouds these mysteries from the world.

Sir Edward Bulwer-Lytton seems to recognise two separate forms and, as it were, modes of existence—the real and the ideal. Those words which, used accurately, point to a relation which is implied in every mental process, are by him sharply contrasted, and represent classes of objects perfectly independent of each other. There can be neither union nor alliance between them. The laws of their being are different ; so soon as they come into relation, one or the other, and perhaps both, are destroyed. Such, at least, appears to be the philosophical meaning of "Zanoni," so far as "Zanoni" has any meaning whatever. The pupil of Mejnour is the representative of an ideal life in its utmost possible perfection. He possesses eternal youth, absolute power, and absolute knowledge, which last implies, as we are elsewhere told,* absolute goodness. His love for Viola compels him to descend from this high estate, to become realized as it were, and to be as other men are, impotent and blind. His degradation is completed by the birth of a child. Then, the union of the Ideal and the Real having borne fruit, Zanoni dies. By the aid of this theory, the parentage of which is obvious enough, we may explain what otherwise it is not easy to see, why the poet, who studies nothing but the human heart, is a greater philosopher than anybody,† and also why the novelist should be a philosopher. Poets and novelists live in this world of ideas ; it is theirs to communicate with Adon-Ai, to be ever young, to contemplate the pure

* "As ignorance is the sole spring of evil, it necessarily follows that were we consummate in knowledge we should be perfect in good."—*Disowned*.

† "Zanoni," book iv. ch. ix. vol. ii. p. 86.

essence of things, and to solve the "Great Problem of the Unknown." Only by ascending "from men's narrow world to the spirit's infinite home" can we arrive at that "Poetry, Music, and Art which belong to the idea of Beauty."* But the knowledge of these ultimate forms is philosophy. Therefore the Poet is a Philosopher. First and last this is the teaching of "Zanoni," of the "Disowned," and of "Ernest Maltravers." But what is the principle of this ideal life? We are landed at once on "that grandest of all earthly speculations—the metaphysical proofs of the immortality of the soul."† At first Sir Edward Bulwer-Lytton seems to have thought that this question was not only accessible to reason, but easily accessible. In "Devereux," the hero meets in Russia an Italian philosopher named Bezoni, "a believer in that dark doctrine which teaches that man is dust, and that all things are forgotten in the grave." Bezoni and Devereux have several long discussions on the immortality of the soul, in which Bezoni's prodigious acquirements give him the advantage. But Devereux begins to reflect that, after all, "Truth lies in a small compass, and that in considering any speculative subject it is better to have one book of Euclid as a model than all the library of the Vatican as authorities." Accordingly he betakes himself to Italy, and proceeds to meditate on the matter. We are not carried through the stages of his reasoning, but we gather that with the aid of Euclid he speedily resolves his doubts, and that in a happy moment the grand truth flashed upon him.

"I had been at my task the whole night—pale alchemist, seeking from meaner truth to extract the greatest of all! At the first hour of the day, lo! the gold was there: the labour, for which I would have relinquished life, was accomplished: the dove descended upon the waters of my soul."—"O Earth, Reservoir of Life, over whose deep bosom brood the wings of the Universal Spirit, shaking upon thee a blessing and a power—a blessing and a power to produce and reproduce the living from the dead, so that our flesh is woven from the same atoms which were once the atoms of our sires, and the inexhaustible nutriment of Existence is Decay! O eldest and most solemn Earth, blending even thy loveliness and joy with a terror and an awe! thy sunshine is girt with clouds, and circled with storm and tempest: thy day cometh from the womb of darkness, and returneth unto darkness as man returns unto thy bosom. The green herb that laughs in the valley; the water that sings merrily along the wood; the many-winged and all-searching air, which garners life as a harvest and scatters it as a seed: all are pregnant with corruption, and carry the cradled death within them, as an oak banqueteth the destroying worm. But who that looks upon thee, and loves thee, and inhales thy blessings, will ever mingle too deep a moral with his joy? Let us not ask whence come the garlands that we wreath round our

* "Zanoni," book iv. ch. ix.

† "Devereux," book v. ch. vi.

altars, or shower upon our feasts : will they not bloom as brightly, and breathe with as rich a fragrance, whether they be plucked from the garden or the grave? O Earth, my mother Earth, dark sepulchre that closes upon all which the Flesh bears, but vestibule of the vast regions which the Soul shall pass, how leapt my heart within me when I first fathomed thy real spell !”*

This passage, which is inscribed “The Victory,” is certainly not very intelligible, but we can scarcely expect Sir Edward Bulwer-Lytton to succeed where Plato failed. And to do him justice, he appears to have since suspected that he had not so completely demonstrated the immortality of the soul as he once imagined, for he proceeds to supplement his metaphysical argument by a proof derived from animal magnetism. In “A Strange Story” there is a Dr. Fenwick, a physician of eminence, who, like Devereux, was sceptical as to the existence of the soul—that is, he maintained “that by natural philosophy no accurate reasoner could arrive at its existence as a third principle of being equally distinct from mind and body.”† The intention of this novel, which we hold to be the most striking and original of Sir Edward Bulwer-Lytton’s works, is to disabuse him of the error in question. His incredulity receives its first shock on the occasion of a ball given at the opening of a museum of natural history in the town in which he lives. Among the assembled guests are—a Sir Philip Derval, a neighbouring baronet, who has lived much in the East, and is a believer in mesmerism and clairvoyance; one Margrave, a shadowy character of the Zanoni type, who has been miraculously restored to youth by some elixir which he stole from a dervish, and Dr. Fenwick. These three persons, who may be supposed to represent the spiritual, the intellectual, and the animal life, are brought together in the museum alone. We first see the conquest of Soul over pure matter.

“As Sir Philip spoke and advanced, Margrave sank back into his seat, shrinking, collapsing, nerveless; terror the most abject expressed in his staring eyes and parted lips. On the other hand, the simple dignity of Sir Philip Derval’s bearing, and the mild power of his countenance, were alike inconceivably heightened. A change had come over the whole man, the more impressive because wholly undefinable.

“Halting opposite to Margrave, he uttered some words in a language unknown to me, and stretched one hand over the young man’s head. Margrave at once became stiff and rigid as if turned to stone. Sir Philip said to me—

“Place one of those lamps on the floor—there, by his feet.”

“I took down one of the coloured lamps from the mimic tree round which the huge anaconda coiled its spires, and placed it as I was told.

“Take the seat opposite to him, and watch.”

* “Devereux,” book vi. ch. ii.

† “A Strange Story,” ch. i. p. 11.

"I obeyed.

"Meanwhile Sir Philip had drawn from his breast-pocket a small steel casket, and I observed, as he opened it, that the interior was subdivided into several compartments, each with its separate lid; from one of these he took and sprinkled over the flame of the lamp a few grains of a powder, colourless and sparkling as diamond dust; in a second or so, a delicate perfume, wholly unfamiliar to my sense, rose from the lamp.

"You would test the condition of trance; test it, and in the spirit."

"And, as he spoke, his hand rested lightly on my head. Hitherto, amidst a surprise not unmixed with awe, I had preserved a certain defiance, a certain distrust. I had been, as it were, on my guard. But as those words were spoken, as that hand rested on my head, as that perfume arose from the lamp, all power of will deserted me. My first sensation was that of passive subjugation; but soon I was aware of a strange intoxicating effect from the odour of the lamp, round which there now played a dazzling vapour. The room swam before me. Like a man oppressed by a nightmare, I tried to move, to cry out; feeling that to do so would suffice to burst the thrall that bound me: in vain. . . . I saw before me the still rigid form of Margrave, and my sight seemed, with ease, to penetrate through its covering of flesh, and to survey the mechanism of the whole interior being.

"View that tenement of clay which now seems so fair, as it was when I last beheld it, three years ago, in the house of Haroun of Aleppo!"

"I looked, and gradually, as shade after shade falls on the mountain-side, while the clouds gather, and the sun vanishes at last, so the form and face on which I looked changed from exuberant youth to infirm old age. The discoloured wrinkled skin, the bleared dim eye, the flaccid muscles, the brittle sapless bones. Nor was the change that of age alone; the expression of the countenance had passed into gloomy discontent, and in every furrow a passion or a vice had sowed the seeds of grief.

"And the brain now opened on my sight, with all its labyrinth of cells. I seemed to have the clue to every winding in the maze.

"I saw therein a moral world, charred and ruined, as, in some fable I have read, the world of the moon is described to be; yet withal it was a brain of magnificent formation. The powers abused to evil had been of rare order; imagination, and scope: the energies that dare; the faculties that discover. . . . And still continuing to gaze thereon, I observed three separate emanations of light; the one of a pale red hue, the second of a pale azure, the third a silvery spark.

"The red light, which grew paler and paler as I looked, undulated from the brain along the arteries, the veins, the nerves. And I murmured to myself, 'Is this the principle of animal life?'

"The azure light equally penetrated the frame, crossing and reuniting with the red, but in a separate and distinct ray, exactly as, in the outer world, a ray of light crosses and unites with a ray of heat, though in itself a separate individual agency. And again I murmured

to myself, 'Is this the principle of intellectual being, directing or influencing that of animal life; with it, yet not of it?'

"But the silvery spark! What was that? Its centre seemed the brain. But I could fix it to no single organ. Nay, wherever I looked through the system, it reflected itself as a star reflects itself upon water. And I observed that while the red light was growing feebler and feebler, and the azure light was confused, irregular—now obstructed, now hurrying, now almost lost—the silvery spark was unaltered, undisturbed. . . . And I murmured to myself, 'Can that starry spark speak of the presence of the soul?' . . . And suddenly the starry spark rose from the ruins and the tumult around it—rose into space and vanished. And where my soul had recognised the presence of a soul, there was a void. But the red light burned still, becoming more and more vivid; and as it thus repaired and recruited its lustre, the whole animal form which had been so decrepit, grew restored from decay, grew into vigour and youth: and I saw Margrave as I had seen him in the waking world, the radiant image of animal life in the beauty of its fairest bloom. . . . I shrank appalled into myself, covered my face with my hands, and groaned aloud, 'Have I ever, then, doubted that soul is distinct from mind!'"*

We have no wish to ridicule the belief which "A Strange Story" is intended to promote. Sir Edward Bulwer-Lytton has every appearance of being perfectly in earnest. But we wonder he did not see that his book would either be mischievous or simply useless. The few who think it worth while to consider whether the separate existence of the soul can be established on a physiological basis are not likely to pay much attention to the dreams of an imaginary physician. Most people have no doubt as to the fact of its existence, and nothing is gained by letting them see that others do doubt. It is an offence against good taste to broach questions like those opened in "Devereux" and "A Strange Story" for the gratification of the mere novel-reading public.

When Sir Edward Bulwer-Lytton descends from these speculations and addresses himself to matters in which he can be followed, the outlines of his system become more and more indistinct. We gather, however, that he is decidedly opposed to any restrictions whatever on our knowledge. The world of Soul, Mind, and Matter is before us, and we have only to enter in and possess. "All philosophy is incomplete and unsatisfactory which bounds its inquiries to the limits of the known and certain."† "The very soul of philosophy is conjecture."‡ "It is by this hardihood of conjecture that all the triumphs of science as well as art have been accomplished."§ This opinion, which seems to have been rapidly generalized from something he has read about the value

* "A Strange Story," vol. i. pp. 246-299.

† "Ernest Maltravers," book v. ch. vi.

‡ Ibid.

§ Ibid.

of hypothesis in science, proves that Sir Edward does not rank himself among the modern followers of Bacon. It is, therefore, scarcely a matter for surprise to find the "Novum Organon" described as a book written "to show in what knowledge is power, how that power should be defined, in what it might be mistaken."* The only excuse for this astonishing summary is that it is put in the mouth of Dr. Riccabocca.

A person with these notions on philosophy is not likely to be very instructive when he begins to generalize upon history. Sir Edward Bulwer-Lytton is in the fullest sense of the word commonplace. His views are limited to a consideration of certain definite epochs—critical periods—to which he refers all intervening action. The doctrine of growth, of change effected by slowly accumulating increments of force, he rejects, or rather seems never to have considered. His habit of mind leads him to prefer something intense and spasmodic, and he reads history as children do—with an eye fixed on its horrors and bloodshed. The "Last Days of Pompeii," the "Last of the Tribunes," the "Last of the Saxon Kings," the "Last of the Barons," anything for a violent catastrophe; it being well understood that the events of the world are determined by battles, earthquakes, and the change of dynasties. There would be nothing to complain of if he professed only to use historical persons and events as materials for an exciting story. This intention, however, he expressly disclaims. His is "the humbler task of employing romance in the aid of history."† And as a means to this end, he has "consulted the original authorities of the time with a care as scrupulous as if intending to write, not a fiction, but a history." It is curious to observe the spirit in which he approaches this humble task. We are accustomed to consider that ideas govern the world—that on the additions to our knowledge, more than on anything else, rest the changes which we recognise in comparing successive epochs of national life. Sir Edward rejects any such theory in the strongest possible language. Knowledge is not, even in scientific investigations, power. Bacon never said that it was. He was "the last man in the world to have said anything so pert and so shallow."‡ And in the sphere of human action, ignorance, evil, fanaticism, hunger, almost anything indeed, is more powerful than knowledge.§ What, then, is the responsible agent in bringing about the progress of which we hear so much? In a word, it is literature. "When we look back upon human records, how the eye settles upon WRITERS as the main land-marks of the past! We talk of the age of Augustus, of Elizabeth, of Louis XIV., of Anne, as the notable eras of the world. Why? Because it is their writers who have made them so. Intervals

* "My Novel," book iv. ch. xix.

‡ "My Novel," book iv. ch. xix.

† Preface to "Harold."

§ *Ibid.* loc. cit.

between one age of authors and another lie unnoticed as the flats and common lands of uncultured history.* Nor must any one think that by writers may possibly be meant scientific writers. The distinction between literature and science is strongly insisted upon in the "Last of the Barons," where it is pointed out that high literary cultivation may coexist with the utmost ignorance and intolerance of scientific learning. Works of imagination—poems, novels, plays, are the levers which have moved a world. We leave this theory as we find it. It is not worth while to argue the general question with a man who is persuaded that "Belles Lettres" are the efficient cause of civilization, but we should like, as a matter of curiosity, to know what is meant by saying that the aphorism "Knowledge is power" is not to be found in Bacon. Bacon says that knowledge and power come to the same thing, "*in idem coincidunt*;" he says that our power is based upon our knowledge, and is not only limited by it, but varies with it. The aphorism may be pert and shallow, or it may not—that is a matter of opinion—but Bacon is responsible for it, whatever it is, and to deny that it can be found in his works is a mere verbal quibble.

As becomes a Protestant and Conservative, Sir Edward Bulwer-Lytton has a proper contempt for mediæval Christianity. We hear much of "the imbecile priestcraft of the illiterate monk;" we have many vivid comparisons between "the Christianity of cell and cloister and the Christianity which rejoices in the daylight." In this he is perhaps justified by his instincts as a politician, but he must find it hard to reconcile the belief with his duty as an historian, especially one who has consulted the original authorities with so much care. For a comparatively slight examination of the records in question must have convinced him that this imbecile priestcraft, with all its abuses, was for many centuries the only power which stood between a subject population and the unbridled violence of their masters; and that, although the clergy of the eleventh and fifteenth centuries were not exactly educated up to a modern standard, they had at all events a monopoly of the learning of that time. We suspect many of them would have made short work of much of the reasoning in "Harold" and the "Last of the Barons." So that, measured by the only standard which we can apply, the monk was neither imbecile nor illiterate, but, on the contrary, very much more learned and powerful than his modern representative. And why need we have this Exeter Hall jargon about the Christianity of cell and cloister, and the Christianity which rejoices in the daylight? Can Sir Edward Bulwer-Lytton actually believe that there is any connexion between narrowness of mind and the confinement of a cell, or between

* "My Novel," book ix. ch. xv.

intellectual darkness and the gloom of a cloister? But suppose it so, why is mediæval Christianity the Christianity of a cell? Are the secular clergy to count for nothing, or the mendicant orders—thousands of whose members saw much more of the world than our modern rectors and curates? And as to the love for daylight, if Sir Edward supposes that the average Protestant clergyman is not quite as intolerant as the average monk or friar, he has something to learn, not only about the middle ages, but about his own times.

Sir Edward Bulwer-Lytton lays great stress on his classical scholarship. His works bristle with Latin and Greek, and he always expresses himself with the easy confidence of a man to whom the life and language of antiquity are perfectly familiar. In "Pelham," written when he was fresh from Cambridge, he says of Mr. Clutterbuck—"His knowledge (of Greek history) was not drawn from the ignorant historian of her republics; nor did he find in the contemplative mildness and gentle philosophy of the ancients, nothing but a sanction for modern bigotry and existing abuses."* To which is added in a note: "It is really a disgrace to our university that any of its colleges should accept as a reference, or even tolerate as an author, the presumptuous bigot who has bequeathed to us, in his "History of Greece," the masterpiece of a declaimer without energy, and of a pedant without learning." A few pages further on, we read as follows: "I descended into the drawing-room. The only one yet there was the pale nephew; he was bending painfully over a book; I took it from him; it was Bentley upon 'Phalaris.' I could scarcely refrain from throwing it into the fire. 'Another victim!' thought I. 'Oh, the curse of an English education!'"† Again, in the "Disowned:" "As the tutors were all of the orthodox university calibre, who imagine that there is no knowledge (but vanity) in any other works than those in which their own education has consisted; so Henry Vavasour became at once the victor and the victim of Bentleys and Scaligers, word-weighers and metre-scanners."‡ From "Ernest Maltravers" we learn the true way of mastering an ancient language, and which Bentley and the college tutors so reprehensibly neglected:

"Looking upon the Greek marbles, we become acquainted, almost insensibly, with the character of the Greek life and literature—That Aristides, that Genius of Death, that fragment of the unrivalled Psyché, are worth a thousand Scaligers!

"Do you ever look at the Latin translation when you read Æschylus?" said a schoolboy once to Cleveland.

* "Pelham," vol. ii. p. 67.

† Ibid. p. 74.

‡ "Disowned," ch. liv.

“ ‘That is my Latin translation,’ said Cleveland, pointing to the Laocoon.”

Now what are the qualifications of a man who snubs Bentley and Scaliger, and calls Mitford an ignorant historian and a presumptuous bigot? We are not reviewing Sir Edward Bulwer-Lytton's "History of Athens," so we will merely say that we have read the work, and it has convinced us that he is entirely unacquainted even with the most ordinary materials of Greek history.* More than this, we think it plain that he is unable to read a Greek book in the original without making frequent and serious blunders, and that it would be paying his History an extravagant compliment merely to say that it is inferior to Mitford. It belongs to quite another order of performance, being nothing more than an inflated essay on the glory and genius of the Athenian people. No one would expect him to have any critical acquaintance with the Latin and Greek languages. Men who talk of reading Æschylus with the aid of the Laocoon never have; it is sufficient to say that he makes "defluere" a verb of the first conjugation,† and that he translates ἀποικίζειν "to pre-

* In the opening of the book the author touches on the Pelasgic controversy. He says: "Herodotus, speaking of some settlements held to be Pelasgic, and existing in his time, terms their language 'barbarous'; but Müller, nor with argument insufficient, considers that the expression of the historian would apply only to a peculiar dialect; and the hypothesis is sustained by another passage in Herodotus, in which he applies to certain Ionian dialects the same term as that with which he stigmatises the language of the Pelasgic settlements." ("History of Athens," vol. i. pp. 5, 6). Sir E. B. Lytton's readers are left to infer that Herodotus applies to the Ionian dialects the same term as he had before used in speaking of the language of the Pelasgic settlements—namely, "barbarous." Herodotus does nothing of the sort. He says that the language spoken by the Pelasgi is "barbarous," and then he goes on to refer to it as "a mode of speech"—*γλώσσης χαρακτήρ*. Afterwards, alluding to the varieties of language in use among the Ionic Greek cities, he calls them also "modes of speech"—*γλώσσης χαρακτήρες*. And the controversy turns precisely on the fact that the word "barbarous" is *not* used in both passages, although the expression "mode of speech" is. Either Sir E. B. Lytton has not referred to Herodotus or he has not understood him. Neither supposition is creditable to an historian of Athens.

In describing Solon's appeal to the people for the possession of Salamis, Sir E. B. Lytton says: "Plutarch (followed by Mr. Mitford, Mr. Thirlwall, and other modern historians) informs us that the celebrated Pisistratus then proceeded to exhort the assembly, and to advocate the renewal of the war—an account that is liable to this slight objection, that Pisistratus at that time was not born!" ("Athens," vol. i. p. 316.) It is this writer's misfortune never to be more wrong than when he is most confident. We should be glad to be informed how he knows that Pisistratus was not born when Solon made his speech. The best scholars confess their inability to fix the date of Pisistratus' birth, and we are quite sure that Sir Edward Bulwer-Lytton knows nothing which is unknown to the Bishop of St. David's and Mr. Grote.

† Dedication to "Eugene Aram." "I have played the procrastinator, and hoped for that morrow of better desert which never came. But *defluat annis*

pare for one a home.*" If any doubt could remain of the slightness of the accomplished baronet's acquaintance with the studies of which he speaks with such easy assurance, it would be removed by noticing the way in which he talks of learning. He uses language which no one acquainted with the subject could possibly fall into. His heroes have a range of knowledge which is incredible and monstrous. Montreuil is not a hero, but a designing Jesuit, and so at the age of twenty-eight he only knows "the dead languages" well; English, Italian, German, and Spanish, with their respective literatures, perfectly; and a few other odds and ends, such as human nature and the use of the small sword. Eugene Aram is far better worth knowing. He has "the high pale brow and deep unfathomable eyes" so well known as the property of reading men. His age was some thirty-five. He must have made a very fair use of his time, for he "had taught himself, under singular difficulties, nearly all the languages of the civilized earth." He was a "profound mathematician—an elaborate antiquarian, an abstruse philologist;" he "united with his graver lore the more florid accomplishments of science, from the scholastic trifling of heraldry to the gentle learning of herbs and flowers." His mind, originally penetrating, "had been rendered yet more acute by his profound and habitual investigations of our metaphysical frame." He was devoted to astronomical researches; so we quite expect to find him addressing the stars as "Ye mystic lights, worlds upon worlds—infinite—incalculable!" such being the well-known practice of observers. He was not less remarkable for his moral qualities. "What is termed pleasure had no attraction for him; he looked back along his youth and recognised no youthful folly. Love he regarded with a cold though not incurious eye: intemperance had never lured him to a momentary self-abandonment. A resistless energy, an unbroken perseverance, a profound and scheming and subtle thought, a genius fertile in resources, a tongue clothed with eloquence—all, had his ambition so chosen, might have given him the same empire over the physical, that he had attained over the intellectual world."

This is very likely; but, take him all in all, we prefer Maltravers. At the age of eighteen this young gentleman was

—the time runs on—and I am tired of waiting for the ford which the tides refuse."

* τοιᾶντ' ἀρῶμαι, καὶ καλῶ τὸ Ταρτάρου
στυγνὸν πατρῶν ἔρεβος, ὡς σ' ἀποκίση.
Soph. Œd. Col. 1389-90.

Thus translated ("Athens," vol. ii. p. 54):—

"Yet while I curse thee, on the murky deep
Of the primæval Hell, I call! Prepare
These men their home, dread Tartarus!"

deeply read in the scholastic philosophy,—“itself,” as Mr. Pickwick would say, “a difficult study of no inconsiderable magnitude;” he was “a little of a botanist, was already up to his ears in the moonlit abyss of Plato, and had filled a dozen commonplace books with criticisms on Kant. He had all the passion of a German for song and music—his voice was sweet, his taste consummate, his science profound.” We know pretty well how he spent his time during the next two years: for six months he was educating Alice; for four he was doing simply nothing; for the rest of the time he was travelling about with Lumley Ferrers, flirting with Madame de Ventadour, and writing poetry,—so he can scarcely have had much leisure for hard reading. Yet at the age of twenty we find that “he was an admirable scholar. The stores of the immortal dead were as familiar to him as his own language. The poetry, the philosophy, the manner of thought and habits of life of the graceful Greek and the luxurious Roman were a part of knowledge that constituted a common and household portion of his own associations and peculiarities of thought. He had saturated his intellect with the Pactolus of old—and the grains of gold came down from the classic Tmolus with every tide.* A few years pass over his head, during which he writes an immortal poem, and travels all over Europe and the East. At the end of that time we discover that he had “a wide range of scientific as well as literary lore: that the stars, the flowers, the phenomena of the physical world, afforded themes on which he descanted with the fervent love of a poet and the easy knowledge of a sage.” To this picture we only know one companion. It is Count Smorltork.

“Have you been long in England?” enquired Mr. Pickwick with his usual affability.

“Long—ver long time—fortnight—more.”

“Do you stay here long?”

“One week.”

“You will have enough to do,” said Mr. Pickwick, smiling, ‘to gather all the materials you want, in that time.’

“Eh, they are gathered,” said the Count.

“Indeed!” said Mr. Pickwick.

“They are here,” added the Count, tapping his forehead significantly. ‘Large book at home—full of notes—music, picture, science, poetry, politics; all things.’”

Novelists are proverbially bad in their law, and Sir E. B. Lytton is not better than the worst of them. He is very hazy indeed in his notion of the quality of estates, and he has an idea, which we thought was now confined to young ladies, that

* “Ernest Maltravers,” book ii. ch. ii.

real property in this country is usually disposed of by an instrument technically called a "paper":—that, for example, a landed proprietor who wishes to sell or mortgage, just sits down at his desk, takes up half a sheet of note-paper, and concludes the matter at once without the odious formality of drafts and parchments. The case of *Vavasour v. Mordaunt*, as reported in "The Disowned," is a good illustration of this practice, which is not so well known as it deserves to be. The action was an ejectment, and the circumstances appear to have been these:—A Mr. Mordaunt was the descendant of a race which had numbered princes in its line, and the owner of a large estate in Norfolk, which had been in his family several centuries. This points rather strongly to land in strict settlement, and the probability is increased by our being told that there was in existence "some paper which could for ever have prevented Mr. Mordaunt's sale of the property." At the time of the transaction to be immediately described this Mr. Mordaunt had one son, an infant. Under these circumstances, at the instigation of a distant relation called Vavasour, the lessor of the plaintiff, Mordaunt destroys the paper which could for ever have prevented the sale, and by another "paper" disposed of all his estates to the distant relation, "upon condition that they should not be claimed nor the treaty divulged till after his death." The sum given was, of course, "ridiculously disproportioned to the value of the estate." On Mr. Mordaunt's death, the distant relation with the paper suddenly makes his appearance, and claims everything. The son, who had entered into possession, was advised that he had a good title, and refused to quit—hence the action. The distant relation, however, succeeded completely, and Mordaunt was turned out of his property and reduced to beggary. Most unfortunately, Sir Edward Bulwer-Lytton has not preserved the arguments in the case, nor the law as laid down by the learned judge who tried it.

Looking, then, at these novels from the point of view which their prefaces suggest, it must be confessed that there is little room for praise. If they do really record the growth of the author's mind, all that can be said is that his mind must have grown very badly. With the higher subjects of education he is by no means conversant. He is simply a rapid, versatile, superficial writer, who gets up his knowledge as he wants it, and is always enthusiastic about the last book he has read. Nor as monuments of ideal art can Sir Edward Bulwer-Lytton's works be considered durable. The intrusion of a philosophical or political object is fatal to their symmetry, and the language in which they are written is quite enough to repel readers of a classic taste. But if we put aside the extravagant claims which are made on their behalf, and compare them with other fictions of the

order to which they really belong,—with “Darnley” or “Whitefriars,”—a more favourable conclusion may be drawn.

In one of his prefaces Sir Edward Bulwer-Lytton observes that it is in the delineation of character that he chiefly excels, and we are disposed to think him right. He has a quick eye for outward details and for the general outlines of the moral and intellectual nature,* and it is only his unfortunate habit of exaggeration that has spoilt so many of his characters. He seizes what he would call “the type” very readily; most of his historical portraits have the merit of being remarkably vivid and distinct. He is acute in showing up the pretension of vulgar people; his men of fashion, his vagabonds of the middle class are, with scarcely an exception, excellent. The pedlar in “Pelham,” his gypsy king in the “Disowned,” Bachelor Bill in “Paul Clifford,” Pansa in the “Last Days of Pompeii,” are a most agreeable relief from the tediousness of his Christian stoics and ideal philosophers. Where he fails is principally in describing the highest and the lowest class: he has no ear for the language and idiom of the vulgar,† and his heroes and villains reek of the Surrey Theatre.‡ There is a good deal of lively re-

* One of his most successful portraits is that of Richard Avenel. “Whether kind or cross, he was always wounding you in some delicate little fibre—not from malice, but from the absence of any delicate little fibres of his own. He was really, in many respects, a most excellent man, and certainly a very valuable citizen. But his merits wanted the fine tints and fluent curves that constitute beauty of character. He was honest, but sharp in his practice, and with a keen eye to his interests. He was just, but as a matter of business. He made no allowances, and did not leave to his justice the large margin of tenderness and mercy. He was generous, but rather from an idea of what was due to himself than with much thought of the pleasure he gave to others; and he ever regarded generosity as a capital put out to interest.”—*My Novel*, book v. ch. iii.

† The subjoined extracts are from “Paul Clifford;” the language is supposed to be that of a Londoner:—“There be nothing like a friend in need, Dummie; and somehow or other, I thinks as how you knows more of the horrin of that ’ere lad than any of us!”

“Me, dame?” exclaimed Dummie, with a broad gaze of astonishment.

“Ah, you! You knows as how the mother saw more of you just afore she died than she did of ’ere one of us. Noar, now—noar, now! tell us all about un. Did she steal ’un, think ye?”

“Lank, Mother Margery! dost think I knows? Vot put such a crotchet in your ’ead?”

We find in the same novel:—

“Aha! if so be, Counsellor Prandon, you knew vat I knows, you would not go for to bully I so.”

This is also the language of a Londoner. The italics are the author’s.

‡ These companion pictures are from “The Disowned:”—

“The figure of the stranger, though not very tall, was above the ordinary height, and gracefully, rather than robustly, formed. He was dressed in the darkest colours and the simplest fashion, which rendered yet more striking the nobleness of his mien, as well as the clear and almost delicate paleness of his

mark, which occasionally becomes wit;* but Sir Edward Bulwer-Lytton has little notion of humour, and his jokes would have disgraced Joe Miller.† Of his women we hardly like to speak. Every one has a different standard of female perfection, and no description in a book recalls the exact shade of character which the most inexperienced reader has imagined or met with. We think they are too good. People who are satisfied with loveliness and the moral virtues must be hard to please if they do not find an ideal in Sir Edward Bulwer-Lytton's pages. Here, as before, his least ambitious efforts are the best. The heroines are shadowy and unreal; the Caroline Mertons and Valerie de Ventadours are

complexion; his features were finely and accurately formed; and had not ill-health, long travel, or severe thought deepened too much the lines of the countenance, and sharpened its contour, the classic perfection of those features would have rendered him undeniably and even eminently handsome: as it was, the paleness and the somewhat worn character of his face, joined to an expression, at first glance, rather haughty and repellent, made him lose in physical what he certainly gained in intellectual beauty. His eyes were large, deep, and melancholy; and had the hat which now hung over his brow been removed, it would have displayed a forehead of remarkable boldness and power."

" 'I shall have this man now,' muttered Crawford, between his ground teeth, as he left the house and took his way to his counting-house. There, cool, bland, fawning, and weaving in his close and dark mind various speculations of guilt and craft, he sat among his bills and gold, like the very gnome and personification of that Mammon of gain to which he was the most supple, though concealed, adherent. . . .

"Cool, sagacious, profound in dissimulation, and not only observant of, but deducing sage consequences from, those human inconsistencies and frailties by which it was his aim to profit, he cloaked his deeper vices with a masterly hypocrisy; and for those too dear to forego and too difficult to conceal, he obtained pardon by the intercession of virtues it cost him nothing to assume."

* " 'Two cherries on one stalk,' said Lumley, gaily: 'by the by, it is not a complimentary simile. What young lady would be like a cherry?—such an uninteresting, common, charity-boy sort of fruit. For my part, I always associate cherries with the image of a young gentleman in corduroys and a skeleton jacket, with one pocket full of marbles, and the other full of worms for fishing, with three-halfpence in the left paw, and two cherries on one stalk (Helena and Hermia) in the right. . . .

" 'What do nine-tenths of us ever get from our parents but an ugly name, and advice, which if we follow, we are wretched, and if we neglect we are disinherited?'"

† Especially his classical puns, e.g.—*Te rediisse incolumem gaudeo*—"I am very glad to get back to my tea." "*Ars longa, vita brevis*," which paraphrased means "that it is slow work before one fags one's way to a brief." " 'How wonderfully,' said Vincent, 'your city dignities unloose the tongue; directly a man has been a mayor he thinks himself qualified for a Tully at least. Faith, the Lord Mayor asked me one day what was the Latin for spouting, and I told him '*hippomanes*, or a raging humour in mayors.'"

"I suggested to Lord Dareville, who affects the gourmand, what a capital thing a dish all turbots' fins might be made. 'Capital!' said he, in a rapture; 'dine on it with me to-morrow.' '*Volontiers!*' said I. The next day I betook myself punctually to my engagement. Would you believe it? The sacrilegious

worth most of them. And his young ladies have a most execrable style of talking and letter-writing: a style which is decidedly Bulweresque, and as different as possible from the easy delightful rambling manner which is the despair of men and the greatest literary achievement of women.* The female Genius blooms most vigorously in these novels. One of them describes herself as "a sort of visionary Rosicrusian." That is quite enough.

Sir Edward Bulwer-Lytton's excessive veneration for the ideal is the groundwork of his greatest faults. We have no wish to be disrespectful, but really several of the plots, not to mention much both of the illustration and dialogue, remind one strongly of the stories in the "London Journal." There are the same faultless women, the same scheming villains, the same noble-minded young men, the same proud heartless lords, who excite the fears and admiration of our cooks and housemaids in the penny novels. Unless a writer is very strong indeed, the ideal is a dangerous tool [to play with. There is often a ludicrous inconsistency between characters as given from the ideal side in description, and the same characters as shown to us from the real side in action. So-and-so is said to be an extraordinary man—

dog of Amphitryon had put into the dish 'Cicero de Finibus.' 'There's a work all *ains*!' said he."

"The master of the ceremonies remarked that 'that fine-looking man seemed disposed to give himself *airs*!'

"'Judging from the gentleman's appearance,' said the earl, drily (Ned's face, to say truth, did betoken his affection for the bottle), 'I should imagine that he was much more accustomed to give himself *thorough draughts*!'

"'Ah!' renewed the *arbiter elegantiarum*, who had not heard Mauleverer's observation, which was uttered in a very low voice; 'ah! they seem real dashers.'

"'Dashers!' repeated Mauleverer; 'true, *haberdashers*!'

* "'The world," said he, kissing the hand that yet lay on his arm, 'the world will—'

"'Oh, you men! the world, the world! Everything gentle, everything pure, everything noble, high-wrought, and holy, is to be squared, and cribbed, and maimed to the rule and measure of the world! The world—are you too its slave? Do you not despise its hollow cant—its methodical hypocrisy?'

"'Heartily!' said Ernest Maltravers, almost with fierceness. 'No man ever so scorned its false gods and its miserable creeds—its war upon the weak—its fawning upon the great—its ingratitude to benefactors—its sordid league with mediocrity against excellence. Yes, in proportion as I love mankind, I despise and detest that worse than Venetian oligarchy which mankind set over them and call "THE WORLD."'

"And then it was, warmed by the excitement of released feelings, long and carefully shrouded, that this man, ordinarily so calm and self-possessed, poured burningly and passionately forth all those tumultuous and almost tremendous thoughts, which, however much we may regulate, control, or disguise them, lurk deep within the souls of all of us, the seeds of the eternal war between the natural man and the artificial."

accomplished, learned, subtle, and so forth. The course of the story leads him to do something in which these qualities would naturally be exhibited. So far from finding him in any way remarkable, he is seen to be exceedingly like ordinary people, and most of all like Sir Edward Bulwer-Lytton himself. For example, in "Devereux" we have that well-known fiction the Jesuit priest. Montreuil is precisely the sort of person who presents himself from time to time to the imagination of the editor of the *Record*. He is a man of overwhelming learning and diabolical wickedness; who knows intimately the statesmen, wits, and roués of all nations, and who travels about Europe in the capacity of a Satan's messenger. He is endowed, as a matter of course, with the subtlety and profound dissimulation peculiar to his order, and which diplomatists and members of Parliament are never known to possess. His manner and appearance accord with his remarkable gifts. "Nobody ever inspired more dim religious awe than the Abbé Montreuil." In person he was slightly above the middle standard, and the texture of his frame was particularly hard, wiry, and muscular. He had thin lips and a calm smooth face. Nothing was blander than his demeanour—nothing more worldly in their urbanity than his manners and address. He never failed to obtain an ascendancy, in some measure allied with fear, over all in whose company he was thrown. He effected this "partly by the magic of an extraordinary and powerful mind, partly by an expression of manner which seemed to sneer most when most it affected to respect." We wait with some curiosity for the display of these unusual qualities. At length the moment arrives. The Abbé has a quarrel with Morton Devereux—a boy of about twenty years of age—for the possession of a certain letter. The arch dissembler conducts the dispute in the following manner:—

"'Boy,' said the Abbé, gasping for breath, and still seizing me with his lean bony hand, 'boy, give me that letter instantly. I charge you not to disobey me.'

"'You forget yourself, sir,' said I, endeavouring to shake him off. 'you forget yourself; there is no longer between us the distinction of pupil and teacher; and if you have not yet learned the respect due to my station, suffer me to tell you that it is time you should.'

"'Give me that letter, I beseech you,' said Montreuil, changing his voice from anger to supplication; 'I ask your pardon for my violence; the letter does not concern you, but me; there is a secret in those lines, which you see are in my handwriting, that implicates my personal safety. Give it me, my dear, dear son; your own honour, if not your affection for me, demands that you should.'

"I was staggered. His violence had confirmed my suspicions, but his gentleness weakened them.

" 'Besides,' thought I, 'the handwriting is his, and if even my life depended upon reading the letter of another, I do not think my honour would suffer me to do so against his consent.' A thought struck me—
 " 'Will you swear,' said I, 'that this letter does not concern me?'

" 'Solemnly,' answered the Abbé, raising his eyes.

" 'Will you swear that I am not even mentioned in it?'

" 'Upon the peril of my soul, I will.'

" 'Liar—traitor—perjured blasphemer!' cried I, in an inexpressible rage, 'look here, and here!' and I pointed out to the priest various lines in which my name legibly and frequently occurred. A change came over Montreuil's face; he released my arm, and staggered back against the wainscot; but recovering his composure instantaneously, he said, 'I forgot, my son, I forgot—your name is mentioned, it is true, but with honourable eulogy, that is all.'

" 'Bravo, honest father!' cried I, losing my fury in admiring surprise at his address; "bravo! However, if that be all, you can have no objection to allow me to read the lines in which my name occurs; your benevolence cannot refuse me such a gratification as the sight of your written panegyric!"

" 'Count Devereux,' said the Abbé, sternly, while his dark face worked with suppressed passion, 'this is trifling with me, and I warn you not to push my patience too far. I will have that letter, or——' He ceased abruptly, and touched the hilt of his sword."

William Brandon is the lawyer who always plays an important part in melodramatic fiction. Directly we are introduced to him and find that he has an icy smile, a serpent eye—that his features are "steeped in sarcasm," that he is usually cold and possessed, but that he sometimes walks about his room at night and mutters, "Ha!—I have it—yet methinks, 'twere well; but—but—this is weakness!"—we know perfectly well what is coming; we see, as in a glass, that he has committed a great crime, and that he is secretly tortured by remorse; we are sure that he is laying plans which will come to nothing, and that he is destined to an untimely end. He is essentially one of those "Tragic Truths which lie hid in the Philosophy of Circumstance," and which the novel "Paul Clifford" was designed to bring out. His history is shortly this:—He was of noble family and commanding abilities. Early in life he paid his addresses to a lady of the name of Julia; eventually he married her, but as she did not turn out so well as he had expected, he disposed of her for a pecuniary consideration to a friend. His son—the Paul Clifford of the romance—he did not sell, but on the contrary kept him at home, and became very fond of him. Mrs. Brandon, however, took it ill that she should have been sold, and accordingly hired some loose fellows to steal her son from his father by way of revenge. Brandon was in despair; all his hopes of founding a family were gone; so he resolved

to make a name. He immediately becomes eminent in his profession. "Envy itself was driven into acknowledging the profundity of his legal knowledge." "No juvenile lawyer browbeat, no hackneyed casuist puzzled him." On the only occasion on which we are permitted to judge, he did not distinguish himself. It was a swindling case, in which he was counsel for the Crown. A pawnbroker was called on the part of the prosecution. This witness (who, by the way, is oddly described as "the culprit,") dropped some hints which led counsel to suspect that he knew something of the long-lost son. "Brandon started back—his lips grew white—he clenched his hands with a convulsive spasm, and while all his features seemed distorted with an earnest yet fearful intensity of expectation, he poured forth a volley of questions so incoherent and so irrelevant that he was immediately called to order by his learned brother on the other side."* Notwithstanding this he became a judge. Paul Clifford, after spending seven years in the most gentlemanly manner on the road, falls into the hands of the police, and is brought before his father for trial. It so happened that during the progress of the case, the last links of evidence which established the identity of the prisoner and Justice Brandon's son were handed to the bench. After a most impartial summing-up, a verdict of *Guilty* was returned, and a few hours afterwards the judge died in his carriage in a fit.

We do not complain of the story itself, which in some respects is one of Sir Edward Bulwer-Lytton's best, but we take leave to observe that William Brandon—the central figure—is a failure. And it is a failure of a kind which we are surprised that any man of education should make. In the "Mysteries of London," and in "Reynolds's Family Newspaper," we are prepared for all this tawdry description and vulgar commonplace; but in a writer who especially prides himself on his analysis of motive and knowledge of the human heart, and who is at the pains to tell one that he has deeply studied ethics and metaphysics, we look for something better—something more real, restrained, and original. It hardly requires a course of philosophy to create a man like William Brandon; if it did, it would prove the justice of Cicero's saying. "Nihil tam absurde dici potest quod non dicatur ab aliquo philosophorum."

If Sir Edward Bulwer-Lytton would be content to be taken for what he is, a respectable place might be assigned to him in the ranks of modern novelists. His historical romances cannot, indeed, be classed with those either of Scott or of his more immediate artistic predecessor, Chateaubriand. In describing the growth of character and the influence of varying circumstances upon it—

* "Paul Clifford," ch. xix.

the branch of art on which he most plumes himself—he never comes within distance of George Eliot. His portraits are not distinct, like Mr. Trollope's, nor finished and lifelike, like Mr. Thackeray's; his plots are never so carefully worked out as Mr. Wilkie Collins', nor has he the eye of that writer and of Mr. Thackeray for a telling dramatic situation. He is neither original, pathetic, and amusing, as is Mr. Dickens, nor lively and dashing, as are Mr. Lever and the author of "Guy Livingstone." In fact, it would be hard to mention any one quality of genius or style in which he has not a living superior. But although he is nowhere first, he is throughout a sufficiently good second to justify considerable praise. His ideas are generally ingenious, his incidents are varied, he is fertile in expedients; and when the number of characters and situations are taken into account, it must be owned that he reproduces himself but little. Many shrewd remarks and a few witty ones are scattered up and down his pages. His favourite contrast between speculative and practical life is enforced with a persistency which proves that he has both thought and acted; and we believe him to be free from the vanity with which he is often charged, of making himself his own hero. With some grave exceptions, such as "Eugene Aram," "Ernest Maltravers," "Alice," and "Lucretia," his books are not objectionable in tone and substance; and even when he offends, we believe that the fault may be traced rather to a want of taste than to a perverted imagination. A high and somewhat chivalrous vein of sentiment runs through his writings, passing sometimes into passages of real eloquence and often into a diffused poetic imagery. He tries to be on the right side of things, and has a true sympathy for the struggling and unfortunate. He has always been loyal to his adopted profession, and in the background of his works we may see the figure of an English gentleman of more than ordinary abilities and information. He is unquestionably the first of the particular school to which he belongs—that of sentimental melodrama. But with being the first of this school he is by no means satisfied; and when he comes before us with the language and manner of an ancient sage, and calls our attention to the philosophical design of his books—to their ethical truth and metaphysical subtilty, and to the fact that they illustrate the growth of his own mind—it becomes necessary to adopt a different tone altogether. We are compelled to say that this affectation of being a teacher is ridiculous, and that he errs greatly in supposing that his intellectual history is a matter of moment to any one but himself and his friends.

It may be thought that we have not treated this writer with the gravity which his fame and reputation deserve. The truth is, we have found it impossible to be grave when we contrast what

Sir Edward Bulwer-Lytton has done with what he is. As for his fame, he has bequeathed that to posterity, and we wonder what they will make of it. Their verdict will probably be one of unmixed astonishment. "Here is a man who has gone on year by year, during a long life, pouring out this inconceivable quantity of sentimental clap-trap, and he has been created a baronet for his literary services, and has lived to become a Secretary of State!"

For our own part, we are content to remark that his career offers an instructive example of what may be done by any one who will condescend to an unlimited belief in his own powers. We recommend the subject to Mr. Smiles for a future edition of "Self-Help." Sir Edward Bulwer-Lytton has helped himself to position, reputation, and wealth, partly because he does not know how little he knows, partly because he permits himself to print what most men would be ashamed to say, and chiefly by the aid of an audacity which really borders upon genius. He hears one praised as a scholar, another as a poet, a third as a philosopher. He is fired with a noble ardour. Why should not he, too, enter that triple priesthood of the Learned, the Beautiful, and the True? Why should not he be scholar, poet, and philosopher, all in one? He knows nothing of the qualifications required for these parts, but he is convinced that he can play them all. Like Bottom in the "Midsummer Night's Dream," he will be Pyramus, Thisbe, and the Lion too. For an ambition of this kind nothing is either too small or too great. Sir Edward Bulwer-Lytton, like Francis Bacon, has taken Nature for his province. Art, science, history, politics, and religion are the strings of a lute with which he accompanies endless hymns to the Infinite, to be published in a three-volume novel.

In the "Last Days of Pompeii" allusion is made to a certain Fulvius. The author assures us that Fulvius was once thought to be the greatest of living poets, and he goes on to say that but for his own novel the name of Fulvius would have been completely forgotten. When the "Last Days of London" come to be written, it may happen that a remark equally modest and true will be made of Sir Edward Bulwer-Lytton himself by a novelist not inferior to the author of "Pelham." It will be pointed out that in the time of Queen Victoria lived a man who was not only esteemed by his cotemporaries the prince of modern fiction, but who lived himself in the belief that he was some great one. The New Zealand public will be reminded that this now forgotten writer actually presided for a time over the destinies of their infant state, and that he achieved a notoriety which in that barbarous age was easily mistaken for fame; that his sentimentality passed for poetry, his rhapsodies for ideas, and his assertions for knowledge. A gloomy review of the state of our literary taste

will be finished off by a spirited little sketch of Knebworth and an essay on "the Artist's House."

But it is impertinent to examine too curiously the secrets of that future to which Sir Edward Bulwer-Lytton has solemnly commended himself. The present age enjoys the privilege of sitting at his feet and listening reverently to his teaching. It accepts his mission like that of the Cæsars and Napoleons. All criticism yields to the logic of success. And no one has been more successful than the man whom a hundred thousand readers hail as the First of living novelists, the Prince of Fiction, the Great modern apostle of the Beautiful and the True!

ART. V.—PARLIAMENT AND REFORM.

1. *The English Government and Constitution.* By JOHN, EARL RUSSELL. New Edition.
2. *History of the Reform Bill.* By the Rev. W. N. MOLESWORTH, M.A.
3. *Representative Government.* By JOHN STUART MILL.
4. *Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, Sessions 1859 and 1860.*

THERE can hardly be found in the current century of our constitutional history a chapter so discreditable and humiliating as that which recounts the failure of recent movements for Parliamentary Reform. We are at present, perhaps, too familiar with the condition of things which brought about these disgraceful results to feel keenly alive to the shame and scandal they entail upon our governing system. But a time must assuredly come when Englishmen will appreciate more thoroughly the discredit our statesmanship and our political principles have suffered from the manner in which the great Reform question has been treated. Successive Governments have so acted as to place the policy of the country in a dilemma from which there is literally no escape. Is a measure of Parliamentary Reform really necessary at present? If it is necessary, why have both our governing bodies, the Whigs and the Tories, agreed to treat it as something only to be put contemptuously aside—something of which the very mention provokes laughter? If it is not necessary, why did Whig and Tory Governments alike agree for years, and indeed vie with each other,

in proclaiming that a reform of the parliamentary suffrage was absolutely indispensable to the safe conduct of the English political system? In 1859 there were few questions, indeed, on which the Tories in office and the Whigs out of office were completely agreed. That singular harmony of tone which has since made them so much alike that one can hardly distinguish Whigs from Tories had not then begun to prevail. The Government and the Opposition were entirely at variance in their financial principles. They were discordant as regarded most great Continental questions. They had differing notions about the management of India; they were by no means in accord as to our system of dealing with China. But there was one great question which afforded them a common platform; they were completely in agreement as to the imperative necessity of Parliamentary Reform. Of course they did not put forward the same plans, or survey the ground from exactly the same point of view. But they alike admitted, and indeed insisted—Whigs and Tories, Peelites and Radicals, independent Ministerialists and independent Opposition—that the parliamentary system of Great Britain was not equal to the progress of society, and that it stood in imperative need of a reform.

Indeed, it may be at once assumed that, however our political condition may have undergone magical transformation since then, there must have been, at least in 1859 and 1860, an obvious need of Parliamentary Reform. We must either believe this, or believe that all the leading men on both sides of the House were, during those years, idiots or liars. For the proclamation of this need of reform was the common confession of faith among all parties and on all lips during these two remarkable seasons. From the Sovereign on her throne down to the humblest and least responsible follower of either great political party, all alike declared that the time had come when we must absolutely do something to amend our parliamentary system. When Parliament opened in February, 1859, Lord Derby's Government being in power, the Queen's Speech introduced the subject of Reform. When Parliament re-assembled after the general election, the Queen's Speech again bespoke attention to "the amendment of the laws which regulate the representation of my people." When the Houses were opened in January, 1860, her Majesty once more urged on her faithful Lords and Commons "the necessity of amending the laws which regulate the representation of the people in Parliament," and for "placing that representation on a broader and firmer basis." That was the last session during which the Queen, or one of her Ministers, or one of the leaders of her Opposition, made official and authoritative announcement in favour of a Reform Bill. The subject then suddenly dropped. To adopt an expressive, though

vulgar phrase, it fell through. Whigs and Tories were agreed in 1859 and 1860 that Reform was absolutely necessary. They are now equally agreed that it is entirely unnecessary. No political or social change of any kind has taken place which could explain this sudden and simultaneous alteration of sentiment. No ingenuity can devise any method of accounting for it, without disparaging either the wisdom or the political virtue of our rulers. If they are wise now, they must have been foolish then. If they were not foolish at either time, they must have been insincere at one or the other period. It is not an agreeable, but it is an absolutely inevitable conclusion, that for several years back the country has been governed by gentlemen whose conduct in regard to one of the greatest public questions proves them to have been capable of the grossest deceit, or of the most unaccountable error and folly. Persons who now affect to treat the whole question of Parliamentary Reform with a cool contempt, or who are in the habit of declaring that a more liberal admission of the working classes to the suffrage would be a dangerous and revolutionary measure, must not flatter themselves that such opinions obtained in 1859 or 1860 the sanction of any leading statesman on either side of the House of Commons. The conduct of a public man who opposed Reform openly because he regarded it as unnecessary, or foolish, or dangerous, might be criticised as unwise, but could not be censured as insincere or unpatriotic. No such man appeared among the leaders on either side. Indeed, so earnest were all the political chiefs to save themselves from the suspicion of objection, or even indifference to Reform, that Mr. Disraeli seized the opportunity given by the withdrawal of the bill of 1860 to set himself quite right with the public on this subject. "I should not have wished," said Mr. Disraeli, "for a moment to touch on the subject of the bill now about to be withdrawn; but the noble lord (Lord John Russell) made an allusion which I hardly like to pass without comment. The noble lord, referring, as is his custom on such occasions, to the pedigree of progress, seemed to intimate that on this side of the House there could be no authentic claim to assist in it." Mr. Disraeli, be it observed, is unable to sit silent under the injurious insinuation that he and his party have no claim to be regarded as earnest reformers. Mark how he repels the charge. "I beg the noble lord and the House to remember that this bill is withdrawn, not from any successful opposition, or from any opposition of any kind, that has been offered to the real and *bonâ fide* amendment of the representation of the people of England. . . . In reference to the general principles laid down by the noble lord the member for the City of London (Russell) as to the necessity of the representation being extended in a certain degree to the working

classes, I beg to remind the noble lord that this has not been the question of controversy. The question of controversy has been as to the means and method of effecting that extension." They who heard those words spoken will probably remember the peculiar earnestness and emphasis with which they were delivered. The leader of the Opposition felt it due to his political position, and to the prospects of his party, to place on record a public and solemn declaration of his conviction that reform was necessary, and that that reform must take the direction of an extension of the suffrage, "at least in a certain degree," to the working classes. It is impossible to appreciate the extraordinary position in which our leading statesmen have placed themselves in regard to the Reform question, if we do not bear steadily in mind that until within the last year or two they were all Reformers. During the last fourteen or fifteen years we have had four great Reform Bills introduced. None of them, indeed, passed into law. But only one of them was opposed, and that was the bill introduced by Mr. Disraeli himself, which was objected to merely on the ground that it fell entirely short of the political requirements of the age. It cannot be an uninteresting or unprofitable study to survey briefly the history of that singular parliamentary movement which ended in the unanimous rejection of all notion of reform by a number of statesmen who were the whole time equally unanimous in proclaiming their belief that reform was imperatively needed in the political institutions of the country.

The great Reform movement of Earl Grey's day had three grand objects. It was intended to abolish anomalies, to remove inequalities, and to supply deficiencies. Forty years before that measure became law, Charles Grey presented to the House of Commons the famous petition of "the Society of the Friends of the People, associated for the purpose of obtaining a Parliamentary Reform." This document contains a clear, full, and comprehensive statement of the grievances under which the petitioners felt that the people of England were then labouring. In order to understand what was accomplished and what was left undone by the Reform Bill of 1832, we can take no better guide than this remarkable statement. The grievances set forth there are in substance, that the number of representatives is grossly disproportioned to the comparative extent, population, and trade of the constituencies; that the elective franchise is partially and unequally distributed, and is in many instances committed to electoral bodies of obviously insufficient numbers; that the right of voting is regulated by no uniform or rational principles; and that the exercise of the elective franchise is only renewed once in seven years. Now this petition may be taken as the starting-point in the modern history of the Reform movement. When

William Pitt, in 1785, with a better excuse and a more decent show of reluctance than Lord Palmerston had in 1860, but probably influenced by just the same feelings, finally withdrew from the Reform cause, the new era of agitation may be fairly said to have had its prelude and its announcement in the petition presented by Charles Grey. Foreign wars and domestic troubles caused the promoters of that petition to postpone any serious action upon it for a whole generation, and it was with the aid of John Russell that Earl Grey was able at last to put into effect the movement which he had opened with the concurrence of Charles James Fox. It is not necessary now to go into any history of the Grey and Russell Reform campaign. We are at present considering it merely with reference to its bearing on much more recent agitations. We desire to show that its success did not and could not fulfil the requirements of the petition of 1793, and that a further Reform Bill was not rendered superfluous, but, on the contrary, rendered absolutely necessary by the passing of the measure of 1832. But one observation must be made upon the means by which that bill was carried. It was not carried by argument—it would be as rational to say that Catholic Emancipation was carried by an appeal to the reason and justice of its opponents. The Reform Bill of 1832 had, so far as it went, reason and justice wholly on its side. But its opponents were not then—some of them are not even now—brought to recognise the validity of its claims. The whole of the argument for and against such a measure might be exhausted in a speech of an hour's duration. The struggle was, as most parliamentary contests are, a trial of strength between interests on the one side and interests on the other. The one party as naturally thought themselves justified in maintaining their political monopoly as the other side thought themselves justified in assailing it. How, then, was the victory won? By the wholesome terrorism which the friends of the bill were enabled to put into operation. It was altogether a bill for the political advantage of the middle classes. It admitted them to a political power from which they had long been unjustly excluded. It did nothing whatever for the working classes. Nay, we are wrong in saying that it did nothing for them; it deprived them of considerable power which they had previously enjoyed. The complicated and various franchise which was abolished by the bill, allowed to a large proportion of the working classes the opportunity of having a vote. In some boroughs—notoriously in the borough of Preston, for instance—there existed before the bill a franchise which was all but universal suffrage. The Reform Bill struck the working classes at once out of any share in the electoral privileges of such a borough. Those who take the trouble to refer to the debates on the bill will see

that members of the more extreme Radical party, while supporting the measure, strongly complained of its injustice to the working classes. Orator Hunt, as he was called, seemed almost inclined to oppose it on that ground. A much greater and wiser man than Orator Hunt—we mean Daniel O'Connell—a man to whose political sagacity Englishmen are even now beginning to do something like justice—criticised the measure severely because of its shortcomings as regarded the working classes. Nay, even one of its most powerful opponents, Sir Robert Peel, commented with emphasis upon the fact that in constituencies where the working man had a vote the bill proposed to deprive him of it. But, despite all this, the English working men, generous as they usually are, and confiding in the good faith of the upper classes, lent all their support to the promoters of the measure. The middle classes made use of the working population to frighten the Tories and the Peers into passing the bill. Recent revelations have suggested that the Home Office itself did not scruple to accept the help of the terrorism exercised by the proposed march of the Birmingham Reformers upon London. The middle classes and their spokesmen kept up a perpetual incitement to the working populations. Members of Parliament, bankers, merchants, and journalists commonly talked and wrote in a style which could hardly be called anything but seditious. Thus they brought the working populations to such a pitch of excitement that the latter only awaited the word of command to sweep all Conservative resistance before them. The working man was made the cat's-paw by which the middle class drew its political chestnuts out of the fire. It cannot be too clearly understood that the working population of England carried the Reform Bill, and carried it at the bidding and to serve the purpose of the middle classes. When the working man, in his turn, came to ask for his Reform Bill, his middle-class friend snubbed him, and gave him the cold shoulder. Middle class treated working class after Reform, exactly as the candidate familiar to satire and caricature treats the humble voter after the election. People asked why there was not the same agitation in 1860 as in 1832, and argued from the absence of excitement an absence of just dissatisfaction. But the working population rarely indeed agitate unless on an impulse from some class placed socially above them. The middle class had made use of the working man in their own hour of need, but had not the slightest notion of lending him their help and countenance in turn. There were in 1860 two great traitors to the cause of Reform and the just claims of the working population. These were the governing class in the House of Commons, and the middle class out of doors.

However, the Reform Bill of 1832, after all its discomfitures

and postponements, passed into law. It certainly abolished a great many crying grievances. It put an end to a most complicated, bewildering, and absurd franchise system, the source of endless trouble, quarrel, litigation, confusion, corruption, and expense; it made the country seem a little like a civilized and enlightened land. It removed some gross and hideous political anomalies and monopolies, the like of which never before perhaps were known and tolerated in any community of rational men. "A stranger," said Lord John Russell in his introductory speech of March, 1831, "would be very much astonished if he were taken to a ruined mound, and told that that mound sent two representatives to Parliament; if he were taken to a stone wall, and told that three niches in it sent two representatives to Parliament; if he were taken to a park where no houses were to be seen, and told that that park sent two representatives to Parliament. But if he were told all this, and were astonished at hearing it, he would be still more astonished if he were to see large and opulent towns, full of enterprise and industry and intelligence, containing vast magazines of every species of manufactures, and were then told that these towns sent no representatives to Parliament." Such abuses as these were indeed removed. But other and grievous abuses remained behind. The ideal stranger whom Lord John Russell described would find a good deal, probably, to excite his wonder even yet. Let us see how many of the grievances complained of in Charles Grey's famous petition were removed by Charles Grey's Reform measure, and how many were left for another generation to abolish.

We venture then to say that only one of those grievances was really removed by the Reform Bill. The principle of the suffrage was regulated upon a plan which we may allow to be uniform, if not always rational. The other demands were, that the number of representatives should be brought into fair proportion with extent, population, and trade; that the elective franchise should be more impartially and equally distributed, so that a reasonable proportion of the population should elect the majority of the representatives; and that the exercise of the franchise should be renewed more often than once in seven years. Now we presume we may put this latter demand entirely out of our consideration for the present. It was not thought a very dreadful stroke of Radicalism to demand a more frequent election of Parliaments when Charles Earl Grey was young. But we have fallen upon more Conservative days. The age has grown too picked indeed, although not exactly in Hamlet's sense. The man who ventures to put forward the demands now which some of the best and purest patriots are applauded for having urged then, must make up his mind to be stigmatized as chartist, revolutionist, anti-English, and flatly

burglarious. So we decline to go as far as Earl Grey might safely have gone, and keep ourselves within more prudent limits. We now merely ask whether it can be seriously asserted that the House of Commons is elected by a fair proportion of the people, and whether the appropriation of representatives to constituencies can be said to show a due regard for relative extent, population, and trade. We might perhaps also ask whether it is not obvious that any defects which our system at present manifests in either direction are likely to grow greater and greater as succeeding years give stronger claims to the interests that owe their strength and influence most especially to the spread of education and the development of trade.

Here then are two distinct questions. First as to the suffrage, and next as to the representation. Now we should like to make it clear to any one who argues that the suffrage is wide enough at present, that he is simply arguing against the propriety of admitting working men to a vote. There is no decent way of evading this issue. If a politician will boldly and directly say, "I think the working classes ought nowhere to have anything to do with the choice of representatives," then the debate assumes a clear and intelligible ground, and can be conducted on the merits of the question. But to say, as three-fourths of the Conservative orators say, that they are quite ready to acknowledge the claims and the merits of the working classes, while at the same time they object to a reduced franchise in boroughs, is simply nonsense. A common piece of clap-trap in Reform debates is to declare that the working man is not, *quoad* working man, shut out from the franchise. He has only to rent a 10*l.* house and occupy it for a certain time, and behold a voter on an equality with my Lord Mayor or Baron Rothschild. Quite true. There is nothing to exclude the working man too from becoming a member of Parliament, or a clergyman, or a captain of a crack cavalry corps. If he can only comply with certain preliminary qualifications, and get together a certain needful sum of money, he may do any of these things, just as he may buy an estate or keep a yacht. But if you make the conditions of procuring a vote such that the working man, as a rule, cannot, under present circumstances, by any possibility comply with them, then you do just the same thing in practice as if you passed a law declaring him personally disqualified for the exercise of the franchise. The working classes now have no vote. They cannot have it under our present system. The franchise excludes them, and, if the truth were boldly told, is intended to exclude them. Every man in his senses knows that this is the *arrière pensée* which lies behind all the Conservative and much of the Whig declamation about the stability of our constitution and the dangers of violent change. At present the

Parliament which is supposed to represent the whole interest and sentiments of the English people is elected by rather less than one seventh of the adult male population of the country. We submit that the bare statement of this fact ought to render further argument superfluous. Is it possible to suppose that only one in every seven Englishmen is to-day fit to be entrusted with the power of declaring whether he thinks Mr. Disraeli or Mr. Gladstone, Mr. Bright or Mr. Newdegate, more nearly expresses the convictions which seem to him best for the country to act upon? And if this be so, if six men out of every seven among us are so signorant, so stupid, or so corrupt that they cannot safely be allowed to exercise the most elementary right of political choice, then what a scandalous and disgraceful failure our political and social institutions must be! If this be the fruit of our restricted suffrage, we are not able to conceive of any severer condemnation which could possibly be pronounced upon any human system. If this were really the condition of English society, then England, instead of being, as she is, the leader of civilization and of political progress, could be regarded as nothing but a nuisance and a danger to human enlightenment and prosperity.

We must remember too what our English principle of government is. It is not a principle calculated to give entire satisfaction to the mind which is in the narrowest sense merely logical, or to the soul filled with romantic theories of high philosophic and divinely ordained rule. But it is a principle out of which, all vulgar and practical as it may seem, springs the best theory of government which human ingenuity can devise. It is the simple principle that every man understands his own interest best. We recognise in this country no theory of splendid Imperialism. The dream of a divinely-sent monarchy which filled up Dante's highest aspirations would present itself repellingly to the plain, practical English mind. The Emperor Napoleon's theory might help to reconcile France to Imperialism; it would only set England more strongly against it. We do not want to be benignantly and passively governed for our good, by some supreme intellect which announces itself as endowed with a celestial commission to tax and teach and chasten us. We do not believe that Cæsar himself could understand the interests of Stoke Pogis nearly so well in the long run as the people who live in Stoke Pogis and have a selfish concern in its welfare. Therefore we find no better scheme of government possible to limited human capacity than to let every Stoke Pogis send its delegates to Westminster, and let the delegates there among themselves settle what is to be done. This is not at all a splendid theory. A lofty imperial mind would naturally despise its homely sense, its vulgar business-like simplicity. But this is the only

theory by which English people will ever consent to be governed. Therefore, in considering whether our present representation is sufficient, we are not at all to consider whether the enfranchised classes comprehend enough of the scholarship and the intellect and the gentility of the country; we have simply to ask whether they represent fairly and fully the English people as it is. We, the common people, do not at all want to be ruled supremely by sages and scholars; we want to have a share in the doing of our own business and in the government of ourselves. It is obvious, therefore, that if the nation does not stand still, the franchise must not. Neither in suffrage nor in adjustment of representation does the present system conform to the condition of the various interests in which our population are concerned. We do not for ourselves adopt the bare broad principle that representation should simply be proportioned to population. We do not say that the whole electoral system should be revolutionized in order that a new division of representation should take place in which only the relative numbers of voters and representatives should be taken into account. But we do decidedly say that a reform is needed when gross and monstrous inequalities and disproportions can be exhibited. It is impossible upon any rational principle to contend that Honiton with a population of 3300 ought to have—as it now has—just as many members as Liverpool or Glasgow with half a million of people and incalculable wealth of commerce. Even those who contend that interests and not population ought to be represented, (and, like Mr. Mill, we find it impossible to understand what interests can be apart from the people,) must allow that the interests represented by Manchester ought to be accorded a preponderance over those represented by Honiton. A recent parliamentary return showed that in England alone there are 75 boroughs with an average population of 7100, which return 118 members to Parliament, while there are 59 places with an average population of 13,200, or nearly double the former average, which do not return any representative whatever. Now we are quite unable to understand how any sensible man can pretend to justify this monstrous anomaly. During the debates on Earl Grey's Reform Bill, the argument founded on such grievances was promptly and boldly met. It was argued from the Opposition benches that neither population nor interests had anything to do with representation. No town or borough, it was asserted, had ever in England been called into parliamentary existence because it was large and prosperous, or excluded because it was poor and small, or even because it had no population whatsoever. The object of the parliamentary system was simply to bring together a number of influential and powerful persons to advise and assist the Sovereign in the government of

the country. The ruins and the mounds of which Lord John Russell had spoken so contemptuously, were on this principle just as appropriate places for representation as the largest and greatest city in England. But we presume there is not to be found any one individual capable of maintaining such a theory now. Even the slowest of living Conservatives is probably astonished to think that, only thirty-three years ago, intelligent and able men, leaders of his party, did earnestly and solemnly pledge themselves to the support of such a principle. The Reform Bill of 1832 affirmed the opposite principle, which indeed must in the mere nature of things have asserted itself with or without Act of Parliament. It was acknowledged that representation must bear some proportion to population. Once there is a representative system of any kind, the rest follows. No possible combination of conservative forces or vested interests can prevent great and growing communities from taking an increasing share in the government of the country. If they are not allowed a direct influence, they will have it indirectly. The non-electors at present do undoubtedly exercise a great though indirect influence upon the elections. Speeches are made at them, and their favour is courted; and they have an influence on the poll, which, like that of women, is not direct and legal, but also like that of women, is often irresistible. In like manner, although Manchester, Liverpool, and Glasgow do not marshal in the House of Commons more members than Honiton and any two kindred boroughs, yet the indirect influence of the interests the former represent is a power of almost incalculable strength. The Reform Bill of 1832 therefore proclaimed as the great principle of parliamentary government that which was already asserting itself by reason of its own inherent power. But it did little more than formally proclaim the principle. It left to another generation to reduce it more distinctly and equally to practice.

The conviction soon therefore forced itself upon leading minds, that the Reform Bill of 1832 was but a step of progress, and not a complete measure. A sort of apology is due to the readers of the *Westminster Review* for entering into any argument to show that there can be no such thing as "finality" in politics. The bare fact that a measure is sufficient for the condition of things in 1832 is in itself a *primâ facie* argument against its sufficiency in 1865. Where all other circumstances of society around have changed, the presumption is that those which apply to the franchise must have changed likewise. But the truth is, that when the Reform Bill of 1832 was passed, it was not thought a sufficient measure by its leading promoters. It fell far short of the change which they originally contemplated and strove to accomplish. It was simply the best compromise they could effect

with tradition and reaction, and prejudice and vested interest and stupidity. Much nonsense has been talked about Lord John Russell's alleged promise that the Reform Bill should be final. Lord John Russell was not competent to make any pledge which could bind his successors or the nation at large. He was not competent even to make in 1832 any pledge which could preclude himself from new political action in 1860. Had he solemnly and publicly vowed that he regarded the Reform Bill as a final measure, no such adjuration could have affected the course to be taken by himself or anybody else, on any subsequent occasion. But Lord John Russell was guilty of no such piece of unmeaning folly. He made no vow, uttered no declaration, expressed no opinion which could militate against a supplementary Reform agitation. In the last debate which took place on the bill in the Commons (that on the amendments introduced by the Lords, 5th June, 1832), Lord John Russell said: "I think, so far as ministers are concerned, this is a final measure. I declared, on the second reading of the bill, that if only a part of the measure were carried it would lead to new agitations, but that is now avoided by the state in which the bill has come from the other House." The meaning of this statement has been absurdly perverted. Mr. Molesworth, in his "History of the Reform Bill," correctly points out that "the words were meant to convey nothing more than that, so far as the Grey administration was concerned, the Reform Bill was intended to settle the question with which it dealt, but that they did not pledge Lord John Russell, or the other members of the Grey cabinet, to abstain from assisting in the further extension of the franchise, or the remedy of other evils and injustices which their bill left untouched."

The defects which remained in the system of representation did not, however, press for immediate settlement; other and more imperative demands caused them to be for a while forgotten. Two great agitations took the place of that by which the Reform Bill was accomplished. The Repeal Agitation in Ireland, and the Anti-Corn-Law League in England, absorbed the attention of the public. We know with what consummate talent, political as well as oratorical, each agitation was conducted. We know what splendid success the one achieved just as it seemed to be on the eve of failure, and what a miserable failure the other proved just when it seemed most likely to end in success. There was hardly time for the Anti-Corn-Law League fully to accomplish its work and finally to scatter and trample out the reactionary agitation which arose against it, when the slumbering Reform question awoke again, and called upon the Parliament and the country to settle its long-outstanding claims. People sometimes argue, that if the

demand for reform had any real vitality, it could never have lain dormant during the twenty years from 1832 to 1852. It would be much nearer to the truth if they were to admit that there must needs have been an irrepressible vital power in the claim, which was not bribed into silence by the splendid success of the Anti-Corn-Law League, or frightened into dumbness by the failure of the Repeal and Chartist agitation.

In 1852 began, formally, the new Reform movement. The Queen, in opening Parliament that year, declared that it appeared to her "a fitting time for calmly considering whether it may not be advisable to make such amendments in the Act of the late reign relating to the representation of the Commons in Parliament as may be deemed calculated to carry into complete effect the principles upon which that law is founded." A fairer statement of the object to be accomplished could hardly be made. The principles of the Reform Bill had not been fully carried into effect; they had been thwarted by the one party, and necessarily compromised by the other. To complete the Reform Bill, and not to supersede it, was therefore the task proposed to the House of Commons. Earl Grey has told the world something about the private history of the Reform Bill of 1852. It was solely promoted by Lord John Russell, who had become justly alarmed by the vote of the House of Commons, in the previous year, on Mr. Locke King's motion for extending the right of voting in counties to 10*l.* householders. Lord John Russell, it may be remembered, was defeated by Mr. Locke King on that motion. His lordship in consequence resigned. But Lord Derby and Lord Aberdeen alike declined to form a cabinet, and therefore Lord John Russell and his colleagues found themselves literally compelled to resume office. Earl Grey was a member of the administration; and the story which he told the House of Lords, in 1860, about the ministry and the Reform Bill, is not without its interest. Lord John Russell had already several times pledged himself to renew the Reform movement; and he thought the House of Commons had now given him an unmistakeable hint that he had better do something to redeem his pledge. So he prepared a Reform Bill and submitted it to the cabinet. Earl Grey was entirely opposed to it, and objected strenuously, but at last consented to it, for perhaps the oddest reason a statesman ever yet publicly acknowledged—because he felt convinced that it could never be carried. He foresaw that the ministry must break up on another question, and therefore he was willing to be a party to a proceeding which, according to his view, had no redeeming quality but the fact that it was a farce, and which he would have felt bound to repudiate if it had the least prospect of becoming a reality. Now this is Earl Grey's own story, and, however certain circumstances of

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his narrative may be disputed, we must all admit that Earl Grey is the best judge of the secret motives which decided Earl Grey's public conduct. Perhaps the oddest part of the business is, that Earl Grey told this tale to the House of Lords as if it were a revelation which reflected terrible discredit on Lord John Russell. We think it highly creditable to that noble lord that, being himself in favour of a Reform measure, he took the hint as to time and opportunity given by the House of Commons. We think it even more creditable to him that he attached no weight to the objections of a colleague who was ready to suppress those objections only because he secretly hoped that their purpose would be indirectly accomplished without any overt aid from him. But the story throws a world of light upon the difficulties with which Lord John Russell's reform projects have had to contend. When the history of the cabinet measures of 1860 comes to be revealed by some actor as indiscreet as Earl Grey, we shall probably know for certain that the financial policy of Gladstone and the reform policy of Russell had to contend against some enemies within who were far more influential and far less easily managed than any of the enemies without.

Lord John Russell's Reform Bill of 1852 aimed principally at the following objects:—The substitution of a rated value of 5*l.* in boroughs for the 10*l.* franchise, and the reduction of the 50*l.* county franchise to 20*l.* rated value. The creation of a new class of voters, consisting of persons residing either in boroughs or counties who paid direct taxes to the amount of 40*s.* yearly. The addition of places in the neighbourhood to small boroughs with less than five hundred electors. The abolition of the property qualification, and of invidious distinction between the oaths tendered to Protestant members and those to representatives of other religious persuasions. Here, it must be allowed, was goodly variety of matter—suffrage reform, constituency reform, reform in qualification and in religious tests, not to speak of a variety of minor changes. Surely the minister must have been sanguine indeed who believed that the House of Commons would accomplish all this as one piece of work. We quite agree with Earl Grey that such a bill had not then the least chance of becoming law. It was not, however, vouchsafed even a serious debate, for within a fortnight after its introduction the Government was in other hands. Lord John Russell was defeated by a Palmerstonian amendment on the Local Militia Act; Lord Derby took office, and retained it but for a brief space. Defeated on Mr. Disraeli's budget, the Tories went out, and Lord Aberdeen came in. Lord John Russell, then Foreign Secretary, took the first opportunity of promising that a new Reform Bill should be introduced in the ensuing session. Accordingly, when the Queen

opened Parliament in February, 1854, her Speech informed the Houses that it would be their duty "to consider whether more complete effect may not be given to the principles of the Act of the last reign, whereby reforms were made in the representation of the people in Parliament." Her Majesty added, that in recommending this subject to the consideration of the Houses, her desire was "to remove every cause of just complaint, to increase general confidence in the Legislature, and to give additional stability to the settled institutions of the State." Now we draw attention to the several declarations on this subject, made in successive speeches from the Throne, not because we would for a moment imply that such expressions ought to be regarded as having, or claiming to have, any mandatory value. They are, of course, merely the announcements of the ministerial programme. But it is precisely as such that they are important to our present purpose. They prove that every party in the State which was capable of holding office even for a month professed to regard the Reform Bill of 1832 as incomplete, and proclaimed a determination to supplement and perfect it. It was only after the session of 1860 that anybody, however Conservative his nature, professed to have found out that Parliamentary Reform was entirely unnecessary, and that no further change in our electoral system ought to be admitted into consideration.

In February, 1854, Lord John Russell brought in his new Reform Bill. It proposed to disfranchise small boroughs containing less than 300 electors or 5000 inhabitants each; to subtract one member from constituencies of less than 500 electors or 10,000 inhabitants. By this change it was estimated that sixty-two seats would be placed at the disposal of the House. It was proposed to appropriate those seats by dividing the West Riding of Yorkshire and South Lancashire into two electoral districts each, returning respectively three members; by giving three members to places with more than 100,000 inhabitants; by giving a representative to Kensington and Chelsea combined, and to Birkenhead and other places; by bestowing an additional member upon Southwark; by allowing the Inns of Court to return two members, and the London and the Scotch Universities one member each. The bill further proposed to enfranchise all persons receiving a salary of 100*l.* yearly, paid quarterly, or 10*l.* a year in dividends; all persons paying 40*s.* a year to the income or assessed taxes; all graduates of universities, and all persons who had possessed for three years uninterruptedly 50*l.* in a savings' bank. These provisions of enfranchisement were to apply to counties or boroughs alike. But the borough franchise was to be reduced to 6*l.*, and the right of freemen as such to vote was to be abolished after the expiry of existing interests. We

must not omit to state that the bill proposed to make provision for the representation of minorities in districts returning three members each by giving each elector only two votes. The obvious result of this provision would be, of course, that at a general election the third member returned by such a constituency would represent the votes of a minority. This proposal had the evil fortune to prove itself almost equally distasteful to both sides. Indeed it was, perhaps, criticised rather more severely by Liberals than by Conservatives. We do not deny that the proposal as made by Lord John Russell was open to practical objection. One criticism upon it, made by Mr. Bright, if we remember rightly, it is not easy to answer. What is to be done, Mr. Bright asked, if the member who represents the minority should die, or resign his seat, or be appointed to some office which requires his re-election? The simple fact that he represents the minority renders it hopeless for him to seek re-election when only his own seat is the object of contest; and the same fact, of course, makes it impossible for the minority who elected him ever to supply his place with another member of their choice, unless when the two seats belonging to the majority have also to be filled. But while the proposal is clearly open to this and other practical objections, we yet think that it deserved high consideration as sanctioning a principle which ought even now to be recognised, and encountering a difficulty which, as it will have to be met some time, had much better be dealt with sooner than later. We own, too, a strong objection to the policy which aims at nothing better than to reduce the whole government of the country to the bare, absolute despotism of even the most intelligent and well intentioned majority. Until it can be shown that a man is capable of understanding other people's interests quite as well as they are, and that he is likely to consider his own interests with as calm an impartiality as he would those of a stranger, we must believe that a House of Commons elected almost exclusively by a monotonous majority would really cease to be a representative assembly in the true meaning of the phrase. This is one of the points on which the practical politicians of the Houses of Parliament seem to us wrong, and the merely thinking politicians outside the Houses right. Nor is it fair to say that in our days there is no danger of a majority out of doors endeavouring to exercise an undue and despotic power. People are rarely, indeed, so intelligent and so calm as to distinguish between the degree of their power and the degree of their right. There is an agitation at present going on in this country which is directed towards a general object as deserving of approval and sympathy as any for which men ever struggled. It is a movement intended to get rid of drunkenness. It is guided by men of education, of the highest

character and the most unquestioned disinterestedness. No one would willingly say a harsh or scornful word of them or their purpose. Yet it may well be doubted whether a more extravagantly vicious principle was ever proposed to be introduced into legislation than that which is advanced by the promoters of the Permissive Bill Agitation. It is simply a movement having for its object the introduction of a measure to confer upon local majorities the absolute power of prohibiting minorities from indulging in a habit which no one contends is dangerous or objectionable in itself, but which only becomes dangerous in extreme and exceptional cases. As these extreme cases do undoubtedly create a great deal of annoyance and evil, and as men are always easily roused to fanaticism by the notion that they are empowered to compel their neighbours to be virtuous, it is quite possible to imagine a time when in the greater number of the constituencies a popular majority might be found ready to return only the candidates who professed the principles of the Permissive Bill Alliance. At such a time as that, it is not too much to say that all the really enlightened and practical politicians in the country would be found in the minority. We should think it much to be deplored indeed if, at a moment like that, there were no constitutional means open to the enlightened minority to raise its voice in the House of Commons. It may be said that only under the most abnormal conditions will a majority be found ready to support a measure like the Permissive Bill—a measure which Mr. Leatham so admirably characterized the other day at Huddersfield when he spoke of its “naked and revolutionary simplicity.” But it must be remembered that an absolute and unchecked majority has all the tendencies of an oligarchy or an autocrat. It is always prone to believe itself supremely wise, and entitled by virtue of its supreme wisdom to exercise an omnipresent and omnipotent domination.

We think then that Lord John Russell did well to introduce his provision for a representation of minorities, practically insufficient and defective as the proposal may have been. In the introduction to the new edition of his “English Government and Constitution” published a month ago, Earl Russell declares that he still adheres to the principle which he proposed to introduce in 1854. But, strangely enough, he is very severe upon those who would introduce other principles not more novel, and intended to have a somewhat analogous effect. He entirely rejects and contemns Mr. Hare’s franchise and representative scheme; and he has not a favourable word to say of the suggestion for a plurality of votes according to qualification recommended by Mr. Mill in his work on “Representative Government.” It does not come within the scope of our purpose at present to enter upon the

consideration of that suggestion, or of Earl Grey's recent propositions, or any similar proposals. The object of this article is to show how the governing and the middle classes have dealt with the proposals for reform which were officially submitted to parliamentary discussion; not to consider whether broader and better schemes might not possibly have been devised. But we cannot help remarking that Earl Russell's entire argument against Mr. Mill's and Mr. Hare's recommendations may be summed up in the statement of the indisputable and admitted fact that they are novelties, and that the English people are unaccustomed to them. Earl Russell too, while declaring that he is especially anxious to do no injustice to so profound a thinker as Mr. Mill, does him nevertheless no inconsiderable injustice. For although in the appendix to the volume he cites nearly the whole of the passage from Mr. Mill's work, yet in arguing the question he always speaks as if Mr. Mill had proposed his recommendations for immediate adoption and supported them as of present feasibility and urgency. Mr. Mill distinctly stated that it would not be possible at present to give to such plans any practical shape, and that he even declined for himself to be bound by the particular proposals, although put forward by him as worthy of consideration. He expressly declared that he recommended them only because it was evident to him that "in that direction lay the true ideal of representative government, and that to work towards it by the best practical contrivances which can be found, is the path of real political improvement." Like most professional politicians, Earl Russell is fond of depreciating the suggestions of mere political thinkers. His habit led him in this instance into a decided injustice to a man of thoroughly practical purpose, and perhaps furnished another excuse to shallow and flippant praters in the House of Commons to sneer at every proposal which comes from a profounder thought and a more comprehensive observation than they are capable of following or understanding.

We have wandered a little away from the path of our narrative. Earl Russell's measure of 1854 was as unfortunate as that of 1852. The English people in the former year were little interested in anything but war. The Crimean campaign was just about to open; and in politics the toga always has to give place to the sword. Lord John Russell bowed his head, not uncomplainingly, to the storm. It may be that some of his colleagues were not very sorry to get rid on any pretext of the troublesome Reform project, which they did not care to support and did not dare to oppose. On the 11th of April Lord John Russell explained that he did not mean to proceed with his bill—that the disturbed state of our foreign relations allowed no time for setting to rights our domestic affairs. He appealed plain-

tively to Mr. Disraeli to spare him all sarcastic thrusts, and he finally became affected, and wept. Mr. Disraeli, who, to do him justice, is mostly a generous foe, responded to the appeal in conciliatory and cordial tone. Some people thought the scene affecting, others thought it ridiculous. An appeal to the feelings of the House of Commons is always a dangerous experiment. The slightest touch either way decides whether sympathy or laughter is to prevail. In this instance we think, on the whole, sympathy gained the ascendant. But the struggle was terribly critical, and the great Reform question was clearly degenerating. A little more, and it would become a mere laughing matter, like the annual Anti-Maynooth motion, or the objection which a late noble lord used to bring regularly forward to the exhibition of unclothed young women as models for Royal Academy students.

For a considerable time little more was heard of the subject. The country drifted, as Lord Clarendon said, into the Crimean war. Then came the Indian mutiny and the Chinese difficulties, and the panic about French invasion, and consequent on it, the Volunteer movement. "Better a rotten borough or two," wrote the Poet Laureate, "than a rotten fleet and a town in flames." But with the first quiet moment, or lucid interval, or whatever the pause in battle-motion may be called, came the desire to revive the Reform question. In 1858 a Parliamentary Reform Committee was instituted, which issued an address embodying certain principles of a rather advanced kind, which it proposed to make the basis of a measure to be introduced into the House of Commons by Mr. Bright. The address was signed by thirty-six members of Parliament, and by many gentlemen who now have seats in the House. A bill was prepared which for some time was rather celebrated under the name of Mr. Bright's Bill; and Mr. Bright himself undertook a political campaign through the country to promulgate and support its principles. The basis of the bill was, as to suffrage, a simple rating franchise in boroughs, and a 10*l.* franchise in counties; and as to representation, a readjustment which would bring more nearly into proportion the numbers of members and of constituents. By depriving some very small places of representatives, a number of seats were to be obtained which might be appropriated for the creation of new constituencies and the strengthening of the representation of great cities. One of the newest features of the measure was, that it proposed to give six members each to Manchester, Finsbury, Glasgow, Marylebone, and Liverpool, and four members each to London (city), Sheffield, Bristol, Edinburgh, Leeds, Southwark, Birmingham, Westminster, Lambeth, Dublin, and each of two divisions of the Tower Hamlets. Now, while admitting, as we have done, the gross inequalities which in our present system

reduce the direct political influence of Manchester to the level of that of Tiverton or some decaying and desolate old town like Galway in Ireland, we cannot think it desirable to adopt such a principle as that proposed in Mr. Bright's bill without at the same time introducing a change into our arrangement of electoral districts. We cannot understand how the country would be the better for an addition of four members to the two already returned by the Marylebone minority composed of publicans and vestrymen, who at present arrange for the representation of that constituency. Unless with a new division of constituencies (one, for instance, which would allow the members to be elected by districts, as in the case of municipal representatives), or with a due provision for the representation of minorities, it would hardly be expedient to push the principle of representation in proportion to population to any considerable degree. It is, however, not necessary now to discuss the provisions of Mr. Bright's bill. The measure was never put forward in the House of Commons. In this we think the Radical Reformers made a mistake. If they had brought in the bill and fought for it, and pushed it as far as they could, they would at least have had a standard and a rallying-place, they would have kept the Reform question always prominently before the country, they would have compelled the Government to pay some attention to the subject, and they would have saved themselves from the familiar reproach, not without its effect in the House of Commons, that while ready to condemn all other Reform propositions, they were not prepared to put forward any proposal of their own. In fact, to carry a Reform Bill would have needed just the same sort of policy which forced the Anti-Corn-Law measures on a reluctant Government. Among the many requisites which were wanting to the Reform movement of 1859 and 1860 was leadership. Neither Mr. Bright nor Mr. Cobden was prepared, or indeed was in a physical condition, to encounter the heavy and constant labour which official leadership requires in such a struggle; and the Reform party contained no other man whose ability and influence would enable him to assume such a place.

Mr. Disraeli seized the *mocolletto*, and tried to carry it a little on its way. Having not unsuccessfully played at being Chancellor of the Exchequer, the brilliant Conservative leader thought he saw an opportunity of becoming conspicuous as the promoter of a Reform Bill. Perhaps we shall never know how much of trouble it cost Mr. Disraeli to persuade some of his party that the exigencies of the situation absolutely required of them to disguise themselves as Reformers. We cannot imagine a greater sacrifice to the necessities of party than some of the steady old Tories must have made when they consented to become the patrons of any scheme of Parliamentary Reform. No doubt their ingenious

leader laboured hard to explain to them that if there must be reform of any kind, it would be much more safe in their hands than in those of their opponents. No doubt he allayed their fears by assuring them that, though compelled for the nonce to play the lion, he would roar them as gently as any sucking dove. No doubt many of the Tories gave their consent to their leader's taking the Reform question into his hands only in the hope and belief that he would emasculate it and render it harmless. The consent of the party was, however, obtained somehow, and Mr. Disraeli appeared at last before the country in the unwonted attitude of a Parliamentary Reformer. The bill which he introduced on the 28th of February, 1859, was a pretty and picturesque imitation of a political reform measure. When we remember the opposing interests its inventor had to satisfy, we cannot but admire the ingenuity with which he attempted to reconcile them. Perhaps, however, there was more than boldness—there was foolhardihood, in such an undertaking. Mr. Disraeli had to try to prove to one side of the House that he really meant Reform, and to the other that he meant nothing of the kind. Don Juan or Macheath placed between the contending claims and endeavouring by contradictory assurances to satisfy the vehement demands of two feminine rivals, could hardly be in a more critical and interesting dramatic situation than Mr. Disraeli while engaged in the effort to bring in a Reform Bill which should at once disarm Mr. Bright and not alarm Mr. Henley. The Conservative leader adopted a fanciful and delightful scheme of educational franchise. Ministers of religion, graduates of universities, members of the legal and medical professions, and certificated schoolmasters, were to have votes. The most timorous of Conservatives must have admitted that there was nothing very anarchical in that, as nearly all the personages thus proposed to be specially enfranchised either already had, or without the slightest difficulty could have obtained, the ordinary franchise. People having 10*l.* a year in the Funds, in Bank Stock, or East India Stock, were to have votes. Persons having 60*l.* in a savings'-bank were to have votes; but a man who had just drawn out 60*l.* to get married, or to furnish a house, or to embark in some little business, or to pay off some honest liability, was to be disfranchised for his conduct. Recipients of pensions to the amount of 20*l.* in the naval, military, or civil service (and we all know what an independent and energetic class of politicians Government pensioners usually are), were to enjoy the additional privilege of a vote. In counties the franchise was to be reduced to 10*l.*, but *en revanche* the 40*s.* freeholders living in boroughs were no longer to have a county vote. There was to be a sort of 20*l.* (or 8*s.* a week) lodger franchise. Some few additional representatives of large constituencies were to be brought

in, and three or four new constituencies were to be created. Votes were to be taken in certain cases by voting papers—a thoroughly ridiculous and indeed monstrous proposition. Dockyard and arsenal *employés* of Government were to be disfranchised. Finally, the bill contained an admirable provision which only required extension to boroughs in order to merit the cordial support of every honest Reformer—the expenses of the polling-places were to be paid for out of the public rates. Such in substance was Mr. Disraeli's bill.

The proposal was received with utter scorn by the advanced Liberal party. It was met by the ex-ministerialists with a complete and uncompromising opposition. Lord John Russell moved an amendment, declaring that it was “neither just nor politic to interfere in the manner proposed with the freehold franchise as hitherto exercised in counties,” and that “no readjustment of the franchise will satisfy the House and the country which does not provide for a greater extension of the suffrage in cities and boroughs than is contemplated in the present measure.” After a lengthened debate, in which all the leading Palmerstonians and Whigs condemned severely Mr. Disraeli's hesitation to lower the franchise in boroughs in order to give free admission to the working classes, the House adopted the amendment by a majority of 39 against Government, and the Derby Administration was virtually at an end. The Parliament was dissolved, the general elections were contested on what we may call the Broad and Narrow Reform question, the famous Willis's Rooms compact was made between Whigs and Radicals, the Government, on the re-assembling of the House, was expelled by a vote of no confidence, and the Palmerston and Russell cabinet came into office pledged to a liberal measure of Reform.

The course taken by the Liberals in rejecting Mr. Disraeli's bill has been the subject of much hostile criticism. The Whigs are accused of having frustrated the efforts of the Derby Government, not in order to do something better for the unenfranchised population, but solely in order to regain possession of the power which they had for a short time forfeited. They are accused, indeed, of deliberate political treachery and treason. The advanced Liberals are blamed for not having grasped at anything in the shape of a Reform Bill—taken with readiness, if not with gratitude, any poor instalment of reform, rather than refuse that which, whatever its shortcomings, was at least better than nothing, and which, once rejected, was not likely to be offered again. It is urged that if the House had been allowed to go into committee on the bill, many of its defects could have been remedied, and some, at least, of its shortcomings might have been supplied. We have heard sincere and intelligent Radicals express great

regret that the leaders of their party did not embrace the opportunity, such as it was, and try to make something of Mr. Disraeli's Reform Bill. Now we do not think that, as regards the advanced Liberals, the criticism has any foundation. They appear to us to have been clearly bound by all their professions and their policy to reject such a measure altogether. Let us remember what they had always been demanding of successive Governments. They had claimed, not special franchises for barristers and doctors and certificated schoolmasters and government pensioners; they had demanded that the working classes should receive again some share of that political power which they freely consented to sacrifice for a time when Earl Grey's measure was introduced. Mr. Disraeli's bill could not possibly have been made to satisfy that requirement. Its details might indeed have been amended in committee, but the committee could not reconstruct the whole bill, and turn it into something which its promoters expressly desired it not to be. So far as the working classes were concerned, Mr. Disraeli's bill was a measure of further disfranchisement. Mr. Disraeli and his party took good care indeed to compliment the working man upon his patience, his intelligence, and his virtues; they were loud in their professions of faith in him, and eagerness for political co-operation with him; but it is quite obvious that the measure of Reform which they introduced would, if it had any effect whatever on his position, have tended to remove the franchise a little further out of his reach. The Liberals were no more wrong in rejecting such a proposal, than a man would be wrong who, having asked for bread, refuses to accept a stone. If there were no other measures in contemplation—if no Whig pledges had ever been made—if the choice lay avowedly between Mr. Disraeli's bill and nothing, we still think the Liberals would have been fully justified in rejecting the offer. But we must remember that they were promised a Reform Bill of a very different kind. The statesman in whose charge Reform was supposed to be placed by the voice of the nation, had actually moved the rejection of Mr. Disraeli's bill in order that he might himself introduce a measure to supply the very wants of which the Liberals complained. The latter could not be expected to foresee the extraordinary acts of political treachery by which their hopes were to be frustrated. We think that the Radicals were quite right in rejecting the bill; we think the Whigs would have been equally right if they had supplied its place with a better. But they who watched the conduct of the Government chiefs during the Reform debates of 1860 will find it hard to believe that the failure of the bill then introduced was not mainly due to a blending of imbecility and treachery on the Treasury benches.

On the 1st of March, 1860, Lord John Russell rose for the last

time in the House of Commons to propose a Reform Bill. It would be unnecessary for us to describe in detail the provisions of a measure so recent, so simple, and so well known. Enough to say that its principal objects were to introduce a 6*l.* franchise in boroughs, a 10*l.* franchise in counties, to add a few members to large cities, and create some few new electoral constituencies. Mr. Disraeli led off the opposition—if opposition that may be called which formally professed not to oppose. The leader of the Conservative party made a long and weary speech, in which he had nothing to say but that he objected to the introduction in a lump of so many of what he called homogeneous voters. Mr. Disraeli evidently regarded or appeared to regard the working men all over the country as if they resembled the little tin soldiers in boxes which are made so plentifully in Germany. Any one of these tiny warriors, from whatever box you pick him, or in whatever town you find him, is of course exactly like any other. And Mr. Disraeli apparently considered the operative population of England a race of just the same monotonous constitution. His mind conjured up visions of a mass of working men (Lord John Russell proposed to admit something under 200,000 of them), all rushing to the poll in obedience to a mysterious *mot d'ordre*, and voting with unbroken harmony against all landed proprietors, capitalists, men of station, and men of intellect. No higher idea of our political system appears to have flashed upon his mind than that of a sort of scramble in which each class endeavoured to get the better of the other. He declared himself quite ready to admit working men if only you brought in at the same time enough of some preponderating influence to keep them harmless. He wanted a sort of political *gendarmerie* of pensioners and certificated schoolmasters to keep the turbulent working men in order. It was of no use to tell him that, even if the Government measure were carried, the humble class voters would still remain in a hopeless minority, and respectability, even without the aid of the certificated schoolmaster, would have the thing all its own way. Mr. Disraeli had one reply to such suggestions—the poor voters would all, to a man, vote together and for their own class interests, while the other voters would be split up into parties and *cliques*. This was his one solitary argument. His genius exhausted itself in this notable discovery. Reduced to practical shape, the following might be taken as Mr. Disraeli's notion. In Liverpool, say, the working population just now is divided, as we all know, into two great parties—mobs if you like—one Tory or indeed Orange, and the other Radical. In Belfast the condition of things is somewhat similar. In many other towns the same circumstances produce the same result. Now these two parties, unenfranchised, have always remained, and pro-

bably always will remain, thus divided and opposed. But give them votes, and, according to Mr. Disraeli's theory, you unite them into one homogeneous political mass. The differences between Orangeman and Radical, Catholic and Protestant, sink into the dust, and unenfranchised enemies become enfranchised allies. The Radical workman and the Tory workman who, when without votes, would have smashed each other's heads in the cause of opposing candidates, become, the moment they are endowed with the suffrage, the fastest of friends, and walk arm-in-arm to the poll, determined to vote, not for Whig or Tory, Episcopalian or Ultramontane, but always and only for the candidate who declares that property is robbery, and that education is bloated aristocracy. If Mr. Disraeli's speech did not mean this, it meant nothing. In truth, we do not suppose it really meant this; we rather accept the other alternative. It meant nothing.

Yet this was the keynote of the long, weary, and imbecile debate. It all turned upon a question of numbers. How many working men are you venturing to admit? 150,000 or 170,000; or do you really mean to say you propose to let in 200,000? Are you going to subject us to the influence of poverty and passion? asks Sir E. Bulwer-Lytton, as if poverty and passion would not be far more dangerous unenfranchised than enfranchised. What is to become of constituencies like mine if you allow so many unenlightened persons to vote? demands Mr. Black, the representative of the enlightenment of Edinburgh, which rejected Lord Macaulay. Two hundred thousand persons all ignorant of political economy! cries Mr. Bentinck, who to this day is firmly convinced that free-trade principles are the ruin of a nation. The Tories, it must be observed, did not oppose; they only criticised. The only thing like opposition in a direct shape came from supporters of Lord Palmerston. Mr. Massey opposed, and Mr. Massey is now financial minister for India. Mr. Edwin James opposed, and that dignified and high-minded personage was almost immediately after despatched by Lord Palmerston as private envoy to the camp of Garibaldi.

The Opposition game was clear. They had rather an ignoble part to play. Let it be acknowledged that they played it with a certain dexterity which at times bore a shabby resemblance to political skill. Their game was to talk the measure down, and in doing so to make it seem ridiculous and to convert the whole question into a subject of laughter. Now, whether an Opposition shall simply talk a measure out of existence or not, depends entirely upon the ministry. The House of Commons does not, and we trust never will, admit of a *cloture* system. As long as anybody chooses to speak, and can get forty persons to listen to him, or to remain in the House while he is talking,

or even to hang about the lobbies and the smoking-room, ready to come in if a count should be attempted, so long a debate must go on. The forms of the House moreover afford almost unlimited opportunities of obstructing the progress of an obnoxious measure. Even a very small number of persons can interpose the most serious delay to the passing of a bill which may have the warm support of the great majority. Obviously, therefore, it would be possible for a dozen members to prevent any measure whatever from passing, by the simple process of staving off the final stages to the very end of the session, if there were not some powerful influence at hand to arrest and frustrate such factious policy. That influence always rests with the ministry. Unless a Premier be absolutely despised by the House—and in our time no such man could be Premier—an earnest appeal from him will always put a stop to the policy of mere obstruction. Let him but announce that the Government is determined either to carry the measure in question or to be defeated on it, and the good sense of the House will at once insist that a decision shall not be needlessly delayed. In the Reform debates of 1831 and 1832 the policy of talking down the bill was tried with great success, until Lord Althorp announced that the Government, while ready to listen to any amount of discussion, was determined to prolong the session until a decision should have been obtained. Now, in the debates of 1860 the talking-down policy was pursued in the most open, and indeed ostentatious, manner. The bill contained no provision that had not been discussed over and over again in previous sessions. The Conservative party had formally declared that they did not mean to oppose. Yet they kept on, night after night, repeating to empty benches the same old arguments, and drawing forth the same old answers. The scene became at once dreary and ludicrous. Each new Tory speaker was received with cheers and laughter by his friends; and then his friends, knowing there was nothing for them to listen to, cleared out and left him to his task of talking against time. Once or twice the playful ingenuity of Mr. Bentinck endeavoured to effect a count by the statesmanlike and dignified process of obstructing the doorway with his own huge bulk, and thus preventing members from getting in. The session—a peculiarly busy one in other respects—was wearing on, and the patience of the public was wearing out. Then the impression which prevailed everywhere in the House began to extend its influence out of doors, and people generally came to understand that the obstructive policy of the Opposition derived its best encouragement from the Treasury benches.

We say deliberately that we do not believe it would have been possible to find any one member of Parliament outside the minis-

terial circle who did not entertain this conviction. Inside the ministerial circle there were, no doubt, many who equally entertained it. Every one saw that it only rested with Lord Palmerston to spoil the Tory game by half a dozen sentences. He had only to say that the Government was determined to carry the bill, or to be defeated on it; he had only to say that it would be necessary to prolong the sitting until the House should have decided one way or the other, and the debates would at once have assumed a practical tone, and would have been directed toward a definite conclusion. There could be no rational excuse for unlimited debate upon the second reading of a bill which contained only provisions the House had been discussing session after session for years, and of which no one professed to oppose the principle. We need hardly say that Lord Palmerston took no such course. The Opposition saw quickly enough that the chief of the Government was with them, and that the game was wholly in their hands. We acquit Lord John Russell of any graver defect than a want of firmness. He must have seen clearly enough where his greatest obstacle lay, but he was too undecided and weak to insist upon a manlier policy, or to withdraw from all responsibility. The history of the cabinet councils of 1860 would be interesting and instructive. If some official imitator of Earl Grey would only reveal the secrets of that cabinet, we should perhaps learn something rather piquant about the opposition to the French commercial treaty and the Reform Bill.

The obstructive policy prevailed, and Lord John Russell withdrew his measure, never to renew it. The session of 1860 was his Moscow. Next session Lord Palmerston laughed at the notion of Reform. In the meantime he had been highly applauded by the newspapers for the manner in which he chaffed a butcher on a country platform, because the simple butcher had really supposed that the declarations of 1859 were perfectly sincere and serious. So closed this chapter of our parliamentary history. Not more eager were Whig and Tory leaders in 1858 and 1859 to declare their belief in the imperative need of Reform, than they showed themselves in 1861 and 1862 to proclaim it absolutely and ludicrously useless. It is quite true that this sort of thing could never have prevailed, if the country had been thoroughly in earnest on the subject; but the middle classes, as we have already shown, were not in earnest. They had had their own political wants satisfied, and they troubled themselves little about their humbler neighbours, who had given up so much for them. Nothing, indeed, could excuse the conduct of the ruling classes. Nothing could make their sudden tergiversation anything better than a caricature of statesmanship. No conceivable argument can be found to prove, that if reform was necessary in 1859, it

was less necessary in 1861. No decision of a parliamentary majority in any session had, right or wrong, proclaimed it unnecessary. But if anything could excuse the governing classes, it would be the conduct of the middle classes. The ministries on either side did not, at least, prove themselves ungrateful to those from whom they derived their chance of power. The middle classes did show themselves thus ungrateful. The political power which they never could have obtained but for the co-operation of the working man, they employed, passively at least, to deny to the working man that share of constitutional influence which his intelligence deserved, and which they themselves had encouraged him to expect.

Earl Russell's career as a Reformer is closed. Even his recent publication will not reopen it. In the preface to the new edition of his essay on "English Government and Constitution" he lays down the conditions which he considers necessary qualifications for the body of electors. We notice them because much stress was laid upon them by the *Times* and other journals, in order to show that Earl Russell is firmly and wisely opposed to all Radical reform. We do not doubt that his lordship is sincerely and consistently opposed to any extreme measure, but we quote his own expressions in order to show how much importance may be attached to, and what solid conclusions may be drawn from, words which in themselves express absolutely nothing. Now, here are what Earl Russell considers the essential qualifications of an electoral body. "First. That they should be of average intelligence. Second. That they should, upon the whole, form a security for stability of property. Third. That although bribery cannot be altogether excluded, the body of electors as a mass should not be tainted by corruption. Fourth. That the electoral body should be identified with the general sense of the community—in short, with the public opinion of the time." Now, let us ask whether anybody ever heard of an electoral scheme which did not profess to aim at and to be founded on these qualifications? From the simple universal suffrage of France to the complicated and bewildering system of Prussia—from the plan proposed by the Chartists to that recommended by Mr. Hare—from the Florentine bean to the American ticket—was there ever a franchise scheme known which did not, in the opinion of its admirers, secure just the objects Earl Russell professes to desire? Did anybody ever propound a scheme for the introduction of an electoral body who should be below the average intelligence, opposed to the security of property, generally tainted by corruption, and out of harmony with the public opinion of the time?

So the Reform question lies for the moment in abeyance. It

has been the Poland of many ministries—they have served themselves by it, but never served it. Among the unenfranchised classes a deep distrust of all ministerial promise has naturally grown up. Exciting foreign questions—principally the American war, and all the stirring hopes and discussions arising out of it—have kept the attention of the people in a continued distraction from the less thrilling subjects of domestic concern. But the man must be short-sighted indeed who does not see that this interval of indifference will speedily have an end. The fruit of 1859 and 1860 will doubtless be a Reform Bill much broader and more liberal than anything that was then officially recommended. At present the Reform question wants a leader. It would be better for all parties that the leader should be found within than without the cabinet. Undoubtedly Mr. Gladstone might hold the place, if he would. All parties acknowledge his sincerity and his conscientiousness, and no one disparages his splendid talents. Several times, during the worst period of the distress in Lancashire, he made public declaration of his conviction that an extension of the franchise ought to be granted. Indeed, he spoke more than once as if he only wanted to be pressed in order to assume the leadership of a new Reform movement. This surprised the public all the more, as Mr. Gladstone was notoriously a lukewarm Reformer in 1860, and had come forward as an advocate of the pocket-borough system in 1859. But Mr. Gladstone, like all men of a really high nature, is governed by feeling even in politics as well as by logic; and as it is quite probable that the singular patience with which the working men of Lancashire bore their sufferings, and the intelligence with which they appreciated the political difficulties of the situation, first convinced him that the constitutional system which makes no account of the existence of such men must necessarily require amendment. Mr. Gladstone was not long in making the most emphatic proclamation of his new faith; and on the discussion of Mr. Baines's bill in 1864, he opened what may fairly be called a new Reform era, by the famous speech in which he declared that the *onus probandi* lay upon those who would exclude from the franchise, and not upon those who sought admission to it. Now, if Mr. Gladstone really meant what he said, and is determined to follow it up, we need not speculate about the next Reform leader. Some time or other the present Chancellor of the Exchequer must be the Prime Minister; in any case, he must soon lead the House of Commons. If, therefore, he spoke with a purpose in 1864, it is obvious that, whenever the opportunity arises, we may count upon having the Reform question taken up by one who has talents to which Earl Russell never pretended, and earnestness which even his nearest friends do not ascribe to Mr. Disraeli.

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But we are far from being certain that Mr. Gladstone is determined upon so bold and wise a policy as that attributed to him by the hopes of one party and the fears of another. He is not, in the political sense, a very strong man; he is not self-reliant or self-sufficing. He is highly impressionable and sensitive; he is morbidly conscientious; he always sees so many courses open to him, that he occasionally loses all his time in balancing their respective advantages, and ends by taking none of them. It quite depends upon Mr. Gladstone himself whether he will close in triumph the Reform agitation of this generation; and our chief fear that he may miss the opportunity is because it depends entirely on himself to say whether he will seize it or let it go. In the present cabinet there is no other man capable of doing anything with the question; and on the other side there is probably no one but Lord Stanley who would even be inclined to favour any forward step in such a cause. If, therefore, Mr. Gladstone fails to seize his opportunity, the next Reform movement will be from without, and the ministry will not lead but be driven to the goal. We for ourselves should prefer to see the movement led by a statesman in office, and should be glad indeed if that statesman were so sincere and so gifted a man as Mr. Gladstone. But that the step of progress will have before long to be accomplished somehow, is not to be doubted, except by those whom no experience teaches and upon whom all observation is lost. Only the most stupid want of faith in the English character, and want of understanding of the English political system, can explain the alarm which so many people feel at the notion of constitutional reform in what is called a democratic direction. It is not because of our political institutions that we are what we are. The political institutions are a result, not a cause. It is not because we have not universal suffrage that we are not democratic, but because we are not democratic we have not universal suffrage. As our national and social sentiments and habits change, so must our political institutions. If the English people really is progressing towards democracy, no resisting power in our constitutional system can do any more than by its opposition and its weakness hasten the change it sought to impede. It is absurd to suppose that any change in our franchise could make us like the French or the Americans. It is equally absurd to suppose that if we are tending to Gallicism or Americanism, any resistance offered by our franchise can prevent the change. A reform of our present electoral institutions is now required, simply because there are too many intelligent people excluded from the franchise, and because the machinery which was suitable in 1832 is naturally obsolete in 1865. A *6l.* franchise would no more transform us into a democracy than Catholic Emancipation restored us to Papacy.

or the admission of Jews to Parliament converted the House of Commons into a Judaic institution. Evil consequences never spring from reforms which are based on a principle of justice, unless when the reforms have been granted too grudgingly or withheld too long.

ART. VI.—THE CANADIAN CONFEDERACY.

Resolutions relative to the Proposed Union of the British North-American Provinces. Quebec. January 19, 1865.

THE probable fate of the British North-American colonies has, for many years, afforded wide scope for speculation. Both in this country and in America the chances have been weighed as passing events offered themselves for analysis. It has been regarded from various points of view; the result being, conclusions as widely different as such topics of discussion usually lead to. Argument resting upon a speculative basis is always unsteady, and kaleidoscopic glances at the present yield very unsatisfactory data from which to decipher the future. Hence it is that America and American affairs have so frequently belied prophecy. The conjectures evoked by the dealings between England and her North-American colonies have in many instances proved erroneous, and we are not now so liable to be led astray by the oracular utterances of nervousness and timidity. We were assured that Canada was incapable of self-control, but we find that political strife carried to the extreme has not been able to weaken the springs of government, or to disregard the promptings of patriotism. Recriminations and jealousies which formerly found vent in the Colonial Office, have been smothered where their origin could be soonest detected and their object most easily frustrated. The consequence of transferring responsibility from the shoulders of the Imperial Government to those of the colonists themselves, is that the shafts of temper no longer spend their force on an imperial target, while a spirit of loyalty and affection has taken the place of an ungracious allegiance. It has also been asserted that the democratic tendencies of these American colonies would have the effect of weakening if not terminating the relations between them and the mother country; that the grant of freedom from imperial dictation naturally handed over to republicanism the keys of a British

stronghold. Neither has this proved true, although the anticipation harmonizes well with the expressed wishes of the United States. So long ago as 1775, when delegates from the American States assembled in convention at Philadelphia to agree upon the terms of an union, they evidently accepted as a foregone conclusion the immediate entrance of Canada, at least, into the federal compact, for Section XI. of their Articles of Agreement provided that "Canada, acceding to the confederation and joining in the measures of the United States, shall be admitted into and be entitled to the advantages of the Union." Every inducement to revolt was held out to all the British provinces; but neither open temptation nor secret intrigue was sufficiently powerful to allure them from their allegiance. Lower Canada was appealed to in terms that recognised its peculiar position as regards race, language, religion, and laws, and included a guarantee for their security and permanence. But the French inhabitants, besides having the recollection of past wrongs to prompt a rejection, were moved by a deep-rooted antipathy to republicanism to meet with disdain overtures thus insidiously made to them. In after years, the employment of force had as little effect in changing the determination of these stubborn colonists to remain a portion of the empire; and the several provinces not only fought nobly against the common enemy, but even sent assistance to the more sorely pressed. Notwithstanding this, it has been an article of political faith with American statesmen and politicians that the "manifest destiny" of their republic would, in its own good time, lead to the absorption of some, if not all, of the adjacent British provinces. To embrace these is their traditionary policy, having in its list of founders and supporters such names as Washington, Franklin, Monroe, and Seward. Mr. Seward's views pointed to a peaceable rather than a forcible annexation; and both in England and in British America the idea has been entertained that Canada, New Brunswick, and Nova Scotia, but more especially the first-named, must sooner or later cast in their lot with the powerful nation at their side, impelled by sheer force of political attraction. Nor is this theory incapable of support, though formerly the reasons in its favour were much more numerous than they now are. A glance at the position occupied by Canada a few years ago will be found to justify in some degree the Montreal annexation movement of 1849. It was a dependency shut in from the seaboard for five months of the year, at an enormous distance from the imperial metropolis; separated from those of kindred sympathies and acknowledging a like allegiance, by an almost untraversable tract of country; exposed to attack at every point along a frontier of a thousand miles; gazing at the prosperity of a nation which held out every inducement to unite with it; without manu-

factures, coal, or capital, yet witnessing a stream of British wealth pouring into the lap of its rival ; thinly populated, and outbid in attracting emigration ; with the hope of union between itself and the other British colonies uncertain, although having all the elements of prosperity ready to be combined, but suffering them, from various causes, to lie unimproved and unprofitable. Taking every circumstance into consideration, it cannot be denied that the prospects of a long-continued existence of such a dependency as a separate and distinct political organism were dim and dubious. The maritime provinces had not such influences to contend against ; but the temptations brought to bear upon Canada, and her successful resistance to them, naturally beget surprise at the nature of the causes to which she owed her preservation from a loss of identity in the nation at her side. But it is unnecessary for present purposes to do more than notice the fact, as it serves to show the bent of her inclination. Changed times have suggested new fields for debate, and prophecy has been driven to seek out new channels. A rapid advance in material prosperity brought with it considerations left out in previous forecasts ; while, on the other hand, the American Republic presents to its admirers fewer attractions than formerly. The effect is seen in the almost total obliteration of annexation sentiment in the colonies, and in the strength and encouragement afforded to those in England who looked forward to the establishment of a British nationality in America that would not only rival the great republic, but would prove a faithful ally to the mother land. When we yielded to these colonies the right of self-government, we gave up the right to dictate, whether we reserved the privilege of guiding or not. This abandonment of control carried with it, said some, the last link in the chain that bound our British American colonies to the empire ; but this hasty assertion has been thus far falsified. Confident in their capacity for self-government, we committed their fortunes to their own keeping, as a faithful guardian unburdens himself of his trust on the attainment of majority by his ward. Had we conceived that this transfer involved a mere change of masters, we should have unquestionably hesitated to sacrifice our interests to those of a foreign power. But faith in their future was no less strong with our statesmen than it was in the colonists themselves. That self-reliance, that innate vigour, which defies misfortune and begets self-confidence, is a characteristic of our race, and, when grafted in other lands, reproduces its inherent qualities with the characteristics of the parent stock. We had confidence in our kindred and in the virtue of our institutions ; and a colonial policy based upon this has proved successful, and in its success its wisdom. A complex relationship has been begotten, but the

machinery has worked well. The evidences of stability exhibited by these self-governed colonies, the variety of resources at their command, and the vast progress they have made in utilizing the advantages placed by nature within their reach, have not been lost sight of by that school of politicians which regards the relations between us and states dependent but in name as presenting some unsatisfactory features. Nor has the change in circumstances been passed over heedlessly by the colonists themselves. They, too, have begun to reflect on the chances of the future. Everlasting youth is denied to nations as well as to individuals, and impulses from within combine with influences from without to urge a consideration of the best means for ensuring a lusty manhood. It is with no little pride, therefore, that we see them enter upon the discussion of a subject of such vital importance as a confederation among themselves with calmness and deliberation indicating a knowledge of the responsibility devolving upon them, and a determination to probe to the bottom the secret of national greatness. It is a complete vindication of our modern policy in permitting them to think and act for themselves. It is of importance, therefore, to know what they propose to do, the basis of the contemplated changes, and their effect. To arrive at a proper understanding, it is necessary to go back a little in their history.

It must not be supposed that the scheme of confederation is the offspring of fear. Its origin can be traced much further back than the civil war in the United States, however much a shock so terrible may have contributed to its maturity; nor can colonial emancipators, should their anticipations be realized, lay claim to its inception, however entitled to the credit of supplying a reason for its adoption.

It is stated that as early as 1810 a union of all the British American provinces was suggested by one of the colonists, and at various times afterwards the attention of the imperial authorities was directed to the subject by leading colonial politicians. Chief-Justice Sewell of Quebec, in 1814 laid before the late Duke of Kent a comprehensive plan, which met with the approval of His Royal Highness. In 1827, resolutions were introduced into the Legislative Assembly of Upper Canada, directed more especially to a union of the two provinces of Upper and Lower Canada; but proposing, as an alternative, "what would be more politic, wise, and generally advantageous,—viz., an union of the whole four provinces of North America under a vice-royalty, with a facsimile of that great and glorious fabric—the best monument of human wisdom—the British Constitution."

Lord Durham, in his report on the affairs of British North America (1839), discusses the subject at considerable length, anticipating nearly all the arguments that can now be urged in

its favour. In 1854, resolutions were brought forward in the Nova Scotia Legislature which indicated a strong desire to promote a closer connexion of the different provinces; and in 1857 the subject was pressed upon Mr. Labouchere, then Secretary of State for the Colonies, by delegates from that province; but he felt disposed to leave it to the colonists themselves to take action in the matter. In 1858, the Canadian Government announced as part of their policy that the expediency of a federal union of the British North-American provinces would be anxiously considered, and that communications would be entered into with the other provinces and the Imperial Government to secure adhesion to the project. In accordance with this announcement, delegates were sent from Canada, and the sanction of the Imperial Government was asked to the scheme; but the hesitation exhibited by the other provinces rendered the effort thus made fruitless. The Government of Nova Scotia made the next move, but the policy adopted by them had reference to a legislative union of Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and Prince Edward Island. In 1863 both Houses of the Nova Scotia Legislature passed, unanimously, resolutions authorizing the appointment of delegates to confer upon that subject with delegates from the other maritime provinces. Similar resolutions were adopted in the Parliaments of New Brunswick and Prince Edward Island. A meeting of delegates was accordingly called to sit at Charlotte Town, Prince Edward Island, in September of 1863.

Meanwhile, events in Canada were rapidly tending to render some change in its political condition an absolute necessity. One government after another was forced to confess itself unable to control parliament; and resignation followed resignation, and election succeeded election, with no other effect than to increase the embarrassment. The result was that sectional majorities, firmly united, impeded legislation, and assailed each other with every weapon that strong sectional differences place at the disposal of political factions. Lower Canadian representatives united to resist the demands of their compeers from the Upper Province, and Upper Canadian members were as resolute in enforcing what they considered to be just claims. In fact, Upper and Lower Canada were arrayed against each other, each determined not to yield an inch of ground. This state of things, it was evident, could not long continue without leading to very serious results. The nature of the questions on which the two were divided admitted of no immediate satisfactory compromise, considering the relative position of the disputants. Upper Canadian members alleged that the population of their section of the province exceeded that of the other by 400,000; and as each had an equality of representation, the result was the practical

disfranchisement of these 400,000. It was also contended that the proportion of taxation raised by the respective sections showed a large excess in favour of Upper Canada, as that portion paid two thirds of the taxation of the country, while the relative expenditure exhibited a gross injustice. In answer to this, the Lower Canadians contended that, at the time of the union of the provinces, their section had a majority of 175,000; and it was not till 1850 that the scale was turned against them, by reason of a large immigration; and that they (comparatively rich) had borne the heavier part of the burthen of a debt contracted by the Upper Province, which, at the time, was staggering under the load; that any increase in the representation in Parliament would naturally place them (being a minority) at the mercy of a people dissimilar in race, character, religion, language, and laws. This quarrel culminated on the floor of Parliament, as we have already mentioned, in arraying sections against each other; the one bold in pressing for increased representation, and the other defiant in resisting it. The union effected between the provinces of Upper and Lower Canada in 1840 was, after all, but a nominal one; each section preserved its identity, and the line between them remained in all its distinctness. The government has been administered by a ministry made up of an equal number from both sections, with, in most instances, a distinct staff of crown officers. It was, of course, to be expected that local politicians would keep alive sectional prejudices with such material as they had to work upon. Each half of the provincial cabinet has been expected to command the support of a majority from the section it represented, so that a ministry having a majority of the whole Houses of Parliament would be compelled to disband by reason of not having a majority within a majority. This policy could have but one effect, and it may be seen that the secret of frequent political crises lies, therefore, on the surface of Canadian politics. No government could be expected to stand out for any great length of time against a vigilant opposition, with so many conflicting interests to appease as the circumstances and extent of that country created. Party strife loses none of its violence by reason of the smallness of the community in which it is developed; and in its choice of weapons loses no advantage through courtesy. The check given to public business brought both political parties to their senses; and returning reason suggested the necessity for a remedy by which responsible government would be saved from degenerating into a series of faction fights. It was apparent that constitutional difficulties lay at the bottom of this sectional strife. Both parties accepted the omen; the political leaders avowed their willingness to throw aside party ties and even personal

feeling; and a coalition was formed pledged to co-operate in searching out a practical remedy for the evils which had become intolerable. The result is embraced in the following memorandum, which expressed the policy of the coalition government:—

“The Government are prepared to pledge themselves to bring in a measure, next session, for the purpose of removing existing difficulties, by introducing the federal principle into Canada, coupled with such provisions as will permit the Maritime Provinces and the North-West Territory to be incorporated with the same system of government: and the Government will seek, by sending representatives to the Lower Provinces and to England, to secure the assent of those interests that are beyond the control of our Legislature, to be united under a general Legislature based upon the federal principle.”*

This coalition of parties (being accepted as a guarantee for the cessation of that species of political contention which had proved a source of constant annoyance and irritation) met with the unanimous approbation of both Houses of Parliament, and gave satisfaction to the people and press of the country; while the policy announced afforded a gleam of hope to those who had begun to despair of an adjustment of difficulties hitherto seemingly incapable of settlement. After the prorogation of the Canadian Parliament, an invitation was extended by the Chamber of Commerce of St. John, New Brunswick, to the members of the Canadian Legislature, to pay a visit to the Maritime Provinces. This was accepted by a large number of Canadians, and the principal citizens of New Brunswick and Nova Scotia gave a hearty welcome to their fellow colonists. Their fraternal meetings went far to pave the way for an union, as public attention was at once turned towards the mutual advantage to be gained by a closer connexion. Such an incident may, at first glance, seem of little importance; but when we consider that up to this time public opinion had not kept pace with the dreams of the colonial statesmen (although individuals in all the provinces had agreed on what ought to be done rather than on what could be done), we are inclined to give it due weight. Shortly afterwards, the convention appointed to consider the subject of an union of the Maritime Provinces, met at Charlotte Town, Prince Edward Island; and members of the Canadian Government attended and proposed to merge in the higher plan of a confederation of all the provinces,—that of a legislative union among the Maritime Provinces. The subject was discussed, and such progress made that it was thought desirable by the Conference that the subject should be resumed in an official manner under the authority

* Statement by Hon. J. A. Macdonald in Canadian House of Assembly, June 21, 1864.

of the governments of the several provinces.* The Governor-General of Canada communicated to the Secretary of State for the Colonies the suggestions of the Conference, stating in his despatch that "the desire for a closer union amongst the colonies than has hitherto existed appears to be generally felt both in Canada and the Lower Provinces;" and, further, "it appears to me that the mode of proceeding suggested is the only one in which the views entertained by the leading politicians of the British North-American colonies on this important subject can be brought intelligibly and in a practical form before your attention." In reply, Mr. Cardwell merely expressed his approval of the course taken in the matter. Official delegates were appointed to represent each province, with the exception of Newfoundland. That province, however, was represented by some of its leading statesmen. The Conference met at Quebec, and formally entered upon the discussion of the subject.

From the foregoing it will be observed that the idea of a possible confederation has never been extinct in any of the provinces, although it has taken Rip Van Winkle slumbers. Until lately it had not been made a party question, nor had its discussion enlisted any very large number of persons. Now, however, it has assumed the proportions of a public question, and invites inquiry into its merits or demerits. Before reviewing the conclusions arrived at by the Conference, it may be as well to take a rapid survey of the country embraced by the confederation scheme, so that we may be enabled to judge of its probable success.

Public attention has but seldom been directed to the capabilities and resources of the British American provinces as a whole: even among the colonists themselves has this been the case, and to such a degree that their knowledge of each other, not to mention the little importance they attached to their united value, has been as slight as an acquaintance with them has been superficial. They have had strange impressions of each other, and until lately, when they began to take stock, the general public had no idea that the provinces would unitedly possess all the elements necessary to constitute a powerful nation. No inducements were offered to render the acquisition of correct information of any practical service; so that while individuals regarded as visionaries bestowed time and labour in laying a basis for their schemes of future action, the mass of the communities paid little attention to their facts, and gave themselves no trouble about their theories. Each province has been so taken up with its own needs and the working out of its own projects, that

* Report of Committee of Executive Council of Canada, September 23, 1864.

greater interests have been kept in the background. But events have forced them to take thought for the future as well as to provide for the necessities of the present, and in setting out they naturally compare themselves with others.

The British possessions on the American continent embrace a territory nearly equal to that of the United States. It is difficult to give with accuracy the area under British rule, as that portion of the continent is but partially surveyed, and boundaries are not yet clearly defined, but an estimate sufficient for practical purposes has been formed. The latest calculation has this result :

	Square miles.
Canada	330,000
Newfoundland	40,200
New Brunswick	27,710
Nova Scotia	18,600
Prince Edward Island	2,131
	418,641

If we add to this the probable area of the remainder—say, British Columbia 213,500, Vancouver Island 16,000, and the Hudson Bay Territory 1,570,500,—the sum total will show 2,218,641 square miles against 2,963,666, which is the area of the great American Republic given in the Report for 1853 of the American Topographical Bureau. A very large portion of this immense tract of country on both sides of the dividing line is of course incapable of cultivation, but the proportion really valuable even for agricultural purposes is very great. Confining ourselves to the North-American provinces likely to be included in the proposed confederation at once, we find, according to the statement of the Hon. George Brown, made at Halifax on Sept. 12, 1864, and alleged to be based upon the statistics of 1861, that the amount of land held by private individuals in the various provinces, with the number of acres under cultivation, stand respectively as follows—

	Held.		Cultivated.
Upper Canada	17,708,232	...	6,051,619
Lower Canada	13,680,000	...	4,804,235
Nova Scotia	5,748,893	...	1,028,032
New Brunswick	6,636,329	...	835,108
Newfoundland	100,000	...	41,108
Prince Edward Island	1,365,400	...	368,127
	45,238,854		13,128,229

Without referring to the agricultural produce of the provinces, which may always be looked to as the basis of their prosperity, and which now yields about 150,000,000 dollars annually,

we shall now glance at other features which, though less important at present, yet afford for consideration an inviting aspect. Besides a fertile soil and magnificent forests, the provinces possess inexhaustible mineral resources, such as are accessories to civilization and material attractions to enterprise and skill. In Nova Scotia, gold, iron, coal, and copper are found in abundance. The quantity of coal at present raised is half a million of tons per annum. Four years ago gold was discovered, and now 151 mines are being worked, yielding in the way of revenues and royalties 20,000 dollars annually. New Brunswick, in common with Nova Scotia, has gold, iron, and extensive coal deposits, extending over seven millions of acres. Newfoundland has a coal formation of 1000 to 1500 feet in thickness; but it has not been worked, owing to other more profitable employments absorbing the attention of the inhabitants. As Canada has no coal, though abundance of iron ore and copper, it will be seen what an important bearing the possibility of obtaining supplies from the Lower Provinces may have in after years. Gold has been found in Canada, but thus far the yield is insignificant. Throughout the mineral regions of Canada forest trees exist in sufficient abundance to render the absence of coal for smelting purposes less felt than it otherwise would be. But the time will come when, wood being no longer at the disposal of the miner, coal will have to be resorted to. The profusion of iron ore in Canada, awaiting the magic touch of the capitalist to add to the country's riches, is wonderful; and the copper mines in both the Upper and Lower Provinces have already given such evidences of productiveness as to justify the expressed opinion as to their national value.

Apart from these agricultural and mineral resources, there exists a guarantee for solid prosperity in the exhaustless fisheries that lie at the very threshold of the proposed Confederacy. Their value cannot be over-estimated, and the many times they have been the subject of diplomatic contest shows that their importance has been in some degree appreciated. For several centuries the governments of various countries have regarded them with envious eye. France has ever shown herself eager to push her interests in this quarter, and placing a proper estimate on their commercial and political importance, has lavished large sums on what she regarded as an investment producing an adequate money return as well as a nursery for her seamen.* It was a maxim with the French Government that the North-American fisheries were of more national value in regard to navigation and power than the gold mines of Mexico could have been if the latter were possessed by France. The number of

* See the Report by M. Aucef for 1851, and that by M. Coste for 1861.

men now employed by her in these fishing stations is about 11,500, and for years large bounties have been paid to encourage her seamen to engage in the occupation of fishing. The return from the French fisheries cannot be less than 3,000,000 dollars a year. On January 14, 1857, the French Government obtained from England certain concessions relative to fishery rights on the coast of Newfoundland, but the alarm created in the Maritime Provinces by what they looked upon as inflicting injury upon their interests, and the refusal of Newfoundland to accede to the terms of the treaty, prevented it from taking effect. Nor are the United States wanting in appreciation of the benefits to be derived from a prosecution of this branch of trade. President Pierce, in his Message to Congress (Dec. 1862), in alluding to the Reciprocity Treaty, said: "The treaty between the United States and Great Britain of 5th June, 1854, which went into effective operation in 1855, put an end to causes of irritation between the two countries by securing to the United States the right of fishing on the coast of the British North-American provinces with advantages equal to those enjoyed by British subjects. Besides the signal benefits of this treaty to a large class of our citizens in a pursuit connected in no inconsiderable degree with our national prosperity and strength, it has had a favourable effect, &c." The amount expended in bounties now averages 300,000 dollars annually, and the return is estimated at about eight and a half millions of dollars. The advantage of position enjoyed by the Maritime Provinces naturally attracts capital and enterprise from other pursuits to profit by an employment so lucrative as that placed by nature within their very grasp. They see with chagrin the treasures of the deep snatched from before their eyes, and going to the enrichment of foreigners, while the apathy of their fellow-colonists living inland prevents a just share being appropriated by those who should profit most by them. Without a system of bounties (except as regards Canada) the value of fish, fish-oil, and seal-skins exported from these provinces (independently of what was consumed in domestic use) is thus given—

Nova Scotia	\$2,335,104
New Brunswick (1862)	303,487
Newfoundland (1862)	3,760,010
Prince Edward Island*	
Canada (1862)	703,896

We have not the returns necessary to found an accurate statement of the aggregate value of these fisheries, but competent

* We regret to be unable to obtain in time for publication in this article the statement of the value of fish, &c. exported from Prince Edward Island.

authorities have suggested 20,000,000 dollars as falling short of the actual yield.

Possessing 5000 miles of sea-coast, the British North-American provinces when consolidated into one power would possess not only all the materials necessary for constructing and equipping ships of war, but also bands of skilful and hardy seamen wherewith to man a powerful fleet. Already their united commercial marine shows an amount of tonnage that would entitle a Confederacy such as is proposed to take high rank as a maritime power. The following table shows the tonnage* required for the accommodation of trade:—

	Inwards.	Outwards.	Total.
Nova Scotia (1863)	712,939	719,915	1,432,954
New Brunswick	659,258	727,722	1,386,980
Prince Edward Island (1861)	79,580	87,518	167,098
Newfoundland (1861)	696,763	695,582	1,392,345
Canada (1863)	4,580,010	4,460,327	9,040,337
	<hr/> 6,728,550	<hr/> 6,691,064	<hr/> 13,419,614

The tonnage employed by Canada on the inland lakes is stated to be 6,907,000 tons, but this includes many coasting vessels, between whose arrival and departure a very short interval elapses, so that a very great deduction must be made to express correctly the actual tonnage. But the sea-going tonnage of Canada amounts to 2,183,000 tons. The opportunities for commerce are such as to indicate the natural increase of the colonial marine. The facilities for ship-building turn the attention of a large number not only to the supply of the home demand, but also to competition in foreign markets for the sale of vessels. In 1832 the tonnage of vessels built in British America amounted to only 33,776 tons; in 1863 the number of vessels built was 645, with a capacity of 219,763 tons,* and representing an export value of 9,000,000 dollars. The number of sailors and fishermen of these colonies, as shown by the last census returns, is 69,256.

The total population of the united colonies cannot be said to indicate great strength, considering the vast region over which it is spread; it must, however, be regarded as a respectable nucleus of a nationality which the varied resources of the country will in time fill up and extend by attracting immigration. In five years Nova Scotia has doubled her population, while Canada has increased from 1,147,349 in 1842 to 2,507,657 in 1861; Upper Canada presenting the most rapid increase, as in 1842 her population numbered 486,055, and in 1861, 1,396,091. The population of the six provinces is represented by the census of 1861 to be thus distributed:—Upper Canada, 1,396,091; Lower Canada, 1,111,566;

* Speech of Finance Minister of Canada, Feb. 7, 1865.

Nova Scotia, 338,857; New Brunswick, 252,047; Newfoundland, 122,635; Prince Edward Island, 80,857: total, 3,294,056. Adding to this the increase from every source since 1861, and the numbers necessarily omitted, the whole population may be assumed to be nearly 4,000,000 of souls. If we place this aggregate in comparison with the population of European countries ranking as substantial powers—for instance, Portugal, 3,570,000; Holland, 3,500,000; Denmark, 2,480,000; Greece, 1,150,000—we are enabled to form a pretty fair idea of the position a British confederacy may ere long hold among the nations of the earth. The following tabulated statement shows the fighting material available for defensive purposes:—

Upper Canada, from . . .	20 to 30	...	128,740
	30 to 40	...	84,178
	40 to 50	...	59,660
	50 to 60	...	36,377—308,955
Lower Canada, from . . .	20 to 30	...	93,302
	30 to 40	...	59,507
	40 to 50	...	42,628
	50 to 60	...	30,129—225,620
Nova Scotia, from . . .	20 to 60	...	— 67,367
New Brunswick, from . . .	21 to 40	...	33,574
	40 to 50	...	10,739
	50 to 60	...	7,312— 51,625
Newfoundland, from . . .	20 to 60	...	— 25,532
Prince Edward Island, from	20 to 45	...	11,144
	45 to 60	...	3,675— 14,819
Total males from . . .	20 to 60	...	693,918

The ebb and flow of the tide of population in a new country such as America presents curious results. While the population is being augmented from without, localities and sections of country suffer from the constant drain made upon them by the attractions of older or more inviting parts of the continent. The young Canadian or Nova Scotian, seduced by the prospect of an enlarged scope for ambition or the hope of acquiring a fortune more rapidly than he could do at home, deserts his native land to push his way in the adjoining States or the extreme west of the continent. Even the French Canadians, noted for their attachment to their native soil, become restive, and are found bold enough to seek new homes among a people whom they have been taught to regard as hostile to all that they hold sacred. The number of British colonists now residing in the United States is very great. It is said that there are 20,000 Canadians alone in the Federal army. What has contributed to this self-expatriation has undoubtedly been the want of inter-

course between colonies which offer every inducement to industry. Instead of an interchange of floating population, the current has gone in a foreign direction, and thousands of young men have not only been lost to the colonies, but have gone to the building up of their rivals. As districts now scarcely rescued from native wildness become more closely settled, and intervening tracts that serve as so many barriers to communication are pierced by advancing civilization, communities now almost strangers to each other will feel the uniting influences of trade, and present to the colonial youth a greater diversity of pursuits than the limited means and distracted energies of each province have been able to open up.

Notwithstanding the disadvantages incident to divided counsels and sectional legislation, the provinces have advanced very rapidly in material wealth. Small markets have stunted their manufactures, but their great staples have enabled them to grasp and retain a fast hold on international trade. Their exports and imports already exceed those of the United States in 1821. The returns of 1863 are presented in one view in the following table—

	Imports.	Exports.	Total.
Canada	\$45,964,493 ...	\$41,831,532 ...	\$87,796,025
New Brunswick . . .	7,764,824 ...	8,964,784 ...	16,729,608
Nova Scotia	10,201,391 ...	8,420,968 ...	18,622,359
Prince Edward Island	1,428,028 ...	1,627,540 ...	3,055,568
Newfoundland . . .	5,242,720 ...	6,002,312 ...	11,245,032
	<u>\$70,601,456</u>	<u>\$66,847,136</u>	<u>\$137,448,592</u>

While this trade in the aggregate is large, the part of it strictly intercolonial bears but a small proportion to that carried on with foreign countries. In 1863 the total imports by the St. Lawrence from the British North-American colonies to Canada amounted to 568,806, and the exports of Canada to the other colonies to 992,738 dollars. This low state of intercolonial trade is attributable to the hostile tariffs put in force by each province, amounting in effect to the exclusion of each other's products. Free trade between them will no doubt remedy the evil to a great extent. In the three years preceding the Reciprocity Treaty, the exports of the United States to these provinces were 48,216,518, and the imports 22,588,577 dollars. During the ten years in which the treaty has been in operation, from 1854 to 1863, the expansion has been unexampled, showing an aggregate of exports to the value of 256,350,931, and of imports to the value of 200,399,786 dollars.* It is very natural for the colonists to

* Senator Sumner—Speech on the Reciprocity Treaty in Congress, Jan. 11, 1865.

argue that if reciprocity between them and the United States lent such an impetus to trade, reciprocity between all the provinces would likewise cause an increase in their trade with each other. A large proportion of the goods which the maritime provinces now buy in the States could be supplied by Canada, and the competition would not be with the productions of Great Britain, but with those of the States.* The imports of all kinds of agricultural produce in New Brunswick amounted in one year to 2,060,702 dollars, of which Canada supplied only 177,328. Most of the flour is of Canada growth and manufacture, and instead of its being procured from Portland in the United States, it could be laid down at the head of the St. John River in New Brunswick as cheaply as it is carried to Portland. The New Brunswick Comptroller of Customs, in his report for 1863, says—"If New Brunswick were connected with Montreal and Quebec by direct railway communication through British territory, our imports from the States would decrease immediately, as much of our flour and other supplies could come direct from Canada." The same might be said of the other provinces. The subject of inter-colonial reciprocity has been considered by the colonists, and various schemes have been suggested to change a state of things which all looked upon as anomalous, but which, being beset with difficulties, offered little prospect of a satisfactory or immediate improvement. In 1862 the Legislature of Nova Scotia passed resolutions empowering the Government to negotiate with the neighbouring provinces for an interchange of articles duty free. The Finance Minister of Canada gave his attention to the proposition, and reported to his colleagues the result of his examination. He said :—

"If a complete customs union could be formed between the provinces under which they could interchange, without restriction, all goods the produce and manufacture of whatever country, it would have a beneficial effect. But as, to carry such a union conveniently into effect, greater uniformity in the tariffs of the colonies must be secured, which would be almost impracticable under their present condition, the undersigned contents himself with recommending that, in answer to the despatch of the Nova Scotia Government, a proposal be made for the reciprocal free admission of all articles the growth, produce, and manufacture of Nova Scotia and any other province becoming a party to the agreement that may be founded on this proposal."

The delegates from the provinces of Canada, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick, who met to consider the subject, came to the conclusion that the free interchange of goods and uniformity

* Report of Canadian Finance Minister on Intercolonial Reciprocity, 1862.

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of tariff were indispensable consequences of the construction of the intercolonial railway, and that the diminution of the revenues of the respective provinces, from various causes, did not warrant the adoption of measures to carry the principle into effect.

The necessity for a line of railway between Canada and the Lower Provinces has been apparent for years past, and the project has occupied the attention of the imperial as well as the colonial authorities. The trade of Canada is dependent, in a great degree, upon the temper and feelings of the United States. For five months in the year exit by the St. Lawrence is completely cut off, and during this period Portland is the Canadian seaport. Should the Portland section of the Grand Trunk Railway be closed at any time, all communication with Europe must be carried on by the overland route to Halifax, and Canada would be forced to resort to the old system of importation by way of the St. Lawrence during the season of open navigation. The repeal of the Reciprocity Treaty and the abolition of the bonding system will compel Canada to find other outlets than those now available, and will force her to seek relief from a virtual blockade by connecting herself with the other colonies. For defensive purposes the road may also be of advantage, in enabling masses of troops to pass rapidly from province to province. However, as matters now stand, it is the only possible way of forestalling the consequences of complete isolation. The importance of the undertaking has never been questioned.

Lord Durham, in the report to which we have already referred, said—"The completion of any satisfactory communication between Halifax and Quebec would in fact produce relations between these provinces that would render a general union absolutely necessary." In 1843 the Imperial Government caused a survey to be made with reference to a military road, and in 1848 Major Robinson and Captain Henderson reported as to the fitness for railway purposes of the proposed route. In a correspondence between Lord Elgin and Earl Grey in 1848, the former insisted strongly on the advantages likely to accrue from the construction of the line; among others, that it would "tend to unite the provinces to one another and to the mother country, and to inspire them with that consciousness of their own strength and of the value of the connexion with Great Britain, which is their best security against aggression." The Legislatures of Canada, New Brunswick, and Nova Scotia passed acts for the promotion of the undertaking. In 1851, Lord Derby, in the House of Lords, expressed himself in favour of the construction of the line; and in 1852 Sir John Pakington, in a despatch to Lord Elgin, gave expression to the views of the Imperial Government, declaring their intention to

fulfil the just expectations held out by their predecessors. In a despatch from the Duke of Newcastle, dated April 12, 1862, a proposal was made, couched in the following terms:—

“Anxious, however, to promote as far as they can the important object of completing the great line of railway communication on British ground between the Atlantic and the westernmost parts of Canada, and to assist the provinces in a scheme which would so materially promote their interests, her Majesty’s Government are willing to offer to the Provincial Governments an Imperial guarantee of interest towards enabling them to raise by public loan, if they should desire it, at a moderate rate, the requisite funds for constructing the railway. . . . The nature and extent of such guarantee must be determined by the particulars of any scheme which the Provincial Governments may be disposed to found on the present proposal, and on the kind of security they would offer.”

In September, 1862, delegates duly appointed by the provinces met at Quebec to consider the proposal, and a memorandum of agreement was drawn up. Owing to a subsequent dissatisfaction with some of the conditions precedent proposed by the Imperial Government, the effort proved abortive. The objections to the construction of the line have been the probable immediate loss connected with it as a commercial speculation, owing to the insufficiency of paying freights, the difficulty of keeping it in running order in winter, and its uselessness for military purposes, owing to its proximity to the frontier. In its favour the arguments rest on a national, military, and commercial basis; that it furnishes the surest means of bringing about a confederation, that it will enable troops to be moved rapidly across British territory, and facilitate the concentration of masses of men, and that it will counterbalance to a certain extent the pressure of the United States on Canada by affording another method by which the foreign mails can be carried, and access to the seaboard obtained for Canadian products and manufactures; besides effecting a saving of time in the transmission of European and American correspondence. The length of railway to be built is estimated at 350 miles;* this, however, may be under the mark. When this line is constructed there will be a complete railway connexion from Halifax on the Atlantic to the shores of Lake Huron.

Thus far the energies of the different provinces have been directed to schemes of internal improvement, promoting facility of internal communication, and every effort has been put forth to secure the vast trade of the West, whose natural channel is the St. Lawrence. Costly though the struggle has proved, yet it is

* Despatch of Duke of Newcastle, April 12, 1862.

not fruitless. Every mile of railway has paid for itself tenfold in opening up the country and increasing the value of property, and the magnificent canal system has overcome the natural obstacles by which navigation was impeded and commerce forced into other and foreign channels. The benefits conferred will not be confined to one province, but must be shared with all to a greater or less extent, from their very nature. To sustain and extend the public works already in existence, and to call others into being that will act as feeders to them, can only be done efficiently, where the aim is a common prosperity, by unity of action and a clubbing of resources. It will be found that the Canadian Confederacy will set out with a respectable income. Its financial standing may be judged of from the following statement of liabilities, revenues, and expenditure:—

1863.	Debt.	Receipts.	Payments.
Canada	\$67,263,995 ...	\$14,382,508 ...	\$14,909,182
New Brunswick . . .	5,778,000 ...	894,836 ...	884,613
Nova Scotia (about)	5,000,000 ...	1,185,629 ...	1,072,274
Newfoundland . . .	946,000 ...	480,000 ...	479,420
Prince Edward Island	240,673 ...	197,384 ...	171,718
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
	\$79,228,668	\$17,140,357	\$17,517,207

Summing up the resources of the provinces about to assume the attitude of a distinct power, we find that they possess every element that enters into the formation of a nationality which will, if properly guided, stand the test of time.

We are thus enabled to see at a glance the magnitude of the interests to be dealt with by the delegates appointed to the Quebec conference, and we can imagine the difficulties that presented themselves at every step in their negotiations, while striving to reconcile the prejudices of localities hitherto having complete control over their own affairs. The necessity for securing different races against mutual aggression, and protecting religious views from an intolerance already busy in sowing seeds of discord, involved problems not easy of solution. Had there been any inclination to trifle with the main object of their meeting, or a disposition to throw obstacles in the way of its attainment, the result of the convention would have extinguished all hope of a British American confederation for years to come, as well as suggested grave doubts as to the future peace and welfare of colonies so situated as the British North-American colonies are. But great responsibilities outweighed narrow-minded views, and mutual concession enabled the delegates to lay down a substantial basis for a consolidated government. The scheme is outlined with prudent forethought, and in detail evinces the care of practical

statesmanship. As a whole it is acceptable, taking it for granted that it is the best that could be arrived at. Its authors tell us that they were anxious to follow, as far as circumstances would permit, the model of the British Constitution. How far circumstances controlled their desires, an examination of the prominent features of the resolutions embodying their conclusions will show. The principle of federation, which forms the basis of the whole scheme, presents the widest departure from the model they were professedly anxious to follow. This Confederacy is not, at first at least, to assume the character of an independent government. The executive authority, the shape and title of which are left undefined, is to be vested in the Queen. We are thus to have a confederation of colonies, with the Queen at their head. Whether its chief executive officer is to be known as Governor-General, or is to have the title and rank of Viceroy, are points apparently reserved for the determination of Parliament. All that the representatives of the several provinces undertook to determine was that the chief executive officer should be nominated by the Crown. It is of the very highest importance to the provinces that this office should be made one worthy the ambition of a statesman. The governors of Canada have necessarily, for the most part, been men of little or no mark at home. It would be very difficult to induce a rising statesman to abandon the prospects which a successful career in the House of Commons opens to him for any attractions that the Governor-Generalship of Canada, as heretofore constituted, has had to offer. At the time of the union of the two Canadas, Lord Sydenham debated in his own mind whether he should make the salary of the governor six or eight thousand pounds sterling, but the former sum was determined upon. In the near neighbourhood of the American Republic, where the chief executive officer is confined to a salary of 25,000 dollars per annum, it may easily be conceived that many of the colonists regarded the salary of their Governor-General as very extravagant; and even as late as 1849, the Legislative Assembly of Canada, in a spasmodic fit of economy, expressed the opinion that a saving in this item ought then to have been effected. As a natural consequence of this rate of remuneration, excessive as it may have seemed to a portion of the colonists, Canada has found it necessary to be content with, on the whole, an inferior order of men for governors. The two most striking exceptions have been those of Lord Sydenham and Lord Elgin. Nor is this the worst. It has happened more than once that the poverty rather than the will of the person selected for this post has induced him to accept the appointment; and the necessity for nursing the dilapidated fortunes of these functionaries has sometimes gone far to bring the representative of the Crown into discredit with

the people. It is apparently to be left to our Parliament to fix the salary of the executive head of the confederation, and it is essential that, without being extravagant, it should be such as will attract men with some pretension to statesmanship.

The complexity inherent in all federations will be increased by the fact of this federation being one of colonies. Above their government, and vested with supreme sovereignty, is the authority of Parliament and the Queen; below will be that of the lieutenant-governors of the provinces, deriving their appointment and receiving their pay from the federal executive. Under this tertiary authority, in Canada at least, there prevails an elaborate and an expensive, because extravagant, gradation of municipalities, beginning with the village and ending with the aggregation of townships which forms the county municipality. A system of government so intricate, combining the imperial, the federative, the local, and the municipal elements, will, from its very nature, be exceedingly complex, and must be something like proportionately expensive. But there is no choice in the matter. Federation forms the only possible principle upon which British America can now be united. Lower Canada—of which a large majority of the population is of French extraction—being sensitively tenacious of its national distinctions, with the peculiar customs and rights growing out of them, could not, from its dread of absorption, be induced to assent to any closer form of union. Whether some of the other provinces might not have refused to surrender the privileges of local legislation may also be a question; for even now objections are made by the opponents of federation that the scheme exacts too great a surrender of local rights.

The relations between the Government and the chief executive officer of the confederacy will apparently differ in no respect from those which are at present subsisting between the Colonial Office and the government of any colony having representative institutions. The colonists advance with excessive timidity to whatever has the appearance of ultimate independence, and they seem to be wholly unconscious that they are framing a confederation which is to form a stepping-stone to this final end. It is not that four millions of people might not desire independence, if circumstances assured them of being able to maintain it. But the thoughtful colonist, aroused by the gigantic war which is going on in the neighbouring republic, finds it necessary to look carefully to his position on the American continent. The overshadowing predominance of a single state is the question which that war appears to him to be about to decide; for if the North can succeed in binding once more the broken fragments of the old Union, he fears an attempt to apply to the whole of Northern America the modern and exaggerated reading of the Monroe

doctrine. For British America there is, therefore, no absolute independence. She must lean somewhere for support, and her inclinations, if not her interests, lead her to prefer a species of dependence upon the mother country, which shall be something more, though perhaps not much more, than a national alliance.

An ardent partisan of the perfect federative principle might find in the proposed constitution reason to object that it is not being dealt fairly by; that under the guise of federation there lurks a manifest desire and persistent determination to establish a form of government that will in effect partake of nearly all the characteristics of a legislative union. The theory of the United States' constitution is, that the general government can exercise such powers only as are specially delegated to it by the separate states. The Quebec convention has attempted to reverse this principle by investing the confederate legislature with powers over "all matters of a general character not specially and exclusively reserved for the local governments and legislatures." Thus the residuum of unappropriated powers, whatever it may be, goes to strengthen the influence of the central government. Of the same character is the right of the federal government to appoint the local governors during pleasure. Nor will the circumstance of these functionaries being irremovable for five years, except for cause, be much, if any, check upon the centralizing tendency; for it is not to be supposed that the federal government would want the ingenuity to have a decent pretext for the removal of an obnoxious governor. In addition to this, the general government is to have a veto on the acts of the local governments. It is impossible to mistake the direction in which these provisions point, and they are calculated to raise the question whether there exists the most perfect conformity and good faith between the semblance and essence of the yielding to local interests in the name of federation. Any attempt of this nature at overreaching would be very likely, by creating dissatisfaction, to recoil upon the masked advocates of centralization, who, in the initiatory stages, doubtless flattered themselves that they were stealing a march on the opposing principle.

The two Federative Chambers are to be respectively called the Legislative Council and the House of Commons. In the formation of the Legislative Council is another and perhaps more excusable compromise of the federal principle. It is a peculiarity of the United States' constitution that every State, great or small, is equally represented in the Senate. In this way the federative equality of all the States is maintained. The six provinces which are at first to form the British American Confederation are to be represented in the Legislative Council, not in their individual characters but in three several groups, of which the Canadas are

to form one each, and the Maritime Provinces, exclusive of Newfoundland, a third. It may be perfectly just that neither Newfoundland nor Prince Edward Island should be allowed to stand on an equal footing with the great province of Upper Canada in the Legislative Council, but the disallowance of this right, nevertheless, negatives the idea of that equality which seems to belong to a perfect form of federation.

Twenty-four is the common number by which these three divisions are to be represented in the Legislative Council. A subdivision has been made for the Maritime Provinces, under which Nova Scotia and New Brunswick are each to have ten councillors, and Prince Edward Island four. Newfoundland, which was not officially represented at the Convention, is to be allowed to enter the union with four members. The scheme embraces prospectively the entrance into the union of the Northwest Territory, British Columbia, and Vancouver Island, just as the articles of confederation of the thirteen colonies made provision for the admission of Canada into the United States league. These distant colonies are not parties to the scheme, and it is only stipulated that they may be admitted in the future on such conditions as the Colonial Parliament may prescribe and the Imperial Parliament sanction. Practical men could hardly talk seriously about an extension, at the present time, of the proposed union from Newfoundland to Vancouver. Between Canada and British Columbia an unsettled wilderness, across which runs the great wall of the Rocky Mountains, intervenes. Without something like continuous settlements, and, at any rate, without other facilities for travel than those which at present exist, so extended an union is out of the question. The promises of colonization made in the name of the Hudson Bay Company when it changed its proprietary, seem to have been already recalled. Add to this the disputed ownership of territory between the Company and Canada; the acknowledged want of means on the part of the proposed Confederacy to open up this country to civilization, and the hesitation of England to move in the matter, and it will become impossible to fix any probable time at which the extension of the new confederation of British America to the Pacific will be practicable. Another obstacle may be created by such action on the part of a much-neglected colony known as the Red River Settlement as will result in its annexation to the United States. Much discontent exists among the settlers there as to their present relations with their sister colonies and the empire; and their proximity to the American border, with its pushing and hardy settlers, should obtain for them that consideration which the future, if not the present, renders advisable.

The mode of appointing the legislative councillors suggested

some difficulties. Of the five existing colonies three had adhered to the principle of Crown nomination; the other two, Canada and Prince Edward Island, had resorted to the principle of popular election. The delegates decided not to sanction the election by a popular vote of both houses of the Confederate Legislature, though some among them advocated the carrying the elective principle to this extreme. It was thought that if both chambers were made elective, it would be impossible long to restrain the Legislative Council to those limits within which it has hitherto been confined; that it would demand the right to alter money bills; and that as its popular credentials would be just as strong as those of the other house, the demand could not long be resisted. Besides, it was feared that some of the overgrown electoral divisions would claim a representation more nearly in accordance with their population, and that as the principle of representation according to population was to be made the basis of the House of Commons, it might become impossible to check an encroachment which would destroy every semblance of federal equality in the Legislative Council. Some strange conditions have been attached to the selection by the Crown of legislative councillors. Far from leaving the Crown unfettered in its choice, the delegates thought it essential to prevent the appointment of any one of immature years to the dignified post of senator, and they decided that no one under thirty years of age should be capable of receiving this mark of distinction. To the qualification of age they thought fit to add one of property, which was placed at 4000 dollars, over all incumbrances, in real estate. An exception, however, was made in the case of Newfoundland and Prince Edward Island, where the property might be either real or personal. Another restriction on the power of the Crown, is the limiting of the number of councillors to eighty-two. The reason for determining upon a fixed number was, that it would ensure to each province a certain proportional representation, which would be otherwise impossible. Mr. Cardwell, in a despatch to the Governor-General of Canada, has objected to this fixity of numbers, on the ground that it may bring the legislative machinery to a stand-still. There is no indication, however, that the local legislatures, in adopting the scheme, will comply with his suggestions to alter the provision. The Legislative Council is to be composed, in the first instance, of persons selected from the existing local councils—a mode of selection possibly intended to influence those bodies in their action on the proposed scheme. Even the elected councillors, in the provinces where the elective principle has been adopted, will for the most part be well enough contented with a change which relieves them from the cost and trouble of elections and the direct supervision of constituents.

Strangely enough, every one of the twenty-four councillors for Lower Canada is to be held to represent a particular electoral division, in which he must either reside himself or possess the property forming his qualification. This anomalous provision was introduced for the purpose of ensuring the English minority in that province a fair proportion of representatives in this chamber. The introduction of anything like an aristocratic element into the Legislative Council will be out of the question. In framing the Constitutional Act of 1791 for Canada, Pitt proposed to establish an hereditary chamber; but though the provision continued in force till within a few years, it was never acted on in a single instance. A French traveller remarked long ago that the atmosphere of America seemed charged with democratic ideas of liberty. Their influence is not confined to the great American republic, and any attempt to improvise an aristocratic order must prove abortive.

It is one of the disadvantages under which a new country lies that it has not a sufficient number of men of leisure, education, and property to fill the various legislative and executive positions. The quality of the Council is likely to be somewhat better for being selected by the Crown in the manner proposed, than it would be if elected under a suffrage so low as prevails at present. A trial of the two plans in Canada goes to show this, though perhaps not in any very striking degree. There is a contrast in the manners and habits of the two chambers in Canada. The Assembly is frequently violent and hasty; the Legislative Council is calm, dignified, but as a rule exceedingly facile, passing in an hour a measure over which the other house would wrangle for a month. The dignified indolence and quiet haste of the Legislative Council are due to the remnant of the non-elective membership, which, in spite of every new popular accession, has always sufficed to fix the character of the chamber. These qualities, perhaps, in some modified degree, will be transmitted by the proposed succession to the Legislative Council of the new confederation.

The Confederate House of Commons is to be based on the sole element of population, as determined every decade by the official census. A readjustment of the representation will take place every ten years, but no reduction is to be made in the number of members returned by any section until its population shall have decreased five per cent. relatively to the whole population of the union. The word section, as here used, is of obscure and uncertain meaning, and is capable of various interpretations. If a constituency be meant, or any number of constituencies, or a province, it would be better to say so. To Lower Canada are to be permanently assigned 65 members, and each successive readjust-

ment is to be made upon this standard. In the first instance, it is proposed that the House of Commons shall contain 194 members, of whom Upper Canada is to send 82, Lower Canada 65, Nova Scotia 19, New Brunswick 15, Newfoundland 8, and Prince Edward Island 5. The number may at any time hereafter be increased by the general legislature. The term for which the House is to be elected is five years—subject, of course, to be dissolved sooner if necessary. This is a longer term by one year than that for which any of the local legislatures are now elected. The extension of the parliamentary term will offer men who have neither time nor money to throw away in frequent elections in widely-spread constituencies, stronger inducements to enter public life than formerly. All laws relating to the qualification or disqualification of members, or of voters, now in force in the various provinces, are to remain undisturbed till the general legislature can supersede them by the adoption of some uniform plan.

A federative system necessarily involves something in the shape of a written constitution. It is required to define many of the powers which are respectively to be vested in the general and in the local legislatures; and to do this with such precision as to prevent any doubts afterwards arising is one of the main difficulties in the formation of such a constitution. Thirty-seven subjects of legislation are expressly named in connexion with the general legislature, and eighteen only in connexion with the local legislatures. The enumeration does not profess to be complete in either case, and a general clause is added comprehending all other subjects of a general or private nature, as the case may be. In some cases, including fisheries, agriculture, and immigration, a concurrent power of legislation is given. But it is evident that the power of the general government in respect of immigration will be very much restricted. The best way to attract immigrants is to offer them free grants of land. By the terms of union the several provinces will retain the public lands; so that, with the exception of the Crown lands of Newfoundland, which it is proposed to purchase at a figure disproportionate to their value, the general government will have no land to grant. It seems to have been regarded as impossible to make any arrangement by which the public lands of the various provinces should become vested in the general government; but surely this ought not to have been a more difficult achievement than the adjustment of so many public debts of different relative amounts. Whether any effort was made to place the public lands under the general government does not appear, but it seems to have been accepted as impossible from the outset.

The idea of numerical representation was adopted from the practice of the North American republic, as also that of decennial readjustment. The former found favour with Lord Durham when the union of the two Canadas was proposed; but the Imperial Government shrank from the possible consequences of then giving power to the French Canadian majority. It is easy now to say that a blunder was committed; but it is very doubtful whether those who thus contend would, if the problem of 1840 had to be decided anew, have the boldness to carry that opinion into practice. The history of the agitation for numerical representation in Canada shows that it has all along been treated as a question of immediate interest rather than of principle. The Upper Canadians who strove for its adoption did not do so on the ground of its abstract merits, for they were unanimous in repudiating it so long as its operation would have told against them. This was brought to the test by a motion made by the Hon. L. J. Papineau, in 1849, for basing the representation exclusively on population. At that time Lower Canada had, or was supposed to have, the advantage in point of population, and every Upper Canadian voted against the motion. It was not till after the census of 1851 showed that the numerical balance was slightly in their favour, with a constant tendency to increase, that the demand for "representation according to population" began to be active in Upper Canada. It was advocated as a means of giving a local predominance to Upper Canada in the Legislative Assembly, to which her superior and increasing numbers seemed to give her some sort of title. But the circumstances under which the principle is now woven into the confederation scheme may, and probably will, deprive it of any such effect. The predominance of numbers under the proposed union will be against Upper Canada if she should excite the jealousy of Lower Canada and the Maritime Provinces, as they may unite together and turn against her that very weapon which she has regarded as the best means of her own defence, if not of aggression also. The system of grouping is well calculated to impress the Maritime Provinces with an idea of identity of interest, and may possess within it the germ of future sectional strife. The deprivation of federal equality may in this way be productive of more mischief than it would had the provinces been permitted naturally to develop their federal individuality.

We have thought it necessary to comment on those features only of the scheme of union which possess general interest; there remain minor points which are merely local in their nature, but which have undoubtedly occasioned to the delegates some trouble in their elucidation. It is yet to be decided whether the scheme in its fulness shall be put into operation. There was

much boldness and much danger in the resolution taken by some of the governments to carry the measure without any direct reference to the people—this kind of union, though often mooted, being, in a parliamentary sense, new. In Canada the Government felt strong enough to carry the measure without making any direct appeal to the constituencies, as the favour with which it had been received by all political parties and the absence of anything like a strong opposition rendered it unnecessary. In New Brunswick the Government was not so sure of its ground, and a general election seemed to afford the best chance of success. Unhappily, the result of a general election has been the return of members avowedly hostile to confederation. A general election is avoided in Nova Scotia, and though the scheme of confederation is not made a Government measure, it is introduced into the Legislature under the paternity of their official delegates, who are thought to have sufficient authority with their own parties to ensure its adoption. Newfoundland, it is not doubted, will accord her sanction to the measure, but in Prince Edward Island there is a likelihood of considerable opposition. The objections urged to the federative movement in the various colonies are for the most part of a sectional character. But there are others of more importance. It is contended that the inherent weakness of federations, as shown both in Europe and America in ancient and modern times, gives little hope of the long-continued existence of such an one as is now contemplated. But it must be considered that this federation will not be one of sovereign and independent States. The general Government as well as the local Legislatures will derive their authority not from a league or compact, but from the great fountain-head of power, the Imperial Parliament; and the chief executive control will be such as to counteract decentralizing tendencies. It is also feared that confederation will hasten the time when the colonies shall be separated from the mother country. Any action of this nature must proceed from the colonies themselves, as it is neither the interest nor desire of England to terminate prematurely a connexion so necessary, at least at present, to the welfare of an important portion of the empire. The growth of a lusty power on their border may perhaps lead the United States to regard it with greater jealousy than they would disunited provinces; hence it is said there is danger to be apprehended on this score. Granting this to be the case, no one can fail to see that the individual and isolated colonies are prizes, which, if not as tempting, would at least be more easily acquired by the United States than a compact Confederacy. It is not pretended that the Confederation, with its widely-extended frontier, at many points difficult or incapable of defence, can at once stand alone. What

England should do for them, and what the colonies ought to do in their own defence, are questions much debated. The ideas of the colonists are not very ambitious on the point of military expenditure, for they set out with the notion that a million of dollars a year is all they can afford. This sum will doubtless expand with their resources, or under the pressure of necessity. At present the colonists are firm in their determination to preserve their connexion with the mother country, and it is scarcely probable that the United States will drag into their Union an unwilling population on their northern boundary. They would be virtually placing their republic between two fires. As it is, they will have trouble enough with the Southern States for a long time to come. Although there are many obstacles in the way of the formation of the proposed Confederacy, yet when, as in the present case, these are clearly perceived and calmly weighed, they cease to be hindrances which need excite apprehension. With the men of education, intellect, experience, and position among the colonists nearly unanimous in support of the proposed scheme, with the Home Government cordially assenting to it, and prepared heartily to co-operate in giving it the force of law, with Parliament almost pledged beforehand to regard it with especial favour, there is no rashness in concluding that the establishment of a great British power on the American continent has ceased to be the glorious vision of a remote future, and will soon be numbered among the most splendid achievements of the present generation.

CONTEMPORARY LITERATURE.

The Foreign Books noticed in the following sections are chiefly supplied by Messrs. WILLIAMS & NORGATE, Henrietta-street, Covent-garden, and Mr. NUTT, 270, Strand.

THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY.

NO words could well be more stimulating to the curiosity of the reader than those in which Mr. Ernest de Bunsen states the questions which he attempts to solve in the present work¹ :—

“The doctrine of Jesus cannot be known as it ought to be until two problems shall have been solved. In the first place, some additional light must be thrown on the last pre-Christian development of Judaism, and on its connexion with Christianity. In the second place, a satisfactory reason must be assigned for the mysterious fact, that the first three Evangelists have evidently agreed not to refer to any of those important sayings of Christ which have been recorded only by the beloved Apostle, whose Gospel was not published before an advanced period of the second century.”

The answers here given to these inquiries we must consider to be eminently unsatisfactory, and must express our regret that so much learning, research, and ingenuity have been expended on the really flimsy and speculative solutions in which the whole work issues.

Most competent critics are disposed to recognise the presence of a Persian or Zoroastrian element in the description of Paradise and the expulsion, as related in the beginning of Genesis; but very few, we apprehend, will be found to identify Adam, personally, with the great Aryan reformer (p. 118), or to suppose that an esoteric tradition originated with Adam, whilst Abraham and Moses were its first great prophets. The principles of this esoteric tradition, from the time of the Babylonian captivity, no longer confined to the few, became, according to our author, incorporated into the national faith of the Jewish people :—

“What the Israelites could not have borne in the days of Moses, what the great prophet and lawgiver had secretly revealed to the chosen few, what the faithful guardians of secret tradition had transmitted ever since the days of Moses, of Abraham, and of ‘Adam,’ was gradually proclaimed to the people from the days of Josias to the days of Daniel and of Christ. The Aryan or Japhetic traditions being known to the people of the Chaldeans, the guardians of the secret Semitic tradition were forced to reveal the same to the people, and thus to show in how far the one agreed with the other. It is quite possible, and even probable, that to a certain extent the one tradition was enriched by the other. But both the Chaldean as well as the Israelitic tradition went back to Abraham, the inhabitant of ‘Ur of the Chaldees,’ if not to Zoroaster, the Aryan reformer and the ‘Adam’ of the Bible.”—p. 119.

But there were other influences which modified Judaism, which exhibited themselves in the formation of sects or schools, and which, accord-

¹ “The Hidden Wisdom of Christ and the Key of Knowledge; or, the History of the Apocrypha.” By Ernest de Bunsen. 2 vols. London: Longmans. 1865.

ing to the distorted hypothesis of our author, became the basis of an esoteric doctrine in the teaching of Jesus Christ. There is, no doubt, evidence of the presence of an Essene element in the teaching of Jesus, and at the same time of a protest or antagonism to Essene excesses; but no evidence, as we think, that he kept back from the many any Essene principles which he inculcated on the few. So, again, the contrasts are well known between the Alexandrian and Palestinian Judaism; and the fourth Gospel as well as the Pauline Epistles exhibit a theology at least analogous to Alexandrianism. But it does not follow that those who were imbued with it held it as a secret doctrine; or that Jesus himself was acquainted with it; or that if he had been, he would have made an arcanum of it. And the supposition that the three Synoptics contain the popular teaching of Jesus, while the fourth Gospel presents his esoteric doctrine, appears to us one of the clumsiest of all methods of solving the difficulty of their differences, and of accounting for the fact that no distinct mention is made of the latter till towards the very end of the second century. For as the Gospel of St. John is imagined by our author to contain the very kernel of the truth as he learnt it from Jesus while on earth, so St. Paul is represented by him as having learnt his "other Gospel" by direct revelation from the ascended Jesus. And the hypothesis altogether fails to account for the fact that Paul held himself commissioned to proclaim, and did proclaim, his Gospel, while substantially the same doctrine, communicated by St. John, was kept as a secret till late at least in the second century.

"If," says the author, "the hidden wisdom of Paul, speaking generally, was the hidden wisdom of Christ; if the Apostles at first excluded the secret doctrine of the Lord from the record of his sayings, then the essentially Paulinic doctrines of this [the fourth] Gospel must be in general, if not in literal, harmony with the Lord's teaching, communicated to his disciples only, and which his beloved Apostle, *the survivor of the rest*, would be sure to preserve. If so, the non-Apostolic composition of the Gospel after John, if it could be proved or rendered probable, would prove nothing. Since, however, it can be rendered in the highest degree probable, if not absolutely certain, that the sayings of Christ herein recorded constitute the Lord's own doctrines, which he secretly and mysteriously revealed the Gospel 'after' John is the fulfilment of Christ's injunction to his Apostles: 'What I tell you in darkness, that speak ye in light; and what ye hear in the ear, that preach ye upon the house-tops.'"—vol. ii. pp. 328, 329.

This seems a very strange fulfilment, that none of the Apostles should have preached it openly in their lifetime at all, and only one be supposed to have left material out of which the secret doctrine could be set forth after his death. But perhaps the wildest part of the book is to be found in the chapter which is entitled "Of the seventy weeks—the seven thousand years." Mr. de Bunsen assumes the weeks of Daniel to be not mere weeks of years, but weeks of weeks of years, or jubilee weeks. Hence the interesting issue, that, taking the commencement of the weeks in the year 586 B.C., we are now at the commencement of the fiftieth jubilee, or last jubilee before the Millennium itself; for the Millennium will commence in the year 1914 and close with the close of the seventieth jubilee week in 2914 of the Christian era

(586 B.C. + 2914 A.C. = 3500 = 50×70). And as 3500 is the half of 7000, "the idea would naturally suggest itself" that the "creation of the world" took place 3500 years before the Babylonian captivity, which it is found to have done, if the chronology of the Hebrew Bible is followed. For from Adam to the Babylonian captivity are found 3360 years, and "thus 140 years would be left for the undefined period from the creation to Adam, or twenty years for each of the seven days of creation." Nevertheless, "the 140 years are of no historical value;" for they comprehend all the period before the Adam of the Bible or the Zoroaster of history knew himself to be a Son of God. But what Dr. Cumming and his followers will be rejoiced to learn is, that the present year (1864) is the beginning of the last pre-millennarian jubilee, and that "during the coming fifty years we have to look forward to the fall of 'Babylon,' to the exodus of God's especial people from the Israel of all nations, to the rebuilding of Jerusalem and of the temple, and to the establishment of the Messianic theocracy in the Holy Land. The future will show in how far these views are correct."—vol. ii. p. 469.

The first volume of Mr. James Donaldson's "Critical History of Christian Literature" in the ante-Nicene period is an instalment of a very valuable work.² The author has thoroughly mastered his material, and deals with it in a spirit of entire judicial impartiality. Mr. Donaldson has no distinctive predilections, and in particular, differs almost entirely from the conclusions at which the school of F. C. Baur has arrived respecting the writings of the so-called Apostolical Fathers. He considers that the extent of difference between the Petrine and Pauline parties in the primitive Church has been greatly exaggerated, and that the "tendency" theory is incapable of application to the writings which are before us in this volume. They are, therefore, not to be interpreted with reference to disputes which there is no sufficient reason to suppose were present to the minds of the authors. More reasonably are they to be considered as the spontaneous expression, by simple-minded but earnest persons, of the effect produced upon themselves by the Christian movement. It is therefore altogether unjustifiable to force into the words of these early writers meanings consistent with systems which were not developed till long afterwards.

"Doctrines generally present themselves in history as broad indefinite truths. Subsequent generations try, as it were, to fill up these truths by endless particulars, explanations, and additions. And in our efforts to ascertain the particular opinions of a writer, we have to take the greatest care not to give greater precision and definiteness to his thoughts than he himself gave to them."—p. 6.

Hence it is vain to expect much light to be thrown from these investigations upon some of the questions which are agitated in our own day—as, for instance, upon that of inspiration, and we may add, upon the whole subject of miracle. The primitive Christians "did not feel

² "A Critical History of Christian Literature and Doctrine from the Death of the Apostles to the Nicene Council." By James Donaldson, M.A. Vol. I. The Apostolical Fathers. London: Macmillan. 1864.

our difficulties, nor had they our desire for precision." Their opinions, therefore, are facts in history from which we must draw our own inferences according to modern methods; they are not authorities by which we are bound to regulate our belief. Perhaps the first feeling which arises on an unprejudiced reading of these earliest post-Apostolical writings is one of disappointment at the little light which they really throw upon the formation of the Christian doctrine, and upon the constitution of the Christian Church; at the almost entire absence from them of any recognition of the authority of the New Testament, either as evidence of facts or as source of doctrine. But in reality, doctrine as yet had no existence, and the writings now before us are not the production of persons of sufficient intellectual grasp or philosophical education to have been capable of giving it such a shape as it began to assume even in the next period: nor again, as yet, had practical necessity or personal ambitions led to the construction of a ministerial hierarchy. The very slight references made to the New Testament confirm us in the judgment which is suggested by the New Testament itself, that its authors did not contemplate either their histories or their letters being treated as a complete supernatural revelation for all time. No doubt the conclusions at which Mr. Donaldson arrives will be extremely distasteful both to high Episcopalians and to dogmatists of every kind; and there are scattered up and down his volume many statements which will call down upon him the imputation of rationalism. But it will be difficult to convict him of "rationalism" without involving the patristic authors whose works he here reviews in the same charge. And it should be observed that the higher the antiquity which is accorded to these remains, the more awkward for the systematic theologian is the absence from them of those doctrinal views which are usually considered as of the essence of Christianity. It is impossible to suppose that doctrines would have been passed over in silence in the immediately post-Apostolic age which had been deemed essential by the Apostles themselves—if they had formed part of that which is ridiculously called "the grand objective faith once delivered to the saints," or had been *articuli stantis vel cadentis ecclesie*.

"Surely this subject," says Mr. Donaldson, "ought to engross the attention of evangelical Christians. If the early writers were heterodox on the Trinity; if they knew nothing of a satisfaction of Divine justice, but spoke only in a vague way of this matter; if they wavered in regard to original sin, some denying it entirely and others expressing themselves with great uncertainty; if their testimony to the inspiration of the New Testament is unsatisfactory and inconclusive, where was Christianity in those days? Did it really sleep for three long centuries? Are we to suppose that there were Christians in those days, but that they never wrote books? Or how is the chasm to be bridged? Or may not the Evangelical school be wrong in asserting that it is necessary for a man to believe in original sin, the Trinity, the atonement, and similar dogmas before he can be a Christian?"—pp. 64, 65.

Professed theologians persist in reading both the New Testament itself and the immediately succeeding Christian literature with notions derived from their own systems. If they do not find systematic doctrine, at any rate they are determined to find material for it. But in the

Apostolical Fathers, so far as anything which may be called doctrine can be brought out, it is of the vaguest kind.

"Nowhere is Christ directly called God in them. Nowhere is a relief from punishment spoken of as the result of his life or death. The Spirit is mentioned without precision. The great facts relating to man's sin and salvation are introduced in a broad, indefinite, real manner. No curious questions are discussed; and the final state of man is set forth in plain, undefined, easily-understood language. The scriptures of the Old Testament are often referred to. The books of the New are never spoken of as inspired, and never mentioned as authorities in matters of belief."—p. 86.

The works treated of in this volume are the first Epistle of Clemens Romanus, the Martyrium of Polycarp, the Epistle of Barnabas, the Pastor of Hermas, the fragments of Papias. The author's method is, first to collect and compare whatever historic notices can be gathered concerning the several persons after whom these works are named; secondly, to investigate the genuineness of the writings attributed to them; thirdly, to give an analysis of the existing document; fourthly, to supply an abstract of its doctrine under certain heads, as—God, Christ and his Work, the Spirit, the Trinity, Angels, Man, Salvation, the Church, the Future State, the Scriptures, and Morality; fifthly, to exhibit a conspectus of the literature belonging to the subject. We cordially welcome the appearance of so candid and judicious a critic in this field. He will undoubtedly find his labours still more arduous as he proceeds in his undertaking, but the impartiality and caution with which Mr. Donaldson has commenced are a guarantee for the successful accomplishment of a great work. We may observe that there is a curtness in Mr. Donaldson's style which gives occasionally a peremptory tone to what he says, alien in reality from the spirit in which he writes.

Mr. Bernard's Bampton Lectures do not take rank among the few which form a small class in that series, they belong rather to the fair thirds.³ He has undertaken an argument capable of being reasonably circumscribed within the limits assigned to these sermons; and in the judgment of those who adopt his point of view, he must be acknowledged to have treated it adequately. His object is, upon the assumptions of the orthodox creed, to account for the diversity of character to be met with in the writings of the New Testament, and especially for the marked difference between the Gospels and Epistles. By acknowledging and endeavouring to trace the method and reason of a certain progress of doctrine in the New Testament, which is at the same time complete in the New Testament, he aims at neutralizing two opposite theories of development—the one of which recognises a *natural* growth of variations of doctrine, which was in like manner naturally continued and propagated in the subsequent ages; the other,

³ "The Progress of Doctrine in the New Testament, considered in Eight Lectures, preached before the University of Oxford, 1864, on the foundation of the late Rev. John Bampton, M.A., Canon of Salisbury." By Thomas Dehany Bernard, M.A., of Exeter College, Rector of Walcot. London: Macmillan and Co. 1864.

the theory of Dr. Newman, which considers the developments of the Apostolic doctrine to be *supernaturally* carried on even to the present day in the Catholic Church. Mr. Bernard attempts to remove the barrier presented by the fact that the Gospels are in order of composition posterior to the Pauline Epistles, by attributing the existing arrangement of the books to the sense of the Church, which has set them in an *ordo docendi*. Thus we are first intended to learn the facts, and then the inferences from the facts. And the progress of doctrine in the New Testament belongs, properly speaking, to the collocation of its parts. It is still entirely unexplained why, if the facts were to be learned first, they were not set down in writing first. But, what is of more importance, Mr. Bernard has entirely ignored the possibility that the facts themselves, as related, may be the product of popular imagination and of the affection of friends, and he has quietly assumed that we have in the Gospels the narratives of four men. He is aware that the Muratorian fragment, anno 160-170, presents the first list extant of the books of the New Testament. Mr. Westcott, we may observe, is hardly justified in saying that it may be "regarded as a summary of the opinion of the Western Church *on the Canon*, shortly after the middle of the second century;" for there is no evidence that it gives more than the opinion of an individual, and the term "Canon" was not used of the collection of the Scriptures in that age. But however this may be, Mr. Bernard does not appear to see any difficulty in this being the earliest known attribution of our existing Gospels to individual authors. The middle of the second century is very ancient and primitive, relatively to our own period, but it is more than a century from the date of the events which these Gospel-narratives relate, and in all that time there is no external evidence to show that they were the work of the persons whose names they bear, of eye-witnesses, or of contemporaries with the facts. A century presents a very considerable gap, and, unless it be bridged over, we have neither that proof of contemporary authorship which is necessary to the credible transmission of mere human testimony, nor proof of the individual identity of the authors which is equally necessary on the supposition of their having been moved to write by a supernatural inspiration. It is easier to have a fling at M. Renan.

"From time to time some fresh portrait may appear; some adventurous imagination, charmed and yet perplexed with the Gospel-story, may attempt to reconstruct it in the spirit of the world. Unable to receive as real the sole example of sinless humanity, it may introduce into the picture touches of the error and infirmity which are not there, and may mistake the awful gleams of the indwelling Godhead for the glimmer of an enthusiasm which deludes and is deluded. The world may read the bold romance, and half commend the creation of fancy; but the creations of the fancy perish as they rise, and the Jesus of the Gospels remains, not only as a perfect ideal but as a *vivid reality*, a representation which appears, after every fresh attempt to change it, more glorious in majesty and beauty, and more conspicuous also for truthfulness and life."—p. 42.

Mr. Bernard has done some pages much better than this piece of stilted rhetoric. But he cannot resist the temptation, which so easily

besets aspirants in a university pulpit, of delivering a testimony, and of showing that they are on the right side. It is easy to praise the Lacedemonians among the Lacedemonians; and it is easy before a congregation at St. Mary's to stigmatize M. Renan without informing the undergraduates that he would have been less assailable if he had been more thorough; as it is easy to gibbet a phrase of Dr. Williams's which the lecturer does not understand, and to impute to him the assertion "that the gifts of the Spirit are to all the same gifts," (p. 116). To a certain extent Mr. Bernard has adopted the suggestion of Heber—a lecturer in the same chair—that the promise of the Spirit made by the Saviour to his disciples, according to the fourth Gospel, was fulfilled in the inspiration which fitted Apostles and apostolic men to become the writers of the New Testament. But he has not followed out this suggestion with anything like the largeness and catholicity of Heber; he has thought to find in it a weapon for use in mere passing controversies; and while his whole argument turns upon the assumption that the product of the apostolic inspiration is to be found in the New Testament, and in the New Testament only, he is unable, on the one hand, to characterize the apostolic inspiration in itself—is driven to describe this supposed exclusive, primitive, and original insight by the technicalities of the ecclesiastical creeds; and, on the other hand, appears to be unaware of the difficulties which attend a definition by means of external testimony of the volume of the New Testament itself.

We can confidently recommend Weizsäcker on the "Gospel History"⁴ as presenting a calm and careful review of the state of the Gospel-question, brought down to the latest point, since the publication of the Lives of Jesus by Renan and Strauss. Weizsäcker has long been engaged in disquisitions concerning the relations between the Synoptics and the fourth Gospel, and on the origin of the latter, which have appeared in German theological reviews. We may not always agree with him, but his method is to search for the really credible and essential in the Gospel-history, by a conscientious sifting of the literary material. Accepting thoroughly the conclusion now generally received, that in the Synoptics we have in varied forms one and the same tradition, of which the last is to be found in the third Gospel—accepting also the fourth Gospel as containing a historical kernel, he insists that the essential inquiry is to frame to ourselves a consistent conception of the person of Jesus as historically manifested: and here he recognises the service which Renan has rendered. Renan has presented indeed an inconsistent character, but he has thereby shown where lies the whole gist of the question, and brought the discussion to a focus. According to Weizsäcker, the miraculous portions of the Gospel-narratives are not the essential: we are not obliged when a miraculous narrative is incredible, or insufficiently supported by evidence, to deny all historical value to it; at least it has this, that it was the form into which the thoughts of the disciples threw them-

⁴ "Untersuchungen über die Evangelische Geschichte, ihre Quellen und den Gang ihrer Entwicklung." Von C. Weizsäcker. Gotha. London: D. Nutt. 1864.

selves, and is an indication of certain conceptions of their lying beneath it: and it is by the conception which we so reach of the character and person of Jesus that we acknowledge him to be the Saviour and Lord of humanity, not by reason of the material wonders connected with his appearance, which may or may not be really and literally true.

The researches of Europeans into the ancient languages and religious lore of India are bearing a remarkable fruit among the natives in the reform of their religious and social systems. The knowledge is now very widely spread that for the peculiar tenets and observances of a vast number of modern sects there is no authority whatever in the Veds, which for all orthodox persons are the ultimate appeal in matters of religious faith and obligation. A recoil from many of the degrading and immoral practices of these sects is spreading among the more intelligent of our Hindoo fellow-subjects. Contact with western civilization, and the formation of a public opinion by means of a free press, lead to inquiries and discussions, before which the grosser impositions engrafted by designing priesthoods upon the primitive worship of Brahma must ultimately give way. We apprehend that the more promising movements connected with these newly-awakened feelings are strictly and truly native, and are disconnected from any Christian missionary schemes. And those who have at heart the true welfare of India will be careful not to encumber the efforts which many natives are making to effect a reform of their religious and social institutions, by attempting to direct them to the advancement of Christian conversions. Indeed, Christianity itself will have to undergo a discussion in India such as it never experienced even among Greeks or Alexandrians. Meanwhile, those native gentlemen who are engaged in the work of reform will do well to concentrate their attention on specific objects, on the exposure and removal, in their several localities, of particular corruptions, such as those which gave occasion to the remarkable trial related in this highly interesting book.⁵ And they can avail themselves, as a leverage, of the fact well known to all competently learned persons, that such corrupt practices have no sanction in the earliest and most authoritative of the Brahmanical books. There may also be much else for which no "inspired" authority is to be found, but which it is not necessary to disturb, because not necessarily conflicting with the plain obligations of morality. The native reformers are the Protestants of Hinduism, and their appeal to the silence of the Veds, in respect to the developments of the later sects, is not dissimilar to the appeal which Luther and his fellow-labourers made to the Bible as giving no countenance to the superstitions of the Roman Church. Native gentlemen are rapidly making good their claim to occupy the same social status as Europeans, but they can never fully place themselves on the same footing until their wives and daughters are fit associates for European ladies. The want of education generally, even among the better class of native females, tends to depress the whole

⁵ "History of the Sect of Mahārājas or Vallabhāchāryas in Western India." London: Trübner and Co. 1865.

community to which they belong, but infinitely more so does the existence of such corruption as is revealed to exist in the Vallabháchárya sect. Aristotle said, with respect to the licentiousness of the Spartan females, occasioned by their familiarity with the nude contests of men, that no people could be truly great of which the one half was corrupt. No community can really elevate itself in the scale of civilization wherein such practices or debasing possibilities exist as are exposed in these pages.

Vallabháchárya was born towards the end of our fifteenth century, and was the founder of the Pushti Marga, or eat-and-drink doctrine. He is said to have taught that privation formed no part of sanctity, and that it was the duty of the teacher and his disciples to worship their deity, not in hunger, but in costly apparel and choice food. The gurus, or teachers, acquired the title of Maháráj in the time of his grandson, Vithalnáthji. The worship of Krishna is widely diffused in all ranks of Indian society, and the sensual imagination excited by stories of his amorous dalliances. Of these legends the Vallabháchárya Gurus avail themselves to excite the passions of their female followers. They are led to believe that as the deity is incarnate or indwelling in the guru, a divine union is accomplished by sexual intercourse with him. The proofs and illustrations that such abominable doctrine is prevalent are abundantly given in the present work, and the judges of the Supreme Court of Bombay, in the Maháráj libel case, in 1862, appear to have been thoroughly convinced of it.

A certain Jewish Association for the diffusion of religious knowledge has put forth a reply to the first part of the Bishop of Natal upon the Pentateuch,⁶ apparently under the impression that the Bible is on its trial, and that if the history of the Pentateuch were shown to be false, its moral precepts must lose all authority, which, if they have in fact, by reason of their intrinsic excellence, formed the basis of the best order of the civilized world, and taught men justice, charity, and love, we do not see would follow. Some portions of this reply turn upon expositions of Hebrew words, true in themselves, but not affecting the questions at issue. For instance, the difference between קָהָל and עֵבֶר is well known; that the former implies strictly an assembly or congregation, summoned to meet by authority at an appointed time and place, the latter an assembly gathered at the voice of a speaker or preacher; but there is nothing in the former word to indicate that it was a representative assembly, consisting merely of the elders of the congregation. It is the word much more frequently used, as about 138 to 49, and frequently when there can be no doubt that the whole people are intended by it, though used without the addition of עֵבֶר. Thus, "The glory of the Lord appeared unto all the congregation," (Numb. xvi. 19); and "he spake unto the congregation," (ver. 26). And that the expressions "congregation" (קָהָל), "people," "children of Israel," are used interchangeably, is evident

⁶ "A Jewish Reply to Dr. Colenso's Criticism on the Pentateuch." Issued by the Jewish Association for the Diffusion of Religious Knowledge. London: Trübner and Co. 1865.

from Numb. xiv. 1, 2, 5, 10. And the frequent repetition of 'all the congregation' assembling before the door of the tabernacle, or being addressed by Moses and Aaron, makes it evident that the narrator, whoever he was, had in his mind the assembly and movements of a camp or caravan of moderate extent, and was not aware of what the numbers implicated in the history must really imply. Indeed our Jewish critic stumbles very closely on the real solution of the whole matter, when he says, "If the Pentateuch is unhistorical because Dr. Colenso cannot understand how Moses communicated the Divine will to two millions of people, every history which relates how a general addressed his army is equally unhistorical."—p. 47. For no one does suppose that the speeches of generals given in Thucydides or T. Livius are of the substance of the history; and when once it is acknowledged that in the Pentateuch *The Lord said*, or *Moses spake*, are mere formulae, not guaranteeing immediate divine authority or report of actual words, then the way will be prepared for a dispassionate examination as to what the amount of the really historical element in the Pentateuch may prove to be. We have again a criticism on the meaning of *וְיָרָא*. In order to meet the difficulty raised by Bishop Colenso, that the Israelites could not have increased in three or four generations to the numbers implied at the exodus, whereas a promise is recorded to Abraham that the fourth generation (after the migration) should return to Canaan (Gen. xv. 16), it is urged that the word is not limited to the signification of a succession of father to son, that it may signify all contemporaries living within a certain period, or be used indefinitely, like "age" or *seculum*. Thus Noah is said to have been righteous in his generation, *i.e.* among his contemporaries, while indefinite continuance is signified by such expressions as *וְיָרָא וְיָרָא*. But neither of these explanations will apply where a succession in a family is specifically intended, just as it is in Job xlii. 16, "saw his sons and his sons' sons, even four generations;" and so the word *וְיָרָא* came to be elliptically omitted, as in 2 Kings x. 30, "thy children of the fourth generation shall sit on the throne of Israel." If the word indeed in Gen. xv. 16 had the indefinite meaning of "seculum," it would convey no tangible promise. Occasionally we have met with a criticism which appears well-founded, as on 1 Chron. vii. 20-22, that Ezer and Elead are not described as sons of the second Shuthelah, and therefore the Bishop's objection that Ephraim is represented as mourning the slaughter of his descendants in the seventh generation falls to the ground. Generally the solutions here attempted are by way of "possibility," or by strained statistics, or ultimately by appeal to miracle, when miracle is not appealed to in the narrative itself, which is to give up the case.

We are glad to see that another edition of "Essays and Reviews" has been called for by the public; and the issue of it is the best and most dignified answer which could be given to the affected condemnation of the book in Convocation.⁷ The defendants in the late suits thereby show what value they attach to the synodical proceedings

⁷ "Essays and Reviews." The Twelfth Edition. London; Longmans. 1865.

of the ecclesiastical busybodies. The peculiar feature of this edition is, that the passages are indicated by inverted commas which were made the foundation of the suits against Dr. Williams and Mr. Wilson. The entire failure of the prosecutions in their whole extent is thus put on record. And the amount of liberty secured to the clergy of the Church of England can be much better estimated than from the meagre and guarded statements of the judgment of the Privy Council, modified and dislocated as they appear to have been, in order to meet some of the objections of those ecclesiastical dignitaries who would willingly have had them other than they were. When the copious passages are well considered in which neither clerical animosity nor legal acuteness could detect anything contradictory to the Articles and Formularies of the Church, a fair measure may be taken of the freedom which may be exercised by clergymen in criticizing and interpreting any narrative in the Bible whatsoever, in questioning or denying the absolute truth of its parts, and in attributing its origin to natural causes rather than to a miraculous operation.

Mr. Wilkinson's illustration of the "Personal Names in the Bible"⁸ will be found useful and interesting by many readers. It is perhaps too diffuse, and although the author should by no means conceal his opinions on the subject of inspiration, and similar topics, we are inclined to think his work would have been more likely to become an authority, if less attempt had been made to render the book spiritually profitable as well as a manual of information on the significance of the names both in the Old and New Testament. No names of importance appear to be omitted, and there is subjoined a useful and indeed absolutely necessary index.

We note the third volume of "Edward Irving's Collected Works;"⁹ there are in these discourses not only grand bursts of eloquence, but truly catholic, wise, and unsectarian views of the Christian religion. Long before Irving could be openly denounced as a heretic, he had said many things which rankled in the hearts of the thorough Scotch Calvinists; as for instance in this volume in the series on Prayer, where he distinguishes between "favouritism" and "grace," and in the sermon on Prayer and Action, where he declares himself so unreservedly hostile to a morbid piety.

"The Revised Presbyterian Prayer-book,"¹⁰ as used in the United States, to which is appended a historical and critical review of the Revision by C. W. Shields, D.D., exhibits more conveniently and completely than is to be met with in any book published in England

⁸ "Personal Names in the Bible interpreted and illustrated." By W. F. Wilkinson, M.A., Vicar of St. Werburgh's, Derby; Joint Editor of Webster and Wilkinson's Greek Testament. London: Alexander Strahan. 1865.

⁹ "The Collected Writings of Edward Irving." 5 vols. Edited by his Nephew, the Rev. G. Carlyle, M.A. Vol. III. London: Alexander Strahan. 1865.

¹⁰ "The Book of Common Prayer, and administration of the Sacraments, and other Rites and Ceremonies of the Church, as amended by the Westminster Divines in the Royal Commission of 1661, and in agreement with the Directory for Public Worship of the Presbyterian Church in the United States." Philadelphia. London: Trübner and Co. 1864.

the differences in the matter of the Liturgy between the Episcopalians and the Presbyterians, which at last rent the Church of England asunder in the disastrous year 1662. This work is of particular interest at the present moment, when, unless wise laymen come to the rescue, the opportunity of the Royal Commission to consider and report on the clerical subscriptions and declarations will be found to have been thrown away.

Mr. Meredith's volume was suggested by the offering, a few years since, of the Baillie Prize for a discussion on Christianity against Infidelity, and Infidelity against Christianity.¹¹ Mr. Meredith appears to have withdrawn quietly from Christianity some years ago, but to have employed himself with inquiries into its origin; and in the present work we have the results distributed into arguments for and against the divine nature of its Founder, the reality and accomplishment of his prophecies concerning the destruction of Jerusalem, the end of the world and his own resurrection, the excellence or defects of his teaching, and the probable sources of his precepts. Mr. Meredith has endeavoured not to wound unnecessarily the feelings of believers. He has collected a great mass of materials, but we cannot say that he always makes a discriminating use of them, and is apt to accumulate illustrations as much on his weakest as on his strongest arguments, as for instance in his chapters entitled "Most of the best things which Jesus taught, borrowed from Heathen theology," and "Both the life and doctrines of Jesus identical with the lives and doctrines of Heathen ascetics, or monks, who lived hundreds of years before his time."

The volume of selections from notes of Theodore Parker's unpublished sermons forms a convenient manual for those who are anxious to be assured that if criticism, science, or philosophy should convince them of the hollowness of much which is usually called Christian doctrine, they will not thereby be robbed of religion.¹² These gems will contribute to the true appreciation of Parker's honesty and clearness. And if ministers of religion among us would take up this book, they would learn that it is possible to speak to the hearts of their congregations without encumbering themselves with Jewish miracles, or with the speculations of the creeds. If some of our stiff pulpit orators would try the experiment of amplifying some of these notes into discourses, they might find they had at last touched the right string. These selections have been made from the sermons of ten years, from 1849 to 1859. Mr. Leighton's purpose of preserving and printing some such collection was approved by Parker; he said it was a comfort to him to think that, after he had passed away, some of his best things might be gathered from his notes and the photograph of the winged words—"the things that I value most are not always such as get printed."

¹¹ "The Prophet of Nazareth; or, a Critical Inquiry into the Prophetical, Intellectual, and Moral Character of Jesus Christ, as exemplified in his predictions, his precepts, his actions, his discourses, and his social intercourse." By Evan Powell Meredith. London: F. Farrah. 1864.

¹² "Lessons from the World of Matter and the World of Man." By Theodore Parker. Selected from notes of unpublished Sermons. By Rufus Leighton. Edited by Frances Power Cobbe. London: Trübner and Co. 1865.

The volume is principally made up of those practical appeals in which Parker excelled; but we select a few passages which embody his conception of the historical person of Jesus Christ.

"I think the time has come when a small part of Christendom would like to look at a daguerreotype of Jesus, and be content with the actual historical person just as he was, and give up that long series of fancy sketches which make up the ecclesiastical Christ; for to my thinking that noble-browed carpenter, with his great trust, and pious feeling, and grand life, is worth much more than all the ecclesiastical dreams about him that have been made, down to this day."—p. 106.

"Palestine bore Moses and Jesus—the last, to my eye, the greatest genius of all time. Starting from Hebrew soil, he roots into the national traditions; but his flower is human substance on the Hebrew stem. He shared much of the superstition of his time, its mistaken philosophy, its limited notion of God, of man, and of the relation between the two; he taught an eternal devil, an angry God, and an endless hell. That was the dust of Jerusalem blown into his flower—the eavesdropping from the synagogue or temple. But his great genius for religion saw religion as love, the mystic love within, the active love without. His genius for philosophy, power of reflection, separated him from the creeds of the doctors of law. . . . Men felt the presence of a great man, and with the instinctive loyalty of mankind they adorned him with the best they could offer: the gewgaws of their fancy they put about his name, called him the son of David, and told miracles about him. . . . One day mankind will drop these fancies, and we shall look on the majestic features of that Hebrew man, radiant all over with humanity, and speaking still his highest word—love to God and love to man. All notions of his miraculous conception, birth, death, and life, will vanish away, the fancied God give way to the real man, and the great services of his genius and life be plain to all men."—pp. 68, 69.

The passages from p. 240 to p. 257 are especially worth attention. On the one hand—

"I do not believe in the perfection of Jesus, that he had no fault of character, was never mistaken, never angry, never out of humour, never dejected, never despairing. I do not believe that from his cradle to his cross he never did, nor said, nor felt, nor thought, a wrong thing. To say that was his character, I think would be as absurd as to say that he learned to walk without stumbling, or to talk without stammering, or could see as well at three years old as at twelve years, and could reason as well at thirty days as at thirty years."—p. 244.

But then as to his place in religious history—

"I look on Jesus as the highest product of the human race. I honour intellectual greatness; I bend my neck to Socrates, and Newton, and La Place, and Hegel, and Kant, and the vast minds of our own day. But what are they all compared with this greatness of justice, greatness of philanthropy, greatness of religion? Why, they are as nothing! I look on Jesus, not only as a historical prophet, but as a prophetic foretelling. He shows what is in you and me; and only comes as the earliest flower of the spring comes, to tell us that summer is near at hand. I thank God for the history which Jesus is! I thank Him more for the prophecy which he is."—pp. 246, 247.

The "Critical Writings" of Theodore Parker consist of essays published by him at various times in different periodicals.¹³ Some are on

¹³ "Critical Writings." By Theodore Parker. Vols. I. & II. London: Trübner and Co. 1864.

theological subjects, as on "Strauss's Life of Jesus," "Dorner's Christology;" but not all—some are on political subjects, others on general literature. They tend to show what a many-sided and well-furnished man he was, and will add to the influence which his name is acquiring daily.

The author of the "Answer to the Archbishop of York"¹⁴ tells us—

"From early childhood I was taught to believe in endless torments as the inevitable doom of the non-elect. I know now that this dogma is not found in the Bible, but only in mistranslations and misrepresentations of it. Do I, therefore, value the Gospel less? Bless the Lord, O my soul! I value it every day the more. Since I awoke from that hideous dream of my youth and shook off that accursed nightmare, which cannot survive the approach of day, the world has seemed to me like another world, and the universe to be filled with a Divine light and beauty unknown to me before."—p. 89.

The ambiguity of many of the Scriptural texts relied upon generally in support of this horrible dogma is well pointed out, and the greater weight of other passages which teach or imply a universal loving-kindness towards mankind on the part of his Creator is forcibly insisted on.

Mr. Stirling has devoted, as he tells us, and as will readily be believed by those who read or endeavour to read his book, a great number of years to the study of Kant and Hegel¹⁵—not without a very large amount of success; for he has approached nearer to an intelligible exposition of the Hegelian philosophy than has yet been accomplished in England. His readers will no doubt be led over a very rugged path, and will have to follow a guide who does not allow himself to be contradicted. Whether the end is worth the labour—whether, after all, the "Secret" is worth having, is another question. Mr. Stirling has done well in refusing to encumber himself with a criticism of the whole philosophical literature of Germany from Kant to Hegel, and, as it seems to us, in affiliating Hegel directly upon Kant. He has thus relieved himself and his readers from discussing the relation of Fichte to Kant, or entangling themselves in the controversies about Schelling. Having thus limited his field, Mr. Stirling occupies a considerable portion of an extended preface in showing that German philosophy is neither *obsolete* nor *bad*. And he pours out some vials of contempt upon the *negative* school in England, who represent what was known in Germany as the "Aufklärung," but whose work is long ago done. The Essayists and Reviewers and Mr. Buckle incur his displeasure as obstructives seeking to spread "a negative which has long reached ultimate tenuity," and in days "when it is not the negative but the affirmative we need." Yet Mr. Stirling might have considered that an "Aufklärung" may still be necessary in England, though it may have done its work or be worn out in Germany.

¹⁴ "An Answer to the Archbishop of York on the Subject of Endless Torments." By a Bachelor of Divinity. London: Williams and Norgate. 1865.

¹⁵ "The Secret of Hegel: being the Hegelian System in Origin, Principle, Form, and Matter." By James Hutchison Stirling. In 2 vols. London: Longmans. 1865.

Indeed, if it had proceeded somewhat further in this country, we should not have heard a celebrated Bampton Lecturer first denouncing as impious where they were intelligible, and as unintelligible where they were not impious, Hegelian formulæ of which he was well aware his audience were no competent judges, even if he was such himself, and then demanding an assent to a revelation which reveals nothing—of which the mysteries are as incapable of apprehension as the Hegelian “Nichts,” whose claims must be admitted because they are claims, and its miraculous credentials neither to be tested by the light of philosophy nor by the laws of evidence. As to Mr. Buckle, who is departed, some things might have been spared: perhaps what is said was written while he was yet alive. It may be allowed that he was in a process of “becoming;” but he was more teachable every day. Mr. Stirling is perfectly right in saying, that when the negative criticism has done its work, it is time to construct; and right also in saying, that Kant and Hegel were constructors. The “Aufklärung” had “undressed the baby,” but Kant saw that “the naked baby would not do.” Meanwhile, in England, the ill-dressed baby is not yet undressed, so that the question of properly dressing is for the greater part premature. But with respect to the dying out of the “Aufklärung” in Germany—

“The central principle of Kant was Freiheit, Freewill; and when this word was articulated by the lips of Kant, the Illumination was virtually at an end. The single sound Freiheit was the death-sentence of the Aufklärung. The principle of the Aufklärung, the Right of Private Judgment, is a perfectly true one. But it is not true as used by the Aufklärung, or it is used only one-sidedly by the Aufklärung. Of the two words, Private Judgment, the Aufklärung accentuates and sees only the former. The Aufklärung asks only that the *Private* man, the individual, be satisfied. Its principle is Subjectivity, pure and simple. But its own words imply more than subjectivity—its own words imply objectivity as well; for the accent on Private ought not to have blinded it to the fact that there is question of *Judgment* as well. Now, I as a subject, you as a subject, he as a subject, there is no guarantee of agreement: I may say A, you B, and he C. But all this is changed the instant we have said *Judgment*. Judgment is not subjectively mine, or subjectively yours, or subjectively his: it is objectively mine, yours, his, &c.; it is a common possession; it is a thing in which we all meet and agree. At all events, it is not subjective, and so incapable of comparison,—but objective, capable of comparison, and consequently such that in its regard, in the end, we *shall* all agree.”—p. lxxii.

Here is, in fact, pointed out a distinction in the meanings which may attach to the phrase private judgment: for if by private is meant singular as opposed to collective, then the claim to the right of private judgment is vicious; if it signify general or collective as distinguished from magisterial and authoritative, then it is justifiable and right. We cannot follow Mr. Stirling even through his preface, which is a remarkably vigorous and *masterful* piece of writing. But we must take a passage touching the relation of his philosophers to religion and Christianity.

“To Kant the three interests that were vital, and which lay at the centre of

every thought and movement in him, were the Existence of God, the Freedom of the Will, and the Immortality of the Soul. These three positions Kant conceived himself to have demonstrated, and in the only manner at once consistent with themselves and with the thinking faculties of man. It is precisely in these themes that Hegel follows Kant; these are his objects also: yet it is precisely here—especially in reference to God and Immortality—that the teaching of Hegel has been held, and by what is called his own school, to be inexplicit. Not the less, however, is it to be said that every step of his system is towards the Immortality of the Soul, that every step is towards the Freedom of the Will, that every step is towards God. Hegel, in truth, would restore to us all that Understanding, all that Reflexion, all that Illumination has deprived us of, and that, too, in a higher and richer form, and not less in the light and element of the Illumination itself, and in perfect harmony with its principle and truth. Hegel, in fact, completes the compromise of Understanding by the complement of Reason. Philosophy is to him not Philosophy unless, or rather Philosophy is to him only Philosophy when, it stands up for the Substance of Humanity, for all those great religious interests to which alone we virtually live. Accordingly, it is not only the interests of what is called Natural Religion that he seeks to restore, but those of Christianity itself.”—p. lxxii.

And for the sake of conciliating, not Mr. Darwin or Professor Huxley, but some scared auditor of Mr. Mansel, we may take this extract from the close of the second volume:—

“In short, what we all long for is the Christian simplicity, the Christian happiness of our forefathers. We have seen already in picture the subject of this simplicity, the subject of this happiness; but it will do us good to see him once again. ‘The simple pious soul, on the green earth, in the bright fresh air, patiently industrious, patiently loving, piously penitent, piously hopeful, sure of a new world and a new life, a better world and a better life, united to the loved ones, there for ever in the realms of God through the merits of his Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ.’ This is happiness: the thinnest Aufgeklärter, if he deny it with his lips, will confess it by his sighs! This is happiness, and this is what must be restored to us, else history indeed draws nigh its term: a universe recognised to be material only were but Humanity’s grave. But this happiness will be restored to us, and in this restoration the very most powerful instrument will, perhaps, be the identical Hegel as in contrast to whom—so contradictorily opposed the error was—the picture of this happiness first suggested itself. Hegel, indeed, has no object but reconciling and neutralizing atomism—once again to restore to us, and in the new light of the new thought, Immortality and Free Will, Christianity and God.”—Vol. ii., p. 622, 623.

We must leave the struggle to Hegel, and Hegel himself to those who have courage to grapple with them; for Mr. Stirling’s book, though able in the highest degree, is not of easy analysis.

The English reader is already acquainted, by means of a little book translated by Mr. Morell, with J. H. Fichte’s theory concerning the pre-existence of the human soul.¹⁴ He has undoubtedly shown that the phenomena of the consciousness necessarily presuppose some antecedent previous to the awakening of the consciousness itself: it may not be

¹⁴ “Psychologie.” Die Lehre vom bewussten Geiste des Menschen, oder Entwicklungsgeschichte des Bewusstseins, begründet auf Anthropologie und innerer Erklärung. Von Immanuel Hermann Fichte. Erster Theil. Leipzig. London: D. Nutt. 1864.

so clear that such antecedent can only be the soul as a "Real-wesen." In the present volume the same theory is further illustrated and enforced by observation of the individuality of each soul; of the genesis of its conceptions of time and space, of its being the spring and centre (for something must be the spring and centre) of perception, imagination, will. A large part of this volume is taken up in developing the action of the imagination in normal and abnormal states, in waking, sleeping, and somnambulism—the phantasms of the dreamer and even the imagery of the prophet are not his real thoughts or ideas, only their clothing, but they imply thoughts, the product of the hidden but not unreal nor yet material soul. There is a great deal here which appears to us rather as amusing or interesting and somewhat shadowy speculation, than as philosophy or even as science.

The merits of Dr. M'Cosh as a philosophical investigator—and they are undoubtedly very high—would stand much higher in the estimation of competent judges if he would purify his style of a certain alloy of declamation, and where his subject necessarily leads him into the region of theology, if he would not confound particular religious systems with theology in the abstract.¹⁷ The undertaking to adjust the claims of the sensational and intuitional philosophies, and of the *à posteriori* and *à priori* methods, is not only legitimate, but accomplished in this work with a great amount of success. But even in such a prefatory statement as the following, of the questions which lie before him, we meet with the diffuseness and pulpit phraseology of which we complain:—

"In this present age, two manner of principles, each of the character of a different parent, are struggling for the mastery; the one earth-born, sensational, empirical, utilitarian, deriving all ideas from the senses, and all knowable truth from man's limited experience, and holding that man can be swayed by no motives of a higher order than the desire to secure pleasure or avoid pain; the other, if not heaven-born, at least cloud-born, being ideal, transcendental, pantheistic, attributing man's loftiest ideas to inward light, appealing to principles which are discovered without the trouble of observation, and issuing in a belief in the good instead of a belief in God . . . while the great body of reading men are professedly indifferent,—those who claim to be neutral, however, being all the while unconsciously in the service of either one or the other, commonly of the lower, or earthly, just as those who profess to belong neither to God nor Mammon, do in fact belong to Mammon."—p. 4.

And throughout the treatise there is not only observable a caution not to advance any view which may conflict with any part of the received Evangelical doctrine, but there is frequent reference to it as founded upon the inspired writings, guaranteed by miracles and the like.

Dr. Doherty proposes to ascertain man's true place in nature by treating elaborately of the nature by which he is surrounded, which is inorganic or organic, and then of man, who is in relation with it, who consists of body and soul.¹⁸ We fear that the very completeness of his

¹⁷ "The Intuitions of the Mind inductively investigated." By the Rev. James M'Cosh, LL.D., Professor of Logic and Metaphysics in Queen's College, Belfast, &c. &c. New and Revised Edition. London: Macmillan and Co. 1865.

¹⁸ "Organic Philosophy; or, Man's True Place in Nature." Vol. I., [Epicosmology. By Hugh Doherty, M.D. London: Trübner and Co. 1864.

treatment of these subjects will deter many readers, who will be alarmed at his multifarious divisions and the uncouthness of his terminology, and thus the fruit of much scientific investigation and careful analysis be practically lost.

POLITICS, SOCIOLOGY, VOYAGES AND TRAVELS.

IT is impossible to lay down Earl Grey's *Essay on Parliamentary Government and Reform*¹ without an increased feeling of respect for its author. From his point of view, he has given the whole question the most careful consideration, but the firm conviction he entertains that a fuller Representation would be incompatible with good administration so affects every detail of his treatment of the question that none but those who share in this opinion can expect to read this volume with unmingled satisfaction. The first part, which treats generally of parliamentary government, is by far the most valuable. Nowhere is the distinction between the theory of Representation and the practice of Parliamentary Government better displayed and insisted on. His experience makes him an unquestionable witness on the effects of party government on the purity of the administration; and his testimony as to the means by which the House is managed will be seized upon by many who will use it with far less candour than that with which it is given. The strict supervision of public opinion, and the comparative publicity of every act of the executive, have, in his opinion, too much weakened the hands of those who have to carry on the "Queen's Government," and by withdrawing indirect means of influencing votes, dangerously lessened the initiative of ministers. This result should rather be attributed to the existing state of party feeling, which has brought about, in the present House, so nice a balance of power that its exercise has become proportionally hazardous. Many of the Earl's arguments against a further extension of the franchise would have been equally efficient in 1832, and repose on a want of faith in the more democratic classes of the community which, in our opinion, has no sufficient foundation. There is a slight longing after the flesh-pots of Egypt about the Earl's doctrines that will expose him to many misrepresentations, but not at our hands, to whom his plain speaking seems worthy of the highest respect. The main features of his suggestions for the improvement of our Representative System consist of an equalization of the county and borough franchises, and of a maximum and minimum constituency to give a title to Representation, which in every case should consist of three or more members; so that, by the operation of the cumulative method of voting, a minority at all greater than a quarter of the voters

¹ "Parliamentary Government, considered with reference to Reform." By Earl Grey. London: J. Murray. 1864.

would be enabled, if unanimous, to secure a representative of their opinions. A great variety of minor suggestions are also contained in his project of Reform, which substantially amount to this conclusion: any kind of reconstruction so that an extension of the franchise be avoided. We are afraid, and Earl Grey himself shares the fear with a very different feeling, that the public on this topic will close its ears to the voice of the charmer, charm he never so wisely. In alluding to Mr. Hare's plan for the management of elections, we think he dismisses that remarkable proposal too summarily from consideration. It is true that its adoption would be most revolutionary in one respect—it would at once put an end to all local influence, and would rely upon the political sagacity of the nation as a whole. Such a thorough destruction of the powers of county magnates cannot be expected to find advocates among those who have so long enjoyed the source of influence which so largely supports the Conservative party. Although we think the Earl's volume calculated to exert but little influence, by its doctrines, on the progress of events, its perusal cannot fail to clear up many misconceptions on the general working of our existing system of Representation.

It is not a little instructive to compare the English tone in the discussion of this subject with that to which the most intelligent Liberals in France are at the present moment compelled to restrict themselves. This can hardly be better done than in the pages of a collection of Political Essays by M. Laboulaye.² The forced employment of the most abstract and general terms is in striking contrast with the practical tone of the volume just noticed. We cannot give a better idea of this than by quoting a part of M. Laboulaye's preface, in which he will be found endeavouring to impress upon his compatriots the conclusions of W. von Humboldt and J. S. Mill:—

“I have gathered together in this volume a few political essays which have for the most part but one object:—viz., to determine the spheres of governmental action (*le pouvoir*) and of liberty, to show that government is only then beneficial when it is confined to its legitimate functions. If there is any truth misunderstood in France, it is this. God knows how dearly we pay for our ignorance. When we review the long series of our revolutions since 1789, we perceive that all parties, however much they may have differed on other points, have been in complete accord on one; they have all considered government and liberty as two irreconcilable enemies contending for the direction of mankind. With liberals of the old school, to weaken government was to strengthen liberty; with the partisans of order before all things, to hamper liberty was to strengthen government—a double and fatal error, which can but result in either anarchy or despotism. When authority is disarmed, liberty degenerates into licence, and destroys itself by its own excesses. That which you desire feeble as an oppressor, as Bossuet justly remarks, you will find powerless as a protector. On the other hand, with an authority which is neither supported nor restrained, you have a reign of intrigue and ambition. These absolute systems are condemned by the fact that each of them stifles one of the vital forces of society. How, then, can we reconcile authority and liberty? By a just view of each. We must elevate ourselves to the notion

² “L'Etat et ses Limites.” Suivi d'Essais politiques par E. Laboulaye, membre de l'Institut. Paris: Charpentier. London: D. Nutt. 1865.

that authority and liberty are not two hostile powers destined evermore to destroy one another, but rather two distinct elements of one and the same organization—liberty representing individual life, and authority (*l'état*) the general interests of society. These two spheres of action have neither the same centre nor the same circumference; they touch one another at more than one point, but they ought never to be confused. Those interests which the State is called upon to defend are far from extending to all things. This I have endeavoured to set forth in the Essay on the State and its Limits, where I have shown that this limitation is the great political problem of the time, and that the same solution is given to it by all the most enlightened minds. Let the general political interests of foreign policy, and the administration of the laws, be the sphere of the state, social interests the sphere of association, and let all personal responsibility be left to the individual. It is by this just notion that modern are contrasted with antique societies, which, existing under totally different conditions, restricted to the circuit of a city's walls, have never entertained any respect for individual liberty."

All through this excellent essay it is the individual that pleads his case against a too powerful executive, and pleads as vainly for another reason as Earl Grey will do for an opposite cause. The other essays in M. Laboulaye's volume have, for the most part, appeared in the *Revue des Deux Mondes*, and are all distinguished by that learning and love of liberty to which he owes the high position he occupies among French Liberals. Another volume of his,³ published some time since, is still more instructive as a display of the indirect devices to which his party are driven if they would even approach a practical treatment of the questions which most interest them. His "Paris in America" is a somewhat artificial device by which the customs and institutions of a free people are compared with the restrictions and governmental tutelage under which the French nation are content to live. A Parisian is magically transported to Boston, where he finds his family around him it is true, but with American minds and feelings. His confusion and astonishment are very graphically described, but as his wonder wears away he soon finds that he is able to do many things for himself that he had never ventured to suppose possible before, and finds, too, that he is the happier for his activity. A very full view of American public and private life is thus brought, *en beau* it is true, before his readers; and when, at last, the converted Frenchman is, by another magic stroke, restored to his own country, with a new mind formed by the influence of the institutions he has learned to admire, his attempts to act in accordance with his new notions ultimately consign him to a madhouse, where his pitying friends look upon him as a confirmed lunatic. There are many very clever hits in the course of this *jeu d'esprit*, which has enjoyed a great popularity in Paris and

³ "Paris en Amérique." Par le Docteur René Lefebvre, Parisien de la Société des Contribuables de France et des Administrés de Paris; des Sociétés philadelphique et philharmonique d'Alise et d'Alaise, &c.; de la real Academia de los tontos de Quisando; Pastore nell' Academia in Brenta (detto Melbeo l'Intronato); mitglied des gross- und klein Deutschen Narren Landtags; mitglied der KK. Hanswurst Academie zu Gänsersdorf; membre du club Tarleton, à Coventry; F.R.F.S., M.A., D.D., &c.; commandeur de l'ordre grand ducal della Civetta; chevalier du merle blanc (LXXXIXme classe) avec plaque, &c. &c.

run through thirteen editions, though to English notions it is somewhat heavy for a political pasquinade.

The devoted personal labour of twenty years in the cause of ragged schools, reformatories, and industrial schools, entitles Miss Carpenter to an attentive consideration of any views she may put forth on the condition of our criminal classes.⁴ The two volumes she has just published are in their result an ardent and most intelligent plea for the more general adoption of what has come to be called the Irish system. It is not without a deep significance that she entitles them "Our Convicts;" always ours from the defective social organization in which all criminals originate, they are now doubly so since we can no longer wash our hands of them by transportation. Necessity now comes upon us as a spur to benevolence. We are obliged to consume our own criminals as we are our lesser nuisances, and a reformatory treatment is at last brought home to us as the most expedient, as well as the most merciful. It is true that the old leaven of the retributive theory stirs within us when we read of the close personal attention, the careful teaching, the helping hand, the almost providential supervision, by which a Montesinos, an Obermeir, a Maconochie, or a Crofton have produced such great and beneficent results; and we cannot but feel that if our penal laws are to be thus administered, how great are the duties undischarged towards those who have not yet come under their operation. Perhaps this overwhelming reflection, as it is the natural result of the perusal of Miss Carpenter's volumes, is also their highest praise. In the subordinate question of literary efficiency, they are everything that could be wished; there may be a slight tendency to repetition in some of the details, but as a general review of the working of our convict system, compared with that at present administered by Captain Whitby, they leave nothing to be desired. There is no branch of the great subject neglected; the information on each is comprehensive, trustworthy, and complete; while from the excellent distribution of topics, any part may be especially studied by those whose existing information requires fresh knowledge on some of them, while to those who for the first time take up the general question of convict life and treatment, the two volumes offer all that can be wished for.

Underlying every sentiment in these volumes, and also of those which animate another on Capital Punishment, by Mr. Moir,⁵ is to be found a deep but half-unconscious feeling of the impossibility of any human skill adequately to inflict punishment at all. The necessary classifications of law are more or less felt to be rough and ready collo- cations that no ingenuity can so define as to prevent their including the greatest variety of personal guilt. As society becomes settled, and life and property secure, the value of life itself becomes more and more appreciated, and the old violences of self-defence, the *lex*

⁴ "Our Convicts." By Mary Carpenter. 2 vols. London: Longman and Co. 1864.

⁵ "Capital Punishment." Based on Professor Mittermaier's "Todesstrafe." Edited by John Macrae Moir, M.A., of the Middle Temple, Barrister-at-Law. London: Smith, Elder, and Co. 1865.

talionis and the simply retributive theory of punishment, lose with every day some portion of their ancient hold on the minds of men. Some time since we called attention to Professor Mittermaier's learned and scientific treatise on the Penalty of Death, and we then pointed out what a comprehensive review it contained of the progress of European opinion on the question of which it treated. Mr. Moir has availed himself of this treasury of facts, and has done good service to the cause he has at heart, by bringing them before his readers. The abolition of the punishment of death would be the crowning victory of those who would abolish every trace of vindictive purpose from penal legislation. It is impossible not to sympathise with such a purpose as this. One thing only should not be forgotten: even benevolence may be followed too blindly, and it is more important that legislation should coincide with the moral sense of the community than that we should possess a code of abstract perfection. It can hardly be maintained, and Mr. Moir shows only the first dawn of such an opinion, that we are prepared to part with what so many among us look upon as an essential attribute of justice. That the time will come when Justice may be deprived of her sword, and trusted without her bandage, is an article of faith with many of the best among us; but the wisest know that the faith of the best can never be made the basis of a legislative system that is to be applied to all. Nothing is so detrimental to true and steady progress as those reactions which never fail to follow a too ardent advance. Miss Carpenter must win her battle before Mr. Moir can fairly put in his plea, and if precedence were to be settled now on the strength of their respective pleadings, she would be entitled to it from the far greater value of her volumes.

Another, but a much less valuable work on this subject, will be found under the title of "The Pauper, the Thief, and the Convict."⁶ From such a graduated title it might be expected that some systematic treatment of the general subject suggested by it was about to be offered to the reader. This expectation is wofully disappointed by the disjointed and rambling contents of Mr. Archer's volume. A full third of its contents does not come in any legitimate manner under either of the divisions indicated in the title, but is devoted to a minute description of the haunts of sailors and German sugar-bakers in Ratcliffe-highway and the neighbourhood of the Minorities. Neither in a systematic description of the external appearance of pauper dwellings, or of the details of workhouse and prison discipline, can this book be recommended. It is animated by no leading thoughts, is most discursive in treatment, and affords some of the worst examples of what has been called "word-painting," in which the words are more considered than the subject they should paint. The moral tone assumed is as vague as the intellectual grasp is uncertain; a declamatory and utterly unsuitable sentimentality takes the place of wholesome morality and practical suggestiveness. High-coloured pictures of the haunts of low vice are surely not needed while the police reports make us so

⁶ "The Pauper, the Thief, and the Convict." By Thomas Archer. London: Groombridge and Sons. 1865.

familiarly acquainted with their results. So much has been done, and so much better done, by Mr. Mayhew, on the matters treated of in this book, that we are surprised any one should have thought there was room for so much weaker a version of his books on the Poor of London and on the Metropolitan Prisons.

In all that really has reference to the Economy of Capital, Mr. Patterson's book⁷ is most excellent. His information is complete; his style is clear, forcible, and even picturesque; and his account of the modes by which capital is economised in the banking system is the very best extant: but his theory of what that system should be is open to the gravest objections. At the very outset, in his chapters on gold and on the question "what is money," he betrays the bias which, in the following parts of his volume, vitiates in our opinion all his conclusions, and renders something worse than nugatory his unquestionable expository talent. While reviewing the various contrivances which have been resorted to in all times and countries to supply a medium of exchange, he insists only on their variety, that he may draw the conclusion necessary to his argument, that in every case the value attached to each selected object has been arbitrary and conferred upon it for the special purpose in view. This is to overlook the fundamental point in which they all agree; for in every time and place where each has been in use, they have all been deemed an *equivalent*, and have embodied labour proportionate to the value assigned to them. It is futile to dwell upon the comparative uselessness of the precious metals so long as they require for their acquisition from the bowels of the earth an amount of labour that gives them the value they possess. Their fitness as an instrument of exchange is dependent not only on this fundamental requisite, but also on their other physical qualities of divisibility and recomposition without loss, which, together with their power of representing great value in small bulk, will ever maintain to them the prerogative they have so long enjoyed. There is nothing arbitrary in the choice of gold and silver as instruments of exchange, and the universality of their use for this purpose is the best proof of it. We mention this defect in Mr. Patterson's early chapters because, to all acquainted with the discussion to which those chapters are the prelude, it affords a note of warning that should by no means be overlooked. His account of the effects of the gold discoveries of California and Australia, of the economy of capital and of the money market, or as he calls it, "the city of gold," is most masterly and judicious. These chapters are singularly accurate, clear, and succinct. Would it were so with the following one on the Bank Act of 1844, which fills up two fifths of his volume and is a detailed criticism on the operation of the Act, which throughout is little more than an acute *petitio principii*. Had his object been to convince rather than to persuade, he would have put in the very foreground of his discussion the principle he relegates to an appendix—viz., "Paper money has already

⁷ "The Economy of Capital; or, Gold and Trade." By R. H. Patterson, author of the "New Revolution; or, the Napoleonic Policy in Europe." London and Edinburgh: W. Blackwood and Sons. 1865.

established itself as a *representative* of gold money; what it must next do is to establish itself as a *substitute* for it." With such a foregone conclusion as this, it is very easy to imagine what work he makes with the operation of an act the sole purpose of which was to render it impossible that paper should ever become in the national currency a substitute instead of an exact representative. In fact, we are in no way introduced by him, during its discussion, to the principles of banking, which he very well understands, but rather to a theory of the regulation of currencies, on principles that have long since been repudiated. His school ought frankly to adopt Porson's drinking maxim as the sum of their theories:—

"When gold and silver are gone and spent,
Then are bank-notes most excellent."

In the fullest sense, and in fact in the only true one, nothing is currency which is not legal tender. Every other form of liquidation reposes upon *credit*, and is effected by the infinite contrivances of the banking system. A sound currency or circulating medium cannot be had without a sacrifice of capital, if that can be called a sacrifice which is one of the most economical uses to which capital can be put. A currency of this kind needs no regulation; the only requisite is that, while being a legal tender, it should also be an equivalent of the value it represents. This point has been unquestionably gained by the Act of 1844. We should like to ask Mr. Patterson by what arguments he can prove the issue of notes to be any legitimate function of banking at all. The office of a bank is to gather together from its constituents their *disengaged* capital, and to make use of as much of it as can safely be invested in a profitable manner. The concentration of the banking system in England results in the display of the weekly amount which at each statement of the bank return is thus disengaged and seeking employment. This is the sum total of what banks can do for their constituents. How much is implied in this, is nowhere better shown than in Mr. Patterson's pages. On banking proper he is an excellent guide and authority. As far as its issue is concerned the Bank of England is a State Bank, guarded and protected from the dangers which are assumed to attend a direct issue by the State. The helplessness of the Bank, as Mr. Patterson pleases to call it, would arouse surprise in the mind of no one if the transparent mask of its quasi agency were withdrawn. It is not to be supposed for a moment that Mr. Patterson is ignorant of this, but its acknowledgement would be fatal to the cause he has at heart, and would at once reduce his argument to very small proportions. In the matter of banks of issue, our fathers have eaten sour grapes, and their children's teeth are set on edge. At the foundation of the Bank of England, the Government, whose credit at that time was inferior to commercial credit, agreed to part with a prerogative of the State, that of issuing money, in consideration of a subsidy in coin which the Bank supplied. Every change in the relations of the Bank and the Government since the peace has been a gradual resumption of the privilege of providing a representative money which had been sold to the Bank in former

times. The Act of 1844 finally withdrew this privilege and determined that legal tender should be an *equivalent* of the amount tendered. The regulations by which this result was arrived at are familiar to every one who takes an interest in these questions. For every note the Bank issues beyond the sum of 14,650,000*l.* it must hold an equivalent in gold. To declaim against the hardship that, when the Bank has issued 21 millions, it has in its vaults nearly seven millions of gold which it cannot use, is about as wise as to regret that you cannot both eat your cake and have it. These seven millions are already used by their representatives in the hands of the public, and are quite inapplicable to any banking purposes whatever. The simple state of the case is this—Mr. Patterson and the school to which he belongs wish to stand in the same relation to the Bank of England that the Government did at its foundation, and to demand as a right what was at that time extorted by State necessities. It would be far more to the purpose if, instead of showing how much the theory of over-issue has been exaggerated, he were fuller in his proof of the harmlessness of over-trading. It may be very true that there can hardly be any active trade without it, that the necessary ignorance of operations of other traders leads each of them to suppose that he alone is about to supply by his exertions a real want, but as the insight which enables him to perceive this want is no monopoly, he must ever be prepared, when he arrives at the market, to find some one on the spot at the same time with himself. The risks of commerce would not be so great were not the profits much more so. Trade must take its responsibilities on its own shoulders, and leave a just and equitable currency to be determined on national and not merely commercial grounds. As for the great argument which is so often cropping up in Mr. Patterson's pages, that a free issue has for many years proved successful in Scotland, the answer on all points suggested is very simple: what can be managed with a constituency of small traders, farmers, and professional people, becomes quite inapplicable to the needs of commerce on a larger scale. This has been sufficiently shown by the break-down of the Western Bank of Scotland, which, being situated in the only Scotch port possessed of a great foreign trade, was found unequal to its seductions, in spite of its being a member of the national system of mutual insurance in banking. In fact, the Scotch system is suited to the country for the same reasons that a silver currency is better suited to India than a gold one. The utopia of money without means must be attractive indeed to delude so clever and accomplished a writer as Mr. Patterson; but utopian or not, there are few books on the subject better worth reading than his, for it contains all that can be urged in favour of a system that promises to take a deal of killing.

The approval with which Mr. Patterson incidentally alludes to the management of the Bank of France is far from being shared in Paris; for its whole policy has been made the object of the most inveterate attack by M. Pereire,⁸ who has succeeded in obtaining a Commission

⁸ "La Banque de France et l'Organisation du Credit en France." Par M. J. Pereire. Paris: Dentu. 1865. London: D. Nutt.

of Enquiry. His object, like Mr. Patterson's, is a constant abundance of what is called, in commercial parlance, "cheap money." At the bottom, M. Pereire cares little for freedom of banking or for a plurality of banks; what he wants is, a bank or banks which, by keeping down the interest of capital, would abuse the confidence reposed in them by disguising from a credulous public the true value of capital at the moment. The Bank of France, being in the fullest sense a monopoly, is of course open to some attacks, which would fall harmless if directed against the Bank of England; but the animating spirit which directs the opponents of both institutions is the same, and arises from the same causes. Any restriction which either of them imposes on the most reckless speculation is immediately followed by an outcry in both countries from those who wish all things to be dear but money. M. Pereire's proposal of a bank which should prove more accessible to commercial exigencies, is founded, as so many similar ones among ourselves have been, on the so-called principle of giving a current value to fixed capital, and on the chimerical assumption that *all* capital is a proper basis for a representative money.

The agitation for a thorough reform of our system, if system it may be called, of Railway management, gains force with every day. The incoherencies and anomalies in the passenger and goods rates of carriage are indeed so great, that they only require such exposure as they have received at the hands of Mr. Galt, and of the author of a small volume on Railways,⁹ to arouse that public attention, which has hitherto slept, from a mingled ignorance of the details of the question and of helplessness in the presence of an overwhelming monopoly. The author of the book just alluded to desires to be anonymous, but gives in his pages indications by which any one who chooses to take the trouble may, with the utmost facility, ascertain to whom he is indebted for a very able exposure of the accumulated evils against which all call out in some vague way, but few so well understand. His project is, like Mr. Galt's, simple enough, and relies upon the success of small charges, as displayed in the reformed Post-office. The weakest part of Mr. Galt's volume is the strongest of the present one. The initiative financial difficulties are grappled with in a very efficient manner, and the general principles on which so great a reform as a uniform charge throughout the kingdom is advocated, hardly admit of refutation. With all the subordinate points connected with railway management the author shows himself to be intimately acquainted, while on the general question of policy he displays an enlightened insight, and desire for the public good.

The second and concluding volume of Mr. Arnold's history of "Lord Dalhousie's Administration of British India"¹⁰ treats of the annexation of Pegu, Nagpore, and Oude, and reviews those varied measures of internal improvement which are associated with his name.

⁹ "Railways: a Letter to the Right Hon. the President of the Board of Trade." London: Longman and Co. 1865.

¹⁰ "The Marquis of Dalhousie's Administration of British India." Vol. II. By E. Arnold, M.A. London: Saunders, Otley, and Co. 1865.



If this unquestionably great Governor-General had not been so grievously mistaken in his estimate of that instrument on which he relied for the execution of his policy, if the Sepoy army had not so grievously deceived the majority of those who commanded and led it, there can be but little question that Lord Dalhousie would have ranked among the very highest of those who have governed India. The policy of unification to which he was so wedded could not be carried out without an adequate force, and the failure of this force has caused many at once to condemn the policy. It is quite as difficult to justify the seizure of Pegu on any ground of international morality as it is to vindicate the suppression of the native governments of Nagpore and Oude; yet Mr. Arnold is full of allowance for the former, while he joins in the very general condemnation which has been passed upon the latter acts of Lord Dalhousie's administration. There is something respectable about open force which recommends itself to many who cry out against it when it attempts to cover itself by arguments that can always be answered. The construction put upon treaties between the East India Company and the various native princes can always be questioned, and general views of policy find obstacles far more insurmountable in old parchments than in the most unquestionable natural rights. It is often a matter of complaint, that when a debate on any Indian question comes on in the House of Commons, it is hardly possible to keep a house together to discuss it. This is not wonderful; no one can flatter himself that he is sufficiently well acquainted with the subject. It cannot be discussed without running into topics that call for a personal knowledge of the country, and which demand the fullest insight into the feelings of the various races concerned, and the most correct estimate of the force which those feelings can exert on the spot. It cannot be questioned that Lord Dalhousie sincerely thought a homogeneous empire was a necessary preliminary to a just and equitable government. He played a great game for a great purpose, and lost it only by one miscalculation. Had there been no mutiny, we should not now be discussing whether it is not better to govern by Indian princes. Our sore need of help in 1857 has made too many of us believe that native nabobs and rajahs can be expected to give up the familiar delights of Eastern princes and rule their subjects on European principles. A native nobility has few of the qualities which go to form our idea of nobleness, and it may be fairly questioned whether upholding them in their privileges is a method likely to lead to their acquiring those qualities. It is quite another matter whether it would not be advisable to give a more free and full career to native ability. There can be no doubt that in the land of caste the white skin has constituted itself as the most exclusive of them all, and that much has still to be done to reconcile a conquering aristocracy to sharing the power they have acquired with those over whom it has been so long exercised. It is too much to expect that a conqueror can have clean hands; it is sufficient if his intentions are really good, and it cannot be disputed that the present government of India is more concerned with the welfare of the Hindoos than any they have lived under for many generations. Mr. Arnold's volume will do good service in the most necessary

work of forcing on the English public some more full and accurate knowledge of Indian politics; his narrative is animated, though perhaps a little pretentious, his "graphic muse" attitudinises a little, and is somewhat too fond of contrasting the metaphysical doctrines of ancient India with the rough practices of its present conquerors; on the other hand, his love for and knowledge of the country itself, enables him to give a reality and force to many of the scenes he has to display that would be quite beyond the reach of any one without those advantages.

Major Evans Bell is one of the most ardent defenders of the rights of the native princes of India. It is impossible to question his intimate knowledge of the historical documents on which they are founded, or to deny that a strict verbal construction of them would result in a favourable verdict to his pleadings. The case of the Mysore Reversion¹¹ is not only "exceptional," as Lord Canning called it, but in many respects typical. It will surprise many of Major Bell's readers to hear that the little boy whom we placed on the throne of Tippoo Sahib is still living. In the shortest summary, his history is as follows: When for our own purposes we placed him, a child, upon the throne that Hyder Ali had wrested from his family, we gave him a minister, and imposed on him a tribute. As soon as he arrived at the mature age of sixteen, he dismissed his minister and allowed the tribute to fall into arrears. The whole district became the prey to anarchy, and the Madras government, which had reserved a power of entering on a part of his dominions to secure the regular payment of the subsidy, entered on the whole in the interest of the population; and after many years of successful administration, brought the country to a state of prosperity which it had never known before. There can be no question that in so doing the letter of the treaty was outraged, and that the Rajah has a good legal case for restitution, now that the subsidy has been long since regularly paid, and the country is quiet, orderly, and prosperous. But the Rajah has no children, and there can be no doubt that if restored he would still postpone the adoption of an heir until approaching death warned him that he could not expect a natural one. What prospect have we, then, that a second generation would lead to any other result than that which followed on our installation of the present Rajah? That the word heirs in our treaties should be restricted to heirs of the body, seems the only mode by which we can escape from the otherwise too probable result of an anarchical minority at every succession. The political arguments on which Major Bell relies to fortify his appeal for a favourable hearing of his client's case, repose on the assumed necessity of a native aristocracy attached to the supreme government, who might be both able and willing to restrain the population in any future outbreak like that of 1857. We doubt greatly if the attachment of the natives to Indian princes rests upon anything better than the displays of fireworks and other amusements, with which they celebrate the *fêtes* of

¹¹ "The Mysore Reversion." By Major Evans Bell. London: Trübner and Co. 1865.

their religion or the events of their family life. It cannot be but that a regular administration of justice, an equitable assessment, and just opportunities of education and advancement will, in the long run, prove a far stronger tie between us and the general mass of the population than any such sympathy as they have met with at the hands of their old rulers. It is not to be expected that advantages of this description, which are only realised by reflection after long enjoyment, should at once be admitted by an ignorant people as more desirable than such fleeting and sensual gratifications as they have hitherto reaped at the hands of their native princes, but a persistence in right doing on our part cannot fail of ultimate success.

What Major Bell attempts to do for the Rajah of Mysore, "Indopolite"¹² ventures on in behalf of the Nawaub of the Carnatic. In this case, the dispute rests not on the question of adoptive heirs, but upon an hereditary claim in the ascending line, he being uncle to the last Nabob. Again, treaties that were to last "as long as the sun and moon endure" are found, like all treaties in every part of the world, to grow old and obstructive with the changes that time brings with it. So long as these claims are argued on personal grounds, there is no escape from the admission that both the Rajah of Mysore and the Nabob of the Carnatic are hardly dealt with; and their case is much strengthened by the celebrated proclamation with which Lord Canning closed his government. The parliamentary committee of inquiry, for which the Nabob petitions, will have, if it ever meets, a most responsible duty to perform; for not only must it decide their case, but lay down rules of procedure, that, when once determined on, ought never after to be infringed. If it can be shown that native princes are compatible with good and uniform government, their personal rights ought doubtless to be respected; but if otherwise, it is greatly to be dreaded that we may find the Queen's Proclamation of 1858 a stone about our necks in times that are to come.

A useful analysis and compendium of Bentham's "Theory of Legislation"¹³ has been published by Mr. Fletcher—useful, that is, to those who may have to get up the book for any examination on its contents, but necessarily so divorced from those individual peculiarities which, in all original authors, are so important, that we can hardly recommend it to any other class of readers. It is not without some degree of surprise that we find in the preface such expressions as the following:

"Even in the better sense in which utility is set forth in Bentham's Works, it may not be the highest nor the safest guide in human actions. I for one concur with those who think that we come nearer to the 'true end of man' in actions which are not perceptibly influenced by ideas of benefit or loss. There may be many means to good ends."

This extract betrays so complete a misapprehension of the principle of utility as a standard by which to judge of the morality of actions, that we

¹² "A Letter, addressed by permission to the Right Hon. Lord Stanley, M.P." By Indopolite. London: J. Davy and Sons. 1865.

¹³ "Analysis of Jeremy Bentham's Theory of Legislation." By G. W. H. Fletcher, LL.D. London: Trübner and Co. 1864.

are surprised any one who entertains the views expressed in it should have taken the trouble to epitomise Bentham's book. The confusion between means and ends is most surprising. Utility, as a standard of the morality of actions, has nothing whatever to do with means, and those who appeal to higher and safer guides in the estimate of their character are as wise as if they should desire the beauty and perfume of a rose without connexion with the soil in which it grows, or the ugly roots inseparable from the fair result. The sole consideration that utility, as a standard, is the only one which accounts for past progress in the moral conceptions and feelings of mankind, while it opens the door to every possible development of both, ought of itself to disarm its antagonists, and recommend it to a more fair and impartial investigation on the part of those who still refuse to accept it in the place of baseless theological or metaphysical assumptions.

Mr. Bridges' translation of the "Discours sur l'ensemble du Positivisme,"¹⁴ is perhaps the best introduction for those few who would not prefer to have recourse to the original, to the form which was assumed by the latter speculations of its great author. Without proceeding to the extravagances which landed him in his celebrated theory of the "Vierge Mère," it is sufficiently significative of the enormous chasm that separates all that was written by Comte before and after his passion for Madame Clotilde de Vaux. It is impossible to call in question the great importance of those critical generalisations which have given him a European celebrity. The form in which he expressed them gave them an immediate and practical effect, though it may be doubted whether Goethe was not on the same track when he divided individual life into a realist infancy, an idealist adolescence, and a critical maturity. There is perhaps nothing so strange as the singular contrast between Comte's Early and Late Methods of Enquiry; and in this volume the systematic subordination of the intellect to the heart, is the first appearance of that subjection in his own person to a system of entirely subjective notions, from which he had formerly done so much to liberate others. In fact, Comte is a sort of intellectual Janus, with the face of a philosopher looking to the past, and that of a mystical enthusiast directed to the future. The entire basis of the *Politique Positive* rests upon the assumed necessity of a subordination of the intellect to the moral feelings, and upon an utter forgetfulness of the undoubted fact that the latter are the creation of the circumstances in which those who possess them are placed. There is a singular parallelism between the views of Comte and a thinker of our own country, now almost forgotten: any one acquainted with the history and works of Toland can hardly avoid being struck by it, and nothing but the backward state of science at the commencement of the last century, prevented Toland being as great a name as Comte is at present. Both singularly learned and portentously vain, they each tried to invent a new religion for their times, and the correspondence between the *Catéchisme Positiviste* and Toland's *Pantheisticon* is one of the most curious that can be imagined.

¹⁴ "A General View of Positivism." Translated from the French of Auguste Comte, by J. H. Bridges. London: Trübner and Co. 1865.

All who are acquainted with M. Michelet's later works, know beforehand what would be the character of a review by him of the various religions which have existed on the face of the earth. The same passionate earnestness, the same vague and poetical imagination, which, in spite of the adventurous opinions and half thoughts of *La Femme*, *L'Amour*, and *La Sorcière*, gave them an attractiveness so long as the reader was under the charm of his style, are to be found in the last of his works. But in this he has taken a more decided tone against any scientific treatment of the subject than he has ever done before. It is not true that because there are no dogmas in his new "Bible of Humanity"¹⁵ therefore nothing but the pure light of truth is reflected from its pages. A creative imagination is one of the worst and most uncritical guides to which any one can resign himself. The truths which are derived from this source are never greater than the individual imagination in which they have their origin, and can pretend to nothing more than a subjective validity. The method pursued by M. Michelet would overthrow all science. It reposes on the belief of a golden age in past time, the happy days of which can be recovered by a resolute determination to ignore all that mankind has suffered and learnt since their departure. The special occasion of M. Michelet's book is to be found in his recent acquaintance with the more ancient sacred writings of the Hindoos. The pastoral images of the Ramayana are clothed by his imagination with a moral force which they can scarcely be said to have exercised in the land of their origin. But it is not necessary to dispute with him about Indian traditions; he takes us also among the Greek poets and mythologists, and shows us, by the wild work he makes among Grecian fables, how much he is to be depended upon. Substantially, the whole volume is a dithyrambic *capriccio* on the progress of the moral consciousness of mankind, from which he would willingly eliminate all that appears to him distinctively Christian, and this because the ascetic principle, which so early associated itself with its progress, obscures his vision of the great resurrection of the human mind which Christianity proclaimed, and blinds him to the deep sanction which it gave to individual freedom. Poetical feeling and bright and lovely images abound, of course, in this last of M. Michelet's works, but its basis is unscientific and substantially adverse to that progress he has so much at heart. His ill-regulated fancy discourses sweet music indeed, but, like an Æolian harp, it is more as the winds will than as he determines.

When a question is approached on the one side with passionate excitement, and on the other with frivolous levity, it may be fairly assumed that it is worth investigation, and that we are as yet a long way from a satisfactory answer to it. That most of the books which have treated on the condition of women fall under one or other of the classes just indicated will hardly be denied by any one, and this state of a controversy which every day increases in gravity and importance

¹⁵ "Bible de l'Humanité." Par J. Michelet. Paris: F. Chamerot. London: D. Nutt. 1864.

will make a book like M. Legouvé's doubly welcome.¹⁶ Its moderation, judgment, and good sense will recommend it to all who wish to steer clear of the excesses with which the treatment of his subject is so frequently deformed. He is as far from advocating the absolute equality contended for by some writers, as he is from espousing those St. Simonian views which resulted in the *femme libre*. He chooses rather, by a review of historical changes which have taken place in the status of woman, to demonstrate by the great advance already made, the possibility of a still greater one yet to make. There are many points touched on in his book which have a more special reference to French law and sentiment than to the customs which have acquired the sanction of either among ourselves, but he is not the less instructive on that account. He holds, with every intelligent inquirer, that the first necessity for any improvement consists in finding some means which shall assure to women a material independence as a basis for the development of individual character, and as a guarantee for their freedom in acting in accordance with it. Until this first requisite is attained, it is impossible to hope for much progress. The edifice cannot be crowned until the walls are finished. It is useless to expect that women should exercise all that power which they could draw from their distinctive qualities, until they can do so from an independent footing. When they can look forward to those returns to a life of active exertion which seldom disappoint a man's industry and intelligence, they will for the first time exercise that power on the general sentiments of mankind which distinguished and happily-placed women have so often done on individuals. It would seem at first sight that all the best-ascertained laws of political economy were against them, that such a progress as this was incompatible with the ascertained laws of the distribution of labour and of its rewards. But the laws of political economy are but deductions from past and existing facts, dependent upon an original postulate that is by no means universal. Far greater obstacles than these have been already surmounted by woman since the early ages of mankind, when she was little better than a beast of burthen. It needs not to go back to early ages; have we not communities on the face of the earth which fully represent them? There can be but little doubt that as mankind devote themselves more and more to industrial occupations, the field for the employment of women will be enlarged, and with it their consequent education and independence. The progress in this direction is well displayed by M. Legouvé, with an insight that dispenses with all exaggeration, and renders his book one of the most satisfactory on a subject that is seldom treated without offence to one or other of the parties into which the question has unfortunately become divided.

M. Mounier opens his admirable little book on "Pompeii and the Pompeians"¹⁷ with a dialogue in a bookseller's shop at Naples. The

¹⁶ "Histoire Morale des Femmes." Par Ernest Legouvé, de l'Académie Française. Paris: Didier & Co. 1864. London: D. Nutt.

¹⁷ "Pompéi et les Pompéiens." Par Marc Mounier. Paris: Hachette & Co. London: D. Nutt. 1865.

customer finds Bulwer too romantic, Mazois too heavy, Dumas too light, Niccolini too dear, and D'Aloe too dry. The bookseller in despair enquires what then he would have, and is asked for a small book, that is exact and trustworthy, and at the same time accessible to all, to which he replies, that there neither is, nor is likely to be, such a volume. The author overhearing this discourse thinks otherwise, and his book is the best justification of his opinion. There is hardly any feature of Roman provincial life that M. Monnier does not bring before his readers by the aid of the relics in that strange museum made for us by Vesuvius on the 23rd of November, 79. The excavations which have not as yet uncovered one-third of the buried city are no longer carried on in the desultory manner that characterized the Bourbon rule, but are systematically pursued with every light that science and learning can contribute to a task of such interest and importance. Every day brings to light some fresh object which throws new light on the incidents of the catastrophe itself, or on the domestic and public life of the unfortunate inhabitants. The most dramatic scenes and the strangest family incidents are constantly revealing themselves to the intelligent explorers. To walk with M. Monnier through these deserted streets and roofless houses is to live with the Romans of the first century. Their very life has been, as it were, photographed for us by its sudden conclusion, and only requires that intelligent eye for its interpretation which M. Monnier lends to his readers. His book is as interesting as any novel, and as instructive as a large library of Roman antiquities. We cannot here find room for any of the curiously vivid pictures which he draws of the arrested life of the city, but must confine ourselves to the strongest recommendation of one of the most complete and accessible monographs on its interesting subject that can anywhere be met with.

Dr. Beke could hardly have taken a more effectual mode of popularising his views concerning the site of the Harran of the Scriptures than the one he has adopted, of first converting his wife, and then inducing her to publish an account of a journey made by them both in which they went over the ground he supposes to have been traversed by the patriarch on his flight from his lengthened servitude to Laban.¹⁸ The received theory, that the Harran in question was situated in Mesopotamia, is encumbered with many difficulties which are for the most part removed by assuming that the true Harran lies, not between the rivers Tigris and Euphrates, but between Abana and Pharpar, rivers of Damascus. The controversy will be settled rather by general considerations and cumulative evidence than by the discovery of a well at Harran, near Damascus, which could be assumed to be that at which Rebecca gave Eliezer to drink. Although the Doctor had his own views in taking his courageous wife on this adventurous journey, he has very wisely allowed the account of it to be entirely hers. Setting aside all controversial features, and looking on the volume only as a description of the country traversed, we have

¹⁸ "Jacob's Flight; or, a Pilgrimage to Harran." By Mrs. Beke. London: Longman and Co. 1865.

hardly met with anything so graphic and vividly natural since the appearance of that excellent little book on Syria, by Miss Rogers, whose brother, now consul at Damascus, was of great service to the travellers. Mrs. Beke seems to have taken a lively pleasure in astonishing the natives, and certainly her bold horsemanship and free use of firearms must have struck the Arab chiefs, who witnessed them, as something more than natural. Her sex also gained her admittance to the women's quarters, a sealed book to most Eastern travellers, and her amusing account of the women's bath at Damascus is not likely to be soon surpassed. There is a degree of freshness, activity, and self-reliance about Mrs. Beke, that is almost as rare among her countrywomen as the unaffected ease with which she tells her tale. The little side-blows she delivers at Bishop Colenso are rather amusing, falling so short of the mark for which they are intended. We do not know that the Bishop has ever disputed the historical truth of the existence of the patriarch, or threatened the basis of her pet controversy; and surely if Harran of Aram Naharaim is to supply the place of Harran in Mesopotamia, the arithmetical argument of the Bishop will be one of the most potent in elevating it to that honour.

If anyone should regret that Dr. Beke, after following Jacob's flight from Padanaram to Sichem, left a town so surrounded with Biblical associations without any but the slightest notice, he will find in Mr. Mills' account of a "Three Months' Residence at Nablus"¹⁹ the fullest discussion of all the interesting sites of which it is the centre, as well as very minute particulars of the Greek Christians, and of the remnant of the old Samaritan worship which is still preserved under the shelter of Mount Gerizim. The special attention he devoted to the peculiarities of the Samaritan Church, which consists of but forty families in a town of more than 9000 inhabitants, leaves but little to be gathered by any farther enquiry. This singular community, which still maintains its antagonism to orthodox Judaism, the evidences of which are frequent in the New Testament, seems so near extinction that their having found so competent an historian cannot but be considered a fortunate circumstance. Mr. Mills' intimate acquaintance with the Jewish ritual and modes of life gave him singular advantages for the task he set himself. His book may be confidently recommended to all who take an interest in the social condition of the modern Syrians, or who can appreciate the incidental light which his enquiries throw upon the text of the Old and New Testaments.

In a letter to Earl Russell on "Our Interests in China,"²⁰ Mr. Lay, late inspector-general of Chinese Customs, gives the history of the origin and failure of the expedition under Captain Osborne. His intimate knowledge of the language and affairs of the empire make this pamphlet highly interesting and instructive. It is not wonderful that Mr. Lay should feel greatly annoyed at the failure of a scheme that would, if it had been carried out as he proposed, have conduced so

¹⁹ "Three Months' Residence at Nablus, and an Account of the Modern Samaritans." By the Rev. J. Mills, F.R.G.S., &c. London: J. Murray. 1864.

²⁰ "Our Interests in China." A Letter to the Right Hon. Earl Russell, K.G. By H. N. Lay, C.B. London: R. Hardwicke.

greatly to his personal credit and influence; neither is it wonderful that our political agents at Peking were not as energetic in removing obstacles to its success as its sanguine author very naturally desired them to be. The want of cordial support on the part of our ambassador enabled the subordinates of the Chinese government to retreat from their engagements with Mr. Lay, and to extricate themselves from the pledge which had been given to him, that the force under Captain Osborne should be in direct communication with the Emperor himself, and subject to the orders of no subordinate governor. The full details given by Mr. Lay of the progress of negotiations with the Chinese commissioners are a perfect study of national character, and abound in warnings to all future diplomatists who may have to deal with them. Though Mr. Lay is naturally and excusably disappointed, his feelings will not be shared by many, for few are prepared for all the consequences that, sooner or later, must have followed from such an employment of European agency in the administration of the Chinese Empire. As a personal defence, Mr. Lay's letter is complete; if he erred at all, it was in forgetting Talleyrand's advice, "*Surtout point de zèle.*"

Mr. Cameron's account of Singapore, Penang, and Malacca,²¹ is a very opportune book. The prospect that these colonies are to be withdrawn from their dependence on Calcutta and administered by a separate governor, will make any fresh information concerning them peculiarly welcome. Their importance may be judged of from the simple facts, that since the foundation of Singapore by Sir Stamford Raffles, in 1819, it has acquired a population of 90,000, and a trade of 12 millions annually. There is, perhaps, nowhere so strange and mixed a population, the Europeans, in all, amounting to not more than 500. So great a progress is almost unexampled, and is to be attributed to its unrivalled commercial situation—half way between India and China. Mr. Cameron, who is intimately acquainted with all three settlements, gives the fullest particulars of the nature and amount of their trade, and of the various races which inhabit each, together with a summary history of their foundation and subsequent fortunes. The peculiarities of English and native life find in him a very accurate and attentive observer. In his political speculations, he is not without that colonial aspiration which we so often meet with, that the mother country should tax as little and protect as efficiently as the colonists desire. His book abounds in stories of tigers, which, by his account, are strangely abundant in the island on which Singapore is placed; of Chinese riots and Malay Amok runnings, which seem to be the only excitements that vary the uniform ease and prosperity of the colonists; while the trustworthiness of his statistical returns, on most of the topics on which they are to be had, gives it a solid and durable interest.

An excellent monograph of "New Guinea and its Inhabitants"²² has

²¹ "Our Tropical Possessions in Malayan India." By John Cameron, F.R.G.S. London: Smith, Elder, and Co. 1865.

²² "Neu Guinea und seine Bewohner." Von Otto Finsch. Bremen: E. Müller. 1865. London: D. Nutt.

been compiled by Herr Otto Finsch, Conservator of the Zoological Collections of the Museum Society at Bremen. There is so little known of this island, and that little is so dispersed among the accounts of Dutch, French, and English voyages, that a work like the present, which systematically arranges all that has been really ascertained concerning the geology, natural history, and ethnography of the island, cannot fail to be of the greatest utility as a basis for further investigations.

In 1859 the Prussian government, in the interest of their growing mercantile marine, if not rather in imitation of the voyage of the *Novara*, despatched ambassadors to China, Japan, and Siam, for the purpose of concluding commercial treaties with those countries, and of founding consular establishments in their ports. The first part of a very full report of the results of the expedition,²³ compiled from official sources, has just been published. It chiefly refers to Japan, and contains a continuous history of that country, gathered from its native literature, followed by the journals kept on board two of the ships in the small squadron which represented Prussia in Eastern waters. The second volume will contain the results of the labours of the naturalists and other scientific officers who accompanied the expedition, while the third is to consist of a series of views of the country, and of objects illustrative of the life of its inhabitants, prepared by Prussian artists during their stay. The present volume is a fine specimen of German typography. The remarks it contains on Japanese life and customs are very judicious, while its treatment of all the questions connected with the various shapes that European intercourse has assumed in the Japanese islands, is singularly impartial.

Captain Grant, in his "Walk across Africa,"²⁴ very judiciously abstains from reopening the geographical controversies which were aroused by the publication of his fellow-traveller. He contents himself with a loyal defence of his friend's character and truthfulness, and confidently hopes that time will do as much for his judgment. His own attention being, as he confesses, more directed to the habits of the people and productions of the country than to its geography, he has complied with the suggestion of his deceased friend by publishing the journal which he kept during their journey. It is very full and interesting, but somewhat prolix, as all books written upon such a system must be. It is far more attractive in tone than its predecessor, and will reward anyone who goes through it, in spite of the absence of general novelty which is inseparable from its late appearance. He gives an excellent route map, in which the imaginative mountain chains which adorned the volume of Captain Speke, "shine by their absence." The laboriousness and difficulty rather than danger of this remarkable exploration, are on the whole better brought home to the

²³ "Die Preussische Expedition nach Ost Asien nach ämtlichen Quellen." Berlin: Verlag der Königlichen geheimen Ober-Hofbuchdruckerei. 1864. London: D. Nutt.

²⁴ "A Walk across Africa." By J. A. Grant, Captain H.M. Bengal Army. London: W. Blackwood and Sons. 1864.

reader by Captain Grant than by his friend, while the completely involuntary picture which he gives of his own courageous endurance is as honourable to him as his defence and support of Captain Speke is attractive and engaging.

The Dean of Canterbury has collected into a little volume those "Letters from Abroad"²⁵ which first appeared in the pages of "Good Words." His cultivated taste and keen appreciation of picturesque scenery give a great charm to his description of the journey to and from Rome, but it will be a matter of regret to many, as well as of annoyance to some of his readers, that he ever entered the city itself. The amiable and kindly tone which pervades his comments on everything else most strangely disappears when anything connected with Romish ritual or ceremony has to be described. A scarlet cloak drives him wild. It was hardly necessary to display so much feeling at the discovery that the Italian populace are both superstitious and ignorant in their religious notions; it might have been expected that a moment's reflection would have recalled to his mind a populace he had left behind him that was as superstitious and ignorant without being so religious, and to our feeling the Dean forgets his usual good taste in the ironical title he gives to the Pope, of the "clergyman-king" (*Pontifice Re*), when there is so great a probability that he may himself one day become a "clergyman-baroa." There is an invidious and very unnecessary attempt, too, to fix on some of our recent "perverts" a share of the responsibility for the pious frauds which surely are not the exclusive property of the Romish Church. It is impossible to give this book the praise it deserves, as a description of North and Southern Italy, without protesting against its intolerant tone on all questions that in any way arouse the *odium theologicum* which sleeps so lightly in the breast of its author.

Although a second volume, Captain Chesney's book²⁶ is, within its limits, complete in itself. The greater part of it treats of the second Confederate invasion of the North, terminating in the battle of Gettysburg, and the subsequent retreat to the Rapidan; the remainder is devoted to campaigns in Georgia, Tennessee, and Western Virginia, including the battle of Chatanooga. Captain Chesney's narrative is totally free from military technicalities, and bears evidence of being written in a perfectly impartial spirit, uninfluenced by the author's political sympathies, which we should conceive are with the Confederates. The space he devotes to the battle of Gettysburg, and the pains with which he describes the disposition of the opposing forces, evince that he justly estimates the importance of that memorable battle. His criticisms on the commanding officers of each army are manifestly the result of a careful study of their various qualities, and are calculated to create a higher and juster appreciation of the abilities

²⁵ "Letters from Abroad." By H. Alford, D.D., Dean of Canterbury. London: A. Strahan. 1865.

²⁶ "Campaigns in Virginia and Maryland," &c., &c. By Captain C. C. Chesney, R.E., Professor of Military History, Staff College. Vol. II. (continuing the History to the end of the Third Year of the War.) With Maps. London: Smith, Elder, and Co. 1865.

of the American generals than Europeans are generally disposed to entertain. By all who are desirous of possessing a lucid and unaffected account of the strategy and general movements of the Federal and Confederate armies—illustrated by excellent maps—rendered interesting without the aid of poetical descriptions and apocryphal anecdotes, the present work will be found a most welcome addition to their library.

Mr. Frederick Milnes Edge's book²⁷ is a collection of entertaining letters, describing the organization of the army of the Potomac under General McClellan, its subsequent advance upon Richmond by the York River, and its ultimate defeat at the Chickahominy and retreat to the James River. As these letters were written to keep the public *au courant* with events as they occurred, and also with the speculations on the future, they of necessity contain much that has to a certain extent lost its interest. At the same time, they are valuable historical memoranda, and are very instructive in showing how those most capable of forming an opinion are mistaken in estimating the magnitude of both military and political prospective events in so great a revolution as that now in progress in North America. All who are anxious to be made acquainted with the mode in which a large army moves, and to become familiar with the men and manners of this great army of the Potomac, will find their time well spent in the perusal of this book. The aspect of the country is agreeably and apparently faithfully depicted. The marked change manifest in the condition of the agricultural districts, upon leaving the Free States and entering those suffering under the "peculiar institution," did not fail to attract the author's notice—their ruinous appearance evincing the baneful influence of slavery. The comments upon General McClellan lead one to question his military ability and even political good faith. To what extent such observations are justifiable we must leave the reader to determine, but we can assure him he will find this volume well worthy of his attention.

Captain Semmes' "Log of the *Alabama* and the *Sumter*"²⁸ gives a very full account of his adventures in these two vessels. His seven months' cruise in the *Sumter* is the more exciting of the two accounts. Her escape from New Orleans when pursued by the *Brooklyn*, and his description of the arrangements made by him when apprehensive of a boarding-attack by the *Iroquois*, in the West Indies, gives a very lively notion of the most exciting incidents of naval warfare short of an actual engagement. He estimates the damage done to the mercantile marine of the United States, during his cruise in the *Sumter*, at nearly a quarter of a million sterling. There is small risk or glory attaching to such exploits; but the constant necessity he was under of keeping the sea in all weathers called for an amount of courage and endurance

²⁷ "Major-General McClellan and the Campaigns in the York Town Peninsula." By Frederick Milnes Edge, late Special Correspondent of the *Morning Star*. With a Map of the Peninsula. London: Trübner and Co. 1865.

²⁸ "The Log of the *Alabama* and the *Sumter*." From the private journals and other papers of Commander R. Semmes, C.S.N., and other Officers. Abridged from the Library Edition. London: Saunders, Otley, and Co. 1864.

the praise of which cannot be fairly refused to him. The cruise of his second ship, the *Alabama*, at first known as "No. 290," is even less interesting than that of the *Sumter*; the sailing qualities of the *Alabama* were too well known to give any chance of escape, and her exploits are completely summarized by the familiar form of "stand and deliver." In her action with the *Hatteras*, her superior armament gave her a predominance that was not at first expected from the relative size of the vessels. The merits of the rifled Blakely gun she carried, and the Dahlgren, with which the *Kearsage* was armed, were fairly tried in the action which finally closed her career. The present volume is an abridgment, but would well bear further compression. Captain Semmes' moral and political reflections are not very striking or interesting. At Gibraltar he longed for the *Warrior*, which he saw there, and so much admired, that he says, with her he could have destroyed with impunity the whole fleet of his antagonists; but it is to be remembered that it is now two years since he entertained that opinion. There can be no doubt that Captain Semmes is a brave officer, but he least of all will think those his friends who try to make anything heroic out of his career.

SCIENCE.

IN his ninth "Scientific and Industrial Annual," M. Figuier¹ continues the gradual improvement to which we adverted in a former notice as characteristic of this work. The volume for 1864 contains a great amount of interesting matter, and the facts are related intelligently and clearly. Among the articles in the Annual for 1864, we may notice especially those on the physical investigation of the sun, on the moon and its volcanoes, and on aerolithes, in the section of astronomy; those on storms and on the absorption of heat by aqueous vapour in that of meteorology; and those on Transatlantic telegraphy, on anthropological questions, and on the proceedings of the French piscicultural and ostricultural establishments. Much valuable and interesting information will also be found in the sections on public hygiene, medicine, and agriculture. The second of these sections contains analyses of discussions at the Académie de Médecine on the theory of the movements of the heart, and on the origin of vaccination, which will well repay perusal. M. Figuier has added in this volume a bibliographical index of scientific works published in France in 1864.

Mr. T. S. Rowlandson has published a lecture² delivered by him at Patricroft, on the "History of the Steam-Hammer," in which he gives a clear description of the principles on which that most important and

¹ "L'Année Scientifique et Industrielle." Par Louis Figuier. Neuvième Année. 12mo. Paris: Hachette. 1865.

² "History of the Steam-Hammer." By T. S. Rowlandson. 8vo. Eccles: Shuttleworth. 1864.

powerful piece of machinery is constructed, and an account of the steps by which the invention has been brought to its present state of perfection. The lecture has also a polemical side; Mr. Rowlandson's object being partly to vindicate for Mr. Wilson a considerable share in the progress of what is commonly known as Nasmyth's Steam-Hammer. There seems to be no doubt that its present efficiency and the wondrous ease with which it is worked are due to Mr. Wilson, who, before becoming a partner, held a responsible position as manager or foreman in the firm of Nasmyth and Co.

In a small pamphlet on "Railways,"³ containing papers reprinted from the Journal of the Society of Arts, Mr. W. B. Adams directs attention to some defects in the construction of railways and of their rolling stock. The main defect in the latter consists in the fact that the wheels both of engines and carriages are immovably fixed to their axles, so that the carriages move essentially upon the ends of rollers which cannot in any way accommodate themselves to curves. Mr. Adams proposes several plans for the avoidance of the consequences of this defect and for the improvement of the permanent ways, the adoption of which would undoubtedly be beneficial.

Those who wish to understand the construction of what Mr. Adams denominates the rolling stock of a railway can hardly do better than consult Mr. Colburn's work on "Locomotive Engineering,"⁴ of which the first five parts have reached us. These are devoted entirely to the history of the development of the locomotive engine, from the first rude attempts and speculations of Cugnot in France (1771), and of Boulton, Watt, and Trevithick in this country, down to the production of those marvellous machines which in the present day whirl our express trains along at a rate of sixty miles an hour. The real gradual development of the locomotive engine is an achievement of which the main credit seems to be due to English engineers, but some of the steps have been made both on the Continent and in the United States of America; and in his historical sketch of the progress of the locomotive, Mr. Colburn does full justice to the efforts of foreigners, and describes and figures the forms of engines (some of them singular enough to English eyes) which have been or are still in vogue in other countries. Besides the woodcuts showing the general construction and appearance of the various engines, this work is illustrated with numerous large plates, showing all the details and measurements of the parts of which they are composed.

M. Louis Figuier has followed up his popular treatises on Geology and Physical Geography (noticed in previous numbers of this Review) with a volume on Botany.⁵ This subject hardly allows of being treated

³ "Railways: their Permanent Way and Rolling Stock." By W. Bridges Adams. 8vo. London: Trousce. 1864.

⁴ "Locomotive Engineering and the Mechanism of Railways: a Treatise on the Principles and Construction of the Locomotive Engine, Railway Carriages, and Railway Plant." By Zerah Colburn, C.E. 4to. Glasgow and London: W. Collins. 1864.

⁵ "Histoire des Plantes." Par Louis Figuier. 8vo. Paris and London: Hachette. 1865.

in the picturesque style which characterised the author's former efforts, especially as he aims at describing, not only those aspects of the vegetable kingdom which lie, as it were, on the surface, but also the structure, physiology, and classification of plants—departments of the science which, from the numerous details necessary to render them intelligible, cannot so easily be handled in a manner to render them generally attractive. To those, however, who wish to acquire an elementary knowledge of botany, M. Figuier's volume may be highly recommended as an elegant and trustworthy guide. His descriptions of the organization of plants are exceedingly clear, and his physiological statements are generally well up to the level of the present state of science. The section devoted to the natural families contains a great deal of interesting matter connected with the illustrative plants referred to, and closes with a good chapter on gigantic trees. The volume concludes with a chapter on the geography of plants. We must notice, also, that in this, as in the preceding volumes, the numerous woodcut illustrations are very accurately and beautifully executed.

Under the title of "A Year at the Shore,"⁶ Mr. Gosse has republished, in a handsome little volume, a series of papers on Marine Natural History contributed by him last year to "Good Words." The volume is divided into twelve sections, each devoted to a single month, and thus the seaside phenomena of the year are arrayed as in a sort of calendar. The subjects described are, of course, such as we have often before seen treated by Mr. Gosse's pen, and the chief novelty in the book consists in its mode of arrangement. The wonders of the shore are dealt with by Mr. Gosse here, as elsewhere, in a pleasant chatty manner, and the information given upon the structure and habits of marine animals appears to be generally correct, although we were rather surprised to find a practised zoologist like our author describing the proboscis of the whelk as being protruded through the siphonal canal. The volume is illustrated with twelve coloured engravings.

In the tenth part of his "Observations on the genus *Unio*," Dr. Isaac Lea⁷ describes some new exotic species of the family *Unionidae*, and then, departing a little from his ordinary occupation of species-making, gives an account of the anatomy and of some of the embryonic forms of numerous species of this family inhabiting the United States. Of the exotic species, by far the greater part are from South America, two or three from the East Indies. The anatomical descriptions relate to 143 so-called species of North American *Unionidae*.

Of anthropological works, which are now taking so prominent a place in our scientific literature, we have several to notice. From the Anthropological Society of London three translations have reached us, of which the first place must be given to the most recently published volume, the "Life and Works of Blumenbach," translated and edited

⁶ "A Year at the Shore." By Philip Henry Gosse, F.R.S. 12mo. London: Strahan. 1865.

⁷ "Observations on the genus *Unio*, together with descriptions of their species, their soft parts and embryonic forms in the family *Unionidae*." By Isaac Lea, LL.D. With ten Plates. Vol. X. 4to. Philadelphia.

by Mr. Bendyshe.⁸ In publishing translations of the original Memoirs of Blumenbach, which, although they may be regarded as the very earliest efforts at a scientific treatment of anthropology, have not yet been superseded, and will probably long retain an intrinsic value independent of their mere historical interest, it seems to us that the council of the Anthropological Society has done good service for the advancement of their favourite science, for the reader will find several matters treated of in them with a grasp of mind which is rarely equalled. The chief portion of this volume is occupied by translations of the first and third editions of Blumenbach's Latin essay, "De generis humani varietate nativa," read by him as his inaugural thesis in 1775. To these are added some of his "Contributions to Natural History," including his treatise on that remarkable personage Peter the so-called "Wild Boy," whose discovery excited so much enthusiasm among a certain section of the philosophers of the early part of the last century. Mr. Bendyshe has prefixed to the essay translations of the Memoirs of Blumenbach by Marx and Flourens, and has added R. Wagner's description of the contents of his anthropological museum. The inaugural dissertation on the varieties of man and their causes, by a Dr. John Hunter, of whom very little seems to be known, appears to us to be somewhat undervalued by the editor when he says that "the principal interest attaching to this treatise arises from the fact that it appeared in the same year, and a month or two before the more famous work of Blumenbach on the same subject;" for although it contains much crude speculation, the author had evidently thought deeply on the subject, and we fancy that many of our modern anthropologists may find useful hints in his pages. Mr. Bendyshe's translation is on the whole creditably distinguished from those produced by his co-labourers in this field,—we meet in it with few of those glaring errors which have unfortunately disfigured most of the volumes published by this society. We have, nevertheless, noticed a few minor blunders, evidently arising from imperfect knowledge of the subject; as for example on page 79, where we find "ventricle" used instead of "stomach" in a rather absurd way; and on page 91, where we are startled by the mention of an animal named the "*Didactylus ignavus*," which it takes some little consideration to identify with our old acquaintance the Two-toed Sloth!

Of Professor Vogt's "Lectures on Man" we some time since noticed the appearance of the first part in the German edition—the complete work has now been translated by Mr. Hunt,⁹ and published by the Anthropological Society. The total number of lectures contained in this volume is sixteen; of these, the first five are devoted to the consideration of the general structure of the human body, and especially of

⁸ "The Anthropological Treatises of J. F. Blumenbach, with Memoirs of him by Marx and Flourens, and the Inaugural Dissertation of John Hunter, M.D., on the varieties of Man." Translated and edited by Thomas Bendyshe, M.A., V.P. A.S.L. 8vo. London: Longmans. 1865.

⁹ "Lectures on Man: his place in Creation and in the history of the Earth." By Dr. Carl Vogt. Edited by James Hunt, Ph.D., F.S.A., &c. 8vo. London: Longman and Co. 1864.

those parts of it which may furnish characters for the comparison of man with the lower animals, and of the different races of men among themselves. These lectures, as stated in our former notice, contain many valuable observations, especially in the department of craniometry. Having thus, as it were, indicated the general nature of the data to be applied in these investigations, the author proceeds to a comparison of the organization of man with that of the apes, which leads him to the recognition of a very close relationship between these two mammalian forms. In subsequent lectures, by a comparison of the organization of the white man and the negro, and that of certain admitted species of monkeys, and the comparative estimation of the value of the differences in each case (a process very similar to that adopted by Professor Huxley in his work on "Man's Place in Nature"), he arrives at the conclusion that these two forms of man are specifically distinct; and further, from the consideration of the whole question and the comparison of the physical and mental qualities of man and animals, he disposes of the claim set up by some writers for the former to be regarded as constituting either a distinct subclass of mammalia, or a distinct *kingdom* of nature. From these considerations as to the zoological position of man, Professor Vogt proceeds to discuss the primæval history of the human genus, as illustrated especially by the numerous discoveries which have been lately made of remains of man and of the works of his hands, often associated with the remains of extinct forms of animals, in bone caves and lake dwellings, in the drift and in other localities. All the questions relating to the antiquity of man upon the earth are discussed here in considerable detail and with much ingenuity, and many particulars are referred to which are not mentioned in Sir Charles Lyell's volume on this subject. The last three lectures are devoted to the investigation of the question of the origin of man. In these Professor Vogt maintains not only the specific diversity of several human races, but also that this diversity is aboriginal—that each race originated at a specific centre, and that no migration from a common centre of creation ever took place. As he accepts the Darwinian hypothesis, or at all events is a strong advocate for a theory of evolution, he assumes that the quadrumanous branch of the great tree of nature has given off several smaller branches, which, after diverging for a time to form "the fundamentally distinct families of the Gibbons, Macaci, and Baboons," again converge by developing "the three anthropoid apes, which by a number of common characters stand considerably nearer each other than the groups of which they are the heads." Hence he considers it probable that the Simioid ancestors of different races of mankind have sprung originally as twigs from each of these main branches; or rather perhaps that the human forms constitute the summits of the main branches, whilst the three anthropoid apes form the highest existing lateral shoots of these branches. Our space will not allow us to refer to the arguments by which Professor Vogt seeks to establish this curious theory, which, we suspect, will hardly find many adherents. Nevertheless, whatever opinion may be entertained as to the tenability of this final result of our author's argument, there is no

doubt that his work abounds in valuable observations and in brilliant discussions, and that, even in its English dress, it may be read with both pleasure and profit. The translation, however, is very far from doing justice to the original. In his preface Mr. Hunt states, in a passage which is itself a curious specimen of English composition, that "the German text has been followed as closely as possible; but there were some forms of expression so utterly intractable when attempted to be rendered into English, that when intelligible, they have been sometimes adopted in preference to the removal of all traces of foreign idiom and colouring." From this one would at least expect to find a painstaking and nearly literal translation; but in place of this, not only is all the brilliancy of Professor Vogt's style completely washed out by the process of transfusion, but even his sense is frequently more or less garbled and imperfectly rendered. And, as far as we can see, the German original might be translated almost literally with but little difficulty. Professor Vogt's opinions on theological subjects are pretty well known, and it is to be regretted that in this work he has seized upon every opportunity that presented itself (and these, it is unnecessary to say, are by no means few) to trample unmercifully upon the dearest prejudices of the orthodox. It is not, we believe, by these means that the conscientious opposition to certain scientific statements of those who hold orthodox views in theology is to be overcome, and Mr. Hunt has done right in discarding many of Vogt's remarks from his translation, but having so done, we greatly doubt whether he has shown equal judgment in printing translations of some of the worst passages in an appendix.

The defects of translation to which we have alluded are, perhaps, most glaringly exhibited in the version of Professor Broca's treatise on "Human Hybridity," noticed in a former number, and in that of Pouchet's "Plurality of the Human Race,"¹⁰ by Mr. Beavan, which forms the third of the Anthropological Society's volumes now before us. In both these works we meet with passages so erroneous as to leave us in doubt whether the editor's knowledge of French or of English is most imperfect,—passages which are not only incorrect renderings of the author's meaning, but actually without meaning in themselves. If the authorities of the Anthropological Society really wish to advance the science which it was established to foster, they ought to take care that the gentlemen to whom the task of preparing the translations, published at the expense or for the benefit of the members, is entrusted, are properly qualified for the work. M. Pouchet, like many of our best authorities, comes to the conclusion that "from animals to man there is nothing but a chain of uninterrupted gradation;" that "there is no human kingdom," as maintained by Geoffroy St. Hilaire and Quatrefages; and that "one and the same method is applicable both to mankind and to animals." Like Professor Huxley, he denies to man the right even to ordinal distinction

¹⁰ *The Plurality of the Human Race.* By Georges Pouchet. Translated and edited by H. J. C. Beavan, F.R.G.S., F.A.S.L. Svo. London: Longman and Co. 1864.

from the rest of the mammalia,—the *genus humanum*, according to him, only constitutes the highest family of the quadrumana. Having arrived at this point, our author proceeds to consider the variations presented by the different races of man, and the causes by which they may have been produced, and comes at last to the conclusion that “either we must admit different species in the *genus Homo* or we must entirely reform zoological classification;” and gives his verdict strongly in favour of the former alternative. In his views on the origin of these species M. Pouchet advocates a doctrine of evolution, differing in some respects from those held by Lamarck and Darwin, although approaching, more closely perhaps than he himself supposes, to the fundamental theory of the great French naturalist.

An important original contribution to anthropological literature is furnished by Mr. Tylor’s “Researches into the Early History of Mankind,”¹¹ in which the author endeavours to point out the course that must be taken in ethnographical researches, founded upon a comparison of the customs of different races of men, with a view to the determination of their degree of relationship; and at the same time to indicate the general principles on which the study of the early advances of mankind on the road of civilization should be carried on. It would be impossible, except in a long article, to give any idea of the interesting series of facts brought together in an eminently suggestive manner in this valuable book. The subjects treated of are—language, the growth and decline of culture, the stone-age, the customs of mankind in connexion with obtaining fire and cooking, traditions and myths, and some remarkable customs prevalent in various parts of the world. The observations on language, on the mental operations by which language has been evoked, and on the connexion in the human mind between images and names, and the influence of this connexion upon thought, are particularly valuable, as are also the chapters on historical traditions and myths of observation.

Mr. Woolnoth’s volume on “The Study of the Human Face”¹² consists of a series of twenty-six engravings of faces representing the same number of phases of individual character. Most of these portraits are devoted to the illustration of the facial manifestations of the bad qualities of our nature—those passions which generally impress the strongest marks on the human countenance; many of them are very characteristic. In a rather feeble preface the author attempts to vindicate the scientific character of physiognomy; and each of the plates is accompanied by a few pages of description.

What Mr. Woolnoth has attempted for the face has been undertaken by Mr. Beamish for the human hand. His “Psychonomy of the Hand,”¹³ founded avowedly upon the writings of two French authors, MM. d’Arpentigny and Desbarrolles, contains descriptions of

¹¹ “Researches into the Early History of Mankind, and the development of Civilization.” By Edward Burnet Tylor. 8vo. London: Murray. 1865.

¹² “The Study of the Human Face.” By Thomas Woolnoth, Historical Engraver to the Queen. 8vo. Tweedie: London. 1865.

¹³ “The Psychonomy of the Hand; or, the Hand an Index of Mental Development.” By Richard Beamish, F.R.S., &c. 4to. London: Pitman. 1865.

the various forms presented by the hand of man and of the lines traced upon the palm, which Mr. Beamish, following his French guides, believes to furnish indications of mental development. That the structure of the hand is correlated more or less to the intellectual constitution of its owner, is a fact which will hardly be disputed, and perhaps our author is right in distinguishing the practical from the imaginative character by the greater knottiness of the knuckles in the former; but we suspect that it will be difficult to demonstrate satisfactorily all the refinements which he would introduce into the study of character from the hands; certainly we can put very little faith in the chiro-mantic branch of chirography, with its lines of the head, heart, and of life, and its mounds of Jupiter, Mercury, and Venus. Mr. Beamish's volume is illustrated with a series of tracings of hands, some of which are of some interest, as belonging to men and women of note.

In a small work exhibiting evidences of considerable research, M. Eugène Flotard¹⁴ has endeavoured to demonstrate that, just as the common ancestors of the Iranian and Brahminic stocks possessed a peculiar language differing both from the Zend and the Sanscrit, so also they had a primitive religion which has served more or less as the foundation of that of both the great branches of the Aryan race. This form of religion he believes to have been originally a pure monotheism, associated probably with the worship of fire as a symbol of the Deity. The Supreme Deity appears to have received no name, but to have been indicated by epithets expressive of his attributes; and, in course of time, by an easily intelligible process, these epithets became the names of distinct but subordinate divinities in the spiritualistic religion of the Iranian branch. The author indicates the probable cause of the separation of the primitive race into its two main branches, and the course by which the naturalistic worship of the Brahminic branch was gradually superadded to the purer original form of religion, until the latter was almost lost in the mass of gross materials with which it was overlaid; and he supports these views by numerous extracts from the Vedas and the Zendavesta, and a comparative study of the myths contained in them. The results at which he has thus arrived lead our author to a conclusion directly opposite to that of Creuzer and others, who regard the religions of antiquity as founded upon a simple worship of material nature,—he maintains, on the contrary, that in the origin of all religions a certain spiritualism—an intellectual and moral element—played an important part.

Mr. Haliburton has added to his "Materials for a History of Man,"¹⁵ a paper on astronomical features in the Mosaic cosmogony. He indicates the prevalence in the Mosaic chronology of periods of 72 years, corresponding with the period in which the sidereal year gains one day upon the common year, which again multiplied by

¹⁴ "La Religion primitive des Indo-Européens." Par Eugène Flotard. 8vo. Paris: Cherbuliez. 1864.

¹⁵ "New Materials for the History of Man, derived from a comparison of the Calendars and Festivals of Nations." By R. G. Haliburton, F.S.A. No. 2: Astronomical Features in the Mosaic Cosmogony. 8vo. Halifax, Nova Scotia. 1864.

360, gives a period of 25,920 years as the great year of the Pleiades. Mr. Haliburton points out the traces of the recognition of such periods as these among various nations of antiquity besides the Hebrews, and maintains that it is impossible to think that their knowledge could have been attained except as "the result of Divine inspiration." The argument from this is of course in favour of the Divine authorship of the Bible and of the unity of the human race.

With the exception of the fourth and concluding volume of Holmes' "System of Surgery," our list of medical works contains but little calling for special notice. A pamphlet by Dr. E. Smith,¹⁶ "On the present state of the Dietary Question," contains a fair resumé of the most important facts involved in this much-vevexed question. The author gives some interesting details of the diet of the poorer classes in different parts of the United Kingdom and Ireland.

In a little work entitled "For and Against Tobacco,"¹⁷ Dr. Richardson, in an impartial manner, reviews the arguments and assertions which have from time to time been put forth on the tobacco question. Whilst the weight of the author's opinion is against the use of tobacco, he nevertheless shows that its evils have been greatly exaggerated, and that it never gives rise to serious disease or injury to health, unless indulged in to excess in early life. He believes it, of all *luxuries*, to be one of the least hurtful. We commend Dr. Richardson's pamphlet to all who take an interest in the controversy on either side.

Dr. Barclay's "Medical Errors"¹⁸ is a thoughtful and well-written book on a subject not only interesting, but of the highest importance to those who are engaged in investigating the causes of disease and the value of therapeutic agents. The author points out the majority of the fallacies which arise from a too exclusive reliance on the numerical method, and the not unfrequent error of confounding averages with laws of causation. The difficulties of attaining anything approaching to certainty when the subject is so complex as disease can scarcely be overstated, and therefore there is the greater need for a strictly sound method of investigation, if we wish our researches to be utilized, and the labour of years not to be, as it too frequently is, useless, from some fundamental error in the method of inquiry. Dr. Barclay's work cannot fail to impress the reader with the need there is for this care in all scientific inquiry, but especially in medical matters, where the causes of error are so abundant.

Mr. Clark's work¹⁹ is a useful contribution to the literature of sani-

¹⁶ Address to the Subsection of Physiology at the Opening of the Thirty-fourth Meeting of the British Association in Bath, September 15, 1864. By E. Smith, M.D., F.R.S. "On the present state of the Dietary Question." pp. 16.

¹⁷ "For and against Tobacco; or, Tobacco in its relations to the Health of Individuals and Communities." By B. W. Richardson, M.D. London: Churchill and Sons. 1865. pp. 75.

¹⁸ "Medical Errors: Fallacies connected with the application of the inductive Method of Reasoning to the Science of Medicine." By A. W. Barclay, M.D. London: Churchill and Sons. 1864. pp. 123.

¹⁹ "Practical Observations on the Hygiene of the Army in India, including Remarks on the Ventilation and Conservancy of Indian Prisons, with a chapter on Prison Management." By S. Clark, M.R.C.S., Inspector-General of Prisons North-west provinces India. London: Smith, Elder, and Co. 1864. pp. 162.

tary science, especially in its relation to our army in tropical countries. The subjects of water, its supply and impurities, ventilation of military hospitals, tents, &c., are fully discussed. The work is illustrated by drawings and diagrams, setting forth the views of the author.

There is but little need of commendation for a work²⁰ that has reached the eleventh edition; suffice it to say that the present edition of Dr. Southwood Smith's work is fully in accordance with the knowledge of the day. The volume is profusely illustrated, and certainly one of the best popular works we have on the subject.

A second volume of "Saxon Leechdoms,"²¹ published by the authority of the Master of the Rolls, gives us an interesting picture of the manners and customs of our ancestors before the Conquest in all that relates to their knowledge of the healing art. We cannot commend it to our readers better than in the words of the learned editor:—

"No historical records are complete without the usual chapter on Manners and Customs; and the true scholar never feels himself well in possession of the requisite knowledge of the past age, till he has so learnt its time-honoured tale, as to apprehend in a human and practical sense those feelings which made its superstitions plausible, its heathenism social, its public institutions tend, in the end, to the general welfare." "The work now published for the first time, and from a unique manuscript, will, if duly studied, afford a large store of information, and show us that the inhabitants of this land in Saxon times were able to extract a very fair share of comfortable food, and healing medicines, and savoury drinks, directly or indirectly from it."

We must congratulate Mr. Holmes²² on the completion of his labours. To be the successful editor of a "System of Surgery" thoroughly up to the knowledge of the day is no easy task. The difficulty in the first instance of selecting suitable authors, and secondly of harmonising their work, can only be surmounted by one who possesses the rare combination of high scientific attainments with unwearied patience and industry. If to have been the means of giving to the profession a work not only creditable to the editor and his *confères*, but also to the English School of Surgery, be a reward for the labour and anxiety involved, Mr. Holmes must feel that reward to be his.

The limited space at our disposal forbids more than a reference to the principal topics treated of in this volume. We are glad to find

²⁰ "The Philosophy of Health, or an Exposition of the Physiological and Sanitary Conditions conducive to Human Longevity and Happiness." By Southwood Smith, M.D. Eleventh edition, revised and enlarged. London: Longman and Co. 1865. pp. 396.

²¹ "Leechdoms, Wortcunning, and Star-craft of Early England, being a Collection of Documents for the most part never before printed, illustrating the History of Science in this Country before the Norman Conquest." Collected and edited by the Rev. Oswald Cockayne, M.A. Vol. II. Published by the authority of the Lords Commissioners of her Majesty's Treasury, under the direction of the Master of the Rolls. London: Longman and Co. 1865. pp. 415.

²² "A System of Surgery, Theoretical and Practical, in Treatises by various Authors." Edited by J. Holmes, M.A. Four Vols. Vol. IV. containing Diseases of the Organs of Digestion, of the Genito-Urinary system, of the Breast, Thyroid Gland and Skin, with an Appendix of miscellaneous Subjects. London: Longman and Co. 1864. pp. 1079.

several articles on subjects not usually noticed, at least at any length, in systems of medicine or surgery, but which, nevertheless, are of great interest and importance to the profession; of these we may mention a useful essay by Mr. Salter on the Surgical Diseases connected with the Teeth, and an excellent article by Mr. Busk on Parasites, Venomous Insects, Snakes, &c.; and lastly, the subject of Hospitals, in an admirable paper, by Sir J. R. Martin, is treated with singular clearness and ability; in everything relating to the construction, management, and general economy of hospitals, civil and military, the reader will find ample information, not forgetting the all-important questions of nursing, cooking, diet, &c.; it is needless to add that the author makes frequent reference to the labours of Miss Nightingale. Of the general contents of the volume, suffice it to say that it contains articles on the surgical diseases of the alimentary and urinary organs, diseases of the skin, surgical diseases of women and of childhood, surgical diagnosis, &c. &c.; each and all of which are written with care and attention, and fully sustain the reputation of their respective authors.

HISTORY AND BIOGRAPHY.

AN historical study by M. Amédée Thierry is always welcome. His diligence in research, his exhaustive yet not tedious presentation of the results of inquiry, and his clear transparent language, give value and interest to his pictures of the past. In the instance before us he has selected for special investigation an important period of Roman history, and has, in his triple sketch of the ministers of the sons of Honorius, done much to reanimate the character and circumstance of the fourth and fifth centuries.¹ The three figures which he has more particularly undertaken to portray—Rufinus, Eutropius, and Stilicho—are, however, very far from being the only forms that attract attention. We have, besides, sketches of three emperors—Arcadius, Honorius, and Theodosius,—of Serena,—the niece of Theodosius, the wife of Stilicho, the muse of Claudian. We have, further, a picture of the great Churchman, John Chrysostom, summoning his army of monks from the desert to make war on the gods of Paganism, to traverse the plains of Palestine, and, mace and crowbar in hand, to destroy the statues and altars. We have, above all, the giant form of Alaric; and, as a fitting close to an historical drama, we have the sack of Rome and the death of Alaric. The period in itself was a great period. It was distinguished by the final retreat of Paganism

¹ "Nouveaux Récits de l'Histoire Romaine, aux IV^e et V^e Siècles. Trois Ministres des Fils de Theodose, Rufin, Eutrope, Stilicon." Par M. Amédée Thierry, Sénateur et Membre de l'Institut. London: Williams and Norgate. 1865.

before Christianity ; it was distinguished by the growing invasion of barbarian energy on the old Roman civilization ; it was the age of the proscription of Polytheism, of the prohibition of sacrifice, of the anti-gladitorial legislation ; the age when the poet Prudentius attempted to sing down the butchery which was the chief entertainment of "the Roman holiday," and the monk Telemachus devoted his life to stay "the human sacrifices of the amphitheatre." There was a conspicuous political phenomenon, too, in that age, in the Roman world. The empire, on the death of Theodosius, was divided between his two sons—Honorius had the west, Arcadius the east. The division, which had been long preparing, thus became complete and permanent. Theodosius died in A.D. 395, a few months after his victory over Eugenius. Rufinus, the first of Thierry's "three ministers," did not long survive him. Rufinus was born at Elusa or Elusium, now Eause, in Gascony. Intelligent, obstinate, subtle, and unscrupulous, he raised himself from the lowest to the highest position in the empire. From Aquitaine he proceeded to Milan, where, for a time at least, he was called friend by Ambrose ; thence he went to Rome, and then to Constantinople. It was Rufinus who counselled Theodosius to perpetrate the vindictive massacre of Thessalonica : a crime which was followed by an atonement no less notorious—the public penance of the emperor, exacted by the great and good Ambrose. After the death of Theodosius, Rufinus continued to influence Arcadius ; but he was now opposed by Eutropius and Stilicho. He succeeded, however, in inducing his imperial master to give a tacit consent to his proposal of sharing the sovereign power with himself. Stilicho, who had won over Gainas, the Gothic ally of Arcadius, determined to disconcert this arrangement ; and when Arcadius and Rufinus arrived at the camp of the Goth, and the ceremony of nomination, as the latter supposed, was on the point of taking place, one of Gainas' men plunged his weapon in the breast of Rufinus. This took place in the Hebdomon, the Campus Martius of New Rome, of Constantinople. The head of Rufinus was struck off, placed on a lance with a stone in the mouth, and so paraded through the city ; his goods were confiscated ; his wife and sister exiled, or permitted to retire to Jerusalem. The death of the oppressor was a subject of congratulation throughout the empire : Ambrose, Symmachus, Claudian the panegyrist of Stilicho, all regarded it with more or less favour. The ruin of Rufinus was the ladder on which Eutropius mounted to power. Eutropius was born in a district near the Euphrates. His parents were slaves : himself a eunuch. Sold and re-sold, he passed, after various trials, into the service of the palace. His sagacity and apparent piety at length recommended him to Theodosius. He disarmed and defeated the matrimonial project of Rufinus, who had selected his own daughter for the emperor's bride ; arranging a marriage between Arcadius and Eudoxia, the beautiful daughter of the Frank, Bauto, then a general in the Roman army. The rebellion of the Gothic chief, Tribigild, at length precipitated the fall of Eutropius. Tribigild refused to enter into any negotiations with the emperor till Eutropius was put to death. The emperor gave up his minister : he was first banished to Cyprus, and afterwards beheaded.

Gainas, who demanded in vain religious liberty for his countrymen the Goths, who were Arians, and who, in revenge for the refusal counselled by Chrysostom, attempted to set fire to the Imperial palace, fled to the banks of the Danube before the storm which he provoked, and was killed by Uldin, the king of the Huns, who, to court imperial favour, sent his head to Constantinople. Of the four principal aspirants to the purple, of the four principal actors in the bloody drama of the Hebdomon, the only one now remaining was Stilicho. Stilicho continued to govern the West till A.D. 407 with great energy and brilliance. His ambition at length procured his downfall. On the death of his eldest daughter, Maria, whom Honorius had married, Thermantia, the second daughter, attracted the emperor, and, though Stilicho opposed the alliance, became his wife. The policy of the minister and that of the emperor was not now in accordance. The crafty Olympius acquired a place in the counsels of Honorius. When the emperor addressed the troops at Ravenna, a tumult arose. Olympius induced Honorius to sign the order for Stilicho's death, as the only remedy for the revolt. Stilicho hesitated, changed his tactics, alienated his supporters. Leaving Bologna and arriving at Ravenna, he took sanctuary. A promise that his life should be spared, induced him to quit the basilica to which he had fled. The assurance of security was treacherously withdrawn, and he had scarcely left his retreat when he was proclaimed a public enemy, and sentenced to death. The name of the officer who struck off his head was Heraclian: the service thus rendered gained him the government of Africa. His family fell with Stilicho. Serena, his wife, found a hiding-place in Rome; Thermantia, driven from the palace, speedily followed her mother; Eucherius, his son, also found a refuge in the eternal city. Stilicho, who has been called the last of the Romans, and whose pride it was to regard himself as a Roman, was, by race, a Vandal. M. Thierry says of him, that to be a Roman was his great ambition. To Rome he restored peace, military glory, poetic splendour in Claudian. Twice he saved her—once on the battle-field of Pollentia, and again beneath the walls of Verona. But though Stilicho was thus devoted to Rome, she never flattered, she always repelled him. The barbarians, on the other hand, whom he renounced, beheld in him a brother; sought to save, loved, and lamented him. His policy is described by M. Thierry as a policy of conciliation. It was calculated to effect, without convulsion, the sole possible transition of Roman society to the new form of civilization, the exclusion of fresh national constituents. After Stilicho, no barbarian cared to be Roman in affection, or Roman in policy. His murder at once roused a feeling of indignation which flamed out into revenge. "In one single day, thirty thousand warriors who had honoured and defended the Roman flag, destroyed it and went to rejoin Alaric in the defiles of Illyria. Three months after, Alaric was at the gates of Rome." But we must leave M. Thierry to tell the story of the sack of Rome, and offer his protest against "the regulation" account of the siege, transmitted by the orthodox annalists. His book is one which will be read with admiring pleasure.

A rapidly-executed sketch of the same period will be found in M. Zeller's² agreeable summary of the characteristic phenomena of ancient and mediæval history. The author, in a series of lectures drawn up at the desire of the Princess Mathilde and addressed to a select audience, has traced the leading political and religious revolutions in the East, in Greece, Rome, and modern Europe, the barbarian invasion, the Christian Church, the society, manners and laws which distinguished the centuries which followed the fall of Rome, and the pontificate of the unlearned but brave, good, and dauntless Gregory, who saved Rome and founded Christian unity. The little volume seems to be carefully compiled. That St. John was banished to the isle of Patmos by Domitian is, however, a statement that should not be reproduced. M. Zeller's epigrammatic description of the deified daughter of Nero, as "an immortal goddess, who only lived four months," is very happy.

The same period of mediæval history is traversed, though with a more definite object, and with a slower step and more exploring eye, by Herr Pfahler, in his "Manual of German Antiquities," a portion of which only is now before us.³ The author has endeavoured to bring together whatever knowledge has been gained, or seems to have been gained, of the origin of the German people and its multifarious parent-stocks. He begins of course with the grey fore-time—primeval seats and ancient names. Our old friends the West Germans, Scandinavian Germans, Goths, Vandals, and Longobards are the subject of inquiry in one chapter. We see that Pfahler derives the national appellation of the last-mentioned people from the long beards which they are said to have worn. Is it not more likely that it was borrowed from their settlements on the Elbe, Langau and Bardengau? The first division of his work ends with a disquisition on the South, South-east, and West of Europe, and some account of the kingdom of the Franks. A few pages of the second division, on national jurisprudence, terminates the volume before us abruptly. The third division, on domestic and civic life, and a fourth, on the mythology, language, and commerce of the old German nation, will in due time complete the work.

We may indicate⁴ in this place, for the advantage of those who may require documentary evidence on the subject, the existence of a compilation of public papers relating to historical transactions to which the Electoral Prince Frederick-William of Brandenburg was a party. These papers have been procured from different sources, the majority from the Record Office at Berlin, some from the Archives at Königsberg, and some from the collection entitled "Manuscripta Borussia," in the Royal Library of the Prussian capital. They range over a period of about ten years only, namely, from 1640 to 1650; and con-

² "Entretiens sur l'Histoire, Antiquité, et Moyen Age." Par M. Jules Zeller. Paris: Didier et Cie. 1865.

³ "Handbuch Deutscher Alterthümer." Von G. Pfahler. Erste Lieferung. London: David Nutt. 1864.

⁴ "Urkunden und Actenstücke zur Geschichte des Kurfürsten Friedrich Wilhelm von Brandenburg." Auf veranlassung seiner Königlichen Hoheit des Kronprinzen von Preussen. Erster Band. London: David Nutt. 1864.

cern Prussia and Poland, the Marches, Sweden, France, Regensburg, and Vienna. The editor, Dr. Erdmannsdorfer, explains the occasion and object of the work, a part of which only seems to be published, in a dedication to the Crown Prince of Prussia, and in a general preface.

A far more attractive collection of documents⁵ has been recently published, under the direction of the Master of the Rolls and the editorial conduct of Mr. Rawdon Brown, who has admirable workmanlike qualities. From the capacious storehouses of State papers in Venice and Northern Italy, the accomplished and discriminating editor has drawn very interesting materials for filling in some of our pictures of English history, or correcting the misrepresentations that are discernible in them. In a masterly report of the character of the Venetian archives, he informs us that the continuous series of the State papers of the old republic begins at the early part of the thirteenth and at the close of the eighteenth century. The two earliest documents preserved are a transcript of the proceedings of the Council of Chalcedon, A.D. 481, and a diploma dated A.D. 883, by which the Emperor Charles le Gros limited the jurisdiction, &c. Further on he tells us that the registers of the Senate exhibit a variety of entries connected with England, in the reigns of Henry IV., Henry V., Henry VI., and Edward IV. Among "the unregistered treaties" are found forty letters of English sovereigns written on parchment, and authenticated by the original royal signatures. From Mr. Rawdon Brown's researches we are first enabled to complete or correct our notions of certain transactions in history. Thus we learn how that Henry Bolingbroke—afterwards usurping Lancaster—was employed in pilgrimages and active warfare against the Moslem during the period in which he disappears from the horizon of history; we learn, on the authority of Andrea Lipomano, that as far back as August 1514, the repudiation of Queen Catherine was said to be in contemplation; we learn, too, from the evidence of Quirini, that the splendid captivity in which a historian has declared that the Archduke Philip and Queen Joanna were detained when driven by a storm into English ports, was a purely fictitious captivity, and that the delay was in reality the consequence of the necessary refitting, the unfavourable weather, and perhaps Joanna's own caprice; we learn also, on good authority, that the two elder brothers of Hyde (Clarendon), killed by biographers in their youth, lived to enter into we would hope the *profitable* career of currant-merchants; we hear for the first time that Sir Walter Raleigh was unscrupulous enough to hazard a piratical proposal to seize and plunder Genoa; we can convict Weston Lord Portland, the Treasurer of Charles I., of the fraudulent sale of Chute Forest; we can correct the received statement that Queen Elizabeth's powers were gradually failing under the cares of a long reign and natural infirmity, by the letters of Secretary Scaramelli, which prove that six weeks

⁵ "Calendar of State Papers and Manuscripts, relating to English Affairs existing in the Archives and Collections of Venice, and in other Libraries of Northern Italy." Vol. I. 1202—1509. Edited by Rawdon Brown. Published by the authority of the Lords Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury, &c. London: Longman and Co. 1864.

before her death she was in all the vigour of a green old age, and attribute the queen's sudden illness to "indignation at the ambitious designs of Arabella Stuart." From these records, too, we obtain confirmation of Cromwell's early visit to the Low Countries, which some historians have disputed, and we are enabled to show that his daughter's marriage with Lord Fauconberg was perfectly private, in contradiction to Clarendon, who declares it was celebrated with all imaginable pomp and state. Mr. Rawdon Brown points also to an entry in the Archives of The Ten, for information respecting the Admirable Crichton, whose eloquence, displayed on 19th August, 1581, astounded the learned Venetians, and finds in the despatches of Angelo Correrio an account of the origin of the celebrated dispute about ship money, so clear and so fair, that he thinks it would not be easy to find its superior in candour or clearness. But, like the editor himself, we have anticipated the progress of events. His first volume of Venetian gleanings from history, with its excellent preface, on which we have gratefully drawn, and its copious index, concludes with the death of Henry VII. in the year 1509.

In another documentary publication—the new volume of the "Calendar of State Papers" of Charles II.'s reign—edited by Mrs. M. A. E. Green,⁶ we have a succession of notices relating to the incidents of a period of but eight months' duration. The most important event that occurred within this period was the fire of London, in which thirteen thousand houses were destroyed, two-thirds of intra-mural London being reduced by this four days' conflagration to a heap of ruins. When the fire was put out, the question arose, How did it originate? and, as no special cause could be assigned, "the people sought some object to vent their fury; but that object varied with the character of the individual." French, Dutch, Anabaptists, Catholics, were in turn suspected, and one demented Frenchman, insisting that he was the guilty agent, was actually executed, notwithstanding his ultimate protestations of innocence. The Catholics, however, being the favourite aversion of the time, were selected as the scapegoat, and, as a consequence, priests were banished and laws against Papists enforced. Though the lords of the Council and his Majesty's ministers came to the conclusion that the fire was the result of accident, yet the inscription placed on the Monument, erased and again restored, ascribed the calamity to this most unpopular of sects. Among the other subjects elucidated in this volume are the rising in Scotland of 1666, the life of Joseph Williamson, afterwards Secretary of State, and that of Mrs. Aphra, or Aphara Behn, the character of whose writings is pronounced by Mrs. Green to be "a reproach to her womanhood and a disgrace even to the licentious age in which she lived." Records of extraordinary natural phenomena show the spirit of the times, and

⁶ "Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series, of the Reign of Charles II. 1666—1667." Preserved in Her Majesty's Public Record Office. Edited by Mary Anne Everett Green, Author of "The Lives of the Princesses of England," under the direction of the Master of the Rolls, &c. London: Longman and Co. 1865.

one phenomenon, which is neither unnatural nor extraordinary, is incidentally illustrated—the general want of money. The fire of London and the story of the Monument serve, as Hume remarks, to show how credulous and obstinate the people are in believing everything which flatters their prevailing passion. To what extent the mythical element enters into or displaces history, competent writers have been instructing us for a long time past. There are still, however, a multitude of partly-educated persons who have a difficulty in conceiving that what has been recorded in a book or has passed into common belief is untrue. Romances announcing themselves as true narratives once obtained general credence. Thus we are told that the chronicle of Archbishop Turpin was pronounced genuine history by Pope Calixtus II., and was received as such by the learned Vincent de Beauvais, preceptor to the sons of St. Louis. An additional illustration of this credulity is presented by the recent publication of a chronicle history of England, included in the issue of the Public Record Office, and edited and translated, with an almost loving care, by Mr. William Hardy.⁷

John de Wavrin, Lord of Forestel, was an illegitimate member of a noble family of Artois. He fought at the battle of Agincourt on the side of the French, where his father and brother were killed. Continuing to follow the profession of arms till 1435, he retired to his native country, settled at Lille, and married a widow of a burgess of that town. The leisure he now enjoyed enabled him to prosecute the study of the ancient memorials of England, and at the suggestion of his nephew Walerin, Lord of Wavrin, &c., he wrote the work, of which we have a portion before us, from the reign of Hercules and Theseus to A.D. 688, the date of Cadwalader's death. We have here the story of Albine, daughter of Diodicias, king of Syria, B.C. 1210-1188, and the lady who gave her name to the island, calling it Albion. We have next a description of the deeds of Brutus and other exiled Trojans. Afterwards, the story of Leir, Bladud, Belinus, Lud, Lucius, Vortigern, Aurelius, and his brother Duke Uther Pendragon. We have fable, prodigy, magic, interwoven in the texture of the narrative. Mr. Hardy offers his translation as an addition to the class of romance history. It will probably amuse, and certainly it points a moral. De Wavrin spent much time and took infinite pains to acquire, according to his lights, a knowledge of the ancient history of England. He tells us himself that he collected the material and drew up the narrative to the best of his knowledge and skill; and yet he regarded as facts what we are assured are absolute fictions. Nor does he stand alone; but, as his editor contends, "In common with many persons of great name and acknowledged learning, even in much later times, when historical criticism and accuracy of judgment had attained a higher point than yet was reached in our author's age, he does not reject

⁷ "Recueil des Chroniques et Anchiennes Istories de la Grant Bretagne, a present nomme Engleterre." Par Jehan de Wavrin, Seigneur du Forestel. Edited by William Hardy, F.S.A., Clerk of the Records of H. M. Duchy of Lancaster. Published by the authority, &c. London: Longman and Co. 1865.

the fabulous history of Britain." A curious proof of this common credulity is furnished by the fact, that "the entire chronicle from the coming of Brutus, and through the whole line of succession of the monarchs of Britain, was drawn up in the form of a legal instrument, and in the year 1301 was transmitted in a declaratory letter from King Edward I. to Pope Boniface in support of his claim to the kingdom of Scotland." This statement will be found in Mr. Hardy's valuable introduction to the Anglo-Norman text, which contains an ample discussion on the sources whence De Wavrin drew his information.⁸

In the reign of the second Edward, the powerful confederacy of the knights of the Temple was suppressed in England, in France, in Germany, and Spain.⁹ The suppression began at the instance of Philip le Bel in France. The Pope was in the French king's power, and, after some demur and long inquiry, resolved on their suppression. To get money, it has been said, was the purpose of Philip's quarrel with Boniface—to get money, he destroyed the Templars. It has been contended that the Order had become an anachronism, that its vast wealth was grounded on false pretences, that instances of private misconduct probably occurred in this Order. All of these allegations may be true; but if proved ten times over, none of them separately or altogether justify the horrible cruelties exercised on these unfortunate knights. Nor does any one of these accusations affect the point really at issue. The Templars were accused of the commission of indescribable abominations, of apostasy from the Christian faith, of Gnosticism, Manichæism, Devil-worship, or some such enormities. The question is, are these charges true? The Templars have had vindicators in Raynouard, Michaud, and others. Their most powerful or at least most erudite accuser appears to have been M. von Hammer, Count Hammer Purgstal. In 1818 he published his "Mysterium Baphometis Revelatum," &c., a book designed to identify the idolatry imputed to the Templars with that of the ancient Gnostic sects, in particular the Ophian or Ophites. Mr. Hallam regards the Count's argument as of some value, but pronounces himself unable to form a decisive opinion. He quotes, however, a French authority, to the effect that the Baphometric cult attributed by von Hammer to the Templars is a chimera of this learned man's, founded on a numismatic and architectonographic error. We are strongly inclined to agree with this authority—M. Chambure. It would require very strong evidence to convince us that the Ophites, so conspicuous among the Gnostic sects of the second century, had any representatives in the twelfth or thirteenth. If Von Hammer's medals and monuments *did* once belong to the

⁸ "A Collection of Chronicles and Ancient Histories of Great Britain, now called England." By John De Waurin, Lord of Forestel. Translated by William Hardy, F.S.A., Clerk of the Records of H.M. Duchy of Lancaster. Published by the authority, &c. London: Longman and Co. 1864.

⁹ "The Persecution of the Knights Templars." By Anthony Oriel Haye, author of "Poemata," "Adrian," &c. Edinburgh: Thomas George Stevenson. 1865.

Templars, they might have brought them from the East as curiosities. A man is not necessarily a Gnostic because he has in his possession an Abrasax gem. The Baphomet notion seems to us very chimerical. In Greek, Baphe means *dipping*, and by extension *baptism*, while *met* is interpreted *spirit*, and the compound is supposed to imply the Gnostic Baptism. Mr. Hays, the latest of the vindicators of the Templars, maintains, and correctly we suspect, that the word Baphomet really means Mahomet, and asserts that authors of the Middle Ages often wrote Bafomet for Mahomet. On the other hand, what proof can be adduced of the existence of a Gnostic Bafomet? Mr. Hays meets many other charges of Von Hammer's in an apparently satisfactory manner, alleging that the latter mistook the words S. S. Simon Juda, for the word *Gnosis*, and dwelling on the acquittal of the Order in Germany, where only, as he says, or where chiefly, as we learn from Hallam, the Gnostic signs are found. On the whole, we are disposed to agree with Michelet, that the Order died of a symbol misunderstood. The forms of reception were borrowed from the whimsical dramatic rites of the Church. The candidate represented a renegade or bad Christian. In imitation of St. Peter, he denied Christ; he dramatized the denial by spitting on the Cross; and after falling pantomimically into this depth of moral degradation, the Order undertook to raise him to a divine life of virtue and holiness. It was this monstrous action of denying and spitting on the Cross, that in all probability turned the world against the Order. The fact excited a horror which no explanation could then remove. Those who care to go into the details of this dreadful tragedy will find an ample account of the entire history of the suppression of this Order, their alleged crimes, and the frightful tortures inflicted on persons whom we must regard as miserable victims of superstition and rapacity, if we pronounce them guiltless, in Mr. Hayes' accessible and spirited little volume, "The Persecution of the Knights Templars."

The Yezides, or devil-worshippers of Kurdestan, are said by Mr. Layard to have opinions and observances borrowed from Sabæanism, Christianity, and Mohammedanism, with a tincture of the doctrines of the Gnostics and Manichæans. We must leave it to others to ascertain whether any precise meaning is attached to these words, and to decide how far the Templars, if guilty, might have been influenced by these Sabæans or their progenitors. We find the passages here referred to quoted by a German, writing in English, in his curious and instructive book on the "Music of the most Ancient Nations."¹⁰ Mr. Carl Engel, whose misgivings as to his power of expression in a foreign language are quite superfluous, commencing with the oldest records of the art, endeavours to appreciate the music of the Assyrians, Egyptians, and Hebrews, and other ancient nations, describes their instruments, assigns their names, and traces their origin and connection. The work, which is enriched with numerous woodcut illustrations, has

¹⁰ "The Music of the most Ancient Nations, particularly of the Assyrians, Egyptians, and Hebrews," &c. By Carl Engel. With numerous Illustrations. London: John Murray. 1864.

special reference to recent discoveries in Western Asia and in Egypt, is a welcome contribution to a new history of music, and is not without a philosophical interest, as demonstrating a sort of ethnological development of the art.

The *History of the Nineteenth Century* shows us the same general struggle between the party of Progress and the party of Conservatism which marked the age of Elizabeth and Mary, with a wider battle-field and with altered relations. In the seventh volume, or rather in the first half of the seventh volume, of the comprehensive history which we owe to the reflective mind and practised hand of Gervinus, we may contemplate the internal conditions of the European States from 1820 to 1830—Greece, Russia, Poland, Austria, Hungary, Germany with its eight sovereignties, Switzerland, and Italy.¹¹ In almost all European States Gervinus discerns in the years immediately following the Restoration and Settlement of 1815, a surprising uniformity; the same social insecurity, the same vacillation, even on the part of the governing powers themselves, between the men and ideas of the new time and those of the earlier period—between the innovations of a recent revolutionary past and the backward tendencies towards the antiquated political arrangements of the preceding century. As the natural opponent of the new system, Gervinus points to the late Emperor of Russia. Nicholas considered it his mission to oppose an iron will to the inroad of Western speculation. He set his heel on the germs of freedom and humanity which Alexander I. had planted. The counterpart of his predecessor, he was Russian where Alexander was European, narrow-hearted where he was large-minded, severe where he was yielding, morose where he was philanthropic. And as man was opposed to man, so was policy opposed to policy. Alexander had endeavoured to transform Russia into a state which should be dominated by law and equity. Nicholas reversed the system of his predecessor. The enemy of all civic life, he left no effort untried to restore the old military régime. In describing the position of Greece, Gervinus throws off a graphic portrait of the President, Capo d'Istrias. Capo d'Istrias, he thinks, attempted to effect a combination of incompatibilities. He had first his own personal interests to uphold; then he had those of Russia to maintain; and, lastly, he had to support the interests of Greece. This triple alliance, represented by one man, inevitably broke down. In Germany, the historian gives us a curious sketch of the young Bavarian king. Never favourable to the Romantic school, Gervinus describes Louis I. as a pupil of that school, in language which clearly shows his opinion of him. He expatiates on his papistical tendencies and mediæval inclinations, on his conception of an amalgamation of the divine forms of the old world with the divine spirit of Christianity, and of the establishment of a league between Art and the Church. The simultaneous delight in the free open heaven of the

¹¹ "Geschichte des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts seit den Wiener Verträgen." Von G. G. Gervinus. Siebenter Band. Erste Hälfte. London: Williams and Norgate. 1865.

old life and the cells of the cloister, the desire at one and the same moment for pagan pleasure and Christian peace, the contempt of the actual in presence of ideal beauty, combined with the search after the beautiful in the sphere of reality—all this union of opposites was the special characteristic of the Romanticists of the time, and so far as King Louis shared in the common epidemic, we can interpret the man by the spirit of the age, of which he was a reflection and embodiment. By a happy phrase, Gervintus stigmatizes the lifeless formalism of official Austria. In Piedmont he reprobates the despotic government of the king, popularly known as Charles the Terrible (*il Feroce*). Distinguished by a systematic tyranny and an Austrian reaction, with all the power centred in the hands of an absolutist nobility and clergy, the government suppressed all intellectual life and resisted all reforming movements. His majesty's disposition disclosed itself in the royal declaration—"I am not *king* to bother myself." The historical presentment of Gervinus, complete and instructive as it is, is always recommended by the quiet philosophical mind, the sympathetic nature, and dignified manner of the author.

The unity which manifests itself in Europe in the nineteenth century has its equivalent in the unity towards which not only Europe but the whole Christian world tended in the eleventh century. Over a vast aggregate of nations, European, Asiatic, African—over Sweden, Norway, Russia, and Iceland, no less than over France, Italy, and Germany—did Gregory VII. establish his drastic sway, ruling first indirectly as the adviser of St. Peter's viceroy from 1046 to 1073, and from 1073 to 1085 (the date of his death) as the spiritual autocrat of Christendom. The Life of Gregory has been often written, but we doubt if it has ever before received the exhaustive treatment applied to it by the Catholic Professor of History at the University of Freiburg.¹³ One portion only of this work lies before us, and it is occupied entirely with what we may call the preliminary statement. The author, Herr Gfrörer, himself tells us that of the nine books into which he has distributed this product of laborious days, the first, to say nothing of the later books, has to do with Germany only. The first book contains five-and-twenty chapters, and has for its range in time the period between the death of Henry III. and the forcible removal of Agnes, the Empress Mother, or from October, 1056, to the spring of 1062. Chronicles have been examined and archives ransacked for material to elucidate the history and geography of times anterior even to the earliest of these dates. Accounts of great old German Houses in Brabant, in Old Saxony, in Bavaria, of the Salic families of Worms, of Luxemburg, Aachen-Tomburg, of Egisheim, recitals of government relations, feudal relations, church relations and secular relations, bring us to the nineteenth chapter, in which Gregory makes his first appearance. In the remaining chapters of the book we appear to

¹³ "Pabst Gregorius VII. und sein Zeitalter." Durch A. Fr. Gfrörer, ord. Professor der Geschichte an der Universität Freiburg. Zweite Ausgabe. Erstes Heft. London: Williams and Norgate. 1864.

have sketches of the men and women who were actors in the world's drama in the age of the hero. The figures of Stephen X., Damiani, Alexander II., Agnes, and others, pass before us. These chapters also contain discussions on the divine theory of the imperial office, the secularization of ecclesiastical property, and the monastic life. It is said that in his historical representations Gfrörer has contrived to reconcile his patriotic sentiments with his Catholic tendencies. As we have seen only one volume, or *heft*, as the author calls it, and as this comprises less than eleven chapters out of the twenty-five which form the first book, it will be evident that in describing it we have drawn on an anticipatory table of contents. The interior title-page of the *heft* bears date 1859, the exterior 1864. The preface was written in the year 1858, so that this "Life of Gregory" is not a very recent composition.

The system inaugurated by Gregory VII. was carried to its consummation by Innocent III., otherwise Lothario di Segni. Between Gregory and the great champion of the Latin church just mentioned, came Innocent II., Adrian IV., and Alexander III., all of whom were able men, and each of whom had aided in sowing the field that their still abler predecessor reaped. The new volume of Mr. Greenwood's "Cathedra Petri,"¹³ takes us over the ground trodden by the second Innocent and the second Anacletus, and gives us some account of the illustrious Bernard of Clairvaux, whose mission was confirmed by his miracles (persons born blind received their sight, the lame walked, the deaf heard, the dumb spoke), and of whom Mr. Greenwood says, that though Christendom could not produce a more upright or intelligent counsellor or judge within his own circle of doctrine and discipline, he did nothing to discourage or correct, if indeed he did not actually countenance, the thaumaturgic narratives of his enthusiastic disciples. Among these disciples Mr. Greenwood specially mentions Gaufrid, his biographer and secretary, who writes under Bernard's own eye a sort of daily journal of his progress. The most interesting portion of this new volume, however, consists of the nine chapters forming the thirteenth book, in which an ample and lucid narrative of the career of Innocent is submitted to us. The author tells us that when he first commenced his history of the Pontificate, his views were in several respects favourable to the claims of the Latin scheme. One result of his inquiries has been a gradual and involuntary change of opinion; a condition of mind which, we are quite willing to allow, affords some security for the writer's integrity. Indeed, we do not see how it is possible to deny the validity of the moral which Mr. Greenwood enforces, that civil liberty is incompatible with mental or religious servitude. To our own mind the entire past of humanity is, in a greater or less degree, a history so deplorable from its atrocious

¹³ "Cathedra Petri": a Political History of the Great Latin Patriarchate. Books XII. and XIII. From the Concordat of Worms (A.D. 1122) to the Close of the Pontificate of Innocent III. (A.D. 1216). By Thomas Greenwood, M.A. Camb. and Durh., F.R.S.L., Barrister-at-Law. London: William Macintosh. 1865.

warfare, its superstitious beliefs, its political wrong and social injustice, that if we were to look only on its transient phenomena, isolating them from the nobler life of which we catch occasional glimpses, even now, and which we hope will one day find a complete expression, we should be tempted to give up mankind as a failure. Judged by the ideal standard of right, the characteristic action of humanity, in and by itself, seems lamentably wrong. But when we consider the almost invincible difficulties which stood in the way of all progress, in the earlier period of our history, we can forgive the agents of an improvement, who adopted censurable but the only available expedients. War, despotism, slavery, as means to an end, as phases of human evolution, may from this point of view be palliated, and with certain reservations and under certain exigencies justified. In this way, if in any, Latin Christianity may itself merit our approbation, notwithstanding its excesses, its forgeries, its pretended miracles, its persecuting spirit. In the earlier stage of its existence the human race must act like a child, and is therefore subject to be treated like a child. Speaking generally, its government, temporal and spiritual, represents itself; it is the shadow which it necessarily projects, and which inevitably accompanies its movements. An imperial Theodosius, who massacres a city, requires an episcopal Ambrose to punish the massacre. Feudalism, estimated by the moral ideal, was the bad secular side of society to which Catholicism was the spiritual counterpart. Mr. Greenwood, who is temperate and fair in his statements, shows (p. 409) that in the absence of a public police, the Church endeavoured to supply its place by carrying her spiritual arms to the aid of such temporal motives as could be brought to bear on the disturbers of the public peace. For the first eleven years of his pontificate, before his hands were red with the blood of the Albigenses, Innocent's popularity never deserted him. At pages 404—406, our author candidly acknowledges the good and noble deeds of his high-principled persecutor. He winds up his almost eulogistical notice by remarking—"The eyes of the mass of the people were fixed upon him, and then in all their difficulties and distresses they were accustomed to look to him for relief, and practically to acknowledge their inability to govern themselves." A mind so powerful as that of Innocent III. could never (as Hallam observes) be indifferent to the beauty of social order and the happiness of mankind. It seems a terrible irony that this great intellect—this noble benefactor—this powerful sovereign—should, in the name of social order, have instituted the Inquisition, and in the interests of sacerdotalism or theological philosophy, have canonized Transubstantiation. We agree with Mr. Greenwood in denouncing the persecuting spirit of Catholicism. The age was not ripe for self-conduct, but the system that could do these things, and do them on principle, had forfeited its right to existence. The heretics were not wrong absolutely, but would successful heresy have been for the welfare of mankind? Anglican Protestantism has persecuted; Puritanism has persecuted; "Godlike Calvinism" roasted Servetus. These considerations, we think, supply the only answer that can be made to our

author's thesis, which is, from one point of view, absolutely unimpeachable. We probably go quite as far as he does in our rejection of Roman ecclesiasticism. Mr. Greenwood half promises us a supplemental volume, which will bring down his narrative to the epoch of the Reformation. His work, so far as we know it, is characterized by solid industry and general moderation of statement. We do not see that it can lay claim to any great originality, and it is certainly more instructive than entertaining. But Mr. Greenwood is a conscientious laborious worker who deserves our thanks and commendation.

Another of the heroic but equivocal characters of history awaits us in the Founder of Islam. Exalted to the highest pinnacle of renown by Carlyle, he is degraded to the lowest station that can well be accorded to so influential a person by Dr. Sprenger.¹⁴ In the January number of the *Westminster Review* for the year 1862, we have already expressed our opinion of the extremely valuable labours of this iconoclastic biographer of Mohammed. In the third and last volume the author recapitulates his charges. We cannot undertake to pronounce a summary decision on the different counts, nor shall we dogmatize on the principal point at issue—the character of Mohammed. We are sometimes inclined to agree with what Dr. Sprenger advances, as when he argues that the success of the prophet lay in the preparation already made for his career; when he asserts that the triumphs of his religion in part depended on the aggressive impulse which, like the vis inertiae in matter, lay dormant in the hordes that ultimately conquered Constantinople and besieged Vienna; or (with some qualification) when he selects Omar as the true founder of Moslem. But how do these allegations affect Mohammed otherwise than as they affect other great men? Was there not a preparation for Christianity? Could there have been a St. Paul without a Jesus, or a Jesus without a Moses? Was not the Roman Conquest one preliminary and Greek Civilization another preliminary of the Faith of the Cross? Undoubtedly the individual is not greater than the race, but it is nevertheless true that the individual hero is necessary to the race. God, said Luther long ago, cannot do without great men. Heroes are the product of their age, but they are also its representatives. If the times act on them they react on the times, and the man is wanted for the hour as the hour is for the man. It is true, however, that this consideration only in part answers Dr. Sprenger's objections. For he says very distinctly that he disbelieves in the ordinary explanation of Mohammed's incipient success. He does not think that it was the prophet's genius that gained him a hearing. He holds that there were monotheistic believers in Arabia, as far back as Jethro or Melchizedek, though a vague polytheism still prevailed in Arabia for centuries. At last a crisis came which made the fortune of Mohammed. In his days a strong tendency to the anchorite life began to disclose itself, with, as a natural accompaniment, an absorbing anxiety for future personal salvation, what

¹⁴ "Das Leben und die Lehre des Mohammed, nach bisher grösstentheils unbenutzten Quellen," bearbeitet von A. Sprenger. Dritter Band. London: David Nutt. 1865.

Mr. Kingsley we believe calls saving one's own dirty soul. Some of these Arabian hermits, wanting spiritual direction, joined the Jews, some the Christians. These proved, however, miserable comforters. Their creed was too complex, too learned, too mysterious: the Trinity, for instance, was not adapted to men who believed that God was nearer them than their own heart's blood. These pious enthusiasts (not above a thousand) caused the religion of their founder to spread from Medina outward, preaching with the sword. Such was the prevailing religious indifference that Mohammed had afterwards few opponents to encounter; the majority of those who cared for religion, in general found a natural satisfaction in *Islam*. Others, besides and before Mohammed, might have, or indeed did proclaim a similar doctrine, but without Mohammed's success. And why? Because they had not Mohammed's pathological idiosyncrasies. Zayd was his superior morally, Omayya intellectually. But they were not the right men for their time. The Arabians wanted a prophet, and the hysterical symptoms of Mohammed produced on them, and on himself also, the conviction that he was that prophet. The Arabian mind was the father and Mohammed the mother of *Islam*. The greatness of the prophet lay in his weakness. Within certain limits we have no objection to this theory of Dr. Sprenger's. But does it not apply, in some degree, to other uncommon characters—to Joan of Arc, to St. Bernard, to St. Paul: all of whom had visions, trances, or hallucinations? Does not the *man* show himself in and through the fancies that he creates out of him? Dr. Sprenger himself acknowledges that the ecstatic dream called *Roya* reflects the highest feeling of the visionary. He acknowledges, too, that Mohammed was a poet, so that he *did* owe something to his genius! But besides intellect, had he not practical qualities, personal ascendencies, modes of activity that Zayd or fifty others had not? Mohammed had, likely enough, his insincerities, his passions, his mental extravagances, and doubtless large deductions must be made from any ideal standard of excellence which a rash admiration may claim. But if he owed something to his hysteria, did he owe everything to it? Dr. Sprenger has done well in drawing attention to this point. He has made the prophet's weakness the cause of his success, as far as the prophet himself was concerned in the establishment of *Islam*. Let Mr. Carlyle or some other vindicator of Mohammed show, if he can, that it was only the occasion. The interest of our author's book lies, as he explains, in the happy peculiarity by which *Islam* is distinguished from Buddhism, Judaism, and Christianity. Their commencement is veiled in obscurity; that of *Islam* is known and its progress can be ascertained step by step. Hence, "Islam is for the history of religion what our solar system is for the astronomy of the fixed stars." Such is the spirit in which this new "Life of Mohammed" is written. If varied knowledge, diligent research, profound learning, and prodigal accumulation of material can enable any man to disparage a hero like Mohammed, or explain afresh the significance of the religion which he founded, Dr. Sprenger unquestionably possesses this right. Whether he has the necessary judgment, the freedom from prejudice, the sympathy with greatness, which aid in the interpretation of cha-

racter, is another question, the decision of which we leave to more competent critics.

In Michael Angelo, painter, sculptor, poet, architect, we have a hero of less questionable shape. A notice of the first part of the *Life of this great artist* by Grimm will be found in an earlier number of our *Review*. The translation of the German original by Miss Bunnett, who has already done good service in giving us her version of the "Shakespeare Commentaries" of Gervinus, reads easily and pleasantly.¹⁵ The work is rich in contemporary picture; in particular it has a very fair account of Savonarola; and those who are disposed to complain of the introduction of extraneous material will seldom pronounce it uninteresting or unattractive. The second volume, which is new to us, takes us to Venice, Florence, Rome; it calls up the long-vanished figures of Rubens, Titian, Correggio, and Vittoria Colonna, the noble friend of Michael Angelo. It contains abundance of art-criticism and much narrative illustration. A sentence, p. 398, surprises us. "The idea expressed by Sophocles also, in his last tragedy, *μη φῦναι ἅπαντα νικα λόγον* of birth being yet to come, surpasses wisdom." We had thought that the idea expressed by Sophocles was, that of certain obvious alternatives relating to human existence, the best of all was never to have been born at all. The idea ascribed to him by Herr Grimm or Miss Bunnett does indeed "surpass wisdom."

This ethnic sentiment would be accepted by not a few in our own time, if it were not for the glorious perspective which faith shows them in the world beyond. This is the feeling that reveals itself again and again, in the pious and graceful letters of the beautiful Catholic mystic, Eugénie de Guérin.¹⁶ Her language, as she says herself, is the language of piety. "La Croix!" she exclaims; "la croix! Courage, vous qui la portez: du Calvaire on s'en va au ciel." In another page she describes the earth as mud and dust—a cemetery in which kings, nations, and our beloved friends lie buried, and which we are to traverse with tears and prayers. Of the one hundred and fifty letters which M. Trebutien has brought together, some are addressed to her brother; others record her grief at his final departure; some are written to Mdlle. Louise de Bayne; some to Mdlle. Antoinette de Boisset. The editor points out their value, as corroborating or elucidating passages in the journal which has had so admiring a welcome not only in France, but on the continent, and even in England. The highest practical eulogy that any book can receive has been accorded to this daily record of the experiences of a saintly soul. Twelve editions have been sold within about two years. How many generations must elapse before women will arise, whose life will be not less beautiful than Eugénie de Guérin's,

¹⁵ "Life of Michael Angelo." By Herman Grimm. Translated, with the author's sanction, by Fanny Elizabeth Bunnett, translator of Gervinus' Shakespeare Commentaries, and author of "Louise Juliane, Electress Palatine, and her Times," &c. With Photographic Portrait. 2 vols. London: Smith, Elder and Co. 1865.

¹⁶ "Lettres d'Eugénie de Guérin." Publiées avec l'assentement de sa famille par G. S. Trebutien, Conservateur adjoint de la Bibliothèque de Caen. London: Williams and Norgate. 1865.

whose faith not less firm, whose love not less enduring, and who will have replaced her dreams, the creation of imaginative thought, with noble truths, the product of man's riper intelligence?

Coleridge, who had read much and thought much, and who often said wise and courageous things, addressed some letters forty years ago to his friend Mr. Thomas Allsop, originally printed in the year 1836, and since twice reprinted, in 1858, when the poet's correspondent was accused of sanctioning the attempted regicide of the 14th January, as a sort of testimonial to the character of the accused, and again in 1864.¹⁷ The book contains many wise and entertaining sentences, and probably some dull and silly ones. Coleridge was, in some sense, the father of the Broad Church. He thundered against Bibliolatry and what he considered the corruptions of Christianity. "Is it possible," he asked, "to assent to the doctrine of redemption as at present promulgated, that the moral death of an unoffending being should be a consequence of the transgression of humanity and *its atonement*?" At another time he descants: "Were I not a Christian, and that only in the sense in which I am a Christian, I should be an Atheist with Spinoza: rejecting all in which I found insuperable difficulties, and resting my only hope on the gradual and certain, because gradual, progression of the species. This, it is true," he adds, "is negative Atheism; and this is, next to Christianity, the purest spirit of humanity." The little volume, from which we borrow these passages, does not limit its reporter's office to Coleridge, but gives us notices of Wordsworth, Lamb, and other notable persons. Among others it contains an amusing story of Lord Kenyon, who, when charging a jury in some bookseller's trial for publishing Paine's "Age of Reason," and enumerating many celebrated men who had been Christians, continued: "Above all, gentlemen, need I name to you the Emperor Julian, who was so celebrated for the practice of every Christian virtue that he was called Julian the *Apostle*!"

We may give a sculptor a place near a poet. "The Life of Thorvaldsen, collected from the Danish of Thiele," by Rev. M. R. Bernard, is a sketch, wanting in finish and completeness, but not entirely without attraction.¹⁸ It is chatty and anecdotal, introducing us to Carlo Alberto, the son of Gotskalk Thorvaldsen, and grandson of an Icelandic clergyman. Gotskalk was a wood-carver, settled at Copenhagen, where "Bertel," as his better known son was called, was born November 19, 1770. In 1787 he won his first academical honours at the modelling school. In 1790 he appeared before the public as a statuary. Of his residence in Italy, of his engagement to a Scotch lady whom he deserted in favour of another fair one, of his illegitimate daughter, and his interviews with several remarkable persons, notices will be found in Mr. Bernard's volume. In p. 49 a curious statement occurs. Mr.

¹⁷ "Letters, Conversations, and Recollections of S. T. Coleridge." With a Preface by the editor, Thomas Allsop, &c. Third edition. London: Frederick Farrah. 1864.

¹⁸ "The Life of Thorvaldsen," collated from the Danish of J. M. Thiele. By Rev. M. R. Bernard, B.A., author of "Sport in Norway," &c., late Chaplain to the British Consulate, &c. London: Chapman and Hall. 1865.

Hope, we are told, paid Thorvaldsen 300 scudi in advance, "but out of this he had to purchase a block of Carrara marble, which alone cost him 650 scudi." If Thorvaldsen achieved this extraordinary feat, he must, though a Dane, have been a near relative of the far-famed British soldier, who lived on his pay and spent half a crown out of sixpence a day. The sculptor died of disease of the heart in March, 1843. It is less easy to fix the day of the month, as his biographer, or his printer, makes Saturday the 23rd and Friday the 24th; an exploit equal to that which is attributed to Thorvaldsen. The sculptor appears, however, to have died on the 30th. According to the Baroness Humboldt, the flower of all his works, the most beautiful of all his statues, is the "Mercury," originally executed (1818) for the Duke of Augustenburg, but afterwards sold to Lord Ashburton, and, if we mistake not, gracefully conspicuous in the Exhibition of 1862.

Of the distinguished persons whose acquaintance Thorvaldsen made at Rome, perhaps the most distinguished (unless we put Byron first) was Sir Walter Scott. A clear, intelligible, workman-like account of the man and poet has been written by a sympathizing German, Karl Elze, in two volumes, broken up into chapters, with characteristic titles indicating the subject-matter of each chapter.¹⁹ The story of Scott's life is simply told, and the critical remarks on his writings show point and purpose. The author accepts Carlyle's estimate of Scott, but not without some revision. That Scott's epic style required external detail, ornamental circumstance, outward material representation, which would have been absolutely foreign to Shakespeare's dramatic conception; and that, on the other hand, Shakespeare's dramatic conception demanded a concentration and introspection which would have been superfluous in Scott's case, is not only an ingenious apology for the shortcomings of the author of "Waverley," but has a certain amount of truth in it. At best, however, it is a palliation, not a justification. Just as Scott would have *written* better had he taken a little more pains, so he would have created more truly and quite as epically if he had not looked on his art as a mere homely shepherd's trade, but had strictly meditated *no* thankless muse. He would then have stood a good deal nearer Shakespeare, and have not transgressed the spirit of his own modest ideal.

The last minstrel is not inappropriately succeeded in our literary survey by a great musical composer, whose life has been drawn up with competent skill and judgment by Dr. Von Helborn.²⁰ Franz Schubert, the son of a schoolmaster resident in Vienna, was born in that city on the 31st of January, 1797. Till his tenth or twelfth year, he dwelt under his father's roof. From that time till he attained his seventeenth year, he was a singing-boy in the Imperial College. He then became his father's assistant at Lichtenthal—then an instrumental performer, and afterwards a musical composer. His biographer

¹⁹ "Sir Walter Scott." Von Karl Elze. 2 vols. Dresden: Louis Ehlermann. 1864.

²⁰ "Franz Schubert." Von Dr. Heinrich Kreissle von Helborn. London: Williams and Norgate. 1865.

pronounces him pre-eminent in *song*. He was an indefatigable worker. His productivity was enormous; and such was the rapidity of his composition that had he lived he would, it is conjectured, have set the whole German literature to music. He died, however, before he had completed his thirty-second year. The little broad musician—so Chezy describes him—outwardly resembled a lump of tallow, but a lump of tallow with such flashing eyes that they betrayed in a moment the fire that burned within. In character he was modest, not joyous, often silent, but fond of social intercourse. He appears to have been an impassioned lover—not of women, but of wine. In this love for the blood of the grape he resembled Beethoven.

Politics must follow, for the nonce, in the wake of music and poetry. The correspondence of Varnhagen von Ense and Oelsner,²¹ a literary and diplomatic friend, extends, *at present*, over a period of about six years—namely, from 1816 to 1822. Of the two hundred and odd letters which the volumes before us contain, fewer than sixty are from von Ense's pen. Very few are from that of Rahel, whose name appears on the title-page. The subjects discussed are political, literary, social. The great men of the day are noticed in them—among others, von Humboldt, *the uncle of my niece*, Ludmilla Assing; to whom the public are indebted, not only for this, but a far more piquant volume of letters. Von Ense speaks of Humboldt in no very reverential language. He appears to think that he was bidding for office by professions of liberalism which his previous conduct belied. He adds, he can easily play the part of a Prussian Talleyrand, but the surprising thing is that it should have any attractions for him. Two volumes of this correspondence are published. More may be confidently expected.

Our section closes with philosophy. "Anaxagoras and the Israelites" is the title of a learned and ingenious treatise, the object of which is to show that the doctrines of Anaxagoras were derived from our old and everlasting friends the Jews.²² The author, Herr Gladisch, has rather a mania for this metaphysical derivation. Disbelieving in the originality of Greek speculation, he traces its various forms to older views of life and the world, looking on the Greek philosophers as transmitters of the leading views of the leading nations of a more remote antiquity. Thus he finds the teaching and morality of Pythagoras among the old Chinese; the doctrine of Heraclitus he refers to Zoroaster, that of the Eleatic school to India, that of Empedocles to Egypt. This is the fifth of the special treatises that have already been published by the enterprising investigator. The proposition that classical scholars are rarely Oriental scholars, and that thus his researches fail to secure the approbation that they deserve, is one that deserves consideration. On general grounds, however, we do not feel very favourably disposed to Herr Gladisch's *idée mère*, and our hesi-

²¹ "Briefwechsel zwischen Varnhagen von Ense und Oelsner, nebst Briefen von Rahel, Herausgegeben von Ludmilla Assing." Vols. I. and II. London: David Nutt. 1865.

²² "Anaxagoras und die Israeliten." Eine Historische Untersuchung, von Aug. Gladisch, Director des Gymnasiums zu Krotischer. London: David Nutt. 1865.

tation is strengthened by the knowledge that he has a formidable opponent in Zeller—now we believe professor of philosophy at Heidelberg. There is a story told of Diogenes, that seeing a little boy drinking water out of his hand, he threw away his cup, declaring it unnecessary. Whether the story be true or not, nothing seems more natural than that a man who had once learned to take a cynical pride in doing without things, should determine to do without a cup, drinking being one of the most frequently repeated of human actions. Our author, however, derives this simple act of philosophical economy from Indian religious usage, and refers to the prescription of the Veds, which, for the highest grade of remuneration, requires the cup to be thrown away and the water to be drunk out of the hand. Herr Gladisch, however, is a man whose learning and researches entitle his theory to the honours of at least a respectful examination from competent inquirers.

The fourth volume of the reprint of Mr. Fraser Tytler's well-known "History of Scotland"²³ carries us into the reign of Elizabeth in England, and her kinsman, James VI., in the northern kingdom. It relates the story of Mary Stuart's detention, trial, and death, and ends with the *Union*, in which, yielding neither to hostile force nor to fraud, "the sister monarchy willingly consented to link her future destinies with those of her mighty neighbour." It is scarcely necessary to remark that Mr. Tytler believes the Scottish queen to have been innocent of the crime for which she suffered. Mary, he contends, was ignorant of the project for Elizabeth's assassination, and was the victim of forged letters manufactured by her enemies. Others are of a different opinion, but the question is not one to be discussed in this place. The fourth and final volume of a work which cost Mr. Tytler nearly eighteen years' labour contains, besides an index, proofs, and illustrations, a biographical sketch, giving the leading incidents in the life of the author.

BELLES LETTRES.

WE have before us five of the publications of the Early English Text Society. This society has been formed with the object of publishing a series of Early English Texts, on the same plan as those which were printed by the Philological Society, but which have now been discontinued. The undertaking is a most useful and laudable one, since, notwithstanding the efforts of the Percy, Camden, and other societies, a vast mass of our early literature is still unprinted, and more than half of that which is in print is beyond the reach of all but wealthy students. The publications of the society will consist of works, some of which have not been printed before; others that will be re-edited

²³ "The History of Scotland, from the Accession of Alexander III. to the Union." By Patrick Fraser Tytler, F.R.S.E., and F.S.A. In 4 vols. Vol. IV. Edinburgh: William P. Nimmo. 1864.

from the MSS. they were originally printed from, or from older MSS. where such exist; and also of reprints of scarce books of which the manuscripts are lost.

1. The volume of Alliterative Poems,¹ which is the first in this valuable series, has hitherto existed only as manuscript Nero A x, in the Cottonian Collection, and is now for the first time edited and printed. Nothing is known of the author; at least the editor rejects the opinion of Sir Frederic Madden, who considers that it was transcribed from the Scotch of Huchowne into the West-Midland dialect, in which it has come down to us. Mr. Morris gives strong reasons in support of his own view, that these poems were composed early in the fourteenth century by one who spoke and thought in the dialect in which they are written. The number of Norse terms used points to Lancashire; but though this may be a matter of uncertainty, there can be little doubt that they were written originally in the West-Midland dialect, of which other specimens are extant. A special peculiarity of this dialect, and which distinguishes it from the Southern and Northumbrian, is that of the inflections of the plural in the present tense, indicative mood; in the Southern dialect it is *eth*, in the Northumbrian *es*, in the Midland it is *en*, and this termination is found to be employed systematically throughout these poems. We must refer our readers to the excellent and highly interesting remarks on the grammar of this dialect contained in the preface, which attest the value of the work to the philological student; nor does the uncouth language in which the poems are written conceal beauties of thought and sentiment, which, added to the quaint mixture of Scriptural themes and mediæval colouring, make them well worth reading even by those who would find them unintelligible without the glossarial index. The poems are three in number. The first, which the editor has named "The Pearl," records a father's grief for the loss of his child, a girl of two years old, whose grave he visits in the "high season of August," and there indulges his sorrow. He falls asleep and dreams of being carried through gorgeous scenes to the bank of a stream, on the opposite side of which he sees and recognises his child "*ful debonere*," who discourses to him of the glories of her heavenly home, and counsels him to be patient under his earthly trials; he attempts to cross the stream, and in so doing awakes from his dream, to lament his over-rashness, and to utter sundry just and pious reflections upon human presumption. This poem consists of a hundred and one twelve-line stanzas, every five of which conclude with the same line, and are connected by the repetition of a leading expression. The second poem, entitled "Cleanness," is a collection of ten Biblical stories in long alliterative lines, beginning with the parable of the Marriage Feast, which is styled "the Mukel Mangerye," and concluding with the Median invasion of Babylon. The original is freely paraphrased, and the details introduced, drawn entirely from the author's own experience and from the contemporary habits of feudalism, are as grotesque

¹ "Early English Alliterative Poems." Edited by Richard Morris, author of "The Etymology of Local Names," &c. London: Trübner and Co. 1864.

as the illuminated illustrations which adorn the manuscript. The third poem, "Patience," tells the history of Jonah in familiar style and with much luxuriance of description; how a woodbine sheltered the prophet from the sun after he had—

Busked hym a bouer, the best that he might,
Of hay and of ever-ferne and erbes a fewe.

2. In the same handwriting and dialect as the above, and from the same Cotton volume, is the metrical romance of Sir Gawayne,² which is printed from the accurate text of Sir Frederic Madden, by whom it has already been edited for the Bannatyne Club under the title of "Syr Gawayn and the Grene Knygt." The unknown author who sung the praises of "Cleanness" has here given his own version of the adventures and sharp temptations of the matchless Gawayne, Knight of the Round Table and nephew of King Arthur. Many of the details are borrowed from the "Roman de Perceval," but there are several original passages highly interesting, from the light they throw on the manners and amusements of the fourteenth century, including a fox-hunt. An outline of the story is given in the Introduction, and the notes and Glossary are all that can be desired.

3. A small volume, containing a sketch of King Arthur's Life,³ is printed from a manuscript of the fifteenth century, belonging to the Marquis of Bath, and is now for the first time edited. It is in the Southern dialect, and consists of six hundred and forty-two lines, which in the manuscript are bound up in an incomplete Latin chronicle of the Kings of Britain; the old chronicler apparently thought that the exploits of Arthur, king of men, could not be done justice to in Latin prose, so he breaks out in English verse and gives his own version, with omissions, of Geoffry of Monmouth.

4. The fourth of these publications is a very curious composition in rhyme⁴ by William Lauder, of which, according to the editor, only two copies are known to be in existence. The fact that such a personage had lived and written was unknown till 1827, when the Rev. Peter Hall republished the "Compendious Tractate," in the pages of a short-lived periodical, "The Crypt, or Receptacle for Things Past," but with little regard to accuracy of spelling or exactness of any kind. The author was a Lothian, born about 1520, and the Register of Ministers states that he "Deid at Candilmes 1572." He furnished a play of some kind, which was performed at the expense of the magistrates and council of Edinburgh, and two other poetical tracts by him are now in the library at Britwell House, Bucks, with the following execrating titles:—

"Ane prettie Mirrouer, or Conference betuix the Faithfull Protestant and the

² "Sir Gawayne and the Green Knight." By the author of "Early English Alliterative Poems." Re-edited by Richard Morris. London: Trübner. 1864.

³ "Arthur; a Short Sketch of his Life and History." Edited by Frederick J. Furnivall, M.A. London: Trübner & Co. 1864.

⁴ "Ane Compendious and Breue Tractate concernyng ye Office and Dewtie of Kyngis, Spirituall Pastoris and Temporall Jugis." Edited by Fitzedward Hall, M.A., Professor of Sanscrit in King's College. London: Trübner & Co. 1864.

Dissemblit false Hypocreit;" and "Ane Godlie Tractate, or Mirrour, Quhairintill may be easilie perceauit quho thay be that ar Ingraftit in to Christ, and quho nocht &c., Compylit in Metre, be William Lauder, Minister of the Word of God."

The advice to kyngis is a stern summary of the duties of rulers and their heavy responsibilities, and declares—"quhat sall becum of Kyngis that contynewis in Inequitie and neclectis thair offices," in terms the reverse of courtierlike.

5. A unique Scotch manuscript, now for the first time edited,⁵ is the first of the society's publications for the present year. It is a curious treatise on grammar, by Alexander Hume, who was at one time Head Master of the High School, Edinburgh, and author of "Grammatica Nova" and other works. He dedicates his tract to King James I., "the maest excellent in all princelie wisdom, learning, and heroical artes," and thus explains his motives for writing it:—

"I, your gracis humble servant, seeing sik uncertentie in one men's wryting, as if a man wald indyte one letter to tuentie of our best wryters, nae tuae of the tuentie, without conference, wald agree; and that they quhae might perhapes agree, met rather be custom then knowlege, set my selfe, about a yeer syne, to seek a remedie for that maladie."

In the course of his remarks upon rules of grammar and pronunciation, the zealous reformer throws light on many points of interest; thus he gives the words food, good, blood, as examples of the same sound, showing that they were then pronounced in the same way; and he expressly denies that the letter *s* in the genitive case is a segment of *his*, because—

"1. His is the masculine gender, and this may be fœminin; as, a mother's love is tender; 2. because his is onelie singular; and this may be plural; as, al men's vertues are not knawen."

The society has been fortunate thus far, both in its choice of subjects and in having at command the gratuitous services of editors so competent to the task they have undertaken. The report of the committee for the first year's operations is satisfactory in every respect, and we wish the society all success in bringing out the long list of works that are to be printed in due time, all illustrative of our early history and literature, and all deserving to be rescued from the oblivion of manuscript or scarce black-letter print.

Seven years ago a volume of "Epitaphs from the Greek Anthology" appeared, by the author who now offers a much larger collection of translations⁶ from the same source. The Epitaphs form one part of the volume before us, which contains selections from various other books of the Anthology, arranged under different heads, and embracing a greater variety of subjects than will be found in any previous at-

⁵ "Of the Orthographie and Congruitie of the Britan Tongue. A Treatise, noe shorter then necessaric for the Schooles. Be Alexander Hume." Edited by Henry B. Wheatley. London: Trübner & Co. 1865.

⁶ "Greek Anthology; with notes, critical and explanatory." Translated by Major Robert G. Macgregor. London: Nissen and Parker.

tempts to render these choice morsels of antiquity into English verse. Here and there a scholar or poet has given us a modern version of a lyric, a satire, or an epigram, and there is a Greek Anthology in Bohn's Classical Library, but for extent and variety as well as for faithful adherence to the spirit and, when possible, the letter of the original, this collection of "fine things" claims special recognition. Few Greek scholars (Major Macgregor disclaims the title) would have the patience or the taste for such a task, and the unlearned reader may well prize the vast store of the thoughts and sentiments of the past that is here brought so easily within his reach. Here we have the praise of Love and Wine, sung in innumerable stanzas of graceful conceit and often tender sentiment—take for example the following of Agathias and Meleager:—

I love not wine, but if thou bid'st me drink,
First taste, then bring to me, for, if its brink
Thy lips have hallowed, 'twill not easy be,
Sober, a cup-bearer so sweet to flee,
For then the cup conveys to me thy kiss,
And tells me, in my own, of its late bliss.

To thee, Myisca! of my life the cables all are bound,
In thee the breath, which still remains, of my sad soul is found,
Yes, maiden! by thine eyes I swear which speak to deafen'd ear,
By thy soft voice which lures the blind, and by thine eyebrows dear,
Cast on me but a clouded look, a certain storm I see,
But Spring is blooming sweet if thou look'st joyously on me.

Then we have satires on the ugly and the hook-nosed; hard hits such as,

"Hail! ye seven pupils of schoolmaster Sleigh,
To wit, his four bare walls and benches three;"

riddles and epigrams that may be recognised through a modern disguise in living jest-books; inscriptions from the statues of the famous white and green champions of the Hippodrome at Constantinople; here and there a few lines that bring the illustrious dead before us more vividly than many pages of history. Witness these upon the victim of Cyril of Alexandria:

"When I see thee, and thy discourses hear,
O ven'erable Hypatia! I revere
And on the virgin's starry dwelling gaze,
Whose life our lesson is to Heav'n's own ways:
Beautiful are thy words, thy reasonings mild,
Thou star of wise instruction undefiled!"

and monumental inscriptions true for all time, such as this—

"Prote! thou art not dead, but gone to regions better far,
Dwelling in islands of the blest where joys abundant are:
With fairy foot and lightsome heart, there 'mid Elysian bow'rs
Far from all ills thou roamest free among immortal flow'rs:
Nor winter chills, nor summer fires, nor thirst, nor hunger vex,
Man's life in thee wakes no regret, nor toil nor ail perplex:
Its fitful fever well o'erpast, thy spirit, blameless quite,
In splendour of Olympus near lives as in native light;"

and others quaintly epigrammatic, as for instance—

“This tomb’s of old Maronis, where is shown
A goblet quaintly sculptured out of stone:
Fond of strong wine, an endless talker, she
Mourned not her spouse or children poor to see,
But in the grave this troubles her—to think
That on her tomb yon cup should hold no drink!”

“Here Dionysius lies, of life
Who sixty years was doomed to see:
I never took nor wished a wife—
Would that my sire had been as free!”

In this comprehensive miscellany are treasures, nowhere else to be found, of the actual every-day thoughts of those to whom our debt is so large, and with whom on some of the most vital points our sympathy is so weak: it is a store-house of instruction as well as a museum of fossil curiosities; and when we take into account the great difficulties of translation, where the whole point and beauty of the original depend on a play of words and neatness of phrase, we are less inclined to note shortcomings and stiffness of construction, than to appreciate the labour and industry which have accomplished so much, and which will enable the ordinary English reader to form some notion of those “untold treasures” known to “few persons but scholars, and of scholars but few,” which, according to Professor Wilson, lie hid in the “beautiful words” of the Greek Anthology.

In a small volume on the rhythm of the ancients,⁷ we have the fruit of much laborious research into this obscure subject. The author quotes from the Fragments of Aristoxenus, the pupil of Aristotle, as the most important authority whose writings have come down to us, and cites with much resentment the inferior and misleading work of Aristides Quintilianus, “a thoughtless compiler” of later and degenerating times, whose three books upon music have been read and believed in by some grievously mistaken modern inquirers. The technicalities of time and rhythm are minutely examined, and in the author’s opinion it is abundantly proved that the rhythmical theory of the Greeks, as well as their practice in music, indicated as strong a sense of the importance of rhythmical series (*rhythmischen Reihe*) as we moderns entertain.

Under a sounding and slightly misleading title⁸, we have three essays on the lives of Eugénie de Guérin, Charlotte Brontë, and Rahel Varnhagen d’Ense. To any one wholly unacquainted with the history of each of these remarkable women, this volume may impart a fairly accurate conception of the circumstances of their lives and the peculiarities of their genius, but they are not happily chosen as representative women of the nineteenth century, nor of their respective countries. And this is especially apparent in the remarks upon Charlotte Brontë,

⁷ “System der Antiken Rhythmik.” Von Rudolf Westphal. Breslau: Leuckart. London: Williams and Norgate. 1865.

⁸ “L’esprit des Femmes de Notre Temps.” Par Camille Selden. Paris: Charpentier. 1865.

whose essentially exceptional history is taken as an average illustration of English habits and modes of education. Having occasion to mention Scarborough, the author kindly explains that it is a small town situated near the sea, and indulges in the following generalizations from the internal economy of Haworth "Presbytère":—

"The robust animal life of England, which blunts the delicacy of the senses, renders the excesses of the table more frequent than with us. They eat for eating's sake, without caring much what they eat; their constant exposure to all weathers gives a keen edge to the appetite, and when to this is added horse exercise, which brings colour to the cheek and brilliancy to the eye, the young beauties who may be seen from earliest dawn riding in the parks, look like the attendant nymphs of Diana. A charming lady, with a face like the rose, blooming amidst her curls, will say to you naïvely, 'I did enjoy my dinner to-day.' Observe, that this said dinner often consists of a slice of half-raw beef washed down by a glass of port wine. Moreover you may, without injuring your character as a gentleman, rise from table, your speech thick, your vision dulled, and ensconce yourself in the sofa, where you may snore till teatime. The extreme relish with which English romance writers dwell upon culinary details, bears ready evidence to this taste. From Fielding to Currer Bell it is observable that every important scene is laid before or during a meal, which is described to the minutest particular. If not a meal, at any rate there will be the inevitable decanter and the abominable biscuits."

The unhappy Bramwell Brontë is described as a type of the English artist, "né, comme *Byron et Burns*, pour dormir dans les tavernes et éveiller par ses lazzis bizarres les rires retentissants des buveurs." The author has undertaken a theme for which he has neither natural fitness nor acquired knowledge to enable him to do justice to, and this is most conspicuously apparent in his treatment of Eugénie and Maurice Guérin, of whom he speaks almost apologetically, as provincial personages in whom it is singular to find a mind and soul which would not disgrace Paris, and which rendered the sister almost the equal of the famous women of the eighteenth century. It was remarked by a distinguished artist that he who would adequately paint a portrait must be himself on something like an intellectual level with his sitter, and we are reminded of the observation by the wholly different aspect in which the same characters present themselves to the eye of genius. In the two essays devoted to the Guérins, brother and sister, by Mr. Matthew Arnold in his recent volume,⁹ we see them as they reveal themselves to one whose mental discernment is not greater than his power of sympathetic appreciation, and who can convey the results thus attained in language so polished, flexible, and lustrously clear, that in reading it we enjoy the pleasure rarely caused by books of the present day, and find our attention straying from the subject matter to dwell upon the purity and beauty of the style. These essays have already undergone a good deal of criticism on their first appearance—with what effect upon their author may be learnt from his amusing preface, which is a small quiverful of stinging, if not absolutely poisoned arrows, shot right and left at reviewers,

⁹ "Essays in Criticism." By Matthew Arnold. London: Macmillan. 1865.

system-mongers, and the fat-headed respectable public in general, winding up with an eloquent appeal to Oxford, that "Queen of Romance, home of lost causes, and forsaken beliefs, and unpopular names, and impossible loyalties." In a literary point of view Mr. Arnold's small volume will bear comparison with the best examples of critical essay writing in our language, for grace of style, richness in allusion and illustration, and artistic sensitiveness to the most refined and delicate shades of variation and difference in the genius and temperament of others. In this last quality he possesses the true critical faculty in a remarkable degree, as is abundantly shown in his handling of two characters, so violently opposed as Marcus Aurelius and Heinrich Heine, to each of whom he has done signal justice in the delightful pages here devoted to them. Mr. Arnold wages war *à l'outrance* against John Bullism, and in his essay on "The Function of Criticism at the present time," he attacks our insular standards, and plain-common-sense-view ethics with all the scorn and a little of the spite of one whose wider culture gives him a right to assert that the current English literature is worth "certainly less, at this moment, than the current literature of France or Germany." But as there never has been a time in the history of letters when the responsibilities of book-makers were so disregarded, and narrow and ignorant criticism so abounded, as now, we cannot be too grateful to any one who will protest, as one having authority, against the sectarian and confused estimates which inevitably pass current when there is no organ of criticism, such as the *Revue des Deux Mondes*, having for its main function to understand and utter the best that is known and thought in the world; but where almost all critics are partisans, bound to test ideas rather by their conformity to and agreement with certain party standards than by their relation to absolute ideal perfection. This subject is pursued, with terrible illustrations from popular authors, in the second essay on "The Literary Influence of Academies." In spite of his assertion, "I wish to decide nothing as of my own authority; the great art of criticism is to get oneself out of the way and to let humanity decide," Mr. Arnold does decide a great many things, and in a tolerably authoritative manner, though the tendency of his mind to destroy rather than to build up is apparent at every turn, as is also a special aptitude for turning up neglected ideas, unpopular truths, and the particular side of a question which a self-satisfied Englishman, desirous of preserving his complacency unruffled, makes a point of refusing to see. To such an one this volume must be as nauseous as bitter; disturbing his most deeply-rooted prejudices, jarring upon his favourite persuasions, and compelling him to see a formidable well-supported *contra* to every one of his *pros*. What, for example, can be more annoying to a staunch Protestant than such a passage as the following, from the essay on "Pagan and Mediæval Religious Sentiment"?

"In spite of all the shocks which the feeling of a good Catholic has in this Protestant country inevitably to undergo, in spite of the contemptuous insensibility to the grandeur of Rome which he finds so general and so hard to bear,

how much has he to console him, how many acts of homage to the greatness of his religion may he see if he has his eyes open! I will tell him of one of them. Let him go in London to that delightful spot, that Happy Island in Bloomsbury, the reading-room of the British Museum. Let him visit its sacred quarter, the region where its theological books are placed. I am almost afraid to say what he will find there, for fear Mr. Spurgeon, like a second Caliph Omar, should give the library to the flames. He will find an immense Catholic work, the collection of the Abbé Migne, lording it over that whole region, reducing to insignificance the feeble Protestant forces which hang upon its skirts. Protestantism is duly represented indeed: Mr. Panizzi knows his business too well to suffer it to be otherwise; all the varieties of Protestantism are there. There is the library of Anglo-Catholic Theology, learned, decorous, exemplary, but a little uninteresting. There are the works of Calvin, rigid, militant, menacing. There are the works of Dr. Chalmers, the Scotch thistle valiantly doing duty as the rose of Sharon, but keeping something very Scotch about it all the time. There are the works of Dr. Channing, the last word of religious philosophy in a land where every one has some culture and where superiorities are discountenanced—the flower of moral and intelligent mediocrity. But how are all these divided against one another, and how, though they were all united, are they dwarfed by the Catholic Leviathan, their neighbour! Majestic in its blue and gold unity, this fills shelf after shelf, and compartment after compartment; its right mounting up into heaven among the white folios of the *Acta Sanctorum*, its left plunging down into hell among the yellow octavos of the *Law Digest*. Everything is there, in that immense *Patrologiæ Cursus Completus*, in that *Encyclopédie Théologique*, that *Nouvelle Encyclopédie Théologique*, that *Troisième Encyclopédie Théologique*, religion, philosophy, history, biography, arts, sciences, bibliography, gossip. The work embraces the whole range of human interests; like one of the great middle-age cathedrals, it is in itself a study for a life. Like the net in Scripture, it drags everything to land, bad and good, lay and ecclesiastical, sacred and profane, so that it be but matter of human concern. Wide-embracing as the power whose product it is! a power, for history, at any rate, eminently *the Church*; not I think the Church of the future, but indisputably the Church of the past, and, in the past, the Church of the multitude. This is why the man of imagination—nay, and the philosopher too, in spite of her propensity to burn him—will always have a weakness for the Catholic Church; because of the rich treasures of human life which have been stored within her pale. The mention of other religious bodies, or of their leaders, at once calls up in our mind the thoughts of men of a definite type as their adherents; the mention of Catholicism suggests no such special “following.” Anglicanism suggests the English episcopate; Calvin’s name suggests Dr. Candlish; Chalmers’s, the Duke of Argyll; Channing’s, Boston society; but Catholicism suggests,—what shall I say? all the pell mell of the men and women of Shakespeare’s plays. This abundance the Abbé Migne’s collection faithfully reflects. People talk of this or that work which they would choose, if they were to pass their life with only one; for my part I think I would choose the Abbé Migne’s collection. *Quidquid agunt homines*,—everything, as I have said, is there. Do not seek in it splendour of form, perfection of editing; its paper is common, its type ugly, its editing indifferent, its printing careless. The greatest and most baffling crowd of misprints I ever met with in my life occurs in a very important page of the introduction to the *Dictionnaire des Apocryphes*. But this is just what you have in the world, quantity rather than quality. Like the world, it chooses to have things all its own way, to abuse its adversary, to back its own notion through thick and thin, to put forward all the *pros* for its own notion, to suppress all the *contras*; it does just all that the world does, and all that the critical spirit shrinks from.”—p. 190.

But then again, where could we find a juster criticism than the following, from the highly interesting essay on Joubert?—

“Coleridge had less delicacy and penetration than Joubert, but more richness and power; his production, though far inferior to what his nature at first seemed to promise, was abundant and varied. Yet in all his production how much is there to dissatisfy us! How many reserves must be made in praising either his poetry, or his criticism, or his philosophy! How little either of his poetry, or of his criticism, or of his philosophy, can we expect permanently to stand! But that which will stand of Coleridge is this: the stimulus of his continual effort—not a moral effort, for he had no morals—but of his continual instinctive effort, crowned often with rich success, to get at and to lay bare the real truth of his matter in hand, whether that matter were literary, or philosophical, or political, or religious; and this in a country where at that moment such an effort was almost unknown; when the most powerful minds threw themselves upon poetry, which conveys truth, indeed, but conveys it indirectly; and when ordinary minds were so habituated to do without thinking altogether, to regard considerations of established routine and practical convenience as permanent, that any attempt to introduce within the domain of these the disturbing element of thought, they were prompt to resent as an outrage. Coleridge's great action lay in his supplying in England, for many years and under critical circumstances, by the spectacle of this effort of his, a stimulus to all minds, in the generation which grew up round him, capable of profiting by it. His action will still be felt as long as the need for it continues; when, with the cessation of the need, the action too has ceased, Coleridge's memory, in spite of the disesteem, nay, repugnance, which his character may and must inspire, will yet for ever remain invested with that interest and gratitude which invests the memory of founders.”—p. 223.

No one, not a “Philistine,” can read these essays without vivid pleasure, and perhaps no one will close the volume without an impression of profound sadness—the impression that haunts us after reading Mr. Arnold's poems. He describes, as few besides could do, the spiritual and intellectual attitude of the present time, and he is himself its living image, in its deep unrest, its startled faith, its bewildering consciousness of loss and trembling doubt of what it has to win, as he has himself expressed it long ago, in the stanzas from the Grande Chartreuse:

“Wandering between two worlds, one dead,
The other powerless to be born,
With nowhere yet to rest my head,
Like these on earth I wait forlorn.
Their faith, my tears, the world deride:
I come to shed them at their side.”

The success which attended the delivery and publication of the Dublin “Afternoon Lectures,” has induced a second series,¹⁰ which is, in some respects, superior to and of greater general interest than its predecessor. To the extension of the programme to Art as well as Literature we owe a very interesting lecture on Architecture, by Mr. Samuel Ferguson, in which the excessive mediævalism of the prevailing taste is well and temperately contrasted with the equally excessive

¹⁰ “Afternoon Lectures on Literature and Art.” Delivered in the Theatre of the Museum of Industry, St. Stephen's Green, Dublin. Bell and Daldy. 1864.

classicism of the last century, and the Asiatic origin of the Indo-Germanic races is suggested as the possible explanation of that delight in the elaborate filigree and profusion of carved ornament which was the taste the Goths brought into Italy, and which was equally repugnant to both the cultivated Italian and the Greek. The opening address, by Mr. Napier, is genial and eloquent; that by Mr. Fitzgerald, on Charles Lamb and Charles Dickens, a very agreeable selection of choice morsels of two very opposite styles of humour; and of the remaining four lectures, one by the Dean of Emly has the superior advantage of a theme unhackneyed by popular treatment—the “*Légende des Siècles*” of Victor Hugo, of which the lecturer gives translated passages in English verse, which are of more than average excellence; but it is a little hard to interrupt our enjoyment of them by informing us that “imagination is the protensive and unifying faculty,” and, as if that were not dark enough, to impart the further recondite information that “when it deals with individual images or objects, it confers upon them higher properties, or detects the universal laws of which they are instances or illustrations. When it acts upon objects in conjunction, it draws them to one luminous point.”

The same poem comes under consideration in an essay on “Victor Hugo in Exile,” which forms one of a series of studies in French literature,¹¹ by Herr Kreyssig, one of the numerous German commentators on Shakespeare. The volume before us consists of ten critico-biographical papers on modern French authors, intended to illustrate the growth and tendencies of French thought in almost every department of literature, from Scribe to Victor Hugo, from Madame de Staël to George Sand, from Châteaubriand to Louis Napoleon. The essays are not brilliantly written, but they are pleasant reading, and, without any vehement national prejudice, are sufficiently German in tone to impress upon the English reader the instructive fact that he is looking at his neighbour from a point of view not his own. The concluding paper on “Louis Napoleon” is one of the best, and presents the French Emperor in the light which, in spite of “*La Vie de César*,” we are little accustomed to regard him—that of a versatile and voluminous author, whose compositions extend over a period of twenty-seven years, and are almost as various as his actual living experiences, including, besides works exclusively political and on the development of the Napoleonic idea, treatises on war and pamphlets on pauperism, and a translation of Schiller’s “*Ideale*,” said to have been written to occupy a weary hour in the Conciergerie while the trial was impending after the Boulogne attempt.

Among the novels of the present quarter, “Tony Butler”¹² stands foremost, as in some respects the most deserving of popular favour. It starts on its independent existence, reprinted from *Blackwood’s Magazine*, in three extra thick volumes. Regarded as a work of

¹¹ “*Studien zur Französischen Cultur- und Literaturgeschichte.*” Von Fr. Kreyssig. Berlin: Nicolaische Verlagsbuchhandlung. London: Nutt. 1865.

¹² “Tony Butler.” Edinburgh and London: Blackwood and Sons. 1865.

fiction, we do not think its merits are of the highest order. It is lengthy and sluggish in its course; the story appears to be forcing its way through the sixty-four chapters in a clumsy and rather ponderous fashion, rather than to flow naturally and evenly to its close. The characters do not seem to be at home in their parts, and play even the most effective passages with a certain stiff self-consciousness that suggests a hand unskilled in the novelist's art. The hero is represented as a strong pugnacious Irish lad, slow of study and warm of heart, with the eye of a marksman and the fist of a boxer, hating books as Dr. Blimber's pupils hated the Romans, their implacable enemies, and sitting down to the composition of a note with almost as little knowledge of spelling and penmanship as a stable-boy; yet, a few chapters farther on, this illiterate young man is described as addressing an epistle to his mother, five printed pages and a half long, in the easy, graphic, descriptive style of a practised letter-writer, retailing good stories, and recording impressions and emotions such as no British youth of the Tony Butler stamp would ever dream of committing to paper. But let the reader forget that he has a novel in his hand, and he will find "Tony Butler" a very entertaining book; the story serving as a scaffolding for various scenes, incidents, and intrigues in the experience of a gentleman engaged on her Majesty's service, and allowing of certain slightly disguised sketches from real life, which are easily recognisable by those acquainted with the world of Government officials. The hero leaves his anxious widowed mother in her cottage near the Giant's Causeway, and his behaviour in Downing-street, and the mode of his reception there, are described as follows:—

"Tony Butler went down each morning to Downing-street and interrogated the austere door-keeper, till at length there grew up between that grim official and himself a state of feeling little short of hatred. 'No letters?' would say Tony. 'Look in the rack,' was the answer. 'Is this sort of thing usual?' 'What sort of thing?' 'The getting no reply for a week or ten days.' 'I should say it was very usual with certain people.' 'What do you mean by certain people?' 'Well, the people that don't have answers to letters, nor aint likely to have them.' 'Might I ask you another question?' said Tony, lowering his voice, and fixing a very quiet but steady look on the other. 'Yes, if it's a short one.' 'It's a very short one. Has no one ever kicked you for your impertinence?' 'Kicked *me*—kicked *me*, sir!' cried the other, while his face became purple with passion. 'Yes,' resumed Tony, mildly; 'for let me mention it to you in confidence, it's the last thing I mean to do before I leave London.' 'We'll see about this, sir, at once,' cried the porter, who rushed through the inner door, and tore upstairs like a madman. . . . 'The Chief wishes to see this gentleman upstairs for a moment,' said a pale, sickly youth to Skeffington. 'Don't get flurried. Be cool, Butler, and say nothing that can irritate, mind that,' whispered Skeffington, and stole away. Butler was introduced to a spacious room—partly office, partly library—at the fireplace of which stood two men, a short and a shorter. They were wonderfully alike in externals, being each heavy-looking, white-complexioned, serious men, with a sort of dreary severity of aspect, as if the spirit of domination had already begun to weigh down even themselves. 'We have been informed,' began the shorter of the two, in a slow, deliberate voice, 'that you have grossly outraged one of the inferior officers of this department; and although the case is one which demands, and shall have, the attention of the police authorities, we have sent for

you—Mr. Brand and I—to express our indignation—eh, Brand?’ added he, in a whisper. ‘Certainly our indignation,’ chimed in the other. ‘And aware as we are,’ resumed the Chief, ‘that you are an applicant for employment under this department, to convey to you the assurance that such conduct as you have been guilty of totally debars you—excludes you—’ ‘Yes, excludes you,’ chimed in Brand. ‘From the most remote prospect of an appointment!’ said the first, taking up a book, and throwing it down with a slap on the table. . . . ‘My lord,’ said a messenger, in a voice of almost tremulous terror, while he flung open both inner and outer doors for the great man’s approach. The person who entered with a quick active step, was an elderly man, white-whiskered and white-haired, but his figure well set up, and his hat rakishly placed a very little on one side; his features were acute, and betokened promptitude and decision; blended with a sort of jocular humour about the mouth, as though even State affairs did not entirely indispose a man to jest. ‘Don’t send that bag off to-night, Baynes, till I come down,’ said he, hurriedly; ‘and if any telegrams arrive, send them over to the House. What’s this policeman doing at the door? who is refractory?’ ‘This—young man,’ he paused, for he had almost said gentleman—‘has just threatened an old and respectable servant of the office with a personal chastisement, my lord.’ ‘Declared he’d break every bone in his body,’ chimed in Brand. ‘Whose body?’ asked his lordship. ‘Willis’s, my lord, the hall-porter—a man, if I mistake not, appointed by your lordship.’ ‘I said I’d kick him,’ said Tony, calmly. ‘Kick Willis?’ said my lord, with a forced gravity, which could not, however, suppress a laughing twinkle of his keen grey eyes; ‘kick Willis?’ ‘Yes, my lord, he does not attempt to deny it.’ ‘What’s your name?’ asked my lord. ‘Butler,’ was the brief reply. ‘The son of—no, not son, but relative of Sir Omerod’s?’ asked his lordship again. ‘His nephew.’ ‘Why, Sir Harry Elphinstone has asked me for something for you. It would be an admirable thing to have some one to kick the porters; but we haven’t thought of such an appointment, eh, Baynes? Willis, the very first; most impudent dog. We want a messenger for Bucharest, Brand, don’t we?’ ‘No, my lord, you filled it this morning—gave it to Mr. Beed.’ ‘Cancel Beed, then, and appoint Butler.’ ‘Mr. Beed has gone, my lord—started with the Vienna bag.’ ‘Make Butler supernumerary.’ ‘There are four already, my lord.’ ‘I don’t care if there were forty, Mr. Brand. Go and pass your examination, young gentleman, and thank Sir Harry Elphinstone, for this nomination is at his request. I am only sorry you did not kick Willis.’ And with this parting speech he turned away, and hopped downstairs to his brougham with the light step and jaunty air of a man of thirty.”—vol. i. p. 210.

It is in such scenes that the author best displays his peculiar powers and special knowledge, and by far the most amusing character in the book is the Hon. Skeffington Damer, a secretary, who threatens to retire, “leaving the whole thing”—namely, European politics, “at sixes and sevens,” and whose part of unqualified absurdity is sustained with a gravity that bespeaks no mean comic powers. Major MacCaskey, who first appears on the scene as an agent for raising Irish recruits for the late Neapolitan Government, is also an excellent sketch, in the same strong colours and broad outline. The female characters are less successful—they are more clever studies than real women; and although their presence is necessary to the plot, and they bear their share, and are made love to when occasion requires, they do not add much to the interest of the story. But, as we have said, “Tony Butler’s” chief merits are independent of the story, and these are sufficiently high to secure it a place in the comparatively small

library of novels in which public affairs and political intrigue take the place of domestic interests, and the narrower field of personal sentiment and individual experience.

Mr. Gilbert takes us to the opposite pole of the social system, and shows us how human beings exist in those lowest depths of poverty which underlie and undermine the glittering superstructure of modern civilization. "De Profundis"¹³ is an excellently written, unvarnished narrative, which might have been composed from certain chapters of Mr. Mayhew's "London Labour and the London Poor," omitting the general statistics, and supplying their place with the needful machinery for a connected story. No one can read it without a painful conviction that it is a faithful transcript of true chapters from those dreary annals of the "City Poor," which are anything but short and simple. The style well becomes the subject—plain, earnest, unaffected, and with an admirable quaint simplicity of language in relating the most heartrending details, which is more effective than the most studied artificial effects, as it is perhaps more rarely attained to. There is little relief to the monotonous record of improvidence, wretchedness, and want, excepting what is afforded by traits of piety, goodness, and self-sacrifice, which shine with greater lustre from the darkness which surrounds them, and which might put to shame the easily-practised virtues of respectable humanity. The strange mixture of recklessness and thrift, profanity and refinement, rags and fastidiousness of the inhabitants of our filthy courts and alleys, is well portrayed by one who is thoroughly conversant with those to whom we have given the piteous name of the perishing and dangerous classes, and who does full justice to the proud and noble spirit which supports many of the industrious poor in their desperate and life-long struggle to maintain their independence by drudgery of the lowest kind. The character of Mrs. Sparkes, washerwoman, the energetic wife of a submissive guardsman, and self-adopted mother of the foundling-boy who is the hero of the story, is one of the best in the book, and we unwillingly take leave of her at the outset, notwithstanding the excellent chapter devoted to her last days. The hero, James Duke (the surname bestowed by the worthy Sparkes on the infant-foundling, out of compliment to the Duke of Wellington), begins life as a regimental drummer, but wearying of his profession, he determines to leave it, and, by the advice of Jemima his future wife, he waylays her Majesty's carriage on Constitution Hill, and making a military salute exclaims—"If you please, your Majesty, I will trouble you to provide yourself with another drummer by this day month." After this legal warning, he considers himself perfectly free to enter upon any civil calling, leaving to Jemima the novel task of explaining his conduct to the astonished adjutant, and returning his uniform and accoutrements in an old band-box, with an explanatory note to the colonel of the regiment. After this spirited action, the pair maintain themselves by costermongering, and would have done so in comparative comfort, but for

¹³ "De Profundis: a Tale of the Social Deposits." By William Gilbert, author of "Shirley Hall Asylum," &c. London: Alexander Strahan. 1864.

their simple-minded credulity, which exposes them to be easily duped.

Among their neighbours at "Smith's Rents"—a wretched collection of dwellings in Westminster—is a returned convict, who goes by the nickname of Gobby, striving desperately to exist without stealing. He is a rough taciturn man, keeping aloof from his neighbours, who neither like nor dislike him, and know very little about him. On one sad occasion, when the young wife of a soldier and her newly-born babe are dying, Gobby appears in a new character:—

"Jemima whispered to Gobby that he would do well to take the infant down into his own room. . . . He employed himself in walking to and fro in his little room, trying to calm the baby the while by imitating, as closely as his hoarse voice would allow him, the tones of a nurse trying to induce a fractious infant to sleep. But all without avail; the low, moaning cry still continued. He stopped short in his walk, and uncovering its face, looked at it for a moment, and then sorrowfully shook his head. He covered the baby up again and recommenced his walk, determining to try what effect his singing would have on it, and commenced, in an intended sweet tone of voice, a song, of which the following is a verse:—

'As we sailed down the river clear,
The twenty-eighth day of May,
Every ship that we passed by,
We heard the sailors say—
There goes a crew of clever lads,
We're sorry for to say,
That for some crime or else another
They're going to Botany Bay.'

The music had no soothing effect on the baby, and it kept up unceasingly its low, faint cry. Gobby stopped in his singing, and opening his cupboard, took from it a little jug, at the bottom of which remained a few spoonfuls of milk. . . . Finding the baby could not swallow, he replaced the jug in the cupboard, and recommenced his singing—

'There is a girl in London town,
A girl I know full well,
If e'er I get my libertie
Along with her I'll dwell.
If e'er I get my libertie
I'll forsake all other girls,
I'll quit all evil company,
And adieu to New South Wales.'

He continued his ditty, and he flattered himself with good effect, for the baby became somewhat quieter. Pleased with his success, he sang somewhat louder and in a more jovial tone, and the baby's cry ceased entirely. He paused for a moment in his singing, and listened. Suddenly an inexplicable, solemn feeling came over him. He removed the flannel from its face—the baby was a corpse!"

The mother dies almost at the same moment.

"When the poor creature was placed in her coffin, Gobby took great care that the infant's head should lean on her arm, and on the left side, 'so that it might be nearest her heart.' He then tried to get some flowers to place in the coffin, as 'they used to do in the part of the world he came from,' wherever that might have been. The time was winter, and no flowers were to be had, and he bought some sweet herbs instead. When it was time

to take the body to the grave he waited down in the Rents with the crowd, quietly smoking his pipe. As the body passed him, as a mark of respect he knocked the ashes out of his pipe, and followed the funeral, though at a considerable distance. When it arrived in the graveyard he placed himself some forty or fifty feet off while the service was being read. He took off his hat, but turned his head slightly another way, as if he wished it to be thought it was for his own convenience he did so, and not that he was attending the funeral. When the clergyman had finished, Gobby put on his hat to watch the gravediggers fill up the grave. The men appeared in a hurry, and took up full spadefuls of earth and flung them heavily on the coffin. Noticing this, he advanced to them. 'I say, mates,' said he, 'you need not pitch it in so heavily as that.' 'Are you afraid it will wake her?' 'No, but it would seem kinder if you did it more quietly.' 'Did you know her?' 'Yes, well; and she was as good a creature as ever lived.' 'I did not know you knew her,' said the gravedigger, using far less force in his work; 'who was she?' 'She was the wife of a soldier, and her husband's away.' 'Poor thing,' said the gravedigger, evidently totally uninterested in the history of the deceased, but perfectly willing to sympathize with the feelings of her living friend—'poor thing! that's very bad, though;' and the conversation continued in the same strain till his work was done. The gravedigger then commenced treading the ground in, not stamping, but doing it very gently; and when he had finished he smoothed the earth down with his spade with considerable care. 'Thankee, mate,' said Gobby, when he had finished. 'All right,' said the gravedigger, cleaning his spade with a piece of an old coffin he had picked up."—vol. ii., p. 28.

There is a pathetic simplicity and a subdued harmoniousness of tone in this passage which recalls some picked examples of English descriptive writing. We have never read a story of humble life so well and unaffectedly told as this, and we recommend it as a wholesome contrast to the pictures of vulgar splendour and luxury under which our tables groan.

A small one-volume story,¹⁴ by the author of "Mademoiselle Mori," offers so many points of resemblance to "Denise," that it inevitably challenges comparison with that charming tale. Unfortunately, the comparison is not favourable to "Madame Fontenoy;" for, though not wanting in the grace and clearness which distinguished "Denise," there is a lack of substance in the texture, which is too slight for even a short story, and gives an impression of thinness which is unsatisfactory. The only figure that is made out with much distinctness is that of H el ene Desmond, the heroine, in whose fortunes we have barely had time to feel interested before she is married and done with, and the book brought to an end. The story opens with a very good description of the arrival of her English father at Rheims to take her—a thoroughly unanglicised damsel of sixteen—to see her mother and sisters, from whom she has been parted for twelve years, and towards whom she cherishes little affection, her whole heart being given to her austere Hugonot grandmother, Madame Fontenoy, who has never forgiven her daughter Ren e, H el ene's mother, for marrying the satirical Englishman, Mr. Desmond, instead of the son of her father's partner, as she was in duty bound to do. H el ene's French training

¹⁴ "Madame Fontenoy." By the author of "Mdlle. Mori." London: Mozley. 1864.

has ill prepared her for the monotonous country life that awaits her at her father's house. She very soon puts herself in an attitude of unnecessary antagonism on account of her cousin Roger, the vicar, an excellent, slow, parish-laden young man, whose clerical virtues have no lustre in her eyes. She had read French romances, and, by their aid, had arrived at the false conclusion that there is to be a *mariage de convenance* between them, for, as she naïvely observes, "in romances the heiress always is given to some poorer son of the family." The family group of the Desmonds is well though slightly sketched, and there are passages worthy of the author, depicting the uneasy amazement of the imaginative, dreamy Héléne at the dull matter-of-fact round of duties which fully occupy her sister and are so foreign to herself, accustomed to listen to discussions on the lawfulness of suicide in the dusky old salon at Rheims, and to hear from old Suzanne in the kitchen, how she was once visited by the Blanquettes one New Year's Eve, in Provence. Slight as is the story of "Madame Fontenoy," and disappointing as being too short, it has a freshness and delicacy of its own, and it belongs to the higher class of fiction, which aims at artistic representation rather than the judicial balancing of goodness and badness, and deducing an obvious moral, which, according to M. Taine, is the besetting error of English writers.

The enthusiastic reception which Miss Muloch's new one-volume story¹⁵ has met with, proves that the pungency of the sensational school is not needful for popularity, and that the public taste is not yet so depraved by stimulants as to be unmoved by a mildly emotional narrative setting forth how a poor young girl, who marries a widower, and one of the Heads of Houses in a University, undergoes a very martyrdom before she and her meek, middle-aged, hesitating, scholarly husband discover that two things are necessary to comfort, to say nothing of happiness, in married life—namely, that there should be confidence between husband and wife, and that the latter should not be tyrannised over by the first wife's sister, who loses no opportunity of insulting her, and endeavours to set the children against her before they have even seen her. In the acquisition of these elementary truths poor Christian suffers every kind of despicable treatment, and finally of threatened shame, for she had had a brief dream of love before the grave don wooed and won her; and the false lover returns and seeks her in the decorous gatherings of College dignitaries and in the sacred precincts of College walks, and the wicked sister-in-law gets an inkling of it, and horrible complications ensue, which are, however, all satisfactorily set right—the fascinating lover turns from the error of his ways, the abominable sister-in-law retires baffled and beaten, and poor Christian is left in peace. In working out this very simple plot, the authoress has abundant scope for the close analysis of feeling, the appeal to the highest and purest principles, and the minute circumstantial chronicling of all the infinitesimally small details of domestic history, which in combination produce the popular lady's novel of

¹⁵ "Christian's Mistake." By the author of "John Halifax, Gentleman," &c. &c. London: Hurst and Blackett. 1865.

the better class. It is not exactly life-like, but it is so suffused by real knowledge of women and their ways, that it is a very pretty composition ; and if it be questionable whether any man, albeit the master of a College, would deliberately take a young wife, whom he adores, and shut her up with such a woman as his sister-in-law, under whose intolerable sway he has himself groaned for years, it is certain that the fine character of Christian is well brought out by contrast with his wholly opposite nature, and that if he had been a little more wise and a little less self-contained, the story of "Christian's Mistake" could not have been written. That Christian should have remembered her first love as a circumstance of immense importance, and that as her heart slowly warmed to her husband she should reflect upon the concealment of it from him as a reservation of terrible magnitude, is perfectly natural, and so also is her profound astonishment when he quietly tells her that he had known it all along ; but we do not see that the experience of these two persons, as here narrated, goes one step towards establishing the axiom laid down, that "every husband, every wife, before entering into the solemn bond of marriage, has a right to be made acquainted with every secret of the other's heart, every event of the other's life." It was by no means the keeping her cherished secret to herself, when she married a man old enough to be her father, and whom she did not pretend to love, that brought the misery into Christian's life ; the circumstances of her married life were enough, in all conscience, to account for it, and these circumstances are drawn with a skilful, womanly touch, that gives them a meaning, and an attraction for their own sake, and as affecting the gentle heroine's fate, but not by any means as making out a case in confirmation of the principle so emphatically declared.

"The Brookes of Bridlemere"¹⁶ is a fair specimen of Mr. Whyte Melville's productions : good of its kind, easy, gentlemanly, and well put together ; filling its three volumes with a facile volubility, and suggestive of prints of ladies and gentlemen in the latest fashion, unexceptionably "got up," and put through their paces for the admiration of beholders. Not a passing *mode* of dress or speech escapes this faithful mirror of society ; whether in the barrack, or the drawing, or the ball-room, he makes his characters act, speak, and, above all, dress with scrupulous regard to the newest style, and he has the art which makes this accuracy in representing the exterior go a great way. Clouds of tobacco smoke and gallons of brown sherry are among his favourite accessories, and he never forgets to call attention to the beautifully-fitting boots and coloured hose of the ladies when they go out walking. The fortunes of the brothers of the house of Brooke are followed through various phases, in the course of which we are taken behind the scenes in a money-changer's office, and a dog-stealer's den ; and throughout all the story is kept going with unflinching spirit, and the reader is amused to the end. Among the minor characters we may mention a certain rough terrier, Tatters by name, who is by no means one of the least interesting.

¹⁶ "The Brookes of Bridlemere." By G. J. Whyte Melville, author of "Digby Grand," &c. &c. Second Edition. Chapman and Hall. 1864.

The English translation of the "Autobiography of the Princess Henrietta Caracciolo," with a catch-protestant title,¹⁷ is badly executed and badly printed, but that the history itself is an authentic one there seems to be sufficient evidence, external and internal. The picture it gives of conventual life in Naples will surprise no one acquainted with Southern Italy; and the intrepidity and persistence with which this unfortunate victim of family cruelty and priestly coercion struggled to regain her freedom, are as extraordinary as the history is painful. The book has, as might be expected, made an immense sensation in Italy, and has gone through several large editions since its first publication at Florence a few months ago.

In a dreary book which has nothing original about it but its title,¹⁸ we think we recognise a strong likeness to an equally dreary one, "Forbidden Fruit," upon which we commented some time ago. A tissue of love-making and love-marring, with profuse descriptions of resplendent beauty and gorgeous toilettes, represent, we think, the only distinct impression to be gathered from these two volumes of uninteresting intrigue and vapid sentiment. The same remark will not apply to an Irish story,¹⁹ which is a mixture of tavern scenes, an agrarian outrage, and an ill-disguised reproduction of the Tyrone ghost story. There is also a sermon, and a great deal of conversation, sustained chiefly by drunken individuals of either sex, and besides these attractions, some peculiarities of style, such as "her faith had never once been shook," and "to account for why." A child's book by Mrs. Greene,²⁰ has many of the qualities that little folks appreciate, including minute circumstantiality, to recommend it, and the lesson of kindness and forbearance it is meant to inculcate is honestly avowed, and not smuggled in when the unwary reader has got fairly embarked in a story that turns to a sermon he hardly knows how.

Among one-volume German books, we have a pretty tale²¹ by Hackländer, and a volume of short stories,²² which also contains a lively paper on the last London Exhibition, and a religious novel,²³ which is praised by a native critic in those fatally warning terms which certify that it may be placed with advantage in the hands of all well-educated young ladies.

We are indebted to Mr. and Mrs. Tom Taylor for a beautiful volume of old ballads,²⁴ which introduces us to the rich and little explored mine of Folks lore to be found in Brittany. They consist of transla-

¹⁷ "Mysteries of the Neapolitan Cloister." Being an Autobiography of the Princess Henrietta Caracciolo of Farino. London: H. M. Blanch. 1865.

¹⁸ "Belial." London: Smith and Elder. 1864.

¹⁹ "Kinkora: an Irish Story." By the Hon. Albert Canning.

²⁰ "Cushions and Corners; or, Holidays at Old Orchard." By Mrs. R. J. Greene. London: Smith and Elder. 1864.

²¹ "Fürst und Kavalier." Von W. F. Hackländer. Stuttgart.

²² "Vom Haidehaus." Von F. W. Hackländer. Stuttgart: Halleberzer. London: Nutt. 1865.

²³ "Stolz und Still." Berlin: Rauh. London: Nutt.

²⁴ "Ballads and Songs of Brittany." Translated by Tom Taylor, with some original Melodies harmonized by Mrs. Tom Taylor. With illustrations. London: Macmillan. 1865.

tions of some of the popular ballads and songs which have been collected with so much industry by the Vicomte de la Villemarqué, and they are but a small gleanings from "a richer ballad literature, and a larger stock of popular idyllic and religious poetry, than exists in any part of Europe of the same extent." The Breton population has always been set apart from the rest of France by blood, language, usages, and feelings, and it has retained much of the Celtic nationality which fusion with other races has effaced elsewhere. Ballads and canticles that were sung in the tenth, twelfth, and fourteenth centuries, are still handed down among the peasantry, and the original of many of the specimens translated by Mr. Taylor was communicated orally to M. de la Villemarqué by beggars and peasant women. They are none of them of later date than the second half of the fourteenth century, and in some of them there is every indication of a very remote antiquity. This is especially the case in the song with which the book opens, "The Wine of the Gauls, and the Dance of the Sword," a ghastly savage chaunt, which is supposed to contain a fragment of the old Celtic sword-dance in honour of the sun, combined with a war-song celebrating the Breton raids upon the Frankish vineyards. It is still sung in taverns by the peasantry, though much of its meaning is lost among them. The chorus:—

" Fire! fire! steel, oh! steel!
 Fire, fire! steel and fire!
 Oak, oak, earth and waves!
 Waves, oak, earth, and oak!"

seems to carry us back to the ferocious religious celebrations of Druidical times, and there is a rhythm in the wild bloodthirsty stanzas that suggests an accompaniment of tramping feet and clashing swords. Many of the ballads commemorate events and personages of historic celebrity, and are full of fire and spirit, which are well preserved in these translations. The second part consists of songs on domestic and festive occasions, and among these one of the most pathetic is "The Leper," in which the wretched sufferer bemoans his misery and is spurned by his love. Many of the popular ballads turn on this subject, and although the scourge has ceased for three hundred years, the trades of ropemaker and cooper, which lepers were allowed to carry on outside the gates of walled cities, are still regarded with aversion and contempt. The music of some of the simple wailing melodies, which belong to the words of eighteen of the ballads, is added by Mrs. Taylor in an Appendix.

A new blank verse translation of the "Inferno"²⁵ by Mr. Rossetti, has the merit of keeping close to the literal sense and phraseology of the original, and to this end it sacrifices everything else; consequently, the language is often weak to English ears—for strictly verbal equivalents never can express in another tongue all that the same

²⁵ "The Comedy of Dante Allighieri." Part I.—The Hell. Translated into blank verse by William Michael Rossetti. Macmillan. 1865.

words meant to the poet who used them. Doubtless, as we are told in the Preface, some passages sound "odd" in English because they are odd in the Italian, but this does not account for the sense of baldness which inevitably attends a translation that aims at only "unconditional literality in phraseology."

A gay little volume of rhymed nonsensicalities²⁶ and whimsicalities will please the little folks of Lilliput Land, and their elders will recognise in some of the effusions by the candidate for the office of Lilliput Laureate—such as "Prince Philibert" and "Polly," pieces that have already been canvassed in the world of grown-up books.

²⁶ "Lilliput Levée." With illustrations by J. E. Millais and G. J. Pinwell. London: Alexander Strahan, 1864.

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