Document Information
Date: 1980-07-08
By: David Cameron
Citation: Note to Mr. Chretien from David Cameron, The Position of Provincial Governments on Reform of the Upper Chamber (8 July 1980).
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July 8th, 1980
NOTE TO MR. CHRETIEN
The Position of Provincial Governments on Reform of the Upper Chamber
The following points can be made on the basis of today’s round-robin discussion of the Senate:
1. There has been a striking development in the thinking which provinces have devoted to this issue and in the generally sympathetic, or at least open-minded manner in which they approach the question of upper-chamber reform. B.C. was obviously surprised and pleased by what other governments had to say, and Alberta, despite its earlier reservations, is now clearly willing to see the issue seriously examined. Several other provinces, in particular Ontario and Prince Edward Island, had well developed positions on this item, and Quebec wishes B.C.’s proposal to be carefully examined, with the consideration of duality added.
2. There were signs of a consensus which in some respects may already exist and in other respects might be developed.
a) Provinces were clearly prepared to give the issue much higher priority in constitutional discussion than had previously been the case.
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b) Most provinces, whether keen on upper-chamber reform or not, were employing a similar frame of reference for analysis, namely, the interrelationship between upper chamber reform and the question of centralization and decentralization.
c) Most provinces appeared to agree on the broad reasons for considering reform, namely, to enhance regional representation at the centre and to ensure that provincial views are reflected in national policy-making. Some provinces saw a reformed upper house as an institution which could express the country’s duality as well.
3. Less clearly, there appeared to be some agreement on certain issues relating to a reformed upper chamber’s functions, composition and powers. Those conclusions must, however, be understood as tentative.
a) Functions. Perhaps the three most frequently mentioned functions were those developed by Ontario, namely, the ratification of specified federal initiatives, the approval of appointments to critical federal agencies, and the provision of advice to the federal government on federal matters having an impact on provinces.
b) Composition. Most provinces seemed to be thinking either of provincial government appointments, or a mix of provincial and federal appointments, probably with each government’s representatives voting en bloc on certain matters. Some favoured regions as the basis for determining representation by province. Some favoured equal representation for each unit, some favoured weighted representation.
c) Powers. Most provinces appeared to accept the idea that the powers of an upper house would have to be carefully limited, and that they could not be allowed to interfere with the central legislative functions of the House of Commons. Many talked of a suspensive veto, and some specified the areas over which greater control would be exercised and the areas over which limited or no control would be exercised.
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Implications for the Federal Government
The federal government, effectively, has no position on the Senate. As such, it is now in a distinct minority.
If one accepts that the development recorded above is promising and potentially beneficial, there is an urgent need to establish a general federal position on the question of upper chamber reform which could then serve as the basis for our negotiations with the provinces.
Thus, in order for us to take maximum advantage of the opening which’ currently exists, it would be most helpful to have guidance in the following points:
1. Would the federal government be prepared to accept an upper chamber composed of government-appointed delegates?
2. Would the federal government be prepared to accept a mix of federal and provincial-government delegates, the ratio to be established subsequently?
3. Would the federal government be prepared to accept the principle that an upper house might impose extra hurdles, but not complete blockage on specified House of Commons legislation having particularly to do with direct provincial-government concerns? (Such hurdles might be in the form of a suspensive veto or a Commons override of a 2/3 vote, and might be one alternative to transferring power to provincial governments in particular cases.)
4. Would the federal government be prepared to accept the principle of an upper-chamber veto on certain specified federal executive action (e.g., appointments to the Supreme Court)?
5. Would the federal government be prepared to extend the role of an upper chamber in French-English relations beyond specifically linguistic matters to include certain specified cultural matters?
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As you know this note has been prepared in the light of the federal delegation’s discussion with you this afternoon. At Michael Kirby’s request, I am arranging to have a copy delivered to the Prime, Minister this evening with the hope that he will have had an opportunity to read it, prior to your telephone conversation with him (to take place, probably, tomorrow morning at about 9:00 a.m.)
David R. Cameron