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Date: 1866-04-02
By: Montreal Herald
Citation: “OUR FELLOW COLONISTS AT THE ANTIPODES” Montreal Herald (2 April, 1866)
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OUR FELLOW COLONISTS AT THE ANTIPODES.
The Colonial office has done what it was bound to do. It has recalled Governor Darling from Australia for using his authority to set the law at defiance. Our readers will, perhaps, remember in what manner, but as it is desirable that they should keep it in mind, the short history of the affair will bear repetition. The present Ministry of Victoria, sustained by a large majority in the House of Assembly, and as we judge of the People outside; but unpopular with a certain class of landholders, passed in the Lower House a high tariff law for the so called purpose of protecting native industry. In the Legislative Council, which is elective like our own, however, they are not popular, perhaps on account of their land policy, though that is not very clear to this Editor. At any rate whether as a party movement, on the general question, of confidence, or because its members were sufficiently intelligent to dislike the principle of protection, the Legislative Council rejected the tariff bill, with all the more good will and good reason, because by a dodge which savours strongly of the worst parts of Colonial statesmanship, it had been tacked to another measure, in order to force the hand of the Upper House. Now, having no sympathy whatever, with protectionist doctrines, we think nevertheless that above all such questions, is that one of the right of the People to govern themselves; and, therefore, if the Colony of Victoria or any other Colony, is sufficiently ill-advised to impose upon itself the grievous burden which their fellow subjects in England have thrown off, there is, in our view nothing for it but to submit. But the people must declare their will, in a constitutional and orderly manner, through the regular forms of legislation, and must, if need be, suffer the delays to legislation, which the existence of a second chamber implies. When then the Legislative Council, rejected the tariff bill, the only recourse was to do without it, until the opinion or the composition of the Legislative Council had been changed. Not so thought the Ministry. They determined to set the constitution at defiance, and proceeded to collect customs duties under the rejected law. This they could not do, however, without the complicity of the Governor; and he acting perhaps, on an impression of his duty to follow the counsel of his advisers, lent his official sanction to their illegal proceedings. He was undoubtedly placed in a position of great difficulty, with a Cabinet backed by a large Parliamentary majority in the lower house, and probably also of the people on one hand, and the Legislative Council supported only by the law on the other. But nothing can be more certain than that it was his duty above all things to hold fast to the law; nor than that the Imperial government was bound to insist upon his doing so. Yet here is, notwithstanding, a very disagreeable antagonism transferred from the Colony to the Mother Country, which now takes the place the Governor should have occupied from the first, in resisting even “the well understood wishes of the People,” when it was attempted to give them effect without regard to law. A very grave incident in this antagonism, is the accidental one, that the question out of which this issue has arisen, is one on which the Imperial government, and the People of the Mother Country are known to feel strongly, and in a sense opposed to that of the majority of the People of Victoria. In simply maintaining the fundamental law, therefore, there is an appearance of forcing Imperial interests against Colonial ones, which may lead to bitter controversy hereafter. Let us suppose that the dead lock shall continue, as we hope it will not, and that all the popular forces of the Province shall be arrayed on the side of the Ministry, and that on the new Governor arriving he shall find this Ministry resolutely determined, to give him no other advice than that which they gave his predecessor—how then? He dismisses them we may suppose; calls new Ministers to his Council; dissolves Parliament, and after a heated election finds his new Ministry beaten and with them himself and the Imperial government! What will the next move be? It is not easy we are sorry to say, to suppose that on a question of the kind now agitated in Victoria, the popular party will yield; but what constitutionalists might expect from them is that they would accept of the delays required by constitutional forms and recognize the authority of the Council, till its members can be changed by new elections. Nor on the other hand, is it too much to look for from the patriotism of the Council, that seeing itself at issue with the mass of the People, it shall give way rather than bring about a crisis such as appears to be impending. That is the shortest and the most probable road out of the difficulty; for if the contest is pushed to the last extremity there is no doubt that the most popular of the two bodies—that which by being most frequently elected is most imbued with the feelings of the constituency at the moment—is the one that will triumph. This brings us once more to point out the folly committed by the wise men of the Quebec Conference, who in their pedantic love for authority, conferred upon the Legislative Council of the intended Confederation, inherent powers of obstruction, far greater than those possessed by the House of Lords in England;—gave that is to say, to the House which is and must be the weakest, a constitution and authority which it requires superior strength to possess and exercise. If the trouble which we see in Victoria has grown out of a contest between two houses, both elected by the People, what is to be expected in a constitution where one Chamber will be independent alike of the People and the Crown, and above the possibility of change, except by the slow process of appointments taking place on the deaths of members. Such a body would, in fear of the consequences, become a mere registry office for the decrees of the Assembly; or rashly exercising the irresponsible power committed to it, would raise a storm that after embittering all our relations, Colonial and Imperial, would sweep the Council away.