The Special Joint Committee of the Senate and of the House of Commons on the Constitution of Canada, 28th Parl, 4th Sess, Final Report (29 May 1972)


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Date: 1972-05-29
By: Canada (Parliament)
Citation: Canada, Parliament, Special Joint Committee of the Senate and of the House of Commons on the Constitution of Canada, Final Report, 28th Parl, 4th Sess (29 May 1972).
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The Special Joint Committee of the Senate
and of the House of Commons on the


CONSTITUTION
OF
CANADA


FINAL REPORT

Joint Chairmen:

Senator Gildas L. Molgat
Mark MacGuigan, M.P.

Fourth Session

Twenty-eighth Parliament

1972


The Special Joint Committee
of the SENATE and of the
HOUSE OF COMMONS
on the

CONSTITUTION OF CANADA

Final Report

Joint Chairmen:
SENATON GILDAS L. MOLGAT
MARK MacGUIGAN, M.P.

Fourth Session
Twenty-eighth Parliament
1972


THE SPECIAL JOINT COMMITTEE
OF THE SENATE
AND OF THE
HOUSE OF COMMONS
ON THE CONSTITUTION OF CANADA

Joint Chairmen: Senator Gildas L. Molgat
Mr. Mark MacGuigan, M.P.

Representing the Senate:

Senators

Cameron
Fergusson
Flynn
Forsey
Haig
Lafond
Lamontagne1
Quart
Yuzyk—(10)

Representing the House of Commons:

Messrs.

Alexander
Allmand
Asselin
Breau
Brewin
De Bané
Dinsdale
Fairweather
Gibson
Gundlock
Hogarth
Lachance
Laprise
Marceau
Marchand (Kamloops-Cariboo)
McQuaid
Osler
Prud’homme
Rowland—(20)

Michael B. Kirby
Gabrielle Savard
Joint Clerks of the Committee

1 Joint Chairman of the Committee to June 29, 1971.

[Page iii-iv]

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Acknowledgements

v
PART

I—

THE CONSTITUTION

Chapter

1—

Constitutional Imperatives

1
2—

The Mandate

4
3—

Why a New Constitution?

6
4—

Patriation of the Constitution

8
5—

Amendments to the Constitution

9
6—

The Preamble to the Constitution

11
PART

II—

THE PEOPLE

Chapter

7—

Self-Determination

13
8—

Native Peoples

15
9—

Fundamental Rights

18
10—

Language Rights

22
11—

Regional Disparities

26
PART

III—

FEDERAL INSTITUTIONS

Chapter

12—

The Head of State

29
13—

The Senate

33
14—

The House of Commons

37
15—

The Supreme Court of Canada

39
16—

The National Capital Area

41
PART

IV—

THE GOVERNMENTS

Chapter

17—

The Division of Powers

43
18—

The General Legislative Power of Parliament

46
19—

Taxing Powers

48
20—

The Federal Spending Power

50
21—

Intergovernmental Relations

54
22—

Municipalities

57
23—

The Territories

61
24—

Offshore Mineral Rights

66
25—

International Relations

68
PART

V—

SOCIAL POLICY
Chapter

26—

Social Security

71
27—

Criminal Law

74
28—

Marriage and Divorce

76
29—

Education

78
30—

Communications

79
PART

VI—

THE REGULATION OF THE ECONOMY
Chapter

31—

Economic Policy

81
32—

Trade and Commerce

84
33—

Income Controls

86
34—

Securities and Financial Institutions

88
35—

Competition

89
36—

Air and Water Pollution

91
37—

Foreign Ownership and Canadian Independence

93

SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

95

APPENDICES
A—

Extracts from the British North America Act, 1867

103
B—

Canadian Constitutional Charter, Victoria 1971

106
C—

Extracts from the Report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and
Biculturalism, 1969

111
D—

List of Witnesses

112
E—

List of other Submissions

125

[Page v]

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

A two-year study on the scale undertaken by the Special Joint Committee on the constitution of canada could not have been carried out without the full cooperation of the Speaker and the Senior Officers of the House of Commons, and we wish to thank them for their kind treatment of our many unusual needs. We also found the Officers of the Senate most helpful.

Such a study requires a sizeable back-up staff. This staff was principally supplied to the Committee by the Committees and Private Legislation Branch, the Committee Reporting Services Branch and the Committee Liaison Officer of the House of Commons and by the Interpretation and Translation Divisions of the Department of the Secretary of State. The Committee is most grateful to the members of these Branches for their constant and painstaking service.

We are particularly conscious of the great contribution to our work made by our Joint Clerks: Mr. Michael B. Kirby, whose intellectual commitment and genial perseverance earned him a key role in the development of the Committee’s work from initial plpn to Final Report; Mr. Patrick Savoie, the other Joint Clerk until April 19, 1971; and Miss Gabrielle Savard, who succeeded Mr. Savoie as Joint Clerk and capped many months of work with long hours helping to check the Report. we are especially indebted to these devoted servants.

We are grateful also to our own staff: Mr. David L. McWilliam, our Legal Adviser; Mr. Jacques Malouin, our Economic Adviser; Mr. Richard Gervais, our Executive Assistant; and Miss Cecile Suchal, our untiring Research Assistant. These staff members made major contributions to the success of our hearings and to the preparation of this Report.

We also had the welcome assistance, during the summer of 1971 of three law students: Mr. Grégoire Lehoux from the University of Ottawa Law School; Mr. C. Kevin Moore from the Law School of the University of British Columbia; and Miss Francis Statham of the Law School of the University of Manitoba.

Our thanks must also go to the thousands of Canadians who participated in our public meetings, and especially to those who appeared as witnesses. To them this Report is ultimately directed and dedicated.

Explanation of References

References as follows (3.24:12) are to be found throughout the Report. They refer to the Committee’s Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence. The first number refers to the session of the twenty-eighth Parliament, the second to the issue number of the Minutes and the third to the page in that issue.

Other Senators and Members who served on the Committee

Senators

Casgrain
Connolly (Ottawa West)
Cook
Giguère
Grosart
Langlois
Lang
Inman
Macdonald (Cape Breton)
McDonald
Phillips
Thompson

[Page vi]

and Messrs.

Baldwin
Barnett
Beaudoin
Caccia
Cadieu
Chappell
Cobbe
Deachman
Deakon
Douglas (deceased)
Downey
Dupras
Forget
Forrestall
Fortin
Foster
Gendron
Gleave
Goode
Goyer
Guay (St. Boniface)
Laflamme
Lambert (Edmonton West)
La Salle
Lefebvre
Legault
LeBlanc (Rhimouski)
Lessard (LaSalle)
Lewis
Knowles (Norfolk-Haldimand)
Matte
McNulty
Nesbitt
Nielsen
Noël
Ouellet
Pringle
Roberts
Rock
Roy (Timmins)
Ryan
Saltsman
Schumacher
Smerchanski
Smith (St. Jean)
Smith (Northumberland-Miramichi)
Stewart (Cochrone)
Sulatycky
Watson
Weatherhead
Whelan
Woolliams

Towns and cities where the Committee held public meetings

ALBERTA: Calgary, Edmonton, Lethbridge
BRITISH COLUMBIA: Kamloops, Prince George, Vancouver, Victoria
MANITOBA: Brandon, Churchill, St. Boniface, Thompson, Winnipeg
NEW BRUNSWICK: Edmundston, Fredericton, Moncton
NEWFOUNDLAND: St. John’s
NORTHWEST TERRITORIES: Inuvik; Yellowknife
NOVA SCOTIA: Antigonish, Halifax, Sydney, Wolfville
ONTARIO: Hamilton, Kingston,London, Ottawa, Sault Ste. Marie, Sudbury, Thunder Bay, Timmins, Toronto, Windsor
PRINCE EDWARD ISLAND: Charlottetown
QUEBEC: Arvida, Hull, Montreal, Quebec, Rimouski, Rouyn-Noranda, Sherbrooke, Trois-Rivières
SASKATCHEWAN: Regina, Saskatoon, Yorkton
YUKON TERRITORY: Dawson,Watson Lake, Whitehorse

[Page vii]


The Special Joint Committee of the
Senate and of the House of Commons
on the Constitution of Canada
has the honour to present its

FIRST REPORT


[Page 1]

PART I—THE CONSTITUTION

Chapter 1—Constitutional Imperatives

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Canada should have a new and distinctively Canadian Constitution, one which would be a new whole even though it would utilize many of the same parts. (See Chapter 3 as well a Chapter 1).

2. A new Canadian Constitution should be based on functional considerations, which would lead to greater decentralization of governmental powers in areas touching culture and social policy and to greater centralization in powers which have important economic effects at the national level. Functional considerations also require greater decentralization in many areas of governmental administration.

In presenting its Final Report to both Houses of Parliament, the Committee is under no illusion that it is pronouncing the final word upon the Canadian Constitution. For even if we succeed in our goal of makring out new paths for Canadian federalism, actual constitutional changes will come about as a result of intergovernmental negotiations in which our Report certainly will not be the only factor taken into account. More important, as was pointed out several times in the course of our hearings, every federal constitution must be constantly in the process of being remade, if it is to continue to meet the needs of the times. Whether such changes take place with or without formal amendment of the constitution, no constitution can remain fixed as of any one point of time.

Nevertheless we find the task of formulating recommendations on the Canadian Constitution at this point of time an essential duty as well as a challenging one. For the views expressed to us by very many Canadians in all parts of the country, as well as our own analysis of ideas and events, have convinced us that Canada needs a new constitution now. We are also convinced that there is a consensus among Canadians in favour of a more functional federalism, whatever the consequences to vested governmental interests. In our opinion a more functional federalism would involve an increased centralization in some respects, an increased decentralization in others.

The need for a new constitution has been amply demonstrated. The considerable number of expert witnesses who appeared before us indicated many areas of weakness in the British North America Act, and we shall pursue this subject in Chapter 3. But more significant than the deficiencies in the B.N.A. Act are the feelings of Canadians about their present Constitution. People in all parts of the country feel that the Constitution is preventing their governments from doing what they would like to see them do, that it is not sufficiently functional in its allocation of governmental powers, and above all that it is not representing Canada as it is and as it is coming to be.

The most critical challenge focusses on Quebec’s role in Confederation. Questions of Quebec’s self-expression and development, culture, language, poverty and unemployment are part of this challenge. Its intensity and magnitude alone, with its threat to our very continuance as a state, is enough to justify constitutional reform.

Indeed, the process of constitutional review was initially set in motion by dissatisfaction in Quebec with respect to the status quo, and this dissatisfaction is still the most acute reason for constitutional change. But constitutional reform is not for Quebec alone nor is it desired by Quebec alone. We found substantial discontent in the West, the Northern Teritories and the Atlantic Provinces, and residents of Ontario also expressed their displeasure with some parts of the constitutional picture. We also encountered feelings of dissatisfaction from many groups—native peoples, some ethnic groups, French-speaking Canadians outside Quebec, and the young generally.

Of course, some of this feeling is wrongly directed against the Constitution. Not all of our problems are constitutional. Many are geographical, economic, cultural or broadly political. Yet constitutional problems are a sufficient part of the whole that reexamination of our constitutional arrangements has become both inevitable and urgent.

One of the most pressing needs is the protection of the individual person, through a comprehensive Bill of Rights and through linguistic guarantees to individuals. Equally pressing is the need for the recognition and protection of minority ethnic groups, including the native peoples. Their contribution to our country should be formally recognized and their natural vitality encouraged.

The most acute cultural-linguistic crisis is that of the French minority in Canada. The original desire of the British Government in the years immediately after 1763 to assimilate the French-speaking eommunity was revived and strengthened by Lord Durham’s Report in 1839, which recommended assimilation on the one hand and responsible government on the other. The determination of the British Government to achieve assimilation and to deny responsible government was not matched by the

[Page 2]

English-speaking majority in Canada in either respect, and in the course of the 1840s Canadian political leaders were able to gain their objective of responsible government without sacrificing the French fact in Canada. In fact, it is no exaggeration to say that it was the association of the Anglophone, Baldwin, and the Francophone, Lafontaine, which brought about responsible government. This political choice by the Canadians of that time to reject assimilation as a policy formed a basis of the subsequent union of the Provinces in Confederation, and has never been regretted by the vast majority of our people. But despite the fact that assimilation is not a current threat in the Province of Quebec, the French-speaking community needs to be given reassurance, and provided with the means, to ensure its preservation and its full development.

There are really two issues involved. The first has to do with the French-speaking community outside Quebec, whose survival can be guaranteed and encouraged principally by the direct action of the Federal Government, along with the cooperation of the nine other provinces. The other is the question of French culture in Quebec. We are convinced that French culture cannot survive anywhere in Canada unless it flourishes in Quebec. The vitality of French Quebec is therefore the principal measure of the vitality of French Canada.

The Committee rejects the theory that Canada is divided into only two cultures, not because we do not wish to give full protection to the rights of French-speaking citizens, but beeause the concept is too confined to do justice to our reality as a people. In the sociological sense most would agree that there is a French-speaking Canadian nation, but there is no single English-speaking nation in the same sense. fn the face of this cultural plurality there can be no official Canadian culture or cultures. But in order to preserve French as a living, as well as a legal, official language, we must also preserve the culture of which it is an organic part.

We acknowledge a cultural imperative for Quebec: it must have sufficient control over its collective life to ensure the preservation and development of French-Canadian culture. Put another way, the Constitution must guarantee the preservation of the collective personality of French Quebec. In the expansion of provincial powers which we propose, Quebec would gain new powers to achieve these ends.

Some witnesses in Quebec spoke to us about the option of independence for Quebec. The Committee respects their sincerity. If English-speaking Canada were totally unsympathetic to Quebec’s true aspirations and had clearly set its face against constitutional change of any kind, then separation might become inevitable. But that is not how we read the mood of English-speaking Canada.

Most of the problems of a dynamic and evolving Quebec would not change their character through independence. The problems would only be transferred from Canada to the independent state of Quebec. Quebec would remain an.outpost of French culture in the alien cultural environment of North America. It would, of course, be argued that sueh problems as that of the working language could be attacked in a determined way within an independent Quebec. But we are convinced that, on a long term basis, French-Canadian culture and cultural survival would not be better served by relying on an economically weaker and more isolated Quebec. It is clear to us that a “go-it-alone” policy would weaken Quebec’s position in dealing with this awesome reality.

We have spoken of the need for an inirease in both centralization and decentralization, depending on functional considerations. In our view greater decentralization in areas of culture and social policy would benefit all the Provinces. We propose such decentralization for reasons of functionalism and flexibility, and to meet the regional differences which became obvious to us in the course of our hearings. Consequently we propose an expansion of Provincial powers in areas like income support, criminal law, marriage and divorce, educational television, taxing powers, and international arrangements, and we suppoft limitations on Federal powers with respect to appointments to the Senate and the Supreme Court, and with respect to Federal spending in fields of Provincial jurisdiction.

On the other hand, greâter centralization is necessary in the reguiation of the’economy. Hence there should be a transfer of some existing Provincial powers to the Federal Parliament. We have in mind, particularly, an increase in Federal jurisdiction over air and water pollution, international and interprovincial trade and commerce, incomes, securities regulation, financial institutions, unfair competition, and foreign ownership.

At the same time, we favour considerable administrative decentralization in the operations of the Federal Government. This change of administrative direction requires no change in the Constitution. It does require a change of heart. It involves the recognition that geographically Canada is a very, very large country. From its extremities the centre of the nation looks and feels very far away. The injection of the judgments and feelings of Canadians from these areas into a more regionalized government service, would be tangible proof that the central government wishes to reach out to all Canadians.

The result of such a decentralized administration would be, we hope, a more responsive public service. In the sense that it is ultimately the job of government to serve people, such a public service would probably be more efficient.

These power transfers and administrative rearrangements would necessitate not only a new spirit of cooperation among the eleven governments of Canada, but also new cooperative structures. We do not think it wise to theorize too much in the area of governmental structures. But we shall have some suggestions to make. One objective is to avoid increasing governmental structures solely for the purpose of creating intellectually tidy superstructures. We would also recognize that the Government of Canada should in the future exercise leadership principally by persuasion rather than by directive.

Regardless of how Canada is articulated—whether in terms of regions, cultural or ethnic communities, or governmental institutions—none of these are enough without the will to succeed as a people. A state is constituted principally by its people’s collective will to live together. If that falters, very little else remains. In our travels across Canada we did hear some doubts about our future. But we also found Canadians still dedicated to constructive solutions within a federal structure. The common strain binding Canadians together is a pervading goodwill

[Page 3]

towards groups other than their own. This spirit was often manifested, in all parts of Canada, and particularly by the young. Tolerant, willing to look at their fellow Canadians in the most generous light, they showed both the appetite and the courage necessary to produce creative change. But they also have serious doubts as to the capacity of our institutions for the self-renewal which would effect the changes they beiieve necessary. Their own remarks to us arose from deeply rooted feelings which often stripped away institutional facades.

These younger Canadians are proud of Canada. But it is not a narrow, self-seeking pride. It is an open and generous pride in Canadians as Canadians. They believe in themselves and their ability to build a new and better Canada. They feel the urgency of finding workable new approaches to Canadian problems.

Finally, all Canadians have aspirations for a truly humah life which go beyond our government and our constitution. Their idealistic quest can be facilitated by a constitution which points the way towards personal as well as collective goals.

The task of writing such a new constitution will not be easy but is certainly not impossible. A modern constitution for Canada is ultimately a restatement of our faith in ourselves and in out country. As such it is a bold challenge to the mind and heart of Canada. We invite all Canadians and their governments to address themselves to the urgency of this task. We would be astonished if, after the growing public awareness of the last decade, some Canadians still doubted that our nation is in the midst of the most serious crisis in its history. We urge them to press, with us, for the writing of a new Constitution.

[Page 4]

Chapter 2—The Mandate

The Special Joint Committee of the Senate and of the House of Commons on the Constitution of Canada had its genesis in resolutions passed in the House of Commons and Senate on January 27 and February 17, 1970, respectively, in the Second Session of the 28th Parliament. The Committee was reconstituted with similar terms of reference at the beginning of the Third Session, by resolutions which stated in part:

That a Special Joint Committee of the Senate and of the House of Commons be appointed to examine and report upon proposals, made public, or which are from time to time made public by the Government of Canada, on a number of subjects related to the Constitution of Canada during the course of the comprehensive review of the Constitution of Canada, which review was agreed upon at the Constitutional Conference of the Prime Minister of Canada and the Premiers and Prime Ministers of the Provinces in February, 1968, and alternative proposals on the same subjects . . . . That the Committee have power to adjourn from place to place within Canada.

The Committee was reconstituted at the beginning of the Fourth Session with the same terms of reference.

The Committee held 145 public meetings, ineluding 72 sessions in 47 cities and towns, and received more than 8,000 pages of evidence. Included in this evidence were the views of acknowledged experts on the Constitution, most of whom the Committee heard at meetings in Ottawa. In addition, the Committee travelled extensively throughout Canada, visiting all Provinces and Territories, and received the views and opinions of Canadians from all walks of life on the fundamental issues confronting Canada and its constitutional deveÌopment. The total attendance at Committee meetings was approximately 13,000 and 1,486 Canadians appeared as witnesses. The highest attendances were in the Provinces of British Columbia and Quebec, in each of which more than 3,000 people attended our meetings.

As its terms of reference make clear, the Special Joint Committee on the Constitution of Canada is charged with the responsibility of making a report to both Houses of Parliament on proposals for change in the Canadian Constitution, after hearing the views of the people from coast to coast. No previous Parliamentary Committee has ever held such an ambitious series of hearings in order to acquaint itself with public opinion. In addition, the Committee developed a new procedure to encourage participation by the man in the street: instead of hearing as witnesses only people who had prepared written briefs, the Committee encouraged people to speak extemporaneously at its meetings from microphones placed on the floor. After its initial experiences with audience reactions, it established time limits on presentations: 15 minutes for briefs of which there was advance notice, 10 minutes for briefs where the notice was simultaneous with the meeting, and 3 minutes for spontaneous contributions from the floor. Normally after each formal brief there were short questions from three Committee members, and then questions or comments were allowed from the floor. At its best, where the comments were relevant and where there was a divergence of viewpoint, the procedure produced a dialogue of high quality.

Anyone who thinks about government today must realize the necessity of expanding the traditional procedures of parliamentary and executive decision-making. In general, we Committee members feel that our experiment in participation has been a considerable success, and that it has made a contribution to the development of better procedures of democratic government. We are of the view that this exercise was highly successful in bringing Parliament into closer contact with the people, particularly in the smaller centres, and that more frequent use should be made of travelling Parliamentary Committees to meet the people at large. Our procedure enabled us to learn a great deal about Canada and the views of Canadians, from the spoken words and the spontaneous reactions of audiences and above all from the challenge of the dialogue itself and our learning was not restricted to problems of the Constitution. At the same time we realize that meetings such as ours have their limitations: they tend to attract those people who are more vocal or more set in their attitudes (and this is especially true of those who are most likely to speak at the meetings), and are thus not so well adapted to uncovering the views of the silent majority; informal as they are by parliamentary standards, they will have the full parliamentary panoply of transcription of evidence, simultaneous interpretation, and rules of order, and so may appear to be unduly inhibiting or overly formal for some citizens; and, finally, the disadvantaged groups in our society (Indians, Métis, Eskimos, the urban and the rural poor) are often not able, or do not feel able, to conceptualize and express their grievances against “the system” in such a setting, if at all—they have perhaps more need of social animators than of an investigating committee. Our satisfaction in the success of our hearings is thus tempered by our realization of their inherent limitations.

[Page 5]

While the Committee has no way of determining with scientific accuracy whether the attendance at the meeting was representative of all of the communities visited, our collective judgment, based both on our common experiences and on what political insight we may possess, in that we are entitled to state certain broad impressions as to what Canadians generally feel about the future shape of their country and its Constitution. The eloquence and, at times, passion with which Canadians expressed their basic feelings about their country added, as well, a human dimension to the Committee’s mandate.

The principal constitutional events during the two years of the Committee’s existence have been the Federal-Provincial Constitutional Conferences, especially the Conference in Victoria in June 1971. We are not discouraged by the apparent deadlock ofthat Conference. We believe that the governments of Canada have made a great deal of progress in their negotiations, and that, the issue of social policy apart, the Victoria Charter represents a consensus among all the governments in a number of areas. Moreover, we believe that the very lack of cornplete accord at Victoria points the way to final success, for it indicates the necessity of a broadening of perspective to include the totality of constitutional problems, and especially the whole of the division of powers. Acting on this belief, we here propose a general constitutional settlement.

As the product of a committee, this Report represents the higheçt common factor of some thirty minds. It is not, as a whole, a unanimous report. On most points therewas some divergence of opinion, on some points a great deal. Probably no member of the Committee would personally prefer the totality of the recommendations. Nevertheless, we have hammered out an agreement which is at the bottom at least a tolerable compromise to all the political groupings on the Committee. To the extent that the Committee is a true microcosm of Canadian society, we may hope that our agreement here will provide an acceptable proposal for the principal streams of opinion in the country.

[Page 6]

Chapter 3—Why a New Constitution?

The purpose of a constitution is to distribute the powers of government according to the wishes of a particular national community and to enunciate’its fundamental values and common goals. A constitution ought thus to be both an inspiration and a mirror for its community. Of these two ends, its inspirational role is the more important. A community that is unable to justify its existence to itself will eventually find that it cannot survive by structure alone.

Taken in this broad sense, a constitution may not be contained entirely, or even largely, in a written document or documents. It is not essential that it should be. What is essential is that a people should understand, accept and even love their form of government. Without the understanding of its people a constitution is meaningless. Without their affection it is dead.

The constitution of a particular people is in part determined by their history and circumstances, in part freely chosen for its apparent merits. The Canadian people chose responsible government largely by reason of their history, a federal system by reason of their geography and demography. The choice of a federal system made a written document inevitable.

The process of conceiving and formulating a written constitution in all its dimensions forces a people to a clearer realization of their distinctive character and aspirations. Once achieved, it provides a self-awareness which reinforces the fundamental institutions and personality of the people. As well, it is a national ideal to which the thoughts and energies and passions of the people canand should—be directed.

The Canadian Constitution may be said to be at present principalty contained in the British North America Act of 1867. But we must note the limitations of this statement. The original Act has itself been subject to direct amendment many times, and it has also been indirectly amended by the United Kingdom Parliament, by the Parliament of Canada, and by the Provincial Legislatures according to their respective powers. In addition, the effect of its various sections has been greatly altered by decisions of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council and, since 1949, of the Supreme Court of Canada. It has also been affected by a myriad of administrative arrangements which have been worked out between the Federal and the Provincial Governments, including the establishment of Federal-Provincial Conferences. Moreover, it has been touched by the ebb and flow of political and eccnomic power between the central and the regional governments under the influence of wars, developments in transportation and communication, changes in business organization, and changing tax yields. Finally, the theory and practice of responsible government, which is the heart of our whole system of government, was ignored entirely by the B.N.A. Act and left to the realm of constitutional conventions.

Clearly, then, the B.N.A. Act has never been taken to be the whole of the Canadian Constitution. Moreover, it has not remained static even as law, and its total significance has been considerably altered by socio-economic events. Nevertheless, as formally amended and realistically interpreted, it is substantiatly the whole of our written constiiution and, more important, is the fundamental framework in relation to which every part of the total constitution must be seen. Rights and privileges of all kinds, even responsible government itself, exist only insofar as they are not altered by the Act. We must therefore judge the adequacy of our present Constitution by reference to the adequacy of the B.N.A. Act.

To take the position that the present Canadian Constitution is to be judged on the basis of the British North America Act is not to confuse the totality of the Constitution with the Act. The Act is the keystone of the constitutional arch, and its weaknesses are transmitted to the whole structure. Thus the inadequacies of the B.N’A. Act are those of the Constitution itself.

The measure of the inadequacy of the British North America Act is that it does not serve Canadians fully as either a mirror of ourselves or as an inspirational ideal. As enacted in 1867, it did not attempt explicitly to set forth any values or goals of that time except to adopt “a Constitution similar in Principle to that of the United Kingdom.” whatever values it recognizes are implicit in that statement, or have to be infered from the governmental structure and division of powers it establishes.

Even the distribution of powers between the Imperial and Canadian governments and between the Federal and Provincial governments does not reflect the Canadian reality of today: an independent, democratic, officially bilingual, multicultural, federal state. The imperial power of London over Ottawa in the Act was matched by that of Ottawâ over the provincial capitals. As one witness remarked, “In the early years after Confederation, the provinces were treated like colonies of Ottawa with limited powers of self-government.” (3.24:12)

[Page 7]

The B.N.A. Act can still be directly amended by an act of the United Kingdom Parliament. The royal power to disallow any Federal law within two years of its passage (s. 56) and the Federal power similarly to disallow any Provincial law (s. 90) are anachronistic today. They would make a mockery of Canadian independence, and of the distribution of governmental powers within Canada. In the case of the royal power the British Government undertook at the London Conference of 1929 not to use it again, but it has not been removed from the Act. The Federal power of disal]owance has not been used since 1943, but also remains in the Act.

The role of the Supreme Court of Canada, the final interpreter of all our laws since 1949, is nowhere mentioned in the Act. Moreover, although Canada officially ceased to be part of the British Empire with the Statute of Westminster in 1931, the only treaty power which is provided for in the Act is that of implementing Empire treaties (s. 132). Then, too, the very limited provisions of section 133, guaranteeing the right to the use of the English and French languages in the Parliament of Canada and in the Legislature of Quebec and in Federal and Quebec courts, are no longer sufficient in a state dedicated to two official languages. Finally, the division of powers no longer appears to be sufficiently functional.

Although the constitution of a colony is not an adequate constitution for a nation, the British North America Act could not be said to have been a failure. It was an adequate enough constitution for the Canada of 1867—perhaps, the only possible constitution for that day—and, it has served us well as a basic framework of government—though increasingly less well as the years have gone by. In taking the position that Canada needs a new Constitution now, we are far from criticizing what our statesmen have wrought in the past.

A constitutional renewal now is all the more necessary as a result of the popular interest which has developed in the Constitution. This interest in the Constitution was, perhaps, kindled by the “Quiet Revolution” begun by the Lesage Government in the Province of Quebec in 1960. It was recognized, and in turn augmented, by the Confederation of Tomorrow Conference sponsored by the Government of Ontario in November, 1967 and by the constitutional review formally undertaken by all the governments of Canada at the Federal-Provincial Constitutional Conference in February of 1968. This initial Constitutional Conference has been followed by five others, several of which were conducted in the full view of the people through continuous radio and television coverage. We believe that it has also been focussed and increased by the apparent success of this Committee in obtaining widespread participation across the country in our constitutional dialogue, as described in Chapter 2. The Constitution has often appeared to people as a “Linus blanket” for politicians unable or unwilling to act. We have aiso found, however, considerable evidence of an understanding of it as a positive means to meet new and challenging needs.

Moreover, the people now want a new constitution. The limited goal of “constitutional review” established by the first Federal-Provincial Constitutional Conference in 1968 has long been outmoded. The only goal which is now acceptable to most Canadians is a new constitution. An expectation of change has been buiit up, and in our view cannot be frustrated without serious consequences for the national psyche. The process of review, once undertaken, must lead irreversibly to a new constitution.

We are convinced that a new Constitution is essential to a Canada with the kind of future Canadians envisage. The present Constitution needs a fundamental recasting. It needs to be rethought and reformulated in terms that are meaningful to Canadians now. For this reason we call for a new Constitution: one that is a new whole, even though it may utilize many of the same parts. Our aim is not novelty, so we have no hesitation in adopting what is functional in the present Constitution. But we insist on a new perspective which will embrace all the constituent parts in a whole that is at the same time distinctively Canadian and functionally contemporary.

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Chapter 4—Patriation of the Constitution

RECOMMENDATION

3. The Canadian Constitution should be partriated by a procedure which would provide for a simultaneous proclamation of a new Constitution by Canada and the renunciation by Britain of all jurisdiction over the Canadian Constitution.

The question of patriation was not explicitly dealt with in the Victoria Charter, but is mentioned in conclusion of the statement of conclusions of the Conference. Presumably, therefore, the fuller agreement on this subject at the Conference in February, 1971 stands. Few things would better symbolize the independence of Canada or the coming of a new constitution than the patriation of the Constitution from the United Kingdom of Canada.

At the same time it would be unwise to proceed with patriation in the absence of agreement on an amending procedure. The present amending procedure is humiliating to an independent state, but it is nevertheless effective. Amendment formally takes place by act of the British Parliament, which follows the constitutional convention that the United Kingdom Parliament will make any amendment to the British North America Act which is requested by the Government of Canada. Such a request of the Government of Canada is traditionally preceded by a joint address of both Houses of the Parliament of Canada. Some argue that there is a secondary convention that the Canadian Farliament will request amendments only with unanimous consent of all the provinces, or of the provinces affected where not all provinces are involved. However, the British Parliament has shown, by its refusal to entertain objections from Provincial Governments in disputed cases, that it will follow the request of the Canadian Parliament without reference to the views of the Provinces. It seems therefore safe to assert that, as a matter of mixed law and convention, the Parliament of Canada possesses the unilateral power to change the Constitution. Nevertheless Parliament has not chosen to exercise that power since 1949, and the Government of Canada has sought the unanimous agreement of the Provinces to the constitutional changes which have recently been contemplated. This recent practice of seeking unanimous agreement makes a less rigid amending formula desirable.

The legal procedures which the February Conference evolved for patriation would operate as follows: following agreement among the governments of Canada as to an amending formula and as to any substantive changes, the Parliament of Canada and all the Provincial Legislatures would pass resolutions authorizing the Governor General to issue a proclamation containing the formula and any substantive changes agreed to; before the issuance of the proclamation the British Parliament would be asked to take all necessary steps to ensure the legal validity of the procedures including the nullification of any British statutes, present or future, which purport to affect the Canadian Constitution; finally, the Governor General’s proclamation would be timed to coincide with the effective date of the British renunciation of jurisdiction.

The complexity of these procedures results from the desire, on the one hand, to avoid having a new Canadian Constitution brought into being solely by an act of the British Parliament, and the fear, on the other hand, that, if it was not so grounded, there might be a legal gap which might conceivably lead to a court’s invalidating the whole new Constitution. The effect of the agreed procedures is to have the negative action which removes Canada from the jurisdietion of the British Parliament and the positive action by which we proclaim our new Constitution occur simultaneously so that both legal continuity and national autonomy are safeguarded.

There are no precedents in such an area, and one can only speculate about possible judicial reaction to the procedures. Nevertheless, since there is no apparent deficiency in them, it is hard to believe that any Canadian judge would strain language or law to invalidate them, since they would represent the solemnly expressed will of all the legislative bodies in Canada. We are therefore preparedl to accept the suggested procedures for patriation of the Constitution without any fears that they would not be legally viable.

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Chapter 5—Amendments to the Constitution

RECOMMENDATION

4. The formula for amending the Constitution should be that contained in the Victoric Charter of June 1971, which requires the agreement of the Federal Parliament and a majority of the Provincial Legislatures, including those of:

(a) every province which at any time has contained twenty-five percent of the population of Canada;

(b) at least two Atlantic Provinces;

(c) at least two Western Provinces that have a combined population of at least fifty percent of the population of all the Western Provinces.

The new amending formula is contained in articles 49 to 57 of the Victoria Charter. The formula is as follows: in general, constitutional amendments would require a resolution of consent at the Federal level, plus the consent of the Legislatures of a majority of the Provinces including (a) the Legislature of any Province now containing at least 25 per cent of the population of Canada, and of any other province that hereafter reaches the same percentage of the population; and (b) the Legislatures of at least two Provinces west of Ontario providing that the consenting Provinces comprise 50 per cent of the population of the Provinces west of Ontario; and (c) the Legislatures of at least two Provinces east of Quebec. The only exceptions to the preceding formula are as to matters peculiar to the constitutions of Parliament or of the Provinces or of concern to less than all the Provinces. In effect, a constitutional amendment would require the agreement of the Federal Parliament, of the Legislatures of Ontario and Quebec and of two Atlantic and two Western provinces, with a special rider as to the composition of the two Western provinces that we shall have to look at closely.

To our mind the new formula is a substantial improvement over the Fulton-Favreau Formula. While that Formula may have appeared to require for constitutional amendment only the agreement of the Federal Parliament and of the Legislatures of two-thirds of the Provinces representing 50 per cent of the population of Canada according to the latest census, actually the amendment of any important section of the British North America Act would have required the agreement of all the Provincial Legislatures, since included in the category requiring unanimous agreement were all the powers in sections 91, 92 and 93 of that Act (except that the consent of Newfoundland would not have been required for amendments to section 93). In effect, therefore, the earlier formula would have required unanimous agreement on all matters of moment, whereas the new one is content with the approval of six provinces on a weighted basis. The theory on which the Fulton-Favreau Formula was based was that each province has an equal right to a veto, since each is equally a province.

In our view what was objectionable about the Fulton-Favreau Formula was this rigidity. We are of the opinion that an amending formula must be a blend of rigidity and flexibility, and that the lower the number of provinces with veto power over amendments the more satisfactory the formula is likely to be. In fact, our only criticism of the new formula is the element of rigidity which is incorporated in the requirement concerning the consent of the Western Provinces.

We have no fault to find with lodging a veto power in the legislatures of provinces which contain at least 25 per cent of the population of the country. Provinces which represent that sizeable a proportion of the population can reasonably expect that their consent will be necessary for constitutional amendment. Since Ontario and Quebec would now acquire a veto on this basis, they will on the formula never lose that veto even if their population should dip below the 25 per cent proportion in the future. Moreover, it is only fitting that any province that hereafter contains 25 per cent of the population should also gain a veto.

The only problem is with the position gained by British Columbia. The requirement for the weighted consent of the Western Provinces is to the effect that consent is required from two Provinces comprising 50 per cent of the population west of Ontario. Some present population projections suggest that British Columbia will possess more than 50 per cent of the population of the Provinces west of Ontario at some point in the 1990s. At such a time even the agreement of the other three Western Provinces would not be sufficient to carry an amendment without the consent of British Columbia. The affirmative adherence, however, of British Columbia would still not be enough to carry an amendment without the support of another Western Province.

On the question of the role of the Senate in the amendment procedure at the Federal level there is a case for the position that the Senate should not be consulted at all with respect to constitutional amendments, on the ground

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that the protection of regional interests (which is the raison d’etre of the Senate) would already be provided for by the requirement of provincial consent. However, it appears to us that there would remain a need for the protection of regional interests by the Senate, since the amending procedure contemplates the possibility of the passage of a constitutional amendment against the will of two Atlantic and two Western provinces. The Senate could fulfill a useful role by acting as a safeguard for the interests of dissenting provinces.

On the other hand, it would be undesirable to allow the Senate an absolute veto over an amendment which was desired by the required majority of provinces and by a majority of members of the House of Commons. We therefore agree with the proposal of Article 51 of the Charter that the Senate veto over constitutional amendments should be limited.

In sum, we endorse the proposed amending formula as a feasible approach to constitutional amendment, and would not expect to see its general terms substantially improved on, no matter how long intergovernmental negotiations were carried on. Such an amending formula would have not only a long-range value as an effective means of future amendment, but also an enormous immediate value. Until now, the Federal-Provincial Constitutional Conferences have proceeded on the basis that unanimous agreement is required for any proposal to be adopted. The lack of unanimity among the various governments has therefore resulted in a lack of agreement on substantive proposals. The immediate adoption of this formula of amendment would thus provide a new procedural rule for the conduct of future Conferences.

We would merely add that we understand the formula to leave open the question of delegation of powers, and we shall consider this question in Chapter 17.

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Chapter 6—The Preamble to the Constitution

RECOMMENDATION

5. The Canadian Constitution should have a preamble which would proclaim the basic objectives of Canadian federal democracy.

In the course of this Report we make a number of references to matters which ought to be included in the preamble to a new Canadian Constitution. We thus propose the inclusion in the preamble of the following basic objectives of our society: a federal system of government within a democratic society; the enhancing of basic human rights; developing Canada as a bilingual and multicultural country; recognition of Canada’s native peoples; the promotion of economic, social and cultural equality; the reduction of regional disparities; the advancement of Canada as a free and open society based on the consent of its people; the striving for world peace and security.

As We have mentioned earlier, a Constitution ought to reflect its community. The preamble in any Constitution can play an important role as a source of inspiration to a country. It can state in the broadest possible terms the objectives and aspirations of the society it governs. A preamble is not legally binding in the narrow sense, yet, if it can achieve an enduring statement of national ideals, it may have a greater psychological value for citizens than any other part of the document.

It may seem to some that Canadians have no need for an inspirational chord in the Constitution. They sometimes argue that we should have a written Constitution, but without any preamble. This, they claim, would be more reflective of the view Canadians have of themselves: dependable, unpretentious—at worst, colourless, at best, solid gray.

We do not feel that this view of Canada reflects the Canada of the 1970s—if, indeed, it ever reflected Canada. The question of whether or not our Constitution ought to have a preamble should be decided in principle before we worry about whether or not we are simply aping any other country.

We support the inclusion of a preamble in the new Canadian Constitution. The preamble is the only place in the Constitution where we can state in broad language what kind of a country Canada is and what it aspires to be. The rest of the Constitution, which will be subject to judicial interpretation, must be drafted with some precision and particularity. The preamble, on the other hand, gives us the broad directions in which we are going; it is not a detailed route map. As the Federal Government’s position paper The Constitution and the People of Canada puts it at page 4:

The first element in Canada’s Constitution, in the View of the Government of Canada, should be a statement—a preamble—on the objectives of the federation. The basic role of the Constitution is, of course, to define the system of law and of government which shall prevail in Canada. But before doing this, the Constitution must express the purpose of Canadians in having become and resolving to remain associated together in a single country, and it must express as far as this is possible in a constitution what kind of country Canadians want, what values they cherish, and what objectives they seek.

To no inconsiderable degree this is a matter of reflecting in the Constitution what kind of nation Canada is: a free people in a free society; a country characterized by rich diversity, in linguistic communities, cultural heritages, and regional identities; a country where individual fulfilment is the fundamental goal of society; and a country where individual Canadians look to the state not simply as a vehicle by which to serve their own self-interest, but as a vehicle by which they can contribute to the well-being of other Canadians.

The Constitution ought also to reflect, in its statement of objectives, what Canadians expect of their country in the future: a country which will preserve its essential characteristics while accepting and nourishing the dynamics of change; a country which seeks both to enlarge and to. make more nearly equal the opportunities available to all Canadians, wherever they live and whatever their background; and a country which seeks to contribute to the well-being of the peoples of the world, as well as to the interests of its own citizens. These are the perspectives which the federal government would hope to see in any statement of objectives for the Constitution of Canada.

We can readily understand why agreement on a specific text of a preamble cannot be easily reached. Like any other part of the Constitution the version finally accepted will require give-and-take on the part of all governments in Canada. We feel, however, that the necessary drafting skills and the necessary political will to make the preamble a reality exist. The road to a preamble is not impassable, only difficult.

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We feel that the preamble to the new Canadian Constitution should include these basic objectives for Canada:

1. To establish a federal system of government within a democratic society;

2. To protect and enhance basic human rights;

3. To develop Canada as a bilingual and multicultural country in which all its citizens, male and female, young and old, native peoples and Métis, and all groups from every ethnic origin feel equally at home;

4. To promote economic, social and cultural equality for all Canadians as individuals and to reduce regional economic disparities;

5. To present Canada as a pluralistic mosaic, a free and open society which challenges the talents of her people;

6. To seek world peace and security, and international social progress.

The details of our recommendations in connection with the Preamble are set out below, particularly in recommendations 6, 10, 27,29, 30, 31 and 32.

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PART II—THE PEOPLE

Chapter 7—Self-Determination

RECOMMENDATIONS

6. The preamble of the Constitution should recognize that the Canadian federation is based on the liberty of the person and the protection of basic human rights as a fundamental and essential purpose of the State. Consequently. the preamble should also recognize that the existence of Canadian society rests on the free consent of its citizens and their collective will to live together. and that any differences among them should be settled by peaceful means.

7. If the citizens of a part of Canada at some time democratically declared themselves in favour of political arrangements which were contrary to the continuation of our present political structures. the disagreement should be resolved by political negotiation. not by the use of military or other coercive force.

8. We reaffirm our conviction that all of the peoples of Canada can achieve their aspirations more effectively within a federal system. and we believe Canadians should strive to maintain such a system.

The principle of self-determination, while not entirely now in Canadian history, has had a new currency in Quebec since 1960.

Some Quebekers, even while opting for a renewed federalism, see a recognition of self-determination as a :-strengthening of democracy, as a kind of guarantee of freedom for their political options. Others demand recognition of the right because they want recognition of their present political option: the separation of Quebec from Canada. Their major spokesman, the Parti Québecois, has made the exercise of right of self-determination the corner-stone of its creed.

On the world scene, the right of self-determination for nations was used in the settlement after the First World War, and was enshrined in Chapter I, Article 1 of the United Nations Charter in San Francisco in 1945: ” . . . respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples.” Most of the former./colonies, particularly in Africa, have invoked that Cha er provision to claim und gain independence. In addition, the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in 1966, which affirmed the principle as follows: “All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic social and cultural development.” (Article 1). U Thant, while Secretary-General of the United Nations, took the position that membership in the United Nations establishes beyond question the fulfilment of self-determination for the peoples of a State.

The right to secede as an expression of self-determination is not generally recognized in federal constitutions.

The majority of definitions of ‘nation’ or ‘people’ by political scientists stress four conditions: a largely homogeneous population, a common language, a common territory and a common history. In examining the demographic map of Canada, we can perhaps find a number of nations in this sociological sense. However, in practical terms the problem focusses on Quebec, and this gives rise to the question of the relationship between self-determination for a people and self-determination for a province. In our view, the two are not equivalent, since the former is a natural entity and the latter an artificial one.

The French-Canadian people is not coextensive with the boundaries of the Province of Quebec. On the one hand, the nation extends beyond the boundaries of the Province into eastern and northern Ontario and northern New Brunswick. On the other hand, there are within the Province of Quebec other groups which would possess an equal claim with Francophones to self-determination: we refer, for instance to the one million Anglophones, who at least in the western part of the province have sufficient geographic cohesion to constitute viable communities. Thus, even if we accepted the View that the contiguous French-speaking community of Canada were a “people” with the right of self-determination, we can see no feasible legal formula for self-determination on the basis of provincial boundaries.

We are therefore of the View that it would rather be appropriate to recognize self-determination as a right belonging to people. Hence we recommend that the preamble of the Constitution should recognize that the Canadian federation is based on the liberty of the person and the protection of fundamental human rights as a fundamental and essential purpose of the State. Consequently, the preamble should also recognize that the existence of Canadian society rests on the free consent of its citizens and their collective will to livetogether, and that any disagreements should be settled by peaceful means.

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The constitutional considerations we have advanced would not in our view predetermine the response of a Federal Government which might be confronted with a clear majority of a total provincial electorate in favour of independence. For such a case we advocate negotiation and reject the use of military or other coercive force. We cannot imagine that any Federal Government would use force to prevent the secession of a region which had clearly and deliberately decided by a majority of the total electorate to leave Confederation. But the reluctant acceptance of a fait accompli is a matter for political bargaining rather than for constitutional drafting.

In conclusion, we reaffirm our conviction that all of the peoples of Canada can achieve their aspirations more effectively within a federal system, and we believe that Canadians should strive to maintain such a system.

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Chapter 8—Native Peoples

RECOMMENDATIONS

9. No constitutional changes concerning native peoples should be made until such time as their own organizations have completed their research into the question of treaty and aboriginal rights in Canada.

10. The preamble of the new Constitution should affirm the special place of native peoples. including Métis, In Canadian life.

11. Provincial governments should. where the population is sufficient. consider recognizing Indian languages as regional languages.

12. No jurisdictional changes should be made in administrative arrangements concerning Indians and Eskimos without consultation with them.

‘Hw legislative authority of the Parliament of Canada mm native peoples comes from section 91(24) of the British North America Act. This heading of legislative power 3.. In the following terms: “Indians, and Lands Reserved to. Hm Indians.” The courts have included Eskimos in the vlvfllilllaitt of ‘Indians’. We heard evidence across Canada is om native peoples in almost every province and territory c ‘.’ mun their organizations and from individuals. We also hunt «I from many other Canadians who were, almost ttxltliuttl exception, very sympathetic to the hopes and ..:.,.o .ttions of the native peoples of’Canada.

‘|’Iu~ru- is already a Standing Committee of the House of I ‘omonons on Indian Affairs and Northern Development. «ml lnmted function is to assess the constitutional position «mo of native peoples. In a sense it is somewhat arbitrary in »..~,».-u-.~nt.c the constitutional aspects of the status of HM aw pvuples from the very real and often stark plight in wlstrh mzmy of them find themselves. Witnesses from the imliw purples opened the eyes of the Committee to the twawl to (in justice to these “first Canadians”. Certainly we M m c« moved by the eloquence and obvious sincerity of the twin-,’ witnesses, both native peoples and other Canadians, -.4.I.o ;»lI°.’t(l(.’d this cause. Generally, the mood of native j’H’n|4lt”i vvzis positive about their role in the future of ¢’mm«l:u But this attitude of optimism was tempered by no lmnt realities of the life many native peoples are low ml to ll.-act. The attribution of blame for this condition tr» Hut ‘H! important as the recognition of its existence. In no. uirilvxl the words of a native\peoples’ witness are mom! upi \

We are a people with special rights guaranteed us by promises and treaties. We do not beg for these rights, nor do We thank you. We do not thank you for them because we paid for them, and God help us, the price we paid was exorbitant. We paid for them, with our culture, our dignity, our pride and self-respect. We paid, we paid and we paid until we became a beaten and poverty-stricken race. (3.3:7)*

There are at least two general approaches to the constitutional position of native peoples. One is to View the native people as collectivities. Those who prefer to follow this approach, and it does appear preferable to many of the native peoples themselves, lay great stress on treaty rights and aboriginal rights. This approach, generally envisions two positions: (1) individual or collective legal claims for treaty and aboriginal rights enforceable in the courts; and (2) solemn undertakings of the people of Canada to the native peoples as matters of justice and equity between two collectivities. The native peoples are now in the process of discovering through community awareness and research the extent of their legal and equitable claims against the Government of Canada.

Some Canadians, on the other hand, favour a “Bill of Rights approach”. This would guarantee to the native peoples equality before the law and protection against discrimination based on their race or creed. Some witnesses favoured this; others criticized it as a strictly egalitarian approach. They maintained that what the native peoples require, certainly for the foreseeable future, is equality-plus, or as one witness referred to it, “citizen-plus”. While it may be theoretically arguable that equality as a principle might be violated by any notion of different status for native peoples, the history of our present constitution indicates that Indians and Eskimos (as a class of people) have already been in a unique legislative position under the B.N.A. Act for one hundred and four years. In any event, it is difficult to see how Indians, broadly speaking, have any real equality with white men in relation to the total social dimension in which they live. To advocate the possibility to even greater real injustice in the name of a formal, legal equality would be folly.

*These references refer to the Committee’s Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence. The first number refers to the session of the 28th Parliament, the second to the issue number of the Minutes and the third to the page in that issue.

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Several witnesses indicated to the Committee that insofar as purely legal considerations are concerned Indian rights may vary considerably across Canada. Broadly speaking, the mechanism of treaties was used for Indians to surrender or extinguish their rights to the land in most of Western Canada and nearly all of Ontario. On the other hand, this technique was not followed in British Columbia, Eastern Canada, or the Territories. One possibility suggested to us was “different options . . . for different groups, for instance, treaty Indians and non-treaty Indians.” (3.88:22)

We were heartened by the growing political consciousness of native peoples, and their attempts to deal with their problems through their own organizations. In fact, our major recommendation in this field springs from the Committee’s acceptance of a major theme of virtually all briefs presented by native peoples’ organizations and many of those by individual native peoples. The National Indian Brotherhood told us:

It is thus obvious that any changes in the Constitution affecting Section 91(24) or even other classes of subjects will have an effect on the Indian People of Canada. The Indian people not only have particular rights which are presently recognized under the Constitution but submit that they have certain rights which must be protected.

The Indian People, however, agree that the situation has evolved. New problems have arisen, and a change has taken and is taking place among the Indians. But they must control their destiny. They must participate in determining their constitutional status.

However, we are not yet in a position to recommend in its entirety the proper legal framework for our development as a people.

The issues at stake are far too important for unprepared or unwise action. Aware of the principle that they themselves must forge their destiny, the Indian people must be given the time to assess not only in legal terms but in social and modern terms who they are, what they have and where they want to go before any action which will dramatically affect these considerations, including constitutional change, is taken.

The Indian people have established research committees in each province and territory precisely to thoroughly investigate and research Indian Rights and Treaties. A National Committee on Indian Rights and Treaties, a committee of the National Indian Brotherhood, has also been established.

The objective of these research committees is to thoroughly document all Indian rights, treaty and non-treaty and enable the Indian people to make decisions as to their future with adequate and factual knowledge of their rights.

To require us to act in any definitive sense in regard to the Constitution at this point, therefore, is premature and unfair. To act without decisions from the Indi.an people in regard to their future is unacceptable.

We need time and this is the central message of this brief (3.88:56).

The Committee therefore recommends that there be no constitutional change made with respect to section 91(24) of the B.N.A. Act, concerning “Indians, and Lands Reserved for the Indians”, until such time as the native peoples’ organizations have completed their research and study into the whole question of treaty and aboriginal rights in Canada. We were told by the National Indian Brotherhood, as one of the native peoples’ organizations involved, that it might be ready to come forward with recommendations early in 1972. We feel confident that, with the new sense of direction and urgency imbuing native peoples’ organizations, their recommendations will be made within a reasonable time. At that time the Government of Canada should enter into extensive consultations with the native peoples before any change is made in legislative jurisdiction over them.

We also recommend that the native peoples of Canada, including Métis, be recognized in the preamble of the new Canadian Constitution as one of the groups composing the Canadian nation as a means of reaffirming the special obligation that Canadians feel towards the native peoples of this land.

We further recommend that, in view of the rising birth rate of native peoples, particularly in western Canada, Provincial Governments should, where native peoples are numerous enough, give consideration to making their languages regional languages. We shall consider the question of regional languages more fully below, but in this context we commend the recommendations made by the House of Commons’ Standing Committee on Indian Affairs and Northern Development as a practical first step towards preservation of the languages of the native peoples of Canada. That Committee recommended in its Fifth Report tabled in the House of Commons on June 30, 1971:

That the language of instruction at the pre-school level and up to the first or second year of primary school should be in the language of the local Indian or Eskimo community with secondary and tertiary languages English and/or French being introduced gradually through the pre-school and primary period and that courses linked to the local Indian or Eskimo culture continue to be taught in the local language throughout the primary level of school.

That decisions regarding the initial languages of instruction and the timing of introduction of secondary and tertiary languages should only be made after consultation with, and clear approval from a majority of parents in the communities concerned. (Votes and Proceedings, June 30, 1971, p. 763).

The Standing Committee on Indian Affairs and Northern Development also made some 15 other recommendations which we endorse. Some of these favour, in general terms, programs like advancing pre-school instruction of Indian and Eskimo children to the three-year-old level; encouraging local day schools rather than residential ones; providing for flexibility in the timing of vacations; allowing, where possible, boarding students to get home for Christmas; and gearing vocational programs to the needs of the areas in which young native people live. These recommendations, some of which are already part of Federal Government policy, are designed to meet a problem in native peoples’ education which the Standing Committee described in these terms:

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Something was drastically and basically deficient in .m education system or systems with a school drop-out rate of more than four times the national average -.4-rving a population of which 40% to 50% of the adult Hl.fllt’S were unemployed or underemployed, and of which an even higher percentage of young people, in .-.ome communities 80% to 90%, were unemployed for :1 good part of the year (ibid. p. 761).

In addition to these administrative and legislative -*.tl_L.:p.jl’fs’l.l()nS of the Standing Committee we would like to in raw attention to two specific recommendations of that I ‘. mimittee with broadly constitutional implications:

That the Government should continue its policy that no transfers of education programs from the federal |«~v<,~l to provincial systems take place without the ¢'\'pt'eSS and clear approval of the majority of the parents in each community concerned. (ibid. p. 763).

Wr wish to make it perfectly clear that we are not no ommending how any programs should be transferred, H imlvvd, any should be transferred at all. The other ton ommendation of the Standing Committee was:

That all curriculums [sic] within the federal program be revised to include:

.1) substantially more Indian history including Indian contributions to the economy, science, medicine, agriculture, exploration, etc.

l)) special courses in Indian culture, music, art, handicrafts, etc. and that pressure be brought upon the respective provincial systems to inaugurate Hllllllal’ reforms wherever Indian children are being taught (ibid.)

Wo agree with these views.

We were also advised by many witnesses representing the Métis people of Canada that they consider themselves in a sort of cultural and constitutional “no man’s land”. Neither white nor Indian, neither a Federal nor a Provincial legislative responsibility, they told us they suffered from social ostracism because of their race, and administrative indifference because of their legal status. As one Métis witness put it:

We are presently too disadvantaged culturally and socially to.be able to avail ourselves of the opportunities available, and we want to correct this inequity. Sociologically, culturally and ethnically the majority of Métis have a strong Indian identity, and other than in legal terms most of us are as much Indian as those who are covered by treaty. At the same time, we do not enjoy the advantages of treaty Indians and suffer all the disadvantages since we share a poverty culture. (2.9:122).

While there are many legal niceties involved in the problem of the social, cultural, biological and ethnic definition of a Métis, we prefer to see the problem, constitutionally, in broader terms. We believe a recognition of native peoples ought to be included in the preamble of a new constitution, and that ‘native peoples’ in this context should expressly include Métis. This is not to specify that Métis should necessarily be treated identically with Indians and Eskimos in all respects, but rather to indicate that they too have a right to special care and attention by Canadians.

In many respects the native peoples of Canada are a test of Canadian society: a test of its compassion to reach out for new and deeper values of tolerance and friendship; a test of its laws to do justice to the weak and the few; a test of its willingness to share the nation’s wealth, and to give equality of opportunity a chance, freedom a new birth, and self respect a new home in the minds and hearts of Canada’s native peoples.

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Chapter 9—Fundamental Rights

RECOMMENDATIONS

13. Canada should have a Bill of Rights entrenched in the Constitution. guaranteeing the political freedoms of conscience and religion. of thought. opinion and expression. of peaceful assembly and of association.

14. The Bill of Rights should include a provision requiring fair and equitable representation in the House of Commons and in the Provincial Legislatures.

15. The right to citizenship. once legally acquired. should be made inalienable under the Bill of Rights.

16. The individual person should be constitutionally protected in his life. liberty and the security of his person so as not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.

17. The individual person should be constitutionally protected against the arbitrary seizure of his property. except for the public good and for just compensation.

18. The Constitution should prohibit discrimination by reason of sex. race. ethnic origin, colcur or religion by proclaiming the right of the individual to equal treatment by law.

19. Discrimination in employment. or in membership in professional. trade or other occupational associations. or in obtaining public accommodation and services. or in owning. renting or holding property should also be declared contrary to the Bill of Rights.

20.Other provisions already contained in the Canadian Bill of Rights (1960) protecting legal rights should also be included in the Constitutional Bill of Rights: protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. the right to be informed promptly of the reason for arrest. the right to counsel. the right to habeas corpus. protection against self-crimination. the right to a fair hearing. the right to be presumed innocent and not to be denied reasonable bail without just cause. the right to an interpreter. the proscribing of retroactive penal laws or punishments. and the right not to be subjected to cruel and unusual punishment.

21.The rights and freedoms recognized by the Bill of Rights should not be interpreted as absolute and unlimited. but should rather be exercisable to the extent that they are reasonably justifiable in a democratic society.

The Committee endorses the agreement of the govern- ments of Canada to entrench in the Constitution certain basic political rights (Articles 1 to 9 of the Victoria Charter) but urges that other rights also be included in a constitutional Bill of Rights.

No one in Canada seriously questions the necessity of protecting fundamental human rights such as those recognized in a limited way by the present legislative Canadian Bill of Rights, but some witnesses before the Committee took the position that such protection should be left entirely to the good faith of legislative bodies, since in a democracy they presumably reflect the prevailing popular will. In plain words the argument was that we can do no better than to trust democracy.

The Committee believes that this argument would identify democracy with the majority opinion of the moment, and that the true interests of democracy do not lie in such a facile identification with every majority. What democracy requires is that a continuing popular majority must prevail, and it is by no means inconsistent with democracy to erect safeguards to ensure that a majority is a continuing one before it may be allowed to interfere with certain long-established rights. Democracy cannot lose by being forced to have second thoughts on some matters of great moment; in fact this is the rationale of the power which our system of government gives to opposition parties to delay government legislative programs.

It is true that an entrenched Bill of Rights must be interpreted by courts, and one can theoretically pooceed to an infinite regression as to which has the final word, a court which has the right to interpret what a legislature enacts or a legislature which has the right to amend a judicial interpretation. But in reality courts in a democratic society always eventually accept what the majority wants, if only because the political representatives of the majority will ensure that judicial appointees share their philosophy. Moreoever, the legislative process of reversal of judicial interpretation through constitutional amendment, though cumbersome, is also assured to the majority.

We admit that an entrenched Bill of Rights would limit legislative sovereignty, but then parliamentary sovereignty is no more sacrosanct a principle than is the respect for human liberty which is reflected in a Bill of Rights. Legis-

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lative sovereignty is already limited legally by the distribution of powers under a federal system and, some would say, by natural law of by a common-law Bill of Rights. The kind of additional limit on it which would be imposed by a constitutional Bill of Rights is not an absolute one, for a Bill of Rights constitutes rather a healthy tension point between two principles of fundamental value, establishing the kind of equilibrium among the competing interests of majority rule and minority rights which is in our View of the essence of democracy.

We do not agree with the allegation that the proposal for a Bill of Rights conceals a hidden enlargement of Federal powers. Indeed, we believe that Federal jurisdiction is more likely to be expanded by the judiciary in the absence of a Bill of Rights. The Federal criminal law power, for instance, has been considerably bolstered in recent years by courts which have had no other way of striking down provincial laws they considered unfair to individuals than by bestowing jurisdiction on the Federal Parliament. The fact is that the losers in the “power game” under a Bill of Rights are the totality of governments and the winners are the people. For us, this is as it should be.

We see a Bill of Rights which is entrenched in the Constitution serving as a guarantee to individuals that democracy does not mean ruthless uniformity, as a symbol to minorities that their reasonable autonomy will be respected, and as a sign to the whole people of a ‘ wholesome rationality in a world often given to a ceaseless struggle for power.

The fundamental rights which the governments of Canada have agreed to entrench in the Constitution are the following:

freedom of thought, conscience and religion,

freedom of opinion and expression, and freedom of peaceful assembly and of association

(Article 1 of the Victoria Charter)

We would have preferred not to have freedom of thought linked solely with freedom of conscience and religion, since it actually has (and presumably is intended to have) a wider application, and as located it might run afoul of the ejusdem generis (same genus) rule of interpretation. We believe it should rather be linked with freedom of opinion and expression.

We note the absence of any specific reference to freedom of the press, presumably on the ground that it is merely a special case of the freedom of expression. That seems to us to be its appropriate location, since we do not see the press as having special rights beyond those of ordinary citizens.

Articles 4 to 8 of the Victoria Charter establish the principles of universal suffrage, free democratic elections, five-year maximum terms and annual sessions for the House of Commons and the Legislatures, and the right not to be discriminated against either as an elector or as a legislator. However, at the theoretical level these rights are not complete without the right to representation on the basis of population, and at the practical level there is a need for a guarantee of this right in Canada, since most Provincial Legislatures do not give adequate representation to urban residents. As a consequence, urban residents across Canada feel that their needs are being neglected by their Provincial Governments, and in their frustration are demanding action by the Federal Government to solve their problems. Such popular demands for Federal action in fields of Provincial responsibility threaten to undermine the jurisdiction of the Provincial Legislatures, and a constitutional guarantee of representation on the basis of population in the Legislatures would thus be in the Provincial interest.

We regard this matter so seriously that we strongly urge the inclusion of a provision for fair representation in the Bill of Rights. As we see it, it would assist in the preservation of the Provinces as strong entities. We believe it is also important that the Federal Government be relieved of the psychological pressure to solve problems which functionally or otherwise belong at the Provincial level.

Of course, the standard to be applied in the determination of fair representation need not be an absolute one. The variation of 20 per cent from the quantitative norm which is tolerated by present Federal law is probably justifiable in a large country with a small population, but the 40 per cent divergence of population which it allows between the most and the least populous constituencies seems to us to be about the maximum desirable. All of the Provinces have such small population densities that an absolute standard of equality would prevent proper servicing of rural districts by their elected representatives. At present, however, the injustice appears to us to work the other way.

The one unfortunate result of a constitutional standard of fair and equitable representation might be the unrestricted assumption by the judiciary of the setting of standards of fair representation, with consequent uncertainty in the legislative process. This could be avoided by establishing in the Constitution a standard of, say, 20 per cent, as the maximum permissible variation from the norm. Any Bill of Rights guarantee of “rep by pop” would have, of course, to be made subject to other constitutional provisions protecting minimal provincial representation in the Federal Parliament.

Another omission from the Victoria Charter relates to citizenship. In Canada, a nation of immigrants, it is entirely fitting that the Constitution should provide that citizenship, once legally acquired, should be inalienable.

There are other unfortunate omissions from the Charter. They are especially striking because they derogate from the proposals for a constitutional Bill of Rights presented by the Government of Canada in 1969, and from the safeguards in the present Canadian Bill of Rights. We have in mind guarantees of procedural justice concerning the right of the person to life, liberty, and the security of his person and of his property.

We should like to avoid the use of the phrase “due process of law” entirely, because it is a phrase which has no tradition in our law, despite its incorporation in the 1960 Bill of Rights, and because of its unfortunate interpretation in the United States under substantive due process. At its worst this phrase gave judges leeway to substitute their socio-economic views for those of legislatures.

In our view it is more desirable to use another phrase found in the Canadian Bill of Rights, “the principles of fundamental justice.” We therefore propose the following guarantee:

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The right of the individual person to life, liberty, and security of his person, and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.

We would also add a protection against arbitrary seizure of property. In order to allow the maximum latitude for economic decisions by legislatures, we would protect the individual person only where his property was taken contrary to the public good or without just compensation. Our proposal is as follows:

The right of the individual person to the enjoyment of property, and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the public good and for just compensation.

All of theseifights are classed, both by the Canadian Bill of Rights and by the Federal constitutional proposals, among political rather than legal rights. In our View they are genuinely political rights, because they are necessary for the preservation of democratic society, and for the fostering of its highest ideals. None is legal in the sense of bcing limited to court processes, as are the strictly legal rights. Even if the governments of Canada should decide not to include legal protections in the Bill of Rights, in our view the rights to life, liberty, and the reasonable enjoyment of property should be guaranteed as fundamental human rights.

We also believe it essential that the Bill of Rights state that no person shall receive unequal treatment by reason of sex, race, colour, ethnic origin or religion. Many witnesses who appeared before us argued convincingly for equal treatment for women before and in the law and its administration. We also received many representations by native peoples about various forms of racial and ethnic discrimination. The Bill of Rights in a new Canadian Constitution should render any discrimination in the legal system unconstitutional, by prescribing positively:

the right of the individual person to equal treatment by the law.

A large area of the discrimination against all these groups of Canadians lies in the area of private morality and individual mores. To the extent that Bill of Rights provisions can give a focus to the spirit of tolerance and egalitarianism in our country, they can help to break down the barriers of ignorance and contempt which are the breeding grounds of discrimination. Such provisions would leave no doubt that Canadians generally do not share the views of any individual Canadian who treats his compatriots in a way inconsistent with the tolerance and respect which is their due as people. We therefore propose the following constitutional provision:

Every individual in Canada is entitled not to be discriminated against by reason of sex, race, colour, ethnic origin or religion

(a) in employment or in membership in any professional, trade or other occupational association;

(b) in obtaining public accommodation, facilities and services;

(c) in owning, renting, holding or otherwise possessing property.

The full control of discrimination practised by private citizens would necessitate the supplementing of such constitutional provisions with ordinary legislation at both Federal and Provincial levels.

We also strongly recommend the inclusion in a Bill of Rights of other basic legal rights such as those already contained in the Canadian Bill of Rights. We adopt the formulation of these rights in the Federal Government’s constitutional proposals put forward in The Constitution and the People of Canada at page 52:

(a) the right of the individual to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures;

(b) the right of a person who has been arrested or detained

(i) to be informed promptly of the reason for his arrest or detention

(ii) to retain and instruct counsel without delay, and

(iii) to the remedy by way of habeas corpus for the determination of the validity of his detention and for his release if the detention is not lawful;

(c) the right of a person not to give evidence before any court, tribunal, commission, board or other authority if he is denied counsel, protection against self-crimination, or other constitutional safeguards;

(d) the right of a person to a fair hearing in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice for the determination of his rights and obligations;

(e) the right of a person charged with an offence to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law in a fair hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, and the right not to be denied reasonable bail without just cause;

(f) the right of a person to the assistance of an interpreter in any proceedings in which he is involved as a party or witness, before a court, commission, board or other tribunal, if he does nét understand or speak the language in which such proceedings are conducted;

(g) the right of a person not to be held guilty of an offence on account of any act or omission which at the time of its commission or omission did not constitute an offence, and the right of a person on being found guilty of an offence not to be subjected to a penalty heavier than the one applicable at the time the offence was committed;

(h) the right of a person not to be subjected to cruel and unusual treatment or punishment.

We believe that these traditional legal rights are sufficiently well accepted by our society not to require any special defence as human rights. We presume that the only question is whether they are better protected constitutionally or legislatively. We have already stated our general position that constitutional protection is necessary.

Just as important as these guarantees of fair legal process is the provision of legal advice and legal counsel to those who cannot otherwise afford them. Although there

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has been a growing awareness across the country of the acute need in this field, the majority of Provinces still do not have publicly supported programs of legal aid which are generally available. It is our hope that the initiative which the Federal Government has recently taken in establishing a legal aid program in the Northwest Territories will be followed elsewhere and expanded everywhere. We would particularly stress that the disadvantaged in our society need counselling as well as counsel, and that an adequate program of legal assistance will ensure that this need is met, through the development of direct governmental services, if necessary. Nevertheless, since the provision of adequate legal services necessitates the development of a considerable program of implementation, we cannot recommend it for inclusion in a Bill of Rights: for a constitutional charter of liberties must needs have a primarily negative thrust, by way of protecting people against an excess of governmental power. The providing of positive benefits is rather the stuff of ordinary legislation.

We have reservations with respect to the general qualification on the fundamental freedoms in Article 3 of the Victoria Charter. That article would allow:

such limitations on the exercise of the fundamental freedoms as are reasonably justifiable in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, order, health or morals, of national security or of the rights and freedoms of others.

Even in the absence of such words, any court would surely read general guarantees of liberties as subject to some restrictions, and we agree with the Charter that it is preferable to have such limitations as officially enacted provisions of the Constitution rather than as roughly formulated propositions in judicial minds. The fact that the limitations are thus made explicit ought also to eliminate the simplistic argument that rights are absolute. In order to focus the principle of judicial interpretation more clearly, however, we would prefer to state any such qualification more rather than less generally. We would therefore recommend that any limitations on the exercise of the fundamental freedoms should be only such “as are reasonably justifiable in a democratic society” without any further specification.

A number of witnesses addressed us on matters connected with the use of exceptional government powers in emergency situations. We take the View that it is preferable to have this problem solved more generally, according to the formula we have just suggested.

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Chapter 10:—Language Rights

RECOMMENDATIONS

22. French and English should be constitutionally entrenched as the two official languages of Canada.

23. The Constitution should recognize:

(a) the right of any person to use either official language in the Federal and Provincial Legislatures and the Territorial Councils:

(b) the right to have access in both official languages to the legislative records, journals, and enactments of Canada. New Brunswick. Ontario. Quebec and the Territories:

(c) the right to use either official language in dealing with judicial or quasi-judicial Federal bodies or with courts in New Brunswick. Ontario. Quebec and the Territories:

(d) the right to communicate in either official language with Federal departments and agencies and with provincial departmental head offices or agency head offices in New Brunswick, Ontario, Quebec and the Territories.

24. All of the rights in recommendation 23 (b) (c) and (d) should also be exercisable in:

(a) any Province where each language is the mother tongue of ten per cent of the population:

(b) in any Province where the legislature declares French and English the official languages of the Province.

25. The Constitution should recognize parents’ right to have English or French provided as their child’s main language of instruction in publicly supported schools in areas where the language of their choice is chosen by a sufficient number of persons to justify the provision of the necessary facilities.

26. We support the general objective of making French the working language in Quebec. We hope that through the studies being carried out in Quebec on this matter. this objective can be reached with due respect for certain Quebec Anglophone institutions. and taking into account the North American and world reality.

27. The preamble to the Constitution should formally recognize that Canada is a multicultural country.

28. The Constitution should explicitly recognize the right of Provincial Legislatures to confer equivalent status with the English and French languages on other languages. Federal financial assistance to support the teaching or use of other languages would be appropriate.

The ethnic origin of the Canadian population as of the 1961 census, when the total population was 18,200,000, was as follows: British, almost 8 million or 43.85 per cent; French, more than 5,540,000 or 30.38 per cent; other origins, more than 4,700,000 or 25.77 per cent. Among the other origins the predominant were German, with slightly more than 1 million or 5.75 per cent; Ukrainian, with just under 475,000 or 2.59 per cent; and Italian, with 450,000 or 2.47 per cent. It is interesting to note that the French proportion of the population has remained almost constant since 1871, declining from 31.07 per cent in that year only to 30.38 per cent in 1961, whereas the British proportion declined from 60.55 per cent in 1871 to 43.85 per cent in 1961. The great increase, of course, has come in the category of other ethnic groups, rising from 8.38 per cent in 1871 to 25.77 per cent in 1961. It is expected the 1971 census figures will show a further increase in the percentage of Canadians who are neither British nor French, largely at the expense of the British proportion.

The only substantive language provision of the British North America Act is section 133:

Either the English or the French Language may be used by any Person in the Debates of the Houses of the Parliament of Canada and of the Houses of the Legislature of Quebec; and both those Languages shall be used in the respective Records and Journals of those Houses; and either of those Languages may be used by any Person or in any Pleading or Process in or issuing from any Court of Canada established under this Act, and in or from all or any of the Courts of Quebec.

The Acts of the Parliament of Canada and of the Legislature of Quebec shall be printed and published in both those Languages.

Section 133 establishes equal rights for the use of English and French in certain circumstances, but does not establish any official languages for Canada. Undoubtedly the presumption of the Fathers of Confederation was that English would be the majority language, but it was not

[Page 23]

given any official status by the Act. Nor was any such status conferred on the French language.

Constitutionally speaking, then, Canada has no official language. By section 133 English and French both have a limited status: with respect to the Parliament of Canada and the Legislature of Quebec and in the courts established under the authority of these bodies. In addition, the Official Languages Act passed in 1969 by the Parliament of Canada provides that:

The English and French languages are the official languages of Canada for all purposes of the Parliament and Government of Canada, and possess and enjoy equality of status and equal rights and privileges as to their use in all the institutions of the Parliament and Government of Canada (emphasis added).

Parliament does not have the power under section 91(1) of the British North America Act to amend section 133 so as to establish the two languages as official for all purposes without qualification.

Undoubtedly the Official Languages Act psychologically prepared the country for a constitutional recognition of English and French as the two official languages of Canada, and the experience of this Committee indicates that there is now majority support in every part of Canada for such a step. Not only did the testimony of the great majority of witnesses before the Committee, including those representing other language groups, support or accept two official languages, but, with rare exceptions, audience reaction was strongly hostile to expressions of opposition to either official language.

To our minds it is fitting that these two languages should be recognized as official languages. The use of English is so general in the life of our country and it is so much the language of work for most of the people of North America that its designation can be assumed to be non-controversial. But the historical and contemporary claims of the French language to similar recognition are also great. French was not only the first European language spoken in the territory of Canada, but it has been also the language of such a large number of the inhabitants of the country that it can be described as one of the two original languages, whichever one of the stages in our legal evolution is taken as the real beginning of Canada: the Royal Proclamation of 1763, the Quebec Act of 1774, the Constitutional Act of 1791, the Union Act of 1840, or the British North America Act of 1867. It is the majority language of our second most populous Province—the only Province to have a majority language other than English—and is by far the second most spoken language in Canada, being the mother tongue of roughly one third of our citizens. Not only does it have a factual status which no other minority language has, but it has a special status, along with English, in the life of the country. The Committee, therefore, endorses the position stated in Article 10 of the Victoria Charter that English and French should be the official languages of Canada.

The principle granted, there nevertheless remains the determination of its scope. As we have said, the extent of the use of English and French legally required by section 133 of the present B.N.A. Act is limited to the Federal Parliament and Courts and the Quebec Legislature and Courts. This leads us to the belief that under the proposed new amending formula this section would be repealable by those two legislatures alone. as the only legislatures concerned.

The Victoria Charter does not propose a general substitute for section 133. We hope, however, that section 133 will be replaced by an expanded guarantee of the two languages, which would involve all the provinces and thus render moot the question of how many provinces would have to consent to amend the present section 133. Fairness requires that other provinces be as generous in recognizing the rights of their French-speaking citizens as Quebec has been in protecting those of its English-speaking residents.

As a minimum, the Constitution should recognize and guarantee with respect to the English and French languages:

(1) the right of every person to the use of either language in the Parliament of Canada, in the Legislatures of all the Provinces, and in the Territorial Councils;

(2) the right of every person to have access, in both languages, to records, journals and enactments of

(i) the Parliament of Canada,

(ii) the Legislatures of New Brunswick, Ontario and Quebec,

(iii) the legislature of any province in which each language is the mother tongue of at least ten percent of the population,

(iv) the legislature of any province where that legislature has declared that English and French are the official languages ofthe province, and

(v) the Territorial Councils.

The Victoria Charter would also provide in Article 13 that:

The statutes of each Province shall be printed and published in English and French, and where the Government of a Province, prints and publishes its statutes in one only of the official languages, the Government of Canada shall print and publish them in the other official language . . . .

We adopt this proposal for Federal publication, and would also add two additional rights:

(1) the right of any person to use either language, without prejudice by reason of the language he employs, when appearing in or giving evidence in, or in any pleading or process in or issuing from

(i) any judicial or quasi-judicial body established by the Constitution or Parliament of Canada,

(ii)’t.he courts of New Brunswick, Ontario, Quebec, and the Territories,

(iii) the courts of any province in which each language is the mother tongue of at least ten percent of the population, and

(iv) the courts of any province in which the legislature has declared that English and French are the official languages of that province.

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(2) the right of every person to communicate in either language

(i) with any department or agency of the Government of Canada, or of the Territories,

(ii) with the head office of every department and agency of the governments of New Brunswick, Ontario and Quebec,

(iii) with the head office of every department and agency of the government of any province in which each language is the mother tongue of at least ten percent of the population,

(iv) with the head office of every department and agency of the government of any province in which the legislature has declared that English and French are the official languages of the province. ‘

It is regrettable, in our view, that the Victoria Charter does not go this far. The right to the use of either language in their Legislatures was not accepted by the three most westerly Provinces. It would seem that no province would deny the right of any legislator actually to speak in French in the legislature, but three Provinces declined to recognize formally an existing privilege as a legal right.

It would be most unfortunate if that position continued to find support, since the only valid arguments for it can easily be met. On the one hand, the fear that such a provision could be interpreted to mean that the records, journals and enactments of all the legislatures would have to be made available by every Province in both languages, at its own expense, is eliminated by the language of the Charter. On the other hand, the concern that other linguistic groups might be alienated by such a Provincial recognition of the English or French languages could be obviated by the granting of equal Provincial rights to citizens of other language groups, a point we shall develop further below.

The case for granting French such status in the legislatures is not only that fairness demands equal treatment for the French language outside of Quebec with that which English receives within that Province, but especially that without it the two official languages might appear to be an empty symbol. If the Constitution establishes two official languages, it is reasonable to expect that it must somehow go beyond the language policy which has already been established by the Federal Parliament through ordinary legislation. In other words, it must in some way touch Provincial as well as Federal institutions. There is no more minimal way in which two official languages can affect the Provinces than by allowing French to be spoken in every Legislature. There is no obligation to listen. But it may still be important to a French-speaking legislator to speak in his officially—recognized language. It is our feeling that any Province which is not prepared to accept an official recognition of the right to speak both official languages in its legislature would put in question its sincerity in endorsing the principle that English and French shall be the official languages of Canada, a principle which all Provinces have already accepted.

We have already made it clear that we agree with the recommendation of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism that New Brunswick and Ontario, as the two Provinces with substantial proportions of French-speaking inhabitants, have special obligations with respect to the two languages. New Brunswick has accepted such obligations.

While we are in no position, as a Committee of the Federal Parliament, to make direct recommendations to Provincial Governments, we should like to express the hope that Ontario will be prepared to accept access in both languages to the records, journals, and enactments of its Legislature, and the use of either language when appearing in or giving evidence in its courts or in any pleading or process in or issuing from those courts. Since we realize that the financial burden imposed by these responsibilities might be considerable, though no greater than that which has been accepted by Quebec for more than a century, we suggest to the Federal Government that it consider the advisability of offering financial and technical assistance to New Brunswick, Ontario and Quebec to enable all of them more effectively to serve their linguistic minorities.

We regret the absence of any statement in the Charter with respect to the language of education, and we endorse the earlier statement of the Constitutional Conference in February, 1971:

The individual shall have the right to have English or French as his main language of instruction in publicly supported schools in areas where the language of instruction of his choice is chosen by a sufficient number of persons to justify the provision of the necessary facilities.

Here there are both theoretical and practical problems. The theoretical problem is raised by the Province of Quebec, which apparently feels some reluctance to accept an unqualified right in parents to choose the language of instruction of their children, for fear that the supposed economic advantages of knowing English might tempt too many parents to choose education in English for their children.

We are fully conscious of the need of the Quebec Government to keep constantly in mind demographic and linguistic factors. Yet the fact appears to be that the French language in Canada has never been stronger. Even a well-known separatist witness before the Committee admitted that the French language is now so secure that Quebec’s continuance within Canada would no longer pose any threat to it. More important, there are some matters in which a Government in a free society may not go beyond persuasion. In our View this is one such matter, and the right of parents to choose their children’s education is a basic human right which no government can encroach upon.

We would add that, in our opinion, the spheres of trade and commerce and industry in Quebec constitute important fields of activity where the influence of the French language must be established and developed.

To this end we support the general objective of making French the working language in Quebec. Specific suggestions were made on language of work by the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism in Reports 3A and 3B and we include the relevant recommendations in Appendix C.

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We hope that through studies being carried out in t..)nebec on this matter, this objective can be achieved with «inc respect for Quebec Anglophone institutions and hiking into account the North American and world reality If French is established as the key language in the tmsiness world, the Government need not fear that it will not be chosen as a language of instruction by parents.

‘l’here are practical as well as theoretical problems in implementing any guarantee of choice of language in mhication. We believe, however, that, given good will, the practical difficulties can be overcome. We are confident that, over a period of years, every province would be able, with the aid of Federal grants, to achieve substantial progress for its linguistic minority.

We believe that the language question is one of the most important to be settled in a new Constitution. It is obviouuly of great symbolic importance. How can a French-‘t|lt’£tl{lrlg Canadian feel at home in Canada if the use of tits; language is effectively denied him everywhere but in i,,’pu~hec? It is also of great practical importance, since it is it question of equal opportunity before the law and in the l-“i-«leral administration.

tit’ course, the language question goes much beyond the t ‘onstitution. We have already discussed the effort of the tzovernment of Quebec to establish French as the langttzngt? of work in that Province. We have found across the i’oI.ttttI’y not only a sympathy towards the use of French, but a lively interest in learning to speak it, especially among younger Canadians, and we look forward confitl|.’Hliy to the day when the proportion of bilingual Anglophones will be as high as that of bilingual Francophones. To this end we would encourage all young Canadians to it’£tl’ll both the English and French languages. But as far oi the Constitution is concerned, we think it sufficient Hunt the more limited recommendations we make here, be mtopted. Of course, Parliament and the Legislatures -..hould be free to “provide for more extensive use of ttiuiglish and French”, as Article 18 of the Victoria Charter Eili|i(‘S.

/\|though we frankly accept the inherent limitations of .-oo:.t.itutional provisions respecting languages, we are of lluv opinion that it is also important to give constitutional tm’ui.;nltlOl’l to another Canadian linguistic fact, viz., other tumgnziges. There are large groups of Canadians who ‘.~.[H’2li( Ukrainian, German and Italian and smaller numlwt”-4 who speak many other tongues, especially those of l’:zt’—ill’l’n Europe. In the Prairie Provinces other languages mu spoken more than French. Nearly one third of the t’.m;i

In our view a new Constitution should recognize in the jit’t’.’tllli’)l€ that Canada is multicultural rather than bicultural or unicultural. As a fact this seems sufficiently obvious to any student of the country, but it is also a point which needs formal emphasis. There neither is, nor should there be, any official culture in Canada. One of the deepest aspects of our national character has been its cultural tolerance towards minority groups. Canadians do not feel the need to impose a common culture nor to divorce people from their cultural roots. All democracies ‘allow their citizens freedom under law, but many do not go so far as to allow cultural freedom. Canada must continue to do so, but more consciously and more effectively.

The Constitution should therefore provide in its section on language rights that Provincial Legislatures may confer rights on other language groups with respect to use in the Legislatures themselves, or in government administration, the courts, and education in publicly-supported schools. The negative phrasing proposed in Article 19 of the Victoria Charter is not adequate.

Our recommendation would confer no additional rights upon the Provinces. By section 92(1) they already possess the power to amend their own constitutions (except as regards the office of Lieutenant-Governor), by section 92(4) they are granted jurisdiction over “the Establishment and Tenure of Provincial Offices and the Appointment and Payment of Provincial Officers,”, by section 92(14) they control the administration of justice in the province, and by section 93 they receive the power exclusively to make laws in relation to education. Nevertheless, we believe that there is a profound symbolic value in drawing attention to existing provincial powers in the part of the Constitution which specifically deals with language rights. At the same time as official status is being conferred upon the English and French languages, it should be made clear both that this does not confer any priority with respect to culture, and that the use of other languages is encouraged. We have already mentioned the possibility of special status for other languages in the Provincial Legislatures.

The number of other languages besides English and French and the diverse sizes and conditions of the groups which speak them preclude the possibility of establishing mandatory constitutional provisions for them. They are indeed regional rather than national languages, and it is therefore appropriate that the specific recognition they receive should be at the provincial level. At the same time, however, there should be an umbrella provision in the Constitution to give them their due acknowledgement as one of the constituent elements of our country, ethnically and linguistically. Moreover, where a Province confers a particular public right upon a language group, it would be appropriate for the Federal Government to provide a measure of financial assistance. By doing so, it would help the Provinces to provide a valuable public service to a group of citizens.

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Chapter 11—Regional Disparities

RECOMMENDATIONS

29. The equitable distribution of income should be recognized in the preamble of the Constitution as a dynamic and humane objective of our social policy. Consequently. we agree with the principle stated in the Victoria Charter that:

The Parliament and Government of Canada and the Legislatures and Governments of the Provinces are committed to . . . the promotion of equality of opportunity and well being for all individuals in Canada.

30. We agree with the statement in the Victoria Charter that:

The Parliament and Government of Canada and the Legislatures and Governments of the Provinces are committed to . . . the assurance. as nearly as possible. that essential public services of reasonable quality are available to all individuals in Canada.

This objective should be recognized in the preamble of the Constitution.

31. The preamble of the Constitution should provide that every Canadian should have access to adequate Federal. Provincial and municipal services without having to bear a disproportionate tax burden because of the region in which he lives. This recommendation follows logically from our acceptance of the principle of equality of opportunity for all Canadians.

32. We completely accept the following objective as stated in the Victoria Charter:

The promotion of economic development to reduce disparities in the social and economic opportunities for all individuals in Canada wherever they may live.

As in the case of redistribution of income among individuals and for the same reasons, this objective should be recognized in the preamble of the Constitution.

In as vast and rich a country as Canada, it would have been fortuitous if the wealth had been equally distributed among the various regions. Canadians are becoming aware of the problem of regional disparities and have been asking their governments for increasingly greater redistribution of wealth. The Canadian Constitution did not explicitly assign this role to any government, but, through its spending power, the Parliament of Canada has been in a position to meet these needs.

In recent constitutional discussions, the question of regional disparities has been approached by governments through the concept of equal opportunity for all Canadians. Indeed, the First Ministers have reached a consensus on the concept of equal opportunity or equal future prospects.

The statement of conclusions of the third working session of the Constitutional Conference held in Ottawa on February 8 and 9, 1971, stated: “the First Ministers agreed that the Constitution should include a recognition of the importance of granting equality of opportunity to all Canadians. It was therefore concluded that the reduction of regional disparities should be referred to both in a new preamble and in the body of the Constitution.”

The statement of conclusions then proceeded to specify what should be mentioned in the preamble and in the body of the Constitution itself in respect of regional disparities. Article 46 of the Victoria Charter, a section proposed for inclusion in the body of the Constitution was worded in the following terms:

The Parliament and Government of Canada and the Legislatures and Governments of the Provinces are committed to:

(1) the promotion of equality of opportunity and well-being for all individuals in Canada;

(2) the assurance, as far as possible, that essential public services of reasonable quality are available to all individuals in Canada; and

(3) the promotion of economic development to reduce disparities in the social and economic opportunities for all individuals in Canada wherever they may live.

Article 47 of the Victoria Charter makes an important qualification to the provisions of Article 46:

The provisions of this Part shall not have the effect of altering the distribution of powers and shall not compel the Parliament of Canada or Legislatures of the Provinces to exercise their legislative powers.

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We endorse the conclusions of the First Ministers concerning regional disparities and we believe that Canadians fully support these objectives and want to have them included in the Canadian Constitution. Considering the nature of these objectives, we recommend that they be included in the preamble of the Constitution. Otherwise, further provisions would have to be inserted to limit the scope of the various sections, as was the case in Article 47 of the Victoria Charter.

Equal opportunity must exist for every Canadian. This does not mean that every individual must have the same wealth or income but, rather, that there will be equal opportunities which will foster the development and well-being of groups of individuals. Regional disparities are a bar to achieving equal opportunity for all Canadians. Hence, equal opportunity must eliminate the possibility of disparities that arise from belonging to a particular group (region, province, race, language, etc.).

It is important, first of all, to differentiate between policies whose aim is to redistributeincome among individuals and those designed to achieve equal opportunity for all Canadians. In order to achieve vertical equity the governments of Canada redistribute income among individuals so as to reduce disparities in the income scale of Canadians. This goal is being reached through a progressive system of taxation, through expenditures for goods and public services offered equally to all Canadians, and through certain transfer payments such as old age pensions and family allowances which provide assistance to needy citizens. This redistribution has an indirect effect on the distribution of income among regions, but the prime concern is still the individual as a citizen of Canada and not as a resident of a particular region. There is no question here of equalizing opportunities but merely of reducing income disparities, and the extent to which the latter remain depends on what is deemed acceptable by Canadians at a given time. We know what Canadians regard as equitable today, but we also know that vertical equity in future may call for greater or lesser redistribution.

In accordance with the principle expressed in the Victoria Charter, it does not seem wise to us to try to specify in the Constitution the form or degree of redistribution of income. Social priorities and principles cannot be fixed at any specific time. We therefore recommend that the objective of achieving a fair redistribution of income be included in the preamble of the Constitution, and that it reflect the social conscience of Canadians and our own approach to social problems.

Actually it is at the regional or provincial level that equality of opportunity can best be applied. Here the redistribution of wealth can be used to equalize the financial capacities of the regional governments or reduce discrepancies in the economic potential of the various regions.

Governments ensure horizontal equity by seeing to it that the citizens of a disadvantaged region do not have to bear a relatively greater tax burden in order to obtain a level of public services equivalent to that existing in the country as a whole. In Canada this goal is partially attained through equalization of provincial revenues. The present equalization formula enables the Provincial Governments to offer their citizens a fairly uniform programme of essential services without having to saddle them with an excessive tax load. The formula takes into account all revenues belonging to the Provincial Governments themselves, exclusive of conditional and unconditional grants, as well as funds obtained through borrowing. It distinguishes 16 sources of provincial revenue and determines the most appropriate tax base for each. For instance, in the case of the liquor tax, the tax base consists of the volume of alcoholic beverages consumed in each province. The most appropriate tax base for personal income tax, corporate tax, succession duties, sales tax and the like is determined in the same way. For each of the 16 sources of revenue, it is then necessary to compare (1) the per capita yield from the tax base of a province at the average rate in force in the provinces as a whole with (2) the per capita yield from the tax bases of the provinces as a whole at the average rate in force in the provinces as a whole. When the total revenues of a province, calculated according to (1) are lower than the national average as calculated in (2), the Federal Government makes up the difference through an equalization payment.

The existing equalization formula does not take into account provincial differences in the needs for public services and the costs of providing these services. It is based on the assumption that all provinces in Canada have similar needs and costs per capita in this sphere.

It is significant also that this formula raises the overall potential tax yield in disadvantaged provinces to the national average but does not lower the total yield of the richer provinces to that level. The formula therefore does not result in equalization of the total potential revenues of all the provinces, but only of those provinces where potential revenues are lower than the national average.

Furthermore, it should be noted that the formula does not take into account the financing aspect of the equalization programme. In fact, all provinces participate in financing the equalization programme, since Canadians of all regions pay taxes to the Federal Government and part of these taxes is used to make equalization payments to all provinces which are entitled to them. Thus the amounts paid into the equalization programme each year overestimate the net transfers made between richer and poorer provinces.

We have stressed above specific aspects of the present equalization formula. Although a definite improvement over previous ones, it would be more likely to produce equality of opportunity in the area of provincial public services if further changes were made in it.

At the present time, the revenues of municipal governments are not subject to equalization, so that municipalities where the average individual income is lower must shoulder a relatively heavier financial burden in order to give their citizens comparable public services. Since part of municipal revenues is used to finance public services having a direct bearing on individuals and their development, such as education, we submit that this situation makes it difficult to bring about a true equality of opportunity for all Canadians.

Our goal should be to give all Canadians access to adequate Federal, provincial and municipal services. The type of redistribution of wealth necessary is based on much more objective criteria, and the following principle should be incorporated into the preamble of the Constitution: Canadians, regardless of where they live, that is,

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regardless of the city or province in which they live, should not have to bear a disproportionate financial burden in order to receive an equivalent level of public services.

Behind the concept of equality of opportunity there is the desire to equalize the economic potential of each region. Perhaps this is the most subjective aspect of equality of opportunity. Consideration of the nature of economic potential in various regions raises questions “about the means available to achieve such equality of potential and also about its advisability.

Naturally, the basis of equal opportunity remains the existence of a feeling of community of interests in Canada. Insofar as regional economic potential is concerned, however, some economists claim that better balance in the economic development of the various regions can be obtained only at the expense of a reduced rate of growth in the gross national product. Other economists believe that, on the contrary, such a balance can lead to a higher national growth rate. Without attempting to decide the issue, we would suggest that the very existence of regional disparities implies increasingly significant social costs, even apart from such more tangible costs as equalization payments.

If one agrees to define the economic potential of each region in terms of per capita income, one may conclude that the means of reducing differences in potential are (1) a reduction in the relative population of the region or (2) an increase in economic potential through higher investment in depressed regions. In this connection we might note that in the post-war period, there was indeed a slight narrowing of the gap between the levels of average incomes in the various regions. However, we must at once add that this was due in part to a decrease of the relative population in areas of low average income.

Underlying regional development policies is the recognition that in addition to the advantages of greater manpower mobility, there is a social cost associated with an individual’s being compelled to leave his area in order to find a job. Nor can this situation be reconciled with equal opportunity. These considerations lead us logically to consider the relative aspect of regional economic potential.

There is often a tendency to measure regional disparities in strictly monetary terms. Yet pollution levels, crime rates and opportunities for political participation and personal development in general are undoubtedly important factors when comparing one region with another. The monetary aspects of equal opportunity must certainly be weighed against these social factors.

We fully endorse the objective set out in the Victoria Charter, namely “the promotion of economic development to reduce disparities in the social and economic opportunities for all individuals in Canada wherever the may live.” As in the case of the redistribution of income among individuals, and for the same reasons, we recommend the insertion of that objective in the premable of the Constitution.

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PART III—FEDERAL INSTITUTIONS

Chapter 12—The Head of State

RECOMMENDATIONS

33. Because of the state of divided opinion in Canada. the Committee does not recommend any change in the monarchical system at the present time.

34. The Committee itself prefers a Canadian as Head of State. and supports the evolutionary process by which the Governor General has been granted more functions are the Head of State for Canada. Eventually. the question of retaining or abolishing the Monarchy will have to be decided by way of clear consultation with the Canadian people.

The central place of the Crown, from the legal point of view, in the public life of Canada is established in Part III (Executive Power) of the British North America Act. Section 9 of the Act provides: “The Executive Government and Authority of and over Canada is hereby declared to continue and be vested in the Queen.” Section 15 of the same Act declares that “The Command-in-Chief of the Land and Naval Militia, and of all Naval and Military Forces, of and in Canada, is hereby declared to continue and be vested in the Queen.”

The B.N.A. Act also provides in section 12 that all powers exercisable under any acts of the United Kingdom Parliament or of the colonial legislatures then (1867) exercised by Governors or Lieutenant Governors were as far as possible to be exercised “by the Governor General, with the Advice or with the Advice and Consent of or in conjunction with the Queen’s Privy Council for Canada, or any Member thereof, or by the Governor General individually, as the Case requires.” Section 13 adds that “The Provisions of this Act referring to the Governor in Council shall be construed as referring to the Governor General acting by and with the Advice of the Queen’s Privy Council for Canada.”

While the explicit words of the B.N.A. Act seem to imply that the role’of the Canadian Government is that of tendering advice only, yet Canadians are well aware of the constitutional convention that the Governor General, as the representative of the Queen in Canada, must normally follow the advice of his Canadian ministers, and that a corresponding convention applies to the actions of Lieutenant Governors in relation to provincial governments. The binding nature of this advice is one of the principles at the core of our system of responsible government.

We were impressed that Canadians, speaking generally, do not want any major change in direction away from the parliamentary system of government as an institution. Some witnesses even expressed the fear that, if any change were made in the “head of state system” which we now have, this change would itself imperil parliamentary government. However, a number of Commonwealth countries have become republics without undermining their parliamentary systems. Consequently, there seems to be no basis for the fear that the substance of our democratic institutions, and the basis of our responsible government, would be affected by any change in the relationship of the head of state to the executive and parliamentary institutions in the country.

We believe it is fair to say that any change in the nature of the office of head of state for the Canadian nation is, or could be, institutionally speaking, a change of style and not a change of substance. As one expert witness said:

We will have to settle for the fact that we have a head of state here in Ottawa.

I do not see any insuperable difficulty to having this kind of head of state, because for practical purposes from day to day, that is what we have had for a very long time. (3.24:38)

We thus distinguish style and substance, even while fully recognizing that any formal alteration of the position of the Crown would be a highly emotional issue. Many Canadians made it clear to us that they would either affirm or decry such a change with fervour. But we would infer from the general level of satisfaction of Canadians with their institutions, from a democratic point of view at least, that they are confident that their other fundamental institutions would survive any debate on the issue of change for the Monarchy. In this sense most Canadians seem to feel that any change would be more one of climate, however stormy the passage, than one of fundamental constitution import.

The quantity of the evidence on the head of state shows that it was a recurring theme in the Committee’s travels across Canada. There were, first of all, many Canadians who stood squarely for no change in the present system under which the Monarch is represented in Canada by a Governor General who exercises constitutionally limited, but important, functions in the Canadian political system. The main argument advanced by these witnesses was that the Monarch, as the non-partisan head of the Canadian government, protects the people, both institutionally and symbolically, from the excesses of popularly elected governments. For some, the image of the Monarch and the

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Royal Family gives them a central position in the maintenance of socially desirable attitudes and manners. For them the fabric of society is stabilized by the presence of a personage of such dignity and respect. Others argued that the Monarchy must be maintained as the historical link with the United Kingdom in the evolutionary growth of Canada.

The following extracts from our evidence indicate the major arguments of those favouring the present system:

Were there no other reason for his office, this residual discretion which the governor general exercises is sufficient justification. The Crown in Canada is not just an historic survival from the past but a living and enduring part of the life of the people. More personal and therefore more firmly based than ever before, affection has been added to reverence. Like very few other things, the monarchy lays claim equally to the affection of French-speaking and English-speaking Canadians, something for us to remember in these days of discordant dialogue between the two founding races. The Canadian monarchy provides a focal point of national acceptance not only for these Canadians but for the many new Canadians of differing backgrounds. Many coming to Canada from Europe know and understand the concept of monarchy from experience in their native lands. New Canadians are somewhat surprised at the apparent apathy of some native Canadians towards the institution of the monarchy. Every nation must have a head of state. An alternative to our form of democratic government is a republic. In an hereditary monarchy one king succeeds another, as an historic proclamation “The King is dead; long live the King” resounds throughout the land. In every election of a president in a republic there is division and strife. (3.62:23)

Another witness said:

The Crown has not been maintained in Canada just because of tradition, and I would remind you that both English-speaking Canadians and French-speaking Canadians have a long history of monarchical forms coming from both Britain and France . . .

That is not the reason why we have retained the Crown. We have retained it because of its practical political operations and because it has worked . . .

A man going from a private citizen to a minister of the Crown or from ministry to head of state, can lose all sense of proportion and all his personal balance, and the history of the world and the governing of man has illustrated this hundreds of times. Men, whether they come from monarchical levels or whether they are ordinary Corsican corporals become leaders of the world in the name of democracy and take on an emperorship and they, too, are subject to the bends.

So what should we do in our Constitution? We recognize this danger at the headship of state and the headship of government and separate those two elements. We put one person at the top and call him or her the Monarch and say, “You have all the power, you have all the colour, you represent the legal system, you represent the background of the Constitution or you have all the power, but you can exercise none of it.” Then we put another little man up at the top and say, “You will be the trustee of the powers. We will advise on the use of the powers, but you may never have those powers.” Why do we do this? For the simple reason . . . that politicians no matter where they come from, or who they are must be electable, responsible, criticizable and removable. (3.33:49)

On the other hand, those Canadians who opposed the Monarchy seemed in most cases, to oppose it because of the link which the “Canadian Monarchy” has with the British Crown. Their objections were not so much against the monarchical system, as a system, but against the connection with the United Kingdom. The essence of their position was that the present Monarchy is not a Canadian institution because of these links. As one witness said:

To an English-born Canadian such as myself. . . the most damning thing I want to say about the English monarchy is that it is not Canadian. (3.20:43)

Another said:

I think the Queen is a very nice lady. I think that she really appreciated visiting Manitoba. I do not think she really paid too much attention to all the visits and to the comments made simply because of the fact that she really . . . has other problems and does not have that much of a stake. I think at this time in order to really solidify the Canadian unity we should have more contact with our Canadian politicians, our Canadian institutions, with the Canadian people. (3.20:52)

A further observation was:

One thing that I would like to ask—and I do not ask this belligerently or anything—would the people who want to preserve the monarchy be in favour of having a Canadian as a king. If it is the monarchy we want, why not a Canadian? Is there anything magic about having a monarch from some other country? I mean do they have the divine right or anything? Why not a Canadian? (3.33:57)

This group also argued that the Monarchy in Canada was a source of disunity. Ironically, those who argued in favour of continuing the Monarch, argued that it was on the contrary a source of unity. Since the Monarchy cannot be both in the context of the total Canadian society, it would seem that the difficulty of defining the criteria of “unity” or “disunity” prevents any objective evaluation of these respective arguments. One witness even had a remedy, although he was not sure of the diagnosis:

If the Crown cannot be a symbol of unity between French Canada and English Canada, I say, do away with it. But let us do it quickly, and let us part as friends. I am sure Her Majesty would not want to cause division among her Canadian people. (3.39:42)

Those who opposed the institution of the Monarchy also argued that because of its links the Monarchy as established in Canada is a reminder of “colonial” status. Another witness put his misgivings rather graphically:

You get people saying that one thing the fishermen in Newfoundland, the Prairie farmer and the Eskimo in the Arctic have in common is the Queen’s head on the coinage and the oath of allegiance to the Queen when they go to take their seats in Parliament. But ‘1 i-+(Dr-+-,(D .”‘(D(D’<(D -411)

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what they do not seem to realize is that these items are also common between us and the inhabitants of the Fiji Islands and Hong Kong. There is no necessary connection and no logical connection. There is, in fact, no connection between the concept of the Crown and the concept of Canada as a united country. . . .

What is the function of the Crown? What is the Crown? The Crown is in substance the King of England. There is no balking that point. We do not have a debate here when the King or Queen dies who will be the next one. There is no doubt who the next one will be. The next one will be the person recognized by the English Government as the King of England. So what is the purpose of the people of this country—and I speak as a foreigner recently naturalized—what is the purpose of requiring the people of this country to swear allegiance . . .to the sovereign of another country, a person who has no connection, so little connection with this country? He or she not only is not a Canadian but very rarely comes here. When he does come here, he makes a few ceremonial non-political, purely social gestures, like we are going to the Commonwealth Games and things of that sort. What is the point of making people swear allegiance to that person? The answer is obvious. If it means anything, what it means is that we are bowing the knee to England. And if people say the Crown is a symbol, and it is a symbol, what is it a symbol of? …The monarch is the tribal totem of the Anglo-Saxons and . ..when people elected to Parliament or to a legislature are required to swear allegiance to this king of a foreign country, this is equivalent to the bailiff saying, (in William Tell) “You salute my hat. Otherwise you do not take your seat in Parliament.” (3.33:43)

Others pointed out that the requirements of the law in connection with the oath of allegiance in citizenship court, in the public service and in Parliament and the Legislatures, as well as the wording of the B.N.A. Act and the form and process of courts, impose, upon Canadians who reject the Monarchy, an unequal psychological burden of citizenship:

This is not merely a matter of imagination. You hear about it everywhere. I will give you just one example I heard recently. A Dutchman in this province who was recently naturalized, recently took his citizenship, was interviewed by the citizenship judge, and he objected to having to swear this oath of allegiance to the Queen of England. He said, “Look here. I was a Dutchman, I am intending to become a Canadian. I am not intending to become an Englishman. Why should I have to swear allegiance to the King of England?” Now what answer could the judge give to him? There is only one answer the judge could give him. He said, “This is the way it is; you have got to do it.” He did not, of course, say that this is the Queen of Canada, because the only person that you can say that to with a straight face— this person who lives over there and hardly ever comes here and is not a Canadian is the Queen of Canada—the only person you could say that to with a straight face would be a constitutional lawyer, not a human being. (3.33:44)

They feel that the Monarch cannot be made Queen of Canada by what they consider to be a legal fiction.

Several witnesses felt that the predominant mood of Canadians on the Monarchy was apathy:

One more point on which I had not intended to touch, but since so many others have talked about the Monarchy, I cannot resist a word; It is, it seems to me, a matter of secondary consideration compared to other and weightier issues of national unity. I am indifferent about it, retain it or abolish it as you will. (3.34:34)

There appeared to be a considerable measure of support for having a “Canadian” Governor General who would be the Head of State in his own right, rather than as representing the Monarch, while at the same time recognizing the Monarch as the head of the Commonwealth. Some felt that this was a natural evolutionary step for Canada to take, and that it would, in effect, “Canadianize” the office of Governor General and be the least divisive and most generally satisfying step that could be taken. It was further argued that this would be most in accord with our history and traditions.

The following excerpts illustrate this view:

The first specific change would be to rewrite the preamble to the Act. Rather than describing our government as similar in principle to the United Kingdom, we propose a federal constitution based on the principles of parliamentary supremacy. Executive authority in Canada would be vested in the Governor-General as head of state and the working executive would be responsible to the Parliament of Canada . . . .

Those sections which refer to executive authority would be revamped to vest all executive authority in the Governor-General as head of state. This provision which enhances the present office of Governor-General recognizes by inference that Canadians of recognized stature, such as General Vanier or the present Governor-General, would enhance the office and ensure that the head of state was a Canadian, intimately concerned with the welfare of Canada and not a personage removed from Canada whose sovereign authority is not only questioned but disregarded by a majority of Canadians.

The provisions which provide for a Privy Council to advise the Governor-General would remain unchanged. The flexibility in these provisions has allowed for Canadian conventions, customs and procedures to develop to meet the needs of a dynamic policy. Introducing precise legal definitions would therefore, restrict the healthy traditional political process based on the imprecision of the British North America Act. (3.23:60)

Another witness said:

I do not think it is in our power to abolish the monarchy because it is a British institution and they are the people who could abolish it. All we have to do is to have our own head of state and that is all. (3.32:60)

A further view was:

It is my opinion that a head of state should be a Canadian and reside in Canada. I make this suggestion because I think that selecting a head of state from

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one family is contrary to the bill of rights and is discriminatory on the grounds of race, creed and colour.

It should be possible in any sovereign, independent state for any citizen regardless of his ethnic origin, religious beliefs or colour to become the head of state as it is in most independent, sovereign states. (3.32:58)

The majority of the members of the Committee would prefer a Canadian as Head of State who would no longer represent a Monarch beyond the seas but would assume office for an established period of years following an affirmative vote of Parliament. We therefore support the evolutionary process by which the Governor General has been granted more functions as the Head of State for Canada.

However, in the present climate of Canadian opinion any sharp change would probably be an unduly divisive step. As far as we are able to measure, Canadians are about equally divided between those who favour and those who oppose the Monarchy, with the proponents generally being older, and the opponents generally younger

In such circumstances, therefore, the Committee does not recommend any change in the Monarchy at the present time, but eventually the question of retaining or abolishing it will have to be decided by way of a clear consultation with the Canadian people.

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Chapter 13—The Senate

RECOMMENDATIONS

35. The present full veto power of the Senate over legislation should be reduced to a suspensive veto for six months according to the following formula: a bill may become law without the consent of the Senate (1) if the House of Commons. having once passed it. passes it again no less than six months after it was rejected or finally amended by the Senate or. (2) if. within 6 months of third reading of a bill by the House of Commons the Senate has not completed consideration of it. and the House of Commons again passes it at any time after the expiration of the 6 months. but any period when Parliament is prorogued or dissolved shall not be counted in computing the 6 months.

36. The investigative role of the Senate. which has gained more importance in recent years. should be continued and expanded at the initiative of the Senate itself. and the Government should also make more use of the Senate in this way.

37. The Government should be entitled to introduce in the Senate all bills. including money bills but excluding appropriation bills. before their approval by the House of Commons. provided that. in the case of money bills. they should be introduced by the leader of the Government in the Senate on behalf of the Government.

38. The distribution of Senators should be as follows: Newfoundland 6. Prince Edward Island 4. Nova Scotia 10. New Brunswick 10. Quebec 24. Ontario 24. Manitoba 12. Saskatchewan I2. Alberta 12. British Columbia 12. the Yukon Territory 2. and the Northwest Territories 2: a total of 130.

39. All Senators should continue to be appointed by the Federal Government: as vacancies occur in the present Senate. one-half of the Senators from each Province and Territory should be appointed in the same manner as at present: the other half from each Province and Territory should be appointed by the Federal Government from a panel of nominees submitted by the appropriate Provincial or Territorial Government.

40. The personal requirements for appointment to the Senate should be limited to those required for eligibility as an elector in the Canada Elections Act. plus residence in the Province for which a Senator is appointed. The Quebec structure of electoral divisions should be abolished.

41. The compulsory retirement age for all new Senators should be seventy years. Upon retirement. Senators should retain the right to the title and precedence of Senators and the right to participate in the work of the Senate or of its Committees but not the right to vote or to receive the indemnity of Senators.

The Confederation Debates of 1865 prove that there would have been no Confederation in 1867, or at least no Canada as we know it today, if provision had not been made for the Senate. The Maritimes and Quebec were not prepared to join the union if there was to be only one elected House, based on population. Canada would be a federation, and not a unitary state. Consequently, if the Lower House were based on representation by population, there must be an Upper House giving equality to the regions.

The Honourable George Brown, speaking in the 1865 debates in the House of Assembly on a motion to approve the resolution passed at the 1864 Quebec Conference stated:

The very essence of our compact is that the union shall be federal and not legislative. Our Lower Canada friends have agreed to give us representation by population in the Lower House, on the express condition that they shall have equality in the Upper House. On no other condition could we have advanced a step . . . .(p. 88).

Obviously the Fathers of Confederation were determined to establish a Senate, but they did not intend it to be a rival of the House of Commons. The position of the House of Commons was guaranteed by three decisions: only the House of Commons would be elected; all bills for the raising and spending of money would originate in the Commons; the government would be responsible only to the Lower House. It is also clear that the original intention was broadly to pattern the Canadian Senate on the British Upper House and not on the American Senate. As Macdonald said in the 1865 debates:

The Legislative Council will stand in the same relation to the Lower House, as the House of Lords to the House of Commons in England . . . .(p.34).

Two roles, then, were intended for the Senate of Canada: 1) the protection of Provincial, minority or

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regional rights; 2) the review of legislation (in the words of Sir John A. Macdonald, “the sober second thought in legislation”)

Criticism of the Canadian Senate has centred on the method of selection, the term of appointment, and the failure of some Senators to devote sufficient time and attention to their duties as Senators. The Senate suffers as well from a misunderstanding of its role, unfavourable comparison with the American Senate (which it was never intended to duplicate), and inadequate publicity for the work it has done.

The Senate in fact has done a great deal of good work, as will be discussed later in this chapter. Much of it, unfortunately, has gone unnoticed. If Canadian governments in the past have paid only lip service to Senate reform, the Senate itself in recent times has made great efforts to improve itself.

While there is a body of opinion which holds that a non-elected Senate is an anachronism in a modern democracy, the Committee found that the majority of witnesses who appeared before us recommended the reform of the Senate rather than its abolition, and many suggestions for reform were made.

We agree with the witnesses who argued for reform of the Senate, not its abolition. The reasons which prompted the Fathers of Confederation to set up a bicameral legislative process in Canada are still valid today. Federal states in particular have found upper houses valuable. They allow greater regional representation at the level of the central government. The federal legislative process can and does benefit from regional representation.

The importance of this role cannot be denied. The problems of regional disparities, the recurring talk of alienation from some regions, of separatism from others, and the concern about domination by the Central Provinces reinforce traditional and theoretical arguments. The growth and development of Canada has not reduced regionalism in some aspects, but has rather enhanced it as regions grew stronger. Much remains to be done to improve the relations and understanding between regions, and the Senate can be one important tool.

The veto power of the Canadian Senate is unlimited. Even in the case of money bills (while it is true that the Senate cannot initiate them or increase the amount), it can refuse to pass them or can reduce the amounts. There has been no change in this power since 1867. On the other hand, the constitutional power of the British House of Lords, on which our Senate was basically patterned, has been reduced. In the case of the Senate a curbing of its veto power would, paradoxically, strengthen it, and do so without weakening the House of Commons. It would increase the possibilities of confrontation, but avoid the perpetuation of deadlock by ultimately giving the House of Commons its way.

Suggestions have been made that the Senate could have some special power in confirming the appointments of Judges of the Supreme Court, Ambassadors and heads of cultural agencies. Such a role could lead to political controversy over the appointment, and to an unnecessary public discussion which would probably weaken the appointee rather than strengthen him. We reject this proposed role.

The investigative role of the Senate is not new, but it has assumed much greater importance in the 1960s. There have been, for example, special committees of the Senate on Manpower and Employment, Land Use in Canada, Aging, Mass Media, Poverty, and Science Policy, in addition to studies by Senate standing committees. Other investigations have been done by special joint committees of the Senate and the House of Commons – such as those on Consumer Credit and on Divorce in 1967, and this Special Joint Committee on the Constitution. Much useful information has been produced by these Committees, and major legislation has resulted from their work.

We recommend that the present veto power of the Senate be reduced to a suspensive veto for a period of six months: so that a bill could become law without the consent of the Senate if the House of Commons, having once passed it, passes it again after a period of six months from the date of its rejection or final amendment by the Senate. This would ensure the continuation of a legislative role for the Senate in which regional forces could work, while at the same time ensuring that the House of Commons could not be thwarted indefinitely. Such a suspensive veto would recognize political realities in Canada, and would give to the Senate a more realistic constitutional base, as a non-elected body, from which to express its opposition to the elected government and the House of Commons. If the Senate did not complete its consideration of a bill or resolution within six months from third reading or passage in the House of Commons, it should become law if again passed by the House of Commons at any time during the same Parliament. Periods when Parliament is prorogued or dissolved would not be counted in computing the six-month period.

In order to help speed up the legislative process we also recommend that the Government should be entitled to introduce in the Senate all bills, including money bills, but excluding appropriation bills, before their approval by the House of Commons; provided that, in the case of money bills, they should be introduced by the Leader of the Government in the Senate on behalf of the Government. Where bills are first introduced in the Senate. a government would obviously be assuming a favourable reception there, since this procedure would make the overriding of the Senate by the House more complicated if it became necessary.

Under the compromise of 1867 the then-existing three regions were given equal representation in the Senate. The Maritimes as a unit had 24 Senators, and there were 24 each for Quebec and Ontario, for a total of 72. As the Western Provinces entered Confederation they were given varying numbers of Senators. In 1915, Western Canada was made a fourth senatorial area with 24 Senators equally distributed between the four provinces, raising the total representation in the Senate to 96. This was further increased to 102, the present maximum, with the allocation of six Senate seats to Newfoundland on its joining Confederation. The present provincial membership is therefore as follows:

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Newfoundland 6
Nova Scotia 10
New Brunswick 10
Prince Edward Island 4
Quebec 24
Ontario 24
Manitoba 6
Saskatchewan 6
Alberta 6
British Columbia 6
TOTAL 102

For the purposes of senatorial areas the West in 1915 was considered one unit. While the four Western Provinces share many common concerns, even in 1915 it could not be said that the whole of the West was one economic unit. It is even less so today. Furthermore, since 1915 the economic power of the West has dramatically increased.

Two regions, the Yukon and the Northwest Territories remain without representation in the Senate. There is precedent for having Senatorial representation for the Territories. In 1888, the Northwest Territories were first given two Senators under the authority of a Constitutional amendment of 1886. This was increased to four in 1904 prior to the acquisition of provincial status by Saskatchewan and Alberta.

Many federal states have equal representation in the Upper House for all states. In view of the great disparity in the size and economic power of the various Canadian provinces, the concentration of Francophones mainly in one province, and the historical structure and commitments of every province, we reject total equality for each province as impracticable.

On the other hand, Canada is the only federation in which some of the smaller provincial units have more representatives in the second chamber than have the middle-sized units. In our opinion the time has come for a redistribution of Senate seats to reflect better the present regions of Canada.

Two of the most obvious deficiencies in the current distribution of seats are: (1) the disparity in representation in geographical and other terms between the Western provinces and the other provinces; (2) the fact that the Yukon and the Northwest Territories, being a major part of the Canadian land mass, are not represented at all in the Senate. Consideration must also be given to the fact that a reduction in the complement of Senators from Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and Prince Edward Island would have the effect, in some cases immediately, of reducing the number of members in the House of Commons from those provinces: for sections 51(1)3 and 51A of the British North America Act provide a floor for House of Commons representation for a province by ensuring that no province can have fewer members than Senators. Taking into account these factors as well as historical ones, we propose the following distribution of seats in the Senate, which would increase representation for the West and the North:

Newfoundland 6
Nova Scotia 10
New Brunswick 10
Prince Edward Island 4
Quebec 24
Ontario 24
Manitoba 12
Saskatchewan 12
Alberta 12
British Columbia 12
PROVINCIAL TOTAL 126
Yukon Territory 2
Northwest Territories 2
GRAND TOTAL 130

Considering that in the final analysis the success or failure of the Senate depends more on the quality of its membership than on any other factor, the question of selection is paramount.

The method of selection of Senators has been open to much criticism. Many Canadians think of Senate appointments (made, in fact if not in form, by the Prime Minister) as simply a method of rewarding party faithful. With all due respect to the many fine appointments which have been made, there have been over the years too many appointments which in the eyes of the public confirm this view.

The system of appointment is therefore suspect. Credit is due to the present Prime Minister for a very real attempt to broaden the base. There is no guarantee, however, that future Prime Ministers would follow the same course. This is not to say that political appointments are wrong per se—after all, the Senate is part of the political structure; it is a political arena. The criticism is not that politicians are appointed, but rather the reason for their appointment.

If the Senate is to fulfill properly its role, the criterion for membership must not be reward for past service, but rather the expectation of future service to the nation, based on a recognition of ability and past service in various fields of endeavour, including the political sphere. Certainly the Canadian system is unique, as no other federation has chosen to follow the Canadian example of placing the appointments of senators in the hands of the central government.

The Committee has spent considerable time in considering the best method of selecting Senators. We do not feel that a wholly or partially elected Senate is the answer in the Canadian context. The decision made in 1867 was not accidental. The appointment system still offers the most scope for a greater diversity of Senators, drawn from all areas of Canadian life. Consequently, we recommend that one half of the Senators from each Province or Territory be appointed by the Federal Government as now, and that the other half be appointed by the Federal Government from nominees proposed by the appropriate Provincial Government or Territorial Council. Thus, although the whole of the formal power of appointment would remain with the Federal Government, half of the Senate members would be, in effect, Provincial appointees. The new system should be brought into effect as vacancies arise, with the first nomination from each Province or Territory to be made from the Provincial or Territorial list, and subsequent nominations alternating.

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At present, a person eligible for appointment to the Senate must:

—be of the full age of thirty years;

—be either a natural born or a naturalized Subject of the Queen;

—own real property within the Province he represents to a net value of $4,000;

—be worth at least $4,000 over and above his debts and liabilities;

—be a resident in the Province for which he is appointed, and in the case of Quebec, have his residence or real property qualification in the electoral division for which he is appointed, or be a resident therein.

In 1867 this propertyiqualification was very large. In that day it was considered proper to restrict Senate appointments to people of means. Today we find such restrictions repugnant. The Senate must be representative of all facets of society.

The Quebec restriction requiring residence or property holdings in the electoral division of the Senator is anachronistic and ought to be abolished as well as the divisions themselves.

The age limitation imposed in 1867, like the property qualification, reflects the thinking of another era.

Consequently, we recommend that the personal qualifications for appointment to the Senate should be limited to those required for eligibility as an elector under the Canada Elections Act, subject to the additional qualification of residence in the Province or Territory for which a Senator is appointed.

We also recommend that the retirement age for Senators be lowered from the present age of 75 to 70 for all Senators appointed under these new provisions. Members of the present Senate should be able to retire after 70 and before 75 with full salary until they reach the age of 75.

We further recommend that upon retirement Senators should retain the right to the title and precedence of Senators, and the right to participate in the work of the Senate and of its Committees, but not the right to vote or to receive the indemnity of Senators.

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Chapter 14—The House of Commons

RECOMMENDATIONS

42. The mechanism of redistribution of seats in the House of Commons as well as the limitations implied in the 15% rule and the Senate rule should be retained in the Constitution. The formula of representation. however. subject to our recommendations on the Bill of Rights. should be the exclusive prerogative of the House of Commons. to be dealt with by ordinary legislation.

43. Every House of Commons should continue for four years. from the day of the return of the writs for choosing the House and no longer. provided that. and notwithstanding any Royal Prerogative. the Governor General should have the power to dissolve Parliament during that period:

(1) when the Government is defeated

(a) on a motion expressing no confidence in the Government; or

(b) on a vote on a specific bill or portion of a bill which the Government has previously declared should be construed as a motion of want of confidence: or

(2) when the House of Commons passes a resolution requesting dissolution of Parliament.

In an age in which all of our institutions are being subjected to close reconsideration it would be surprising indeed if the principal institution of our democratic government, the House of Commons, was not also undergoing intense reexamination. We believe this is also true of Provincial Legislatures, but their constitution and functioning does not fall under our terms of reference. However, the provinces could do worse than try to follow the principles and procedures in force at the Federal level.

Many of the day-to-day shortcomings in the functioning of the House of Commons have been obvious to the Members, and in the present Parliament many changes have been made in the rules and practices of the House. Some of these changes have been a matter of dispute among the political Parties, but no one has denied the need for serious change. Further changes such as the broadcasting of the proceedings of the House and Committees are even now under consideration.

Outside of Parliament the criticisms are often more radical, and range from the demand of the more extreme exponents of participatory democracy that representative government should be abolished to the suggestion that elections should be held at fixed intervals, thus lessening the control of the executive over the legislative branch of government.

This Committee has encountered most of these views in the course of its hearings, as well as having experienced some of the unconventional opposition to Parliament through demonstrations staged at several of our meetings. We have, in turn, shown our support for participatory democracy by the wide-ranging character of our hearings, by the procedures we developed for our public meetings, by our extension of simultaneous interpretation to audiences, and by our attempts to obtain permission for the broadcasting of our public meetings.

Most of the issues involved in a discussion of representative democracy today go beyond the confines of our terms of reference, since they involve an analysis of the role and financing of political parties and of the diffusion of information in our society. We do want to affirm our support for the preservation of representative institutions. The alternatives would seem to us to be direct democracy on a universal and instantaneous scale through the use of sophisticated computers, or some form of mob rule whereby the group which can most effectively—or most forcibly—influence the Government would make the principal decisions. The latter method is obviously inappropriate for a democracy, for it would reflect the views of a particular group rather than of the people as a whole. We believe that the former method is also undemocratic, though more subtly so. For we believe that democracy is more than merely the mathematical counting of a majority of votes on every decision, but requires an opportunity for the voter to inform himself and to be persuaded by his fellow citizens.

But our endorsement of representative democracy is not intended as an acceptance of the status quo. Unless major changes are made in our political institutions in the broadest sense, we foresee considerable difficulty in the continuance of the system. While we do not believe that many of the issues can be solved by constitutional provisions, we would support two constitutional changes. In order to maintain a better balance between executive and legislative power, we would recommend the following constitutional provision with respect to the dissolution of Parliament: every House of Commons shall continue for four years from the day of the return of the writs for choosing the House and no longer: provided that, and

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notwithstanding any Royal Prerogative, the Governor General may dissolve Parliament during that period of four years (1) when the Government is defeated (a) on a motion expressing no confidence in the Government, or (b) on a vote on a specific bill or portion of a bill which the Government has previously declared should be construed as a motion of want of confidence; or (2) when the House of Commons passes a resolution requesting dissolution of Parliament.

We also believe that the formula for representation in the House of Commons should be cleared up. Section 51 of the British North America Act, which has been amended from time to time to provide for equitable representation, essentially establishes a mathematical formula for representation on the basis of population, with two qualifications: (1) in any readjustment the number of members for any province may not be reduced by the mathematical formula by more than 15% below the representation to which it was previously entitled; and (2) no province may have fewer members of parliament than it has Senators. The 15% clause operates so as to add additional members where this would be required to maintain the representation of some provinces, whereas the Senate clause necessitates rather the reduction of membership from some provinces in order to maintain the required level in others. Evidence presented to us indicated that, on the basis of the present population, other Provinces will have to contribute six members to maintain the number of members in the Maritime Provinces at the same level as Senate representation. This appears to us to be unfair, and we suggest that this number of members should be added to the House, making a total of 269. In keeping with our earlier proposal that there should be a provision in the Bill of Rights for fair representation on the basis of population and in order to minimize the opportunities for any government to tamper with the process of achieving this aim, we would propose that some of the essential prescriptions of the Electoral Boundaries Readjustment Act (1964-1965) (R.S.C. 1970 E-2) be inserted in the Constitution, namely:

A. Following each decennial Census a Federal Commission shall be established for each Province, to consider and report upon the readjustment of the representation of each Province in the House of Commons. (section 3).

B. Each Commission for a Province shall consist of four members, namely:

(1) A Chairman to be appointed by the Chief Justice of the Province from one of the courts of his province. (section 6(1)).

(2) Two members, neither of whom can be a member of the Senate or House of Commons or a Legislative Assembly of a province, to be appointed by the Speaker of the House of Commons from among residents in that Province as he deems suitable. (sections 6 and 8).

(3) The Representation Commissioner. (section 5).

C. Each Commission shall complete its report within one year and the report laid before the House of Commons. After objections filed with the Speaker and considered by the House have been reconsidered by the Commissions concerned, representation orders shall be issued. They shall be in force until the next following readjustment of boundaries.

Other points now covered by this Act should be determined by ordinary legislation.

We would further propose that the representation formula for the House of Commons should be left in the hands of the House of Commons to deal with by ordinary legislation, retaining in the Constitution only the 15% rule and the Senate rule as limitations on the power of the House to act, but without specifying in the Constitution the mathematical effect of their application.

Other matters respecting the House of Commons we would leave for non-constitutional settlement.

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Chapter 15—The Supreme Court of Canada

RECOMMENDATIONS

44. The existence. independence and structure of the Supreme Court of Canada should be provided for in the Constitution.

45. Consultation with the Provinces on appointments to the Supreme Court of Canada must take place. We generally support the methods of consultation proposed in the Victoria Charter. but the Provinces should also be allowed to make nominations to the nominating councils which would be set up under the Victoria proposals if the Attorney-General of Canada and the Attorney General of a province fail to agree on an appointee.

46. The Provinces should be given the right to withdraw appeals in matters of strictly provincial law from the Supreme Court of Canada and to vest final decision on such matters in their own highest courts. thus leaving to the Supreme Court of Canada jurisdiction over matters of Federal law and of constitutional law. including the Bill of Rights. The issue of whether a matter was one of strictly provincial law would be subject to determination by the Supreme Court of Canada.

Presumably no justification, either theoretical or practical, is necessary for a final court of appeal for Canada. The Supreme Court of Canada has now been in existence for almost a century, though it has been the ultimate appellate body for just under one-quarter of that period. For the whole time it has been a statutory rather than a constitutional court, having been established under the Federal Parliament’s power under section 101 of the B.N.A. Act to “provide for the Constitution, Maintenance and Organization of a General Court of Appeal for Canada”. In a new Constitution, with the added duty of interpreting and enforcing a constitutional Bill of Rights, it would be preferable that the Court itself be provided for in the constitution. Hence Articles 22 to 42 of the Victoria Charter.

We agree with constitutional entrenchment of the Court and we see no reason to depart from its present structure—nine judges sitting during good behaviour up to the age of 75, with three of the judges specified to be members of the Bar of the Province of Quebec because the civil-law system in that Province differs from the common-law system of all the other Provinces.

There are, however, several problem areas, the most difficult of which is the appointment process. Articles 26 to 33 of the Charter are devoted to this question. These articles provide that, in the absence of agreement between the Attorney General of Canada and the Attorney General of a proposed candidate’s province for a 90-day period, the Attorney General of Canada has the right to convene a nominating committee. The Attorney General of the Province has the right to opt for a council consisting of all the Attorneys General in Canada or for one composed of the two Attorneys General (Federal and Provincial) and a chairman. If they cannot agree on a chairman, the Chief Justice of the Province shall name the chairman.

Names may be submitted to either kind of nominating council only by the Attorney General of Canada and from among those he has already submitted to the Provincial Attorney General for approval. The council then makes a recommendation to the Governor General in Council, which presumably would accept the recommendation, although it is not bound to do so.

The Charter’s appointment process is an imaginative, though somewhat cumbersome, attempt to provide the Provinces with more than merely token consultation when a new judge of the Supreme Court of Canada is to be appointed. We support the principle and have no quarrel with the method, except to suggest that it would be advisable also to allow the Provinces to make nominations to the nominating council.

The effect of the procedures proposed by the Charter would almost certainly be to ensure a nominee acceptable to the Provinces without the necessity of establishing a nominating council. But if a council has in fact to be established, is it necessary to guarantee in advance that a nominee of the Attorney General of Canada is chosen?

Rather than attempting to make more civil-law judges available to hear civil-law appeals by co—opting lower- court judges on an ad hoc basis, as proposed by Article 39 of the Charter, we prefer that every Province should be given the right to withdraw its appeals on matters of strictly provincial law from the Supreme Court of Canada and to vest final decision on such matters in its own highest court. The jurisdiction which would remain in the Supreme Court of Canada would be over questions of Federal law or of the Constitution, and over matters of Provincial law where a province has not withdrawn from the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction. Whether or not a matter was one of strictly Provincial law would have to be sub-

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ject to decision by the Supreme Court which would be empowered to grant or deny leave to appeal according to its view of each case.

This recommendation for a limitation of Supreme Court jurisdiction is contingent upon our recommendation above for the entrenchment of a comprehensive Bill of Rights in the Constitution. In our view, the Supreme Court should retain jurisdiction over questions of civil liberties and human rights.

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Chapter 16—The National Capital Area

RECOMMENDATIONS

47. There should be a movement by stages towards the possible creation of. an autonomous Canadian Capital.

48. The Canadian Capital should be generally the areas of Ontario and of Quebec now defined in the schedule to the National Capital Act (1959).

A country’s capital is an essential instrument of national pride. In a federal, bilingual and multicultural country, it must also be an essential instrument of national unity. It must reflect equitably all aspects of that country’s character, and each citizen should have a true sense of ownership in the capital of his country regardless of the distance which separates him from the seat of government.

In Canada this has not been and is not now the case. Ottawa was chosen as capital at a time when the Western Provinces did not exist and Canada had only two of its Atlantic Provinces. It was not granted territorial autonomy, but was situated on the territory of one central Province in close proximity to the other.

As Canada grew, so did its Capital, but it did so reflecting the character and the flavour of the Province of which it was a part and on which it was dependent, to the exclusion of the many other characteristics which were already present in, or which were steadily being added to, the fabric of Canada. The absence of a truly bilingual character is particularly marked.

The Federal Government probably first manifested its interest in the capital as a national institution in 1899 with the creation of the Ottawa Improvement Commission but it was not until the late 1920s that a Federal District Commission was set up. Its jurisdiction was limited to the esthetics of Federally owned lands and buildings. It naturally had a low priority on funds during the ’30s and ’40s. It was restructured in the late ’50s into the National Capital Commission when the Federal Parliament, recognized that the Capital area had expanded in fact beyond the limits of the city and of the Province and therefor adopted the National Capital Act. This Act defined the territory over which the N.C.C. would exert influence.

The National Capital Region is an area of 1,800 square miles of Ontario and Quebec. The Region is home to some 600,000 inhabitants whose cultural backgrounds are proportionate to those of Canadian citizens in general. Centered about the cities of Hull and Ottawa, it includes all or part of 57 local municipal jurisdictions. Its problems are typical of those of most urban communities throughout the country. Moreover, the Region is typically Canadian in its content of farmland, bushland, rocky tree-covered hills and innumerable lakes and streams. (N.C.C. Annual Report, 1970-71, p. 2)

The current mandate of the N.C.C. empowers it to acquire and dispose of lands, to undertake joint projects with municipalities, to make grants for various purposes and to conduct research for the planning of the National Capital Region. In our view the Capital Area should continue to be the areas of Ontario and Quebec now defined in the schedule to the National Capital Act (1959).

The Committee is of the opinion that the time has come for the Federal Government to have more voice in the management of the Capital of the country. The Committee also believes that the Capital is not just an Ontario city or an Ontario-Quebec city, but a Federal Capital which aspires to be representative of the people of all 10 provinces, and which can indeed be to all the people an instrument of pride and of unity.

It has been suggested that the national capital should be autonomous. The Committee feels that the present maze of jurisdictional difficulties surrounding this issue have created strong barriers to the establishment of an autonomous capital region. Rather, it would be more expedient to view such an autonomous region as a possible, but not a necessary, final stage of development.

We therefore recommend that a Board comprised of equal numbers of Ministers from the Federal, Ontario and Quebec governments, together with representatives of the Regional Communities concerned, should be established to co-ordinate the activities of governments in the Canadian Capital. This Board should be empowered to promote further municipal rationalization and to impart to the Capital those characteristics which truly reflect the reality of Canada.

Present provincial boundaries and provincial jurisdictions would continue to apply, and residents of the National Capital would continue to elect members of Parliament and members of the Legislature of the Province in which they reside, according to the normal provisions of the respective jurisdictions.

The Committee also suggests, as a second stage, that a single new political structure would be necessary to

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replace the myriad of local governments found within the National Capital region in order to administer those affairs normally under municipal jurisdictions. Hence, we recommend the eventual establishment of a tripartite Board appointed jointly by the Ontario, Quebec, and Federal governments.

We believe that, having gone through these two stages, the population of the National Capital Area may well consider it advantageous to advance towards fully autonomous status.

We have purposely avoided the term “federal district” because of the bad connotation it generally has. We are convinced, however, that it is within the ingenuity of Canadians to develop a new formula that would achieve the aim of a truly national Capital.


THE SPECIAL JOINT COMMITTEE
OF THE SENATE AND OF THE HOUSE
OF COMMONS ON THE
CONSTITUTION OF CANADA

* * * *

FINAL REPORT

CORRECTION

Page 42—
Left column, the first full sentence should read:

“Hence, to determine the nature of this structure, we recommend the eventual establishment of a tripartite Board appointed jointly by the Ontario, Quebec, and Federal governments.”


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PART IV—THE GOVERNMENTS

Chapter 17—The Division of Powers

RECOMMENDATIONS

49. The use of exclusive lists of Federal and Provincial powers. but with an extended list of concurrent powers. should be continued.

50. Concurrent powers which predominantly affect the national interest should grant paramountcy to the Federal Parliament and those which predominantly affect Provincial or local interests should grant paramountcy to the Provincial legislatures.

51. The Constitution should permit the delegation of executive and administrative powers (as at present). but not of legislative powers. except where expressly specified in this Report.

Federal states exist because there is a political will to unite for certain purposes and to remain apart for others. Consequently one of the most complex aspects of a federal constitution is the division of powers between the central and local authorities in a manner which will reflect the political will and political reality. Political scientists and constitutional lawyers have attempted to construct ideal prototypes and absolute criteria to answer the questions as to how powers should be divided and as to which level should have predominant authority, but, for the most part, federal states and federal constitutions have resulted from political bargaining and not from ideal models.

The question as to how powers should be divided has often been resolved in different ways depending on the priorities and political strength of the constituent parts. Among the competing criteria which are often advanced are: economic efficiency and prosperity, national or uniform standards, the need for collective action, increased .~;t.rength and power, the threatof foreign or external domination, greater mobility, cultural survival, individuullsm, the right to self-determination of national groups .md peoples, power to the people, the need for more personal government, and the need for less bureaucracy. ‘l’lu.-se criteria often conflict and will only be accommodatml to the extent that political forces allow them. The urizument that more authority in the central government will result in a higher standard of living will not convince llw minority groups who are willing to give a higher place in their social needs than to economic benefits. Most l’;m.’i(lianS seek a constitutional formula which will provulv :1 balance between both tendencies.

The division of powers set out by the Fathers of Confederation in 1867 seemed to give more power to the Federal Parliament than to the Provincial Legislatures, and seemed to favour a system in which Parliament would be the dominant authority. The peace, order and good government clause, the disallowance power, the residuary power, the nature of the powers in section 91 as opposed to section 92; sections 24, 58, 59, 90, 93, 94, 95 and 96 and the general spirit of the entire Constitution all point to this. The situation, however, has been changed to a great extent by Court decisions and, in particular, by the decisions of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council which greatly extended Provincial authority by expanding jurisdiction under “property and civil rights” and “municipal institutions.” The principle adopted by the Judicial Committee that the Legislatures are not subordinate to the Federal Parliament, but are as sovereign in their jurisdiction as the Federal Parliament in its jurisdiction also enhanced the position of the Provinces.

As a result, after 105 years of judicial interpretation and of legislative and administrative practice, we now have a Constitution where the legislative power is about equally divided between the Provincial Legislatures and the Federal Parliament.

The principal general criticisms we have heard of the present division of powers are the following:

(1) The Federal Parliament does not have sufficient power to manage and plan the economy.

(2) The Federal Parliament does not have sufficient power to cope with large multinational corporations, international unions, and the overwhelming influence and power of the United States of America.

(3) The citizens of Canada are handicapped by the lack of national standards in education.

(4) The Federal Parliament does not have the power to implement a policy of bilingualism in education and other areas now under Provincial jurisdiction, despite the requirements of national unity.

(5) The citizens of Canada are handicapped by varying Provincial standards in fields which cross Provincial boundaries—e.g., pollution, securities regulation, labour legislation, traffic regulation, etc.

(6) The present Federal role in social legislation (particularly in shared-cost programs) interferes with or

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prevents the Provinces from varying the programs in accordance with Provincial needs, resources, and priorities. It also leads to a poor allocation of public funds and an excessive bureaucracy.

(7) The Province of Quebec does not feel that it has sufficient powers to guarantee the survival of the French language and culture and to establish the social and economic institutions necessary to attain this goal.

(8) The present division of powers is too rigid to allow for varying Provincial and Federal needs. The constitution requires greater flexibility.

(9) The present division of powers is unclear and imprecise, giving rise to much litigation and judicial interpretation. It is also incomplete and does not provide for jurisdiction over modern technology and its resulting problems. The division of powers must be more functional.

(10) The grammatical construction of the jurisdictional categories is poor and there is no logical consistency in the relationship between the Qategories. Some of the categories are based on things; others are based on persons, location, behaviour, or activities. Again, this leads to imprecision and litigation.

During the hearings of the Committee there were many briefs and much discussion relating to the deficiencies of the present division of powers and many proposed solutions. We shall summarize here the main alternatives which were presented.

The provision of exclusive powers for the Federal Parliament and the Provinces, with a greater number of concurrent powers and a residual clause favouring the Federal or Provincial authorities, would be similar to the present structure, with the difference that there would be a greater use of concurrent powers. The provisions relating to concurrent powers could stipulate which level was paramount. They could also stipulate whether the inferior level could legislate without the consent. of the paramount level up to the point of conflict, in which case the legislation of the paramount level would prevail; or, whether the inferior level would require the consent of the paramount level before it could legislate at all. In the United States and Australia, the states can legislate in certain fields without the consent of the central government until the central government decides to legislate, or until it legislates in conflict with the legislation of the states. In the United States, there are additional fields where the states can legislate only with the consent of the federal government.

An extended use of concurrent powers would provide for greater flexibility. It would allow the Provinces to act in their own right in certain areas which were primarily Federal, or to supplement na.tional measures through special provisions for regional needs. On the other hand, it would give the central government the right to assure a certain minimum standard in areas which were primarily provincial.

Concurrent powers are widely used in federal constitutions. The Canadian constitution is the most limited in this respect, with only three concurrent powers, while India is the most extensive, with a list of forty-seven concurrent powers. Switzerland has divided powers in addition to concurrent powers.

Another possibility is the provision of exclusive Federal and Provincial powers with the right of delegation. Delegation could be permitted one way or both ways: either from the Federal Parliament to the Provinces or from the Provinces to the Federal Parliament; or the right to delegate from each level to the other. It could also be stipulated whether the delegation would take place between the Federal Parliament and a single Provincial Legislature or whether it could take place only when a minimum number of Provincial Legislatures are in agreement. The delegation could apply to all legislative powers, to specified powers, or to executive or administrative powers. This mechanism is in some ways more flexible than concurrent powers and in other ways less flexible. The chief danger is the creation of special status for a minority of provinces or a single province.

The provision for executive delegation is widespread in the newer federal constitutions while legislative delegation is more limited. It is, however, generally provided for. and is allowed in both directions.

Some federal constitutions provide for exclusive powers to one level only, combined with concurrent powers and a residual power to the other level. This is the situation in the United States, Australia, Switzerland and Germany where there are exclusive powers only for the central governments as well as concurrent powers with paramountcy to the federal governments, and all other matters are local. According to some this is a more precise method of dividing powers.

An alternative method is to divide powers on a national or local basis without regard to subject matter. In this way a federal government could legislate on all matters in those aspects which affect the interest of the entire country or where the activity was interprovincial or international; while the area governments could legislate for all matters which were local or completely within provincial territory. The Fathers of Confederation seemed to have this concept in mind when they drafted the Peace, Order and good Government clause in section 91 and the enabling clauses in section 92.

This method of dividing powers could be used with lists of exclusive and concurrent powers and might thereby serve as a dual residual clause. This would mean that all matters not exclusively listed which were basically national would come under Federal jurisdiction, while those which were basically local or regional would come under Provincial jurisdiction.

Many Committee witnesses have referred to the rigidity of the present division of powers and have urged greater flexibility. We have already referred to the use of concurrent powers and delegation as two means of achieving flexibility. Other important methods are a usable amending formula, special powers which come into operation in emergencies (war, revolution, internal disorder, natural disasters, economic emergencies, etc.), mechanisms or institutions for intergovernmental cooperation (Federal-Provincial conferences, interprovincial coordinating agencies, and independent national commissions for taxation and public spending), and the use of the Federal spending power and shared-cost programs.

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Some witnesses suggested that some Provinces (e.g., Quebec) should have greater or more constitutional powers than other Provinces. This would mean that these special-status Provinces would be able to legislate for matters on which the Federal Parliament would legislate for the people in other Provinces. This would not be in virtue of a delegation of power or through concurrent powers but through sovereign powers which would be special for certain Provinces.

This type of special status is often confused with special constitutional provisions for one or several provinces. We should note that several Provinces now have and have always had special constitutional provisions without having special legislative powers not existing in other Provinces. Quebec is thus constitutionally entitled to use the civil law system in the area of property and civil rights, but this is not a special status since the area of private law is under provincial jurisdiction for all Provinces. There are also Federal and Provincial legislative provisions which apply in some Provinces and make them different, but, again, these Provinces do not have a special status in that they have special legislative powers. Consequently, the Constitution has recognized and can continue to recognize that Quebec is not a Province like the others without according it special or additional legislative powers.

Despite the fact that a Province might have special constitutional provisions and special legislative provisions to meet its particular needs without having a special status, some would still argue that special status, or additional legislative power, is desirable. The arguments we heard against this type of special status are:

(1) That it isolates a particular Province and, in effect, destroys the minimum requirements for a federal state;

(2) That it places the special-status Province and its representatives in an untenable position in Federal institutions;

(3) That it creates different classes of citizenship within the same state;

(4) That it jeopardizes the integrity of the state, internally and externally.

It is possible to conceive of some type of special status of this nature, but it is difficult to envisage how the citizens of the special-status Province could have the same rights within the Federal state, as a whole, as the citizens of the other Provinces.

“Opting out” and “opting in” are different matters. Such arrangements do not require special constitutional powers and indeed do not affect the division of powers. They are in effect a type of delegation, and if provided for in the Constitution, would be permanently available to all Provinces. If they were, as is usually the case, rendered possible by Federal legislation, they would be completely within the sovereign control of the Federal Parliament and could be rescinded at will.

The Committee recommends that there should continue to be exclusive lists of Federal and Provincial powers but with an extended list of concurrent powers.

Concurrent powers which predominantly affect the national interest should grant paramountcy to the Federal authority and those which predominantly affect the Provincial or local interest should grant paramountcy to the Provincial authorities.

The Constitution should permit the delegation of executive and administrative powers (as it does now) but not of legislative powers except in the one instance (the criminal law power) where we recommend it below.

While the descriptions of the legislative categories found in the present division of powers remain valuable, since they have been subject to considerable judicial interpretation, some attempt should be made to eliminate ambiguous heads and provide for logically consistent categories. We do not, however, regard such a drafting project as our responsibility as a Parliamentary Committee. The details of our proposals for substantive change in the present division of powers are set out throughout the Report.

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Chapter 18—The General Legislative Power of Parliament

RECOMMENDATIONS

52. The “Peace. Order. and good Government” power should be retained in the Constitution as an expression of the overriding Federal legislative power over matters of a national nature.

53. Since the Federal General Legislative Power is counterbalanced by a Provincial power over matters of a Provincial or local nature. there is no place for a purely residuary power.

The legislative authority of the Parliament of Canada is principally contained in section 91 of the British North America Act. The form of the grant of power has been responsible for a great deal of constitutional litigation and is therefore worth remarking.

First, the Federal legislative power is said to reside in the Queen “by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate and House of Commons”—a style of grant which is unnecessary in the light of section 17, which has already provided that Parliament consists of the Queen, the Senate and the House of Commons. Second, using words hallowed in British colonial tradition, the power bestowed is “to make Laws for the Peace, Order, and good Government of Canada.” The power conferred on Parliament by these enacting words is known as the “General Power” of Parliament. The enacting clause goes on to provide that the General Power is “in relation to all Matters not coming within the Classes of Subjects by this Act assigned exclusively to the Legislatures of the Provinces.”

The declaratory clause follows, setting out 31 heads of exclusive Parliamentary power “for greater Certainty, but not so as to restrict the Generality of the foregoing Terms of this ‘section.”. Within the declaratory clause it is stated that the legislative authority of Parliament extends to the enumerated classes of subjects, “notwithstanding anything in this Act.” This “notwithstanding” provision is called the non obstante provision. After the enumeration of exclusive Federal powers there are the following concluding words, sometimes called the “deeming clause”:

And any Matter coming within any of the Classes of Subjects enumerated in this Section shall not be deemed to come within the Class of Matters of a local or private Nature comprised in the Enumeration of the Classes of Subjects by this Act assigned exclusively to the Legislatures of the Provinces.

We are not concerned here with textual analysis as such, but we would draw attention to the judicial interpretation of the Federal General Power. The apparent legislative intent of the deeming clause was to ensure that the enumerated classes of matters in section 91 took precedence over section 92(l6) in the Provincial list of powers: “Generally all Matters of a local or private Nature in the Province.” Both the grammar and the phrasing of the deeming clause would appear to make this point clear. However, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council gave that clause a wider interpretation, which at the same time had the effect of weakening the General Power. The Privy Council took the view that it was the deeming clause (rather than, as the text would appear clearly to state, the non obstante provision in the declaratory clause) which established the superiority of the enumerated heads of section 91 over the enumerated heads of section 92, in the event of conflict. The converse of this proposition was that, since the deeming clause established a priority only for the enumerated powers in section 91, the General Power had no priority. It was, in effect, a residuary power.

For the Privy Council by the 1920s the General Power was an emergency power to be used only in abnormal conditions such as war, famine, or pestilence, or a minor power which could justify the incorporation of companies with non-provincial objects, the expulsion of aliens, or the reference of questions to the courts for advisory opinions: in other words, it could be used only where there was no possibility of conflict with section 92, since in every case of conflict the Provincial power would prevail.

We are not so naive as to think that this interpretation came about purely as a matter of textual analysis. Clearly, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, and notably Lords Watson and Haldane, came to a value judgment that the apparent meaning of the British North America Act would give too much power to the Federal Parliament, and especially that a broad interpretation of the General Power could erode Provincial power entirely. We are not without sympathy for this point of view, but we believe that the solution which the Judicial Committee decided on, viz., reducing the General Power to a merely residual power, was much too extreme.

In our view there is a fundamental need for a grant of power recognizing Federal jurisdiction in matters of national interest and possessed of a genuine national character. This would be a counterpart to the Provincial jurisdiction in section 92(l6) over “all Matters of a merely

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local or private Nature in the Province.” It would give an orientation to the whole of section 91 as subsection 16 may be thought to do to all of section 92.

The Privy Council itself began a rehabilitation of the General Power in the 1930s, and this trend continued after the Supreme Court of Canada became the court of final resort. As a result, matters such as aeronautics, broadcasting, the regulation of the national capital district, and labour relations in the atomic energy field have been assigned to the Federal Government under the General Power. We expect this trend to continue. The General Power is, therefore, no longer a merely residuary power, nor is it likely to become so again.

Some witnesses before us argued that the residuary power should rest with the Provinces rather than with the Federal Government. We could accept such a change provided that it applied only to the residuary aspect of the General Power and did not touch its positive power. For, as we have stated, we are convinced of the necessity of Federal jurisdiction over matters of a national nature. However, as we envisage the Constitution there should rather be a complete division of legislative power, with matters of a national character in Federal hands and those of a local or provincial nature under Provincial control. In such a division of powers there would be no real residuary power, since all power would initially be divided according to its aspect. In this context the location of residuary powers would be meaningless.

We frankly recognize that the triad of “Peace, Order, and good Government” is conceptually too vague to be entirely satisfactory as an expression. of the Federal General Power to legislate in the national interest. However, the literal wording has now been qualified by more than a century of judicial interpretation, and we are reluctant to suggest an alternative, since we regard our task as a conceptual rather than a drafting one. We therefore content ourselves with expressing the View that whatever the language employed, the General Power should indicate the Federal Parliament’s guardianship over the national interest.

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Chapter 19—Taxing Powers

RECOMMENDATIONS

54. Generally speaking and subject to recommendation 55. we endorse the principle that the Federal and Provincial Governments should have access to all fields of taxation. However, in order to bring about a division of revenues that may accurately reflect the priorities of each government, there should be Federal—Provincial consultations to determine the most equitable means of apportioning joint fields of taxation in the light of:

(a) the projected responsibilities of each level of government in the immediate future:

(b) the anticipated increases in their respective expenditures;

(c) economic and administrative limitations. such as preserving sufficient leverage for the Federal Government. by means of its taxation system. to discharge effectively its function of managing the economy.

55. Provincial Legislatures should have the right to impose indirect taxes provided that they do not impede interprovincial or international trade and do not fall on persons resident in other Provinces. These limitations could be satisfied by tax collection through an interprovincial or Federal Provincial collection agency, or by tax collection agreements.

The sections of the Canadian Constitution that concern the division of tax fields are well known. The Parliament of Canada may pass measures for “The raising of Money by any Mode or System of Taxation” (section 91(3)); and the Legislative Assemblies have the following powers: “Direct Taxation within the Province in order to the raising of a Revenue for Provincial Purposes” (section 92(2)), and “Shop, Saloon, Tavern, Auctioneer, and other Licences in order to the raising of a Revenue for Provincial, Local, or Municipal Purposes” (section 92(9)).

Interpretation of these constitutional texts has been quite broad and has permitted a measure of flexibility in sharing tax fields to allow for changes in the respective responsibilities of the different levels of government. Undoubtedly, such sharing of tax fields to meet the needs of each government is essential in a federal system. In this connection, the evidence given by one expert who appeared before this Committee is significant:

Utilization of tax fields has been a very important matter for the past 35 years, especially since January 1941, when the provinces and federal government of the day met to discuss the Rowell-Sirois Report. Ever since that date, the governments have been meeting every year, or at least every second year, to discuss the sharing of tax revenue and these discussions have become, I believe, increasingly frequent and intensive in the course of the years.

However, the discussions have dealt with the utilization of those tax fields to which both levels of government clearly have access, rather than with the constitutional provisions themselves. In other words, the real problem arising with the provinces concerned not the constitutional provisions, but rather the use which the two levels of government make of the field of direct taxation. (2.6:9)

The most important point in the Federal Government’s constitutional proposals in this area is the principle of accessibility for all governments to all tax fields. (The Taming Powers and the Constitution of Canada). Theoretically, this principle would remove all constitutional obstacles in the way of use by the Federal or the Provincial governments of any tax field. In practice, however, the only substantial change from the present situation would be to give Provincial Governments access to the field of indirect sales tax.

Indeed, the rule of accessibility has existed since 1867 for direct taxation. Before 1962, however, a Province had to collect personal and corporate income tax itself in order to enjoy complete independence in these two important fields of direct taxation. In 1962, Federal Government made its collection agreement with the Provincial Governments more flexible by giving them greater liberty to use these tax fields as they saw fit. Currently, the collection agreement between the Federal and Provincial Governments requires the latter only to adjust their tax structure to that of the corresponding Federal taxes.

Generally speaking, we endorse the principle whereby the Federal and Provincial Legislatures have access to all tax fields. When this principle is applied, priorities in Federal or Provincial spending become the most significant factor in determining the division of the various tax fields. However, we feel that the application of this principle requires certain guarantees, since the division of tax fields has to satisfy many other criteria. For instance, it

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bears repeating that the various levels of government invariably draw their revenue from the same taxpayers.

Furthermore, there is no certainty that the greater accessibility arising from the changes introduced in 1962 and from the current proposals of the Federal Government will in fact bring about a division that will accurately reflect the priorities of each government. Indeed, it is not clear that the present occupancy of tax fields by the various governments constitutes a fair starting point, in view of the current needs of each level of government.

The other aspect of this problem is the existence of marked differences in the increasing yields from various taxes. At the present time, the yield from Federal tax fields is rising more rapidly than that from Provincial and municipal tax fields. Some assume from this that Federal expenditures should continue to increase more rapidly than Provincial and municipal outlays. We feel that this assumption deserves at least careful study. Recent events do not bear it out, and should it eventually prove to be unjustified it could result in maintaining certain useless or outdated programs at the Federal level.

We believe that these problems can be resolved by Federal-Provincial consultations. But it will be necessary, at the outset, to concentrate upon determining the most equitable means of apportioning joint tax fields in the light of the projected responsibilities of each level of government in the immediate future, anticipated increases in their respective expenditures and, of course, economic and administrative restraints such as preserving sufficient power for the Federal government, by means of its taxation system, to discharge effectively its counter-cyclical function of regulating the economy.

The greatest limitation on the Provincial Governments in certain tax fields necessarily lies in maintaining the free movement of international and interprovincial trade and in avoiding the dangers of double taxation. We therefore recommend that the Provinces be given access to fields of indirect taxation, provided that the taxes imposed do not impede interprovincial or international trade and do not fall on persons resident in other Provinces. Hence such taxes should be collected by an inter-provincial or a Federal-Provincial tax collection agency, or under tax collection agreements. We have in mind, in particular, the fields of indirect sales tax and indirect death duties.

The existence of a tax collection agency would require the coordination of each tax to be collected through this interprovincial or Federal-Provincial agency. Moreover, the agency would prevent double taxation in the taxes it would collect on behalf of the Federal or Provincial governments. It would also make possible greater flexibility in collecting taxes and in distributing the yield from these taxes among Provinces. Thus we can readily envision a sales tax being collected from manufacturers by this agency, and the proceeds of such tax being distributed among the Provinces according to criteria agreed on in advance by the Provincial Governments. Finally, we feel that such a collection agency would provide the Provinces with a tool to ensure better balance in their tax competition with the Federal Government, since it would widen the range of tax fields to which the Provincial Governments have access.

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Chapter 20—The Federal Spending Power

RECOMMENDATIONS

56. The power of the Federal Parliament to make conditional grants for general Federal-Provincial (shared-cost) programs should be subject to the establishment of a national consensus both for the institution of any new program and for the continuation of any existing one. A consensus would be established by the affirmative vote of the Legislatures in three of the four regions of Canada according to the following formula: the vote of the Legislatures in the Atlantic region would be considered to be in the affirmative if any two of the Legislatures of Nova Scotia, New Brunswick or Newfoundland were in favour: the vote of the Legislatures of the Western region would be considered to be in the affirmative with the agreement of any two of the four Legislatures. The consensus for existing joint programs should be tested every 10 years.

57. If a Province does not wish to participate in a program for which there is a national consensus, the Federal Government should pay the Government of that Province a sum equal to the amount it would have cost the Federal Government to implement the program in the Province. However. a tax collection fee of about 1%. equivalent to the cost of collecting the money paid to the Province, should be deducted from the amount paid to such non-participating Provinces.

58. In order that the objectives of joint programs may be more effectively realized, conditional Federal grants should preferably be based on the cost of the programs in each Province. However. since a 50-50 cost-sharing formula, when applied to the expenditures made in each Province. constitutes too great an incentive in high-income Provinces. conditional F ederal grants should not be made for that portion of Provincial expenditures which lies above the national average cost of the service. The maximum per capita amount to which a Province would be entitled would thus correspond to the per capita national expenditure, and additional expenditures by a Provincial Government would in no way increase the Federal grant to that Province.

The Canadian Constitution does not contain explicit provisions concerning the spending power; rather, this power stems from the division of legislative jurisdictions between Parliament and the Provincial Legislatures, more specifically as stipulated in Sections 91 to 95 inclusive.

The judicial interpretation in favour of a Federal spending power has been based primarily on Section 91(1A), which gives the Parliament of Canada authority to legislate in respect of “The Public Debt and Property”, and Section 91(3), which allows “The raising of Money by any Mode or System of Taxation”. Parliament has therefore been able to allocate monies from the Consolidated Revenue Fund for any purpose whatsoever, provided that the legislation authorizing the expenditure does not constitute an invasion of Provincial jurisdiction. Hence the Federal spending power is the power of the Parliament of Canada to make payments to individuals, institutions and Provincial Governments for purposes concerning which it does not necessarily have the substantive power to legislate.

While some constitutionalists would challenge the breadth of this Federal power, it is a fact that Parliament does make payments to individuals and institutions and provides both conditional and unconditional grants to the Provincial Governments. Such payments now represent more than 30% of Federal expenditures and more than 60% of the revenues of some Provincial Governments.

In this chapter we shall limit our discussion to the question of conditional payments to Provincial Governments. We have already dealt with equalization payments, by far the largest unconditional payments that the Federal Government makes to the Provinces, in Chapter 11. Payments to individuals are discussed below in Chapter 26.

In its constitutional proposals (Federal-Provincial Grants and the Spending Power of Parliament) the Federal Government reaffirms its power to make payments to individuals, institutions and Provincial Governments. However, it does suggest certain restrictions on its power to make conditional payments to the Provinces. While these proposals may not meet the basic objections expressed by the Government of the Province of Quebec with regard to the spending power, they are a satisfactory answer to the two principal criticisms voiced by Provincial Governments regarding conditional payments to the Provinces.

The text of the Federal proposals is as follows:

The proposed principles would establish two limitations on the use by Parliament of its power to make conditional grants for general federal-provincial pro-

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grammes—first the existence of a “broad national consensus” in favour of any programme, and secondly the assurance that a “fiscal penalty” would not be imposed upon the people of non-participating provinces. The Government of Canada would suggest the following method for giving effect to these two requirements:

(1) The determination as to when the national interest or extra-provincial interests warranted a new shared-cost programme between the Government of Canada and the governments of the provinces would be arrived at jointly by Parliament and the provincial legislatures, in the manner described below, instead of by Parliament alone.

(2) Where a consensus had been reached that a new shared-cost programme was desirable, the provincial governments whose legislatures had voted for the consensus would receive conditional grants for the programme, once it was started by them. In the provinces whose legislatures had voted against the consensus, the people of the province would be paid grants equivalent in the aggregate to the average per capita amount paid to the participating provinces (multiplied by the population of the non-participating province).

The introduction into the Constitution of these two requirements would meet all of the provincial objections to the present procedures for initiating shared-cost programmes. Parliament would no longer have the power to decide unilaterally when a shared-cost programme ought to be initiated: a provincial consensus would be required. The payment of grants to the people of the provinces whose legislatures had voted against the consensus would meet the “taxation without benefit” argument. The two principles taken together would ensure that the priorities of any provincial government would be changed only if its legislature had supported the consensus. They would also mean that Parliament would not be able to give effect to its judgment that the national interest had come to attach to some problem or programme within provincial jurisdiction unless enough legislatures had voted their agreement, and it would be able to do so only in the provinces where the legislatures had voted for Parliament’s proposal.

The first step in determining whether there was a consensus in favour of a new shared-cost programme would be the presentation to the Parliament of Canada by the federal government of a resolution proposing the programme. If Parliament approved the resolution, it would be transmitted to the provincial governments for submission to their legislatures. The legislatures, in turn, would approve or reject the resolution. The determination as to whether there was a provincial consensus in favour of the shared-cost programme would be made by reference to the Senate divisions provided for in the Constitution.

For the purposes of this proposal the Senate could be regarded as having four divisions under the present Constitution, namely Ontario, Quebec, the Maritime Provinces and Newfoundland, and the Western Provinces. The affirmative vote of the legislatures in at least three of these Senate divisions would be required before Parliament could proceed with the proposed shared-cost programme. The vote of the legislatures in the Atlantic region would be considered to be in the affirmative if the legislatures of provinces having at least 16 of the 30 Senate seats of that region were to vote for the resolution (two of Nova Scotia, New Brunswick or Newfoundland). The vote of the legislatures of the Western region would be considered to be in the affirmative if the legislatures of provinces having 12 of the 24 Senate seats of that region were to vote for the resolution (two of the Western Provinces).

An affirmative vote on the part of three Senate divisions would represent a provincial consensus in favour of Parliament’s proposal. In the event of a negative vote—two or more Senate divisions voting against a proposal—Parliament could re-transmit its resolution to the governments of the provinces whose legislatures had voted against the proposal, within one year, to determine whether the legislatures wished to change their decision given the results of the votes in other legislatures. Subsequently Parliament could not re-submit its resolution to the provinces more often than once every two or three years. (pp. 38-42)

By proposing that a national consensus be reached before any program is launched, the Federal Government has taken into account the fact that prior consultation has been lacking in setting up such shared-cost programs. We accept the Federal proposal for the establishment of a consensus, but without reference to Senate divisions. To achieve such a consensus, then, the Legislatures in at least three of the four regions of Canada would have to accept the program. In the Western and Atlantic regions a program would require approval by the Legislatures of at least two of the four Provinces other than Prince Edward Island.

In order to respect Provincial priorities in areas of Provincial legislative jurisdiction, the Federal Government proposes that any Province should have the right to opt out of any such joint programs. A non-participating Province would receive compensation in the form of a reimbursement to individual residents of that Province equal to the amount that would have been paid to the Provincial Government if it had participated in the program.

We endorse the Federal Government’s proposal that a national consensus should be arrived at before a shared-cost program is launched. However, we recommend that the national consensus rule apply every ten years for each joint program, including existing programs, so as to prevent the pointless perpetuation of certain joint programs, and also to ensure that the Federal Government’s objective of not unduly influencing Provincial priorities is achieved permanently by permitting the Provinces to reconsider periodically their decision whether or not to participate.

With regard to the method of compensation provided in the Federal Government’s proposals should a Province elect to opt out, direct reimbursement to individuals is unacceptable to us. From the administrative standpoint it implies that all individuals in a non-participating province would first pay a certain amount of tax in one form or another to the Federal Government; they would then receive a cheque or a tax credit from the Federal Government; finally these same individuals would be taxed again

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by their Provincial Government, which would likely want to set up a program to replace the one in which it refused to participate. Administratively, this procedure seei;:’i::- too unwieldy.

Furthermore, it appears to us that the impossib-ilit.y of identifying the tax, and the amount paid by each individual to meet the costs of the program in question, constitutes a major obstacle to the method of compensation proposed by the Federal Government. To overcome this difficulty the Federal Government would probably decide to grant equal compensation to individual residents or taxpayers in a non-participating Province. The result would be a more extensive redistribution of income in that Province.

For these reasons we reject the form of compensation advocated by the Federal Government. Instead, we suggest that the Federal Government pay the Provincial Government a sum equal to the amount it would have cost the Federal Government to implement the program in the Province concerned. However, in order to take into account the cost of collection to the Federal Government of the money paid to non-participating Provinces. we recommend that a collection fee of about 1 per cent, equivalent to the collection cost, be deducted from the amount paid to non-participating Provinces. This would provide an incentive for the Provinces to participate while still leaving them free to opt out—if they have valid reasons for doing so—by paying the cost of tax collecting made in their stead.

From the administrative standpoint, this seems a much easier formula and is still consistent with the spirit of a flexible federalism.

We realize that the fact that Quebec has opted out of certain joint programs pursuant to the Established Programs Act (Transitional Agreements), and receives a portion of the compensation in the form of tax points, provides a complication. In order to get around the difficulty while still preserving the spirit of our recommendations, we propose a compromise solution in the arrangements between the Province of Quebec and the Federal Government. Because Quebec collects its own income tax and already occupies a broader share in the personal income tax field as the only Province which has elected to opt out of certain joint programs, we recommend that the Federal Government maintain its special abatement in Quebec. and that the cost of collecting taxes not apply to the abatement portion of the total compensation.

This seems a logical solution since under the Established Programs (Transitional Agreements) Act a Province which decides in favour of non-participation still has to create public services in compliance with the terms of each “established” program in order to be entitled to tax compensation. In the Federal proposals concerning the constitutional right of a Province to opt out of a given program, tax compensation is wholly unconditional; therefore, the Government of the non-participating Province is under no obligation whatsoever to create a similar program.

With regard to the very basis of conditional grants, we raise a number of fundamental objections to certain terms and conditions of existing programs. The aim of such conditional payments is to influence the Provincial Governments so that some of their services will take the national interest into greater account and, especially, to enable them to achieve standards regarded as a mii”:iinum i”oi: Canada as a whole.

In this connection, it is interesting to conipaie the tax incentives applied in respect of each of the three niain shared-cos!’ programs–namely, health insuiance, hospitaliratit:-n insurance. and assistance to pC).’*il-Stf(}'(‘llfl3l’j,~’ education. The following table illustrates the i’especti\.’e formulas used in calculating the amounts to be paid to each Provincial Government. These amounts are always equivalent to 50 per cent of the total national cost for each of the prograrns (in the case of assistance to post-secondary education the proportion is slightly higher). but the formulas take into account either average provincial or average natir,;nal costs. or both:

Factors Determing the Federal Grant
Program Average Provincial Cost Average National Cost
Hospital insurance 0% 50%
Hospitalization insurance 25% 25%
Post-secondary education 50% 0%

We feel that certain aspects of these programs conflict with the objectives which motivate Federal intervention in spheres of Provincial jurisdiction. Thus, in the case of health insurance, where the Federal grant is solely determined by the average national cost and by the size of the population of a Province, several Provincial Governments receive an amount considerably in excess of 50 per cent of the total cost. of the program in their own Province. Although this suggests that the standards of medical services in these Provinces are relatively low, the formula itself contains no incentive for them to improve the quality of their services. We feel, t.oo, that the objectives of the health insurance program are hard to reconcile with the fact that most of the Provinces with low average revenues have had to delay their participation in this program because of insufficient financial resources.

In the case of the post-secondary education assistance program, the Federal grant is based on the total cost of the program in each Province. Consequently, there is a very strong incentive for all Provinces to increase their post-secondary education expenditures. However, in those Provinces where the standards of services are relatively low, this tax incentive is simply removed and replaced by an unconditional per capita grant. As a result, the post-secondary education assistance program promotes improvement of standards only in those Provinces where standards are already relatively high.

Generally speaking, we believe that Federal conditional grants based on the costs of programs in each Province are more in line with the objectives which motivate Federal intervention in spheres of Provincial jurisdiction. However, we feel that the 50-50 formula constitutes too high a tax incentive in Provinces with high average revenues. If the Federal Government is going to reimburse 50 cents for each dollar spent, it is obvious that the Governments of the richer Provinces, having more funds to earmark for these programs. will receive more money from the Feder-

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al Government. On the other hand, the poorer Provinces are being penalized because they cannot spend enough. In order to rectify this situation we submit that conditional grants should never apply to that portion of expenditures which lies above the national average. The maximum per capita amount to which a Province would be entitled would then correspond to the per capita national expenditure, and additional expenditures by a Provincial Government would in no way increase the Federal grant to that Province.

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Chapter 21—Intergovernmental Relations

RECOMMENDATIONS

59. More communication and fuller cooperation among all levels of government are imperative needs. The achievement of these ends involves the improvement and simplification of the means of liaison and. where necessary. the creation of new mechanisms.

60. The Constitution should provide for a Federal-Provincial Conference of First Ministers to be called by the Prime Minister of Canada at least once a year unless in any year a majority of the First Ministers decide to dispense with the Conference.

61. The Federal Government should appoint a Minister of State for Intergovernmental Affairs to respond to the political challenges and opportunities resulting from closer intergovernmental relationships.

62. A permanent Federal-Provincial secretariat for intergovernmental relations should be established.

63. A tri-level conference among F ederal, Provincial and Municipal governments should be called at least once a year.

The relations among governments in Canada, at both the political and official levels, are generally not understood by Canadians. These relationships are very important in the day-to-day operations of governments, and often have effects far beyond the immediate program or policy being explored or developed. Partly because these relationships are not well understood, many who spoke to the Committee yearned for simple, comprehensible structures. Such a desire reveals that Canadians are rightly suspicious that the proliferation of coordinating agencies and administration of one kind or another may be unnecessary.

Undoubtedly there are no simple rules for the myriad of relationships necessary among three levels of government in a country as varied and vast as Canada. We feel, however, that something can be done to make intergovernmental relations more meaningful, more direct, more efficient and more relevant to all Canadians.

Each individual Canadian exists in at least three different political communities, and exclusive jurisdictions of governments are part of the framework of order he or she understands. Nevertheless each individual is affected indivisibly by the whole of government. As one witness said:

For all of the verbal paraphernalia of the Constitution about exclusive jurisdiction, there is hardly an area of power in which there is not a very considerable degree of interdependence . . . The truth of the matter is that governments supposedly are interdependent because they are dealing . . .with the same people . . .

The most sensible way of dealing with it is that they very often have to develop and they do develop methods of co-operating. There is some division of labour, some degree of co-operation and some degree of consultation. And cumbersome and time-consuming though it is, this seems to work pretty well. I would think that we could stand a constitutional revision which would provide for a good deal more concurrent jurisdiction than there is, but recognizing what is in fact the truth of the matter, that there is an interdependence here, that there is a real and crying interest for any provincial government in what federal monetary policy is. It is absurd to say that this is exclusively a federal matter and that the provinces should have nothing to do with it, because it directly affects the way they operate just as what they do in their own jurisdictions vitally affects federal monetary policy. So we may have to spend the next century developing many more of these institutions of a consultative kind, which still leaves room for decisions to be made but on the basis of probably more concurrence of jurisdiction and more consultation and co-operation. (3.24:22)

We agree fully that more cooperation, liaison, and even harmony, is needed among all levels of government. The question is: what mechanisms will help guide us to these objectives? Some witnesses gave us these suggestions:

The nature of the solution we propose puts additional emphasis on a more sophisticated structure of intergovernmental liaison than we have at the present time. There is already a good deal of this in federal-provincial relations but it is basically very unstructured. Formalization is essential if we are to meet our responsibilities . . . We (propose) a pyramidal form of organization . . .

First, we would have to acknowledge that in the parliamentary form of government the position of the Prime Minister or Premier is pre-eminent and we therefore would argue that there should be a permanent committee of the first ministers meeting at least

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annually. This committee would not be a negotiation committee; it would deal with the definition and development of objectives rather than with detailed programs. We also explain at some length why we would favour the continuation of a plenary federal-provincial conference. Not as an instrument of negotiation but for the examination of principles and matters of broad public interest. We think in many ways this is a very useful way of involving the public through throwing the meetings of the plenary conference open to television, to radio and to public observers as has been done in several of the constitutional conferences in the recent past.

Most of the detailed work in the negotiations and arrangements which we think would be necessary should be carried on by functional committees of ministers. These would replace the numerous special purpose committees which now carry on most of the detailed work in these fields. Prominent among these would be the committee of the Ministers of Finance and the Provincial Treasurers which first was set up in 1959 and which has been operating much more actively in recent years. This in addition to having its responsibilities in the functional fiscal field would act, in our opinion, in the future as it has in the past with the sort of staff relationship to the committee of first ministers which would be the prime committee of this organization we envisage.

We also think it would be essential that there would be committees of officials and technical support of all ministerial committees and prominent among these would be the committee of senior officials which has been set up in support of the constitutional conference—something along these lines although not necessarily identical. However, I think the part that has been played by this committee of senior civil servants in support of the constitutional conference is indicative of the very important part such a continuing formally structured committee of senior officials plays in any matters of this kind. (3.45:21)

We also heard the following view:

Under our present organization there are something like 175 to 200 different federal-provincial committees which meet from time to time or have met from time to time. I think this could be narrowed down very substantially to a number of perhaps a dozen or more strictly functional committees, say a federal-provincial committee on health and a committee on natural resources and so forth and so on, which would deal with these subjects as they come up and which would then pass them on through the hierarchical process up to the federal-provincial first ministers who would then agree upon a policy which would be carried back to their respective legislatures of the Parliament for approval or not, as the case may be.

It would have to be supported by a permanent secretariat. At one time I did not believe this, but I have come to the conclusion that the degree of co-ordination and co-operation between the levels of government will be so great under any effective process of co-operative federalism or consultative federalism, or whatever you wish to call it, that some form of effective, continuing, permanent secretariat is required.

You have this at the present time in the constitution field with the Constitutional Secretariat which, in many respects is an intergovernmental body even though it is largely financed and staffed by the federal government . . . In fact I think its powers could be extended very substantially into much broader fields to the advantage of everyone concerned. (3.15:13)

Another expert witness said:

I do think, for example, that at the level of the standards by which programs are governed, understandings could be much firmer. There are cases, which I don’t need to quote, when Quebec officers …and the same situation probably happens in the other provinces, in the small provinces, without any doubt, and still more so, where their officers might have worked on a program for weeks and months when, suddenly, the Federal Government issues its White Paper on the same subject without having even read the studies made by the provincial officers. Just as people in regional districts are entitled to protest against their provincial Government when this one establishes on its own authority and on an unilateral basis programs which affect them in their daily life, so provincial Governments should be entitled, I think, to complain about such a situation. And, on the contrary, it can be said that some programs which affect the whole of Canadian life are developed at the provincial level whereas they should also be subject to consultations. (3.60:32)

One witness indicated that making Federal-Provincial conferences institutions in a formal way is simply recognizing what has already happened:

It is a fact that the federal institution that is not mentioned in the present Federal constitution—the Dominion-Provincial conferences—has rapidly been taking on all the characteristics of a standing arbitral committee for Federal-Provincial problems; and if this trend should continue one would expect further institutionalisation for the Dominion-Provincial conference, as for example the creation of a standing, possibly joint Dominion-Provincial, secretariat, and also some degree of public or private recording of the deliberations of the body. Not too much has been published on the Dominion-Provincial conferences that is of an analytical character, but I would venture the opinion today that such conferences are the pivot of the present Canadian federal constitutional system. (3.10:54)

The need for cooperation between governments is widely recognized. Article 48 of the Victoria Charter states:

A Conference composed of the Prime Minister of Canada and the First Ministers of the Provinces shall be called by the Prime Minister of Canada at least once a year, unless, in any year, a majority of those composing the Conference decide that it shall not be held.

We feel that such a conference would be most useful, and we hope that its climate would be more in the nature of an exchange of views on current joint problems rather than of a negotiating session as such. Perhaps special sessions of the conference could be called after any spe-

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cific program had been broadly worked out between the governments in order to negotiate the total package. We also recommend that a further meeting, on a tri-level basis (i.e., including municipalities), be held annually at the highest political level. These meetings, again, we hope, would be for the purpose of exchanging views and keeping abreast of developments throughout the country.

We would expect some criticism of our proposals on the basis that such conferences might undermine the parliamentary and legislative roles and reduce legislative bodies to mere rubber stamps. It would indeed be ironic for a committee of legislators like ourselves to produce such a result. We certainly do not intend it. By way of defence we would utilize the words of one constitutionalist:

First, is there a threat to parliamentary and democratic government in the development of more regular and systematic intergovernmental cooperation for the coordinated use of federal and provincial powers that are not much changed from what they are now? This should not be viewed as an antidemocratic development, though some commentators and editors will have us believe that it is.

Because of the Cabinet system, the ministers who engage in intergovernmental consultations are responsible to their respective democratic parliamentary bodies for the policies they sponsor, the concessions they make and the agreements they sign. The policies and agreements can be considered and debated under many different procedural arrangements in the Parliament of Canada and the legislatures of the provinces to ensure the accountability of ministers and senior officials to their respective parliamentary bodies and so to the people itself. (36:14)

Being on a regular basis called for by the Constitution, Federal-Provincial conferences of First Ministers would tend not to assume “do or die” proportions as some recent conferences have in the media. The focus of attention, so to speak, would be on the marriage, not on the wedding.

We further recommend the appointment of a Federal Minister of State for Intergovernmental Relations. Because of the importance we attach to conferences at the political level, as well as to the new structures we propose for Federal-Provincial Committees of officials, we believe a continuous and comprehensive overview is required. We envisage a Minister of State for Intergovernmental Relations relatively free of purely departmental priorities, so that his field would be the larger perspective of liaison and cooperation. It makes sense to ease the load of other Federal ministers through a new minister who could look after both communication with other governments as an objective in itself and the general advocacy of Federal policies and programs. Of course, a special conference on a specific topic, e.g. health, would probably still find the Minister of Health as the main Federal representative at the conference. The function of the new Minister of State would be of a more day-to-day nature, and he would have more time to visit the provincial capitals to enhance cooperation and coordination of the two levels of government on a person-to-person basis.

At the level of officials, we propose that the present procedures be radically altered. We were told that there were more than 175 committees which meet with many subjects of joint concern to the Federal and Provincial Governments. We suspect that this structure grew to meet the contingencies of the day. These committees should be greatly reduced in number and put on a more functional basis. Without further study it is not possible to say precisely how many there should be, but we suspect their number could be dramatically reduced.

By reducing the numbers and giving to a single committee a mandate over a whole function, e.g. natural resources, we would expect that the prestige of the committee would be enhanced, and we also envisage that members of the committees would be drawn from the most senior levels of the Federal and Provincial Governments. These committees could take a broad perspective of each function, and would improve coordination of the planning and administrative policies of both levels of government. Because they would exercise jurisdiction at the highest official levels in their functioning, we would expect more real and permanent “decisions” to be taken and the consensus reached to be more meaningful. In line with this consolidation we recommend that a Federal-Provincial secretariat be established to enhance coordination. Of course, these bodies are neither executive nor legislative, and any decisions reached would have to be adopted by the Cabinets concerned, and, where legislation was required, by Parliament and the Legislatures.

The aim of this recommendation is to ensure that all information, particularly in the area of planning, flows to the highest official levels in both Federal and Provincial Governments. By this technique Canada would, we hope, avoid the possibility of major government planning being carried on by one government without any knowledge on the part of other governments. While it cannot entirely eliminate uncoordinated planning as long as any government may wish to surprise other governments, it can avoid situations where the lack of information results from structural impediments rather than from a desire to conceal

We wish to make it unmistakeably clear that we do not see intergovernmental cooperation as only an opening of the Federal decision-making process to Provincial input. The converse must also be true, for cooperation is not a one—way street. The Provinces cannot expect to control the Federal budget unless they are willing to have their budgets, in turn, subject to veto by Ottawa. But what we have in mind is actually somewhat less dramatic than decisional control on either side, though no less complete than frank disclosure of policy intentions and genuine willingness to discuss alternative courses of action. Provided that this degree of cooperation was mutually achieved, that would be revolutionary enough to impart a new direction to Confederation.

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Chapter 22—Municipalities

RECOMMENDATIONS

64. While we recognize the difficulties of larger cities in providing for their needs. financing their programs and determining their own priorities. as well as in negotiating with the Provincial and Federal Governments on works which seriously affect municipal planning. and also their need for more status and more autonomy in order to achieve these goals. we do not see how these matters can be entrenched in the Constitution. They should be negotiated between the cities and the Provincial Governments under whose jurisdiction they fall.

65. The municipalities in each Province. in conjunction with their provincial and national bodies. should determine which representatives from what municipalities would attend the annual tri-level conferences we have recommended in Recommendation

66. Such tri-level meetings would not have the power of veto over any Federal or Provincial programs but would rather operate by way of moral suasion.

67. In the light of the injustice done municipalities by their having to rely on the property tax for the bulk of their revenue, there should be a sharing of tax fields between Governments that would allow municipalities direct access to other sources of revenue.

68. Where feasible. representatives of municipalities should meet with other levels of government to discuss common problems particularly in the area of economic planning through representation at meetings of the Ministers of Finance and Provincial Treasurers.

Undoubtedly one of the major themes in the evidence heard by the Committee was the challenge of Canadian urbanism. Mayors and aldermen from municipal corporations, from the largest to some of the smallest, impressed on us the concerns of cities: dialogue with senior governments, administrative policies, pollution, the revenue squeeze, welfare costs, transportation, and housing, to name but a few. These elected representatives, and Canadians generally, are aware of current projections which show that by the turn of this century approximately 80 to 85 per cent of Canadians will be urban dwellers. In addition, the growth of some of our larger cities, notably Montreal, Toronto and Vancouver, may well produce urban changes not only of degree, but perhaps of kind.

The implications of having two cities in Canada with populations each greater than six million persons are many. To what extent these enormous population explosions should affect the structures of urban government and its relations with other governments has greatly concerned us.

Witnesses who appeared before us stressed various possibilities ranging from the status quo to city provinces. A few excerpts from the evidence may help to indicate the range of views:

I think the constitution has spelled out very clearly that this level of government has certain rights. Unfortunately, at the moment, the municipalities in this province really have no rights at all. They are completely dominated and controlled in every way by the province and not wisely.

The municipalities supply more service to the people than any other level of government but they have the most limited form of taxation.

Most assuredly the constitution has to give rights to municipalities and have them very clearly spelled out . . .

Metropolitan Toronto is like the committee that designed a horse. It came out a camel.

The people who decide what Toronto is going to be do not even live here. We have a very bad form of government. “It is metro”. “No, it is municipal.” “It is the borough’s responsibility.” “No, no. This road ends here and it becomes the municipality of Metropolitan Toronto down the block.” It is very confused. (3.61:34)

It must have authority to collect income to meet its needs; it must know what it can do; it must be able to plan and know how it can raise funds to do so.

These are all the problems that exist because the city has no definite authority. I think one of our great hopes . . . is that this Committee will recommend that the municipal governments of Canada, the 4,200 of them, have rights spelled out just as citizens have rights and the provinces have authority and rights. I think it is essential if we are going to survive. (3.61:35)

Another witness said:

I suggest that what we have attempted to do is to reflect on the existing situation and to consider what

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might be in the future. The question really centers on the need for some constitutional recognition of the third level of government and the difficulty of the 4,500 municipalities as opposed to 10 provinces and a single federal government . . .

In fact, because we have that problem we recognize that the rate of the level of constitutional recognition that can be afforded to the 4,500 municipalities of Canada today is almost impossible. In a redrafted constitution we want you to provide for the future possibility that those municipalities might be reconstructed into a very much smaller number of units and so constructed that when they come together they in fact might well be recognized as a constitutional entity and a third level of government without the hangup of multiplicity of jurisdiction which presently exists . . . We are reasonably and objectively attempting to recognize today’s circumstances, but we are asking you not to lock us out constitutionally of the opportunity to be recognized as a third level of government when the municipal reconstruction that we hope will take place in fact does take place. (3.50:26)

Another witness, an alderman, said:

I consider that the relationships between municipalities and the provinces and the federal government are drastically in need of review. This concept of municipalities being the creatures of a provincial government may have had some validity in 1867, but it has none now. To give you one specific example of the situation in which municipalities find themselves.

The provincial government arbitrarily changed the cost-sharing program with respect to welfare and whereas two years ago we paid as a municipality only 10 per cent of welfare costs and the provincial 40 per cent and the federal 50 per cent, we now have to assume 20 per cent or double the cost of welfare. . . This has meant an increase in per capita from 98 cents to $1.58. Specifically . . .this means in one year an increase of $300,000 in our welfare costs. We have 85 per cent of our revenue derived from residential taxation. So there has to be some drastic re-appraisal of this relationship: some sort of direct channel between perhaps the federal government and the municipal government along the lines they have in some American cities and their federal government. We have to do something, or many of our municipalities are facing a really severe financial crisis. (3.27:62)

A brief from one city stated:

We also support the resolution on constitutional reform adopted by the Canadian Federation of Mayors and Municipalities at their annual meeting in Halifax, June 9 toll, 1970…

1. That full consideration should be given in the redrafting of the Canadian constitution to the question of the status of municipal government as another jurisdiction with powers and responsibilities appropriate to its role in Canadian public life.

2. That in the review of the constitution of Canada currently in progress, the Government of Canada, together with the Provinces, provide for the participation of municipal representatives as equal partners in the process of the redrafting of the Canadian constitution.

3. And that pending more permanent solutions to the problems of local government in Canada steps be taken as soon as possible to provide municipal governments with a role in public policy development more appropriate to their responsibilities, and with sources of revenue more consistent with the accelerating demands made by the growth of municipal responsibilities, either by way of increased taxing powers, a system of shared taxes or by transfer payments from federal and/or provincial governments more adequate to the needs of the developing situation.

4. That in all matters which directly or indirectly concern the questions of local government in Canada, the Government of Canada and the Governments of the Provinces seek the advice of and consult with municipal Governments concerned, either specifically in the case of projects of limited impact or through the municipalities’ appointed representatives in matters of general application. (3.45:8)

A brief from a major Canadian city said:

The second recommendation is that such centres as Montreal, Toronto, Vancouver, and whatever other representation is thought to be fair with other municipalities, be given the immediate right to participate in discussions concerning constitutional revision . . .

In the long term the large area municipalities in Canada designated as such by the National Urban Council, should be given entrenched rights in the constitution. Another arrangement should be made for the access to taxing powers commensurate with the responsibilities of governing major urban centres. (3.63:13)

A Committee member asked the following question:

I understand your brief to reject the idea that we could set out in a new constitution a third level of government with precise powers and resources, and that at the present stage, at any rate, you think that would be unworkable. (3.50:13)

And the reply was:

Right. We think that the local level of government ought to be recognized by being referred to in the constitution, and if for example the revised constitution referred to the place of federal-provincial conferences as a part of the governmental structure of Canada, it should also refer to federal-provincial-municipal conferences which will guarantee the kind of consultation which will be of benefit to the provinces and the federal government as well as to the municipal end. (3.50:13)

One witness made some reference to the American experience:

The argument that in redrafting the constitution the local governments should have some special status and should participate as equal partners in the process of redrafting seems to me, gets into very slippery territory. The Americans have had enormous trouble in their state constitutions with their concept of home

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rule where they have tried to entrench local governments within state constitutions. (3.45:28)

One expert made the following observation in reply to a question:

You are suggesting a right of consultation written into the constitution. We are not the only federal government with a written constitution. Are there any illustrations of where this has been done, or if it has been done, whether it has worked at all? Or are we asked to pioneer in this field?

I would have to say I do not know. I am not aware of any. I find federal constitutions are very difficult to put on a comparative basis. They differ so widely from place to place that I have never found this a very successful operation. I would have to say I do not know, but I think you are probably right that if there is, it is quite rare. (3.50:41)

The following comment was made concerning the enforcement of the right to consultation:

You rely on moral suasion rather than litigation? Oh, I think so. Public pressure. (3.50:37)

It is readily apparent that there are many possibilities open to us when we consider the role of the municipality in Canadian life.

Briefly, the major options may be summarized as follows:

—That municipal legislative powers be spelled out in considerable detail in the Constitution thereby assuring a clear and recognizable place for city governments;

—That municipal revenue sources be spelled out in the Constitution, e.g., a certain fixed percentage of personal or corporate income taxes;

—That municipalities be given the right to be consulted on all major matters undertaken by the two senior levels of government which affect them and that this right be recognized in the Constitution;

—That the Constitution make no change in the present status or rights of municipal government;

—That greater efforts be made to coordinate planning and legislation by both senior levels of governments to include participation, on an informal basis, of municipal representatives at both the elected and official levels.

We reject the option that no change be made in the present status or rights of municipal governments. We are convinced from the evidence we have heard all across Canada that our third level of government requires a new focus of attention, and more effective means of presenting its point of view to the two senior levels of governments. We believe these objectives can be attained, however, without adopting the view that municipal legislative powers should be spelled out in considerable detail in the Constitution; this would not attack the central problem, and it would not allow the Provinces to set up municipal governmental structures which could be tailored to the specific needs of each Province. For example, those Provinces with very large cities might require quite different municipal structures from those with much smaller cities. The constitutional entrenchment of the powers of municipal governments is thus in our view too blunt an instrument.

Consequently we believe the difficulties of municipalities in providing for their needs, financing their programs, and determining their own priorities cannot be effectively resolved by the recognition of municipal governments in the Constitution of Canada. To the extent that constitutional recognition and protection might be afforded major Canadian cities by defining their status in Provincial constitutions, those matters can be negotiated with the respective Provincial Governments in whose jurisdiction they lie.

Spokesmen for municipal corporations across Canada raised over and over again the financial plight of their governments. Their major concerns included: pleas for greater fiscal resources, and, sometimes, transfers of taxing powers; criticism of the real property tax as too rigid a tax base; the interference with municipal priorities because of Federal and Provincial grant schemes, particularly those of the “matching” variety; and the involvement of municipalities in “provincial” services like education, welfare and housing, without adequate revenues. In terms of aggregate spending the importance of municipal governments cannot be overstated. Approximately one third of all public expenditures in Canada are made by municipalities.

We are sympathetic to these financial problems. Without attempting to analyze in quantitative terms the adequacy or inadequacy of real property taxes as the basis of municipal revenues, it is apparent that they are regressive and often inequitable. The pressure of such taxes (through rents, for example) bears down on lower-income groups, and it obviously is not a user-based tax when one considers the number of older property owners who pay real estate taxes for educational purposes despite the fact that they have no children in schools. In relation to municipal expenditures, real property taxes do not have the growth potential of income taxes, and municipal representatives argue that this lack of growth potential built into real property taxation constantly puts municipalities in a fiscal bind. On the other hand, Canada has not had too much experience with earmarking specific percentages of income taxes for particular purposes, and the possibility of differential income tax rates from city to city would be a totally new dimension in the Canadian tax structure.

On balance we do not favour the approach of a specified and guaranteed percentage of income tax. We feel that to the extent that any significant percentage would help the municipal financial plight, it would reduce the fiscal and monetary leverage of the Federal Government.

However, we consider it unjust that municipalities should have to rely on the property base for the bulk of their revenues, and we therefore recommend a sharing of tax fields between the different levels of government that would grant to municipalities direct access to other sources of revenue.

We do not seek to avoid radically new approaches to urban policy. We see in a readjustment of access to tax revenues an alleviation of some of the anomalies and pressures faced by the cities of Canada. We know too that

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there are different types of conferences involving various levels of government and many of these would be appropriate forums for the municipalities. A conference on the Constitution, on health, or on arrangements for native peoples might not lend themselves readily to municipal representation, but conferences dealing with welfare, housing, transportation and coordination of fiscal policy obviously would be much more relevant to the cities and towns of Canada.

That majority of Canadians who now live in cities are no longer satisfied to be unrepresented in forums where policy decisions are taken affecting the way they live. Transportation, welfare, housing, cultural amenities, and pollution abatement are but a short list of concerns which will require decisions by all levels of government, preferably by governments acting in concert.

City living can be restful and satisfying. It should be possible for those who represent city people in all levels of government to find coordinated means of reaching the goal of a better urban way of life.

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Chapter 23—The Territories

RECOMMENDATIONS

69. The objective of Government policy for the Yukon and the Northwest Territories should be the fostering of self-government and provincial status.

70. The provisions of the British North America Act. 1871. section 2. which provide for the admission of new provinces by action of the Federal Government alone. should be continued. provided that no territory should become a province without its consent.

71. The Yukon and the Northwest Territories should each be entitled to representation in the Senate.

Vast, starkly beautiful, and peopled by self-reliant and adventuresome Canadians, the Canadian North is a part of Canada seen by all too few of our citizens. Its potential, we are convinced, is enormous. Its growing pains are many. But as Canadians we have a unique opportunity in this new land not to repeat past errors. We can make the kind of North all Canadians, including Northerners, want without being trapped by precedent or being fearful of the future.

The key constitutional demands of Northern Canadians come under such headings as “responsible government”, “provincial status”, and “control over natural resources”. It is important for all Canadians to understand that Northern Canadians, those who live in our two territories, do not have exactly the same relationship to the institutions governing them as Canadians living in provinces do. In order to appreciate more fully the situation in the Canadian North we shall set out here some geographic, ethnic, and historical factors.

Canada’s northern territories are 1,511,979 square miles in area. The Northwest Territories covers 1,304,903 square miles, which is greater than the combined area of Quebec, Ontario, Manitoba and Saskatchewan. This represents almost 35 per cent of the total area of Canada, yet its population of approximately 32,000 is less than 1/5 of 1 per cent of the total Canadian population. The population density is 2 persons per 100 square miles as compared with 950 persons per 100 square miles for the Canadian provinces.

The Yukon Territory, with its 207,076 square miles, is equal in area to the four Atlantic Provinces. With a population estimated at approximately 20,000, it has a density of 10 persons per 100 square miles. The population is largely centred around the capital, Whitehorse, which contains half of the Yukon’s inhabitants. The rest live in communities along the Alaska Highway, in service centres and in mining communities.

The native peoples’ population, an important part of the total population of the North, is especially significant in the Northwest Territories. Indians and Eskimos make up only 1 per cent of the total population in Canada, yet in the Northwest Territories the majority of the population is Eskimo (33 per cent) and Indian (19 per cent)._Moreover, of the remaining 48 per cent of population, almost one-fifth are Métis, living under the same social and economic conditions as the Indian people. The native peoples’ population is a relatively smaller proportion of the total population of the Yukon Territory, viz., about 16 per cent.

Geological Surveys have indicated that Canada’s Northern Territories are potentially extremely rich in mineral deposits and in oil and gas. In the Yukon, for example, mining production has increased more than twofold in value since 1967. The Yukon also has an estimated 64,500 cubic miles of potential oil-bearing sediments.

As far as the Northwest Territories is concerned, of the 1.7 million square miles of precambrian rock in Canada, 710,000 square miles lie within the Territories; and the mineral wealth of the precambrian shield in the northern parts of Quebec, Ontario and Manitoba has been amply demonstrated. The Northwest Territories has an estimated 930,633 cubic miles of potential oil-bearing sediments as compared with the 341,715 cubic miles in Alberta. The discovery of massive oil reserves at Prudhoe Bay in Alaska has naturally raised hopes that similar large reserves of oil and gas will be found in the Territories, perhaps in the adjacent Mackenzie Delta or in the Arctic Islands. A major oil rush has developed in the North since the Prudhoe Bay discovery.

The early history of government in the Yukon is shared with the Prairie Provinces. Canada acquired Rupert’s Land and the North-western Territory shortly after Confederation. The temporary Government Act of 1869 provided for the first administration. It applied to the present provinces of Manitoba, Saskatchewan and Alberta and northern parts of the provinces of Ontario and Quebec and the Northern Territories as well as the Yukon Territory. The influx of miners to the Klondike gold fields led to the establishment of the Yukon as a separate territory in 1898.

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The first Government of the Territory consisted of a Commissioner and a Council of not more than six members appointed by the Governor in Council to aid the Commissioner in the administration of the Territory. The Council included the judges of the Territorial Court, who were also appointed by the Governor in Council. The Commissioner in Council was given legislative powers similar to those held by the Lieutenant-Governor and the Legislative Assembly of the Northwest Territories. The Yukon Act was amended in 1899 to increase the membership of the Council to eight by the addition of two elected members who were to hold office for two years. In 1902, provision was made for three more elected members, raising the Council membership to eleven.

A fully-elected Council of ten members was introduced in 1908, when the Commissioner was prohibited from sitting in Council. In 1918 the Governor in Council was given authority by an amendment to the Yukon Act to abolish the elected Council and to substitute an appointed Council of two or more members. Second thoughts in 1919, however, led to the amendment of the Act again to provide for three elected members on the Council. From 1919 until the end of World War II, the Territorial Government remained virtually unchanged. Increased population and rising prosperity made it reasonable to increase the size of the Council to five elected members in 1951.

Between 1908 and 1960 there developed a strong tradition of separate legislative and executive powers. Frequent misunderstandings and sometimes deadlock occurred between the two branches of government. Some improvement was made in 1960 when the prohibition against the Commissioner sitting in Council was removed. In addition a Financial Advisory Committee, consisting of three members of the Council, was established to review territorial estimates before their presentation to the Council.

In 1965, further changes were made. A Budget Programming Committee was set up which includes the three members of the Financial Advisory Committee and three senior members of the Territorial Administration. Under this arrangement, the Budget Programming Committee works out the estimates for each Department with the appropriate Department Heads. Previously, the Financial Advisory Committee had only reviewed these estimates after they had been prepared by the Department Heads and approved by the Commissioner. Now the estimates are processed through the Committee and the elected Council members are involved in the actual preparation of the estimates. Further developments respecting an executive committee will be discussed later.

As in the Yukon, the early history of government in the Northwest Territories is linked with that of the Prairie Provinces. When Saskatchewan and Alberta became Provinces, the government of the remaining Northwest Territories reverted to that existing prior to 1870: an appointed Commissioner had control over all phases of government. Elected representation completely disappeared. In 1905 a Council of four appointed members was created, but no appointments were made for sixteen years. A Commissioner was appointed with all the powers previously enjoyed by the Lieutenant-Gover.nor, the Executive and the Legislative Assembly of the Northwest Territories. Finally, in 1921, the Council already provided for by the Act of 1905 was appointed, along with two additional members. From 1922 to 1930 few ordinances were passed, and in some years the Council did not meet at all. Until 1946 it was composed entirely of senior Federal Government officials. In that year the first territorial resident was appointed to Council. In 1951 three elected members were added for the Mackenzie District, and a fourth in 1954. After 1960, the practice of appointing Federal officials to the Council ceased, and members of the public were appointed instead, generally from outside the Territories. Three more elected members were added in 1966, and in 1967 a territorial resident was appointed to the full-time post of Deputy Commissioner.

The office of the Commissioner has had a varied history. From 1905 to 1918, the Commissioner of the Royal Northwest Mounted Police was also Commissioner of the Northwest Territories. From 1918 to 1963, the Deputy Minister of the Department of the Interior and his successors held the office. The first full-time Commissioner was appointed in 1963.

As we have already indicated, the constitutional aspirations of Canadians living in Canada’s two territories are, because of the governmental structures prevailing there, necessarily more ambitious than those of Canadians elsewhere.

The vast majority of those who spoke to the Committee ultimately wanted, in a word, what other Canadians now have.

We shall set forth under several headings some of the views we heard.

A. Responsible Government

Governmental reform, whereby the policy making function is democratically placed in the hands of the people through their elected representatives, is supported. . ..

This brief urges an increase in the Territorial Council to 15 elected members, and supports the idea of a commissioner to be one of the elected members, and directed by the Territorial Council. The executive committee, which is about to be formed, should concurrently with the increase in the number of Territorial Councillors, be formed so as to provide for a majority of elected members with plans to phase out the presence of appointed members entirely. Consequent amendments to the Yukon Act to eliminate the colonial nature of the present government organization would be required as each step was taken, culminating in the amendment of Section 4 of the Yukon Act to provide for a fully responsible government in the same general terms as is now held by the provinces of Canada. (2.16:33)

A plan should be initiated for the more rapid development of responsible government in the Northwest Territories with a fully elected legislature and the immediate inclusion of elected members in the administration. In effect, the Northwest Territories government is very new, very progressive and has done a great deal. We are just asking that it be given the opportunity to do more.

We in the Northwest Territories stand in a colonial status in that we function under a commissioner and a

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partially elected council. We are not dissatisfied with this, but we think things can be done better so we ask for a plan as soon as possible to meet obligations with the rest of Canada that this be carried out for a fully responsible territorial government and that almost immediately we would ask that elected members be made part of the Northwest Territories administration as has been initiated in the Yukon recently. (3.87:7)

I agree with the suggestion that has been made by the Minister in relation to the two appointments by the Territorial Council of two members of the Executive Committee headed by the Commissioner in conjunction with a makeup of the Commissioner, his two assistant Commissioners and two elected representatives on the committee. This is something that is outside the legislative body of the Yukon Act and because it is outside the legislative body of the Yukon Act gives the right to the Minister or the Commissioner on the say-so of the Minister to remove that Executive Committee that he has set up at any time. (2.16:17)

These comments are made in the light of the present legislation governing the Yukon Territory. That legislation provides that the Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development or the Governor in Council shall have the authority to direct the Commissioner of the Yukon Territory, from time to time, on the way the Territory is to be governed. The Commissioner is appointed by the Minister. The Territorial Council is in law advisory only. Two of the members of the popularly elected, seven-man council sit on the Executive Committee with three appointed members, the Commissioner as chairman and two assistant commissioners. The Executive Committee is to be consulted by the Commissioner and its advice is to be given full consideration. The two popularly elected members of the Executive Committee have “line” or administrative responsibility for two departments of the Territorial Government, analogous to that of a Federal or Provincial cabinet minister. There is, however, no obligation on the Executive Committee to resign in the event that its decisions are not supported by a majority of members in the Territorial Council. There is no responsible government in the Yukon Territory—or in the Northwest Territories for that matter—in the constitutional sense of the term. Indeed, the Northwest Territories does not yet have the popular participation in the Executive Committee that the Yukon Territory has.

The Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development summed up his views on the Yukon experiment in these words:

I suggest to you that the wisest course would be to permit the Territorial Government to develop its potential in the context of the new Executive Committee which has the responsibility for those matters which lie within its legislative framework. I cannot predict at this time what form future constitutional development will take. However, my approach to this question is a flexible and experimental one, allowing for further adjustments as experience is gained and as the population and the economy of the Yukon continue to expand. (3.18:8)

B. Provincial Status

Many Yukoners have expressed their desire for political evolution that would permit the Yukon to ultimately reach a constitutional status equal to that of the provinces.

For some unpredictable period in the immediate future, mining interests need assurance that the federal government funds will be obtainable to provide the missing logistic support needed to bring a mine into production, such as roads, power townsites, etc. As the economic base of the Yukon grows, this assurance could gradually be assumed at the Territorial level. (2.14:7)

I would like to re-emphasize something the brief is attempting to accomplish, that it is not trying to put a time limit on when the Territory becomes a province. This would be something to be decided by others. preferably by our local politicians. But the brief is intended to present a formula whereby there would be a transition, first, the administration of everything affecting the Yukon in the Yukon, and secondly, evolution to provincial status at some undetermined time. (2.14:25)

Generally this brief finds difficulty in accepting that there be established a point of development of the Territory, at which time provincial status would be available to the area upon its request. It is felt that the present sections of the British North America Act of 1871 remain the machinery for obtaining provincial status, and the matter proceed as outlined above in the brief without specific targets of population, gross territorial production or total local government revenues being fixed, since none of these factors are in themselves decisive of the matter, and upon the theory that all democratic institutions should be available to all citizens of the country, the setting of artificial targets for such does not seem to be appropriate. (2.16:35)

I feel that the time has come when the Yukon must take over its own and go into provincial status. I have heard the remarks that the time is not ripe. That is ridiculous for the simple reason that until we do have provincial status we will never get industry into the Yukon. At the present time we have potential mining companies who, in the very, very near future, will be opening up mines but that is not the only thing. We must get others than mining; we must get industry into these Territories. (2.13:7)

[Floor Questioner] I do not believe in complete election for all offices of the administration in the Yukon. Is there one case where an appointed member has not come up to . . . expectations?

[Witness] Mr. Chairman, the brief is not intended as a criticism. It is intended as a suggestion on constitutional reform for constitutional reasons. I think the simple answer is “no”.

[Floor Questioner] I believe that some of these appointees from Ottawa do a much better job than some of the people who would be elected here. (2.16:50)

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I have not in my own view come up with any political boundaries for the provinces in the North. We might have a combination of the Yukon and the Mackenzie. We might have the Great Slave Lake area as one particular province. Whether we have one or four I think will depend on developments as they progress through northern Canada. So I cannot give a direct answer in terms of size, numbers, or the various conbinations, other than. to say that I think the objective north of the 60th Parallel must be the creation of provinces within the framework of Canada. (3.86:36)

These excerpts from the evidence indicate that the consensus is not complete on the issue of provincial status in the territories, and certainly not on the timing of any grant of Provincial status. The implications of Provincial status are many, but the main concern appears to be the ability of the territories to generate enough revenues of their own to enable them to carry on as Provinces. Tied in with this is, of course, the small population of the territories, and the extra cost involved in providing “provincial style” services in the Canadian North. Some Canadians in the south see the granting of provincial status as conferring too great an economic benefit, if not immediately, then ultimately on Canada’s northern residents:

With regard to the northern territories, my first concern is that they not be given provincial status particularly with the population situation as it is now because I suggest that it would make living in those territories an extremely attractive proposition. If they had all the resources turned over to them tomorrow, they could almost declare a dividend and retire on the spot.

Either those territories are going to continue to be governed from Ottawa as territories or some arrangement has to be made for internal self-government or for some sort of union. I do not see in the immediate time that internal self-government in the territories is a proposition that would benefit the rest of Canada or even be particularly viable in those territories. (3.1:18)

On the other hand, we heard also from southern Canadians who were very sympathetic to the aspirations of northerners for a greater say in the government of their part of Canada.

C. Control of Natural Resources

It is only in this context that the average person can appreciate what it means to the Yukon’s constitutional aspirations to have our natural resources heritage stolen from us by official Ottawa dictates. It means that without the revenues from our natural resources we can never be self-supporting as the provinces are. Our natural resources are our life’s blood because we have a resource-oriented economy. If we cannot claim our natural resources, then it is also certain that we can never make the claim to self-determination or self-government. We shall be doomed forever to the status of second-class citizenship, always begging the federal government for “handouts” on which to subsist, and always being underdeveloped because we shall not have the revenues on hand with which to develop our area. On a smaller scale our position will be similar to Canada’s always handing over control of our natural resources to outsiders in exchange for funds with which to develop our area, but losing more and more control over the area that we are developing because others are supplying the capital and they are demanding a bigger voice in the future. We would remain always an economic colony. (2.16:60)

I think the mineral rights of the provinces go to the provincial governments and it seems to me that it is strange indeed that the Parliament of Canada can set up the mineral rights of the Northwest Territories and say that they are the rights of all Canadians. I feel that in any kind of a setup of government in the Territories, and eventual provincial status, that certainly the mineral rights or the minerals .in the Territories should become a part of the Territories and be used to support the people who are living and working in the North. (3.86:39)

Eventually, of course, I think that control should be in the hands of the people who own them. But prior to that, I think we should have a clear statement as to who owns them.

We have had a statement to date telling us that the resources of the Yukon Territory and the Northwest Territories belong to the federal government. They called it the people of Canada which I take to mean the federal government. This is ownership we are talking about, not control. They are denying that Yukoners own their own natural resources, and we are the only place in Canada where this is done. Certainly no one would suggest that in a province without fear of getting shot. But in the Yukon, they seem to be able to get away with it.

As to control, at the outset, my personal opinion is this. I want immediately a clear statement from the federal government saying that the resources in the Yukon are ours; that they are being held in trust for us by the federal government. I would be quite prepared to allow the federal government to control them until such time as we are capable of taking over control and management of the resources ourselves.

Until that time I would not argue about an interim period whereby the federal government controls resources.

There is a historical precedent for this. All of the Western provinces went through this stage—Manitoba, British Columbia, and so on and so forth. At no time was it denied that the actual ownership of their resources belonged to the people within the provinces or in their areas. (2.16:66)

The position of the Government of Canada on this issue was put this way by the Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development:

I have asked what we would do with the resources. Are we going to keep them in a trusteeship for the residents of the North or are they to be shared by the whole population of Canada? It is a fundamental question. Some resolutions have been taken on this problem. Some people think’ that they should benefit all Canadians; others think that we should keep them under trusteeship for the Northwest residents. Up to now. the government has been quite neutral, that is to say, we do not keep them under trusteeship and we have not made a final decision, on

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a long-term basis. But as you said, this question should perhaps be debated by the Constitution Committee which should submit a report. The Cabinet would certainly be very grateful to know your opinion on the subject. (3.18:25)

The financial capacity of any territory should not be the only factor to be considered in granting it responsible government or provincial status. Certainly some of the people of the North believe there are other factors—not the least of which is full democratic participation of all Canadians in every level of government—which are also very important. The Government of Canada itself has stated that it does “not regard the financial capacity of the Territory as an absolute criterion of political development.” (3.l8:16) The difference, then, is not one of principle. From the evidence it even seems to boil down, almost, to one of accounting. In the Yukon particularly we were told that Government of Canada figures do not take into account all the revenues which emanate from the Territory. In turn, the Minister replied in these terms:

We sometimes hear comments that the finances, of the Yukon are kept obscure because we do not wish to publish this information. I can assure you that this is not true. In fact, all the figures are public, but we have to admit that the financial pattern is complex and therefore difficult to interpret. I made an attempt to cast some light on this in November 1969. With this in mind, I think, it would be useful to review the matter again now, and perhaps emphasize the fact that the financial data are accessible for examination.

Appropriations for 1970-71 provide for Territorial Government expenditures of over $25 million. Of this amount $5.5 million will come from the Yukon’s own revenue. $6.7 million will come from the federal government under cost-sharing programs similar to those arranged with the provinces. The remainder which is nearly $13 million comes from the federal treasury. Of that $13 million about $2 million could be considered as the abatement of personal and corporate income tax which the Yukon would get if it were a province.

This still is not the complete picture because there are many hidden costs in provincial type services in the Yukon for which the federal government pays directly. Some of these are the costs of the courts and the RCMP, that is to say, about $1.25 million. There is another sum, nearly $500,000, that is paid through the present subsidized patient day-rate at the Whitehorse General Hospital. The full cost of all new road construction in the Yukon as well as all costs for a number of other provincial-type services are paid directly by the federal departments concerned. (3.18:6)

The Minister then provided the Committee with a breakdown of revenues, and projected an estimated deficit, if the Yukon were a province, in 1970-71 of $24,689,183. (3.18:58)

Of course, as already mentioned, fiscal capacity is not an absolute criterion. When linked, however, with a sparse population, a still developing infrastructure, and the special needs of native peoples in both Territories, it shows the difficulties in moving immediately to complete self-government and provincial status. When these factors are combined with the very real problems in communications in the North, both natural and man-made, a timetable approach raises many difficulties.

It is fair to say that the evidence generally in the Territories, and in the Yukon particularly, did not demand either self-government or provincial status immediately. Most witnesses were concerned that there be some timetable of development in constitutional affairs and that the criteria be set out in the Constitution. When any territory met these predetermined criteria, complete self government and provincial status would follow automatically. There are immense practical diificulties in this approach. If all the criteria were set out in the Constitution (assuming they could be agreed upon with sufficient certainty) it is possible a territory might qualify on all but one. Consequently, a constitutional amendment might be required in order to change the one criterion. This approach has these built-in inflexibilities. On the other hand, it is not reassuring to Northern Canadians to leave their future constitutional development completely evolutionary.

We feel that the best approach would be for the Government of Canada to make the following commitment to its Northern citizens: that the objective of northern policy is to foster full self-government and Provincial status for the territories. Administrative and legislative policies in so far as they concern the structure of government in the North should be tested against and advance this objective.

Because of the special relationship between the Parliament of Canada and the Territories, an eventual decision to admit these territories to the status of provinces should be made by the Parliament of Canada pursuant to section 2 of the British North America Act, 1871, provided that no territory should become a Province without its consent. Some provision would also have to be made at that time as to how the consent of these areas would be counted for purposes of the constitutional amending procedure and of the spending power formula.

In order to improve communications between Ottawa and the Territories at the Parliamentary level, we advocate immediate Senate representation for each of the two territories. Under the constitutional rule that a Province cannot have fewer Members in the Commons than the Senate, the appointment of two Senators for each territory would lead to an increase in the number of Members of Parliament to two for each.

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Chapter 24—Offshore Mineral Rights

RECOMMENDATIONS

72. The Federal Government should have proprietary rights over the seabed offshore to the limit of Canada’s internationally recognized jurisdiction, and the Federal Parliament should have full legislative jurisdiction over this subject matter.

73. There should be no constitutional provision as to the sharing of the profits from the exploitation of seabed resources. Nevertheless. we feel strongly that the Federal Government should share the profits of seabed development equally with the adjacent coastal Province rather than with all of the Provinces.

74. Sable Island should be recognized by the Constitution as part of the Province of Nova Scotia.

The question of the ownership of the seabed and the continental shelf offshore from a country’s land mass is even newer in national than in international law. Under international law it was traditional that every country had the ownership of the soil under the internal waters inside the baselines from which territorial waters are measured, as well as the seabed under the territorial waters outside the baselines (whatever the location of the baselines or the accepted width of those waters may be). Then, under the Geneva Convention of 1958, national states were assigned “sovereign rights” for the purpose of exploring their continental shelves and exploiting their natural resources- not quite full sovereignty, but complete control for practical purposes. In the Convention “continental shelf” was defined as the seabed and its subsoil beyond territorial waters to a depth of 200 metres, or beyond that limit to where the depth of the waters admits of the exploitation of natural resources.

Within Canada, until the advisory opinion of the Supreme Court of Canada in November of 1967, there was no authoritative statement of the legal position between governments with respect to offshore subsoil. The Supreme Court opinion, delivered with respect to areas off the west coasts, was that the Federal Government is entitled to proprietary and other rights offshore from the historic boundaries of British Columbia, which it defined as the ordinary low-water mark. The reasoning of the Court makes it clear that there is nothing in the result peculiar to the Province of British Columbia, and that all rights in submerged lands lying outside the low-water marks of the Provinces belong to the Federal Government.

This decision was received with great dissatisfaction by all the coastal Provinces, and the Federal Government therefore proposed in December of 1968, to allow coastal Provinces to administer all lands shoreward from mineral resource administrative lines to be drawn off each coast. The Federal Government would concede to the coastal Provinces all revenues derived from the mineral resources of the submerged lands within these lines. It would itself administer offshore mineral rights seaward from the administration lines, but the revenues accruing from these resources would be placed in a single national pool from which half of the revenues would be made available to the provinces concerned.

The Federal proposal would, for greater certainty, draw the administration lines on the basis of the geodetic grid system. They would be so drawn as_ to enclose for the benefit of the coastal Province the sea bottom on the west between Vancouver Island and the mainland, and on the east large areas beneath the Bay of Fundy, Northumberland Strait, and the Jacques-Cartier Passage, as well as in each case areas adjacent to off-lying islands.

The importance of the problem is indicated by the fact that the continental shelf areas adjacent to Canada have been estimated to be equal to almost 40% of the total land area of Canada, and probably possess substantial mineral resources, particularly oil and gas. Understandably, the Federal proposal has not met with a favourable reaction from the Provinces.

We believe that the orientation of the Federal proposal is the right one: there should be both Federal and Provincial participation in the revenues from these submerged lands, even though the administration should be principally Federal. It is owing to Federal action that there is a Canadian claim to these lands—through, for example, the Canadian participation in the 1958 Conference on the Continental Shelf and the Federal assertion in 1970 of a 12-mile territorial sea. Further expansion of Canadian rights could come about only through further Federal initiatives. It therefore seems fitting that the Federal Government, as the possessor of our international personality and the guardian of our international rights, should have the proprietary right in the seabed.

In addition, Provincial revenues derived from natural resources have been integrated in the equalization formula since 1967. This fact has to be taken into account when considering the question of sharing the revenues associated with offshore mineral rights between the Pro-

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vincial and Federal Governments. With respect to the Provincial share of those revenues, it can be said that in most cases, all Provinces will benefit directly or indirectly from any exploitation of offshore minerals in Canada through the equalization formula. Conversely, there will be in most cases an extra cost, in terms of increased equalization grants to Provincial governments, to be absorbed by the Federal Government. Because of this additional cost and because revenues to be derived from offshore mineral rights should be used, to some extent, to reduce regional disparities, we believe that the Federal Government should have its share of those revenues.

But it also seems fitting that the coastal Provinces should have a share in the profits. Such matters have to be determined by man-made criteria rather than by natural principles. Until 1930, when it finally yielded them to the Provinces, the Federal Government had the proprietary rights to minerals in the soil of Alberta, Manitoba and Saskatchewan. It was this surrender of title which made Alberta into one of the “have” provinces in Canada, and considerably aided the economy of Saskatchewan. The “have not” Atlantic Provinces might similarly be the beneficiaries of a decision to cede them a substantial share in the profits resulting from offshore resource development.

However, we would not propose a constitutional provision respecting the sharing formula for the profits. We do agree with the Federal proposal that 50% of the profits should go to the Provinces, but we feel strongly that the sharing should be directly between the Federal Government and each coastal Province rather than through a national pool. In other words, we do not think that all the Provinces, or even all the coastal Provinces, should share equally.

As we have mentioned above, some redistribution of those revenues will take place even without a national pool, through the general equalization formula and through the Federal share of the revenues. The coastal Provinces should share in proportion to the revenue derived from that portion of the submerged lands adjacent to their provincial portion. While this would work to the disadvantage of some Province or other from time to time, we feel that it would assure each coastal Province that it was deriving all the revenue that the adjacent resources and a free market could produce.

There is a particular problem with respect to Sable Island, a long Sandbar about 150 miles off the coast of Nova Scotia. On the one hand, the British North America Act appears to give the Federal Government both jurisdiction over and proprietary title to the Island. Section 91(9) of the Act specifically mentions it as a head of Federal legislation jurisdiction (“Beacon, Buoys, Lighthouses, and Sable Island”) and the Third Schedule to the Act lists it among the provincial public works and property which would become the property of Canada. On the other hand, section 7 of the Act provides that “Nova Scotia . . . shall have the same limits as at the passing of this Act”, and there is much evidence both before and after Confederation to suggest that the Island has always been considered part of Nova Scotia. It may be that the best interpretation to be given to the words “Sable Island” in the B.N.A. Act is that they confer Federal title and jurisdiction only to the lighthouse and other aids to navigation on the Island, or at most to the Island’s surface.

In the light of Nova Scotia’s historic claims to Sable Island, we feel that the Federal Government should relinquish any claim it may have to proprietary rights in the land or mineral rights of Sable Island, and we recommend that in a new Constitution the Island should be recognized as part of the Province of Nova Scotia.

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Chapter 25—International Relations

RECOMMENDATIONS

75. Section 132 of the British North America Act should be repealed.

76. The Constitution should make it clear that the Federal Government has exclusive jurisdiction over foreign policy. the making of treaties. and the exchange of diplomatic and consular representatives.

77. All formal treaties should be ratified by Parliament rather than by the Executive Branch of Government.

78. The Government of Canada should, before binding itself to perform under a treaty an obligation that deals with a matter falling within the legislative competence of the Provinces, consult with the Government of each Province that may be affected by the obligation.

79. The Government of a Province should remain free not to take any action with respect to an obligation undertaken by the Government of Canada under a treaty unless it has agreed to do so.

80. Subject to a veto power in the Government of Canada in the exercise of its exclusive power with respect to foreign policy. the Provincial Governments should have the right to enter into contracts, and administrative. reciprocal and other arrangements with foreign states. or constituent parts of foreign states. to maintain offices abroad for the conduct of Provincial business. and generally to cooperate with the Government of Canada in its international activities.

The conclusion of a treaty is the final step in a series of negotiations between two or more states possessing internationally recognized sovereignty. For a federation the treaty-making power is a manifestation of complex internal relationships which have no parallel in unitary states. In the case of Canada the situation is even more complicated than for many other federal states, because there is no constitutional provision which settles jurisdictional questions. Although the legal question concerning jurisdiction over international relations arose in Canada with the Statute of Westminster in 1931, it became a matter of political importance because of Quebec’s recent desire to establish relations abroad especially with French-speaking countries. Until very recently, Canada’s international activity and consequent foreign image has almost exclusively reflected its Anglophone side. Quebec’s concern, and the new Federal policy of bilingual government, have led to a new emphasis on relations with the Francophone countries and to the projection of a more bilingual international image. But the problems in this general area have not yet been resolved at the legal level.

The prevailing international rule is that there should be a single international personality for all governments, including federations, and that there shouldbe ultimate control by the central government in a federation even if some leeway in international affairs is allowed to the regional governments. Such a single international personality was definitely recognized by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties in 1969.

In most federal constitutions, the central government is invested with power over international relations. In some constitutions, like that of the U.S.S.R., the regional governments are allowed a certain degree of participation by the constitution, but it is largely fictitious if the internal political structure is taken into account. Other federations, like West Germany, grant regional governments the right to conclude treaties within their jurisdiction, but with certain restrictions. However, this power has tended to become obsolete.

The Canadian Constitution makes no mention whatsoever of treaty-making except in a colonial context. Section 132 of the B.N.A. Act provides that: “The Parliament and Government of Canada shall have all Powers necessary or proper for performing the Obligations of Canada or of any Province thereof, as Part of the British Empire, towards Foreign countries, arising under Treaties between the Empire and such Foreign Countries.” Since Canada’s participation in the British Empire ended with the Statute of Westminster in 1931, the only formal treaty power in our Constitution is now a spent provision.

The right to sign and ratify treaties has traditionally been regarded in parliamentary government as a prerogative of the executive. However, treaties which require implementation have to be carried out by passing legislation in Parliament. Where the subject matter is one which falls wholly or partly under provincial jurisdiction, Provincial legislation is also necessary for implementation.

Since there has been no constitutional provision for treaty-making in areas of shared jurisdiction, the Federal Government has frequently signed international conventions subject to the reservation that it accepted the con-

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vention only to the extent of Federal constitutional jurisdiction. It has also been able in some instances to obtain the consent of the Provincial Governments to ratification, as in the case of the recent International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, though this required five years of Federal-Provincial negotiation. There has also been a serious problem concerning Provincial initiatives in the international arena in commercial and cultural activities, somewhat ameliorated by the willingness of the Federal Government to sign “umbrella treaties” with foreign states which would validate subsequent agreements between that state and a Canadian Province. Such a treaty was worked out with France in 1965 and Quebec and France concluded subsequent cultural agreements. However, this is a piecemeal solution to a general problem.

We recommend that section 132 of the B.N.A. Act should be replaced by provisions incorporating the following principles:

(1) the Federal Government should have exclusive power respecting foreign policy, the making of treaties. and the exchange of diplomatic and consular representatives;

(2) all formal treaties should be ratified by Parliament rather than by the executive Branch of Government;

(3) the Government of Canada should, before binding itself to perform under a treaty an obligation that comes within the legislative competence of the Provinces, consult with the Government of each Province that may be affected by the obligation;

(4) the Government of a Province need not take any action with respect to an obligation undertaken by the Government of Canada under a treaty unless it has agreed to do so;

(5) subject to a veto power by the Government of Canada in the exercise of its exclusive power with respect to foreign policy, the Provincial Governments should have the right to enter into contracts and administrative, reciprocal and other arrangements with foreign states or constituent parts of foreign states, to maintain offices abroad for the conduct of Provincial business, and generally to cooperate with the Government of Canada in its international activities.

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PART V—SOCIAL POLICY

Chapter 26—Social Security

RECOMMENDATIONS

81. In the area of social security. there should be a greater decentralization of jurisdiction with a view to giving priority to the Provinces according to recommendations 82. 83 and 84.

82. With respect to social services. the present exclusive jurisdiction of Provincial Legislatures should be retained.

83. With respect to income insurance (including the Quebec and Canada Pension Plans). jurisdiction should be shared according to the present section 94A of the British North America Act, subject to the following exceptions:

(1) Workmen’s Compensation should be retained under the exclusive ju[risdiction of the Provincial Legislatures:

(2) Unemployment Insurance should be retained under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Canadian Parliament.

84. With respect to income support measures:

(1) Financial social assistance (Canada Assistance Plan, allowances to the blind. disability allowances. unemployment assistance) should be under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Provincial Legislatures:

(2) Veterans’ allowances and allowances to Eskimos and Indians living on reserves should continue to be the exclusive responsibility of the Canadian Parliament:

(3) Demographic grants (old age pensions. family allowances and youth allowances) and guaranteed income payments (guaranteed income supplement) should be matters of concurrent jurisdiction with limited Provincial paramountcy as to the scale of benefits and the allocation of Federal funds among these income support programs. Thus the Federal Parliament would retain concurrent power to establish programs and to pay benefits to individuals under these programs. However. a Province would have the right to vary the national scheme established by Parliament with respect to the allocation within the Province between the various programs of the total amount determined by the Federal Government and with respect to the scale of benefits paid to individuals within the Province according to income. number of children, etc., within each program: provided that the benefits paid to individuals under each program should not be less than a certain percentage (perhaps half or two-thirds) of the amounts which would be paid under the scheme proposed by the Federal Government.

For government responsibilities which did not exist in 1867 or which have developed considerably since then, legislative jurisdiction has to be inferred from constitutional provisions which do not deal with them directly. Social security comes under this category. The provisions which are most relevant to this subject are paragraphs 6, 7 and 8 of section 92 which give exclusive authority to the Provincial Legislatures over public and reformatory prisons, hospitals, asylums, charities and eleemosynary institutions, as well as municipal institutions, and paragraphs 11 and 28 of section 91 which grant legislative authority to the Canadian Parliament with respect to marine hospitals and penitentiaries.

Since the expression “social security” lends itself to various interpretations, for the purposes of this report we define it as including social services (health and welfare services), income insurance measures (unemployment insurance, workmen’s compensation, retirement insurance) and income support measures (family and youth allowances, old age security, guaranteed income supplement, financial social assistance, veterans’ pensions and allowances).

Several provisions have been added to the original British North America Act in the field of income insurance and income support. A constitutional amendment in 1940 transferred to Parliament exclusive power over unemployment insurance. Then, in 1951, section 94A granted Parliament concurrent legislative power with respect to « old age pensions; a 1964 amendment extended this power to cover s.urvivors’ and disability benefits irrespective of age. Section 94A now reads as follows: “The Parliament of Canada may make laws in relation to old age pensions and supplementary benefits, including survivors’ and disability benefits irrespective of age, but no such law shall affect the operation of any law present or future of a provincial legislature in relation to any such matters.”

The Victoria Charter proposed in Article 44 to extend the Federal jurisdiction in section 94A to cover family, youth, and manpower training allowances. In Article 45 it

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also proposed the following limitation: “The Government of Canada shall not introduce a bill in the House of Commons in relation to a matter mentioned in section 44 unless it has at least 90 days before such introduction, informed the Government of each Province of the substance of the proposed legislation and requested its views thereon”. Article 44 of the Charter corresponds exactly to section 94A of the B.N.A. Act, with the addition of the three subject matters mentioned.

We place particular importance on section 94A and income support problems in general, since this matter has been a cause of disagreement between the Federal Government and the Provinces, especially the Province of Quebec. In fact, it seems that the Quebec Government’s refusal to endorse the Victoria Charter stems from its dissatisfaction with Articles 44 and 45.

The provision in section 94A that “no such law shall affect the operation of any law present or future of a provincial legislature in relation to any such matter”, is controversial. Was it intended to establish Provincial paramountcy (which would be a constitutional novelty), or to exclude the application of Federal paramountcy? Since this formula was also used in Article 44 of the Victoria Charter, we feel that it would be advisable to restate it in order to avoid ambiguity.

In our view, there should be more decentralization in the field of social security with a view to giving the Provincial Legislatures priority, in accordance with the following specific recommendations.

First, the present exclusive Provincial jurisdiction over social services should be retained.

With respect to income insurance measures (including the Canada and Quebec pension plans), jurisdiction should be shared in accordance with section 94A of the B.N.A. Act, except as follows: workmen’s compensation should continue to be the exclusive responsibility of the Provincial Legislatures; unemployment insurance should continue to come under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Canadian Parliament.

With respect to income support measures:

(1) Financial social assistance (Canada Assistance Plan, allowances for the blind and the disabled, unemployment assistance) should be the exclusive responsibility of the Provincial Legislatures.

(2) Parliament should continue to have exclusive jurisdiction over veterans’ allowances and allowances to Eskimos and Indians living on reserves.

(3) Parliament and the Provincial Legislatures should enjoy concurrent powers as regards demographic grants (demogrants) such as old age security, family allowances and youth allowances and as to guaranteed income payments (guaranteed income supplement), with limited Provincial paramountcy as to the scale of benefits and the allocation of Federal funds among these income support programs.

More specifically, jurisdiction over demogrants and guaranteed income should be shared i.n the following way. The total amount spent in the form of demogrants and guaranteed income payments, including family allowances and youth allowances, old age pensions and the guaranteed income supplement, should be set and financed by the Federal Parliament (without excluding the Provincial Legislatures’ power to create and finance their own programs). Benefits to individuals under the different programs (excluding specific programs created and financed by the Provincial Legislatures), should be paid by the Federal Government. The Federal Parliament would be responsible for establishing national standards for each program. However, each Provincial Legislature would be free to modify the Federal program as regards the distribution of the total amount set by the Federal Parliament for the various programs and as regards the scale of benefits paid to individuals according to income, number of children, etc., for each program. In each Province, the benefits paid to individuals under each program might not fall below a certain percentage (perhaps half or two thirds) of the benefits paid in accordance with the national standards in the program established by the Federal Parliament. The total amount determined by the Federal Parliament would be distributed among the Provinces according to the amount each Province would receive if the Federal program were applied in all Provinces.

As a result of this recommendation, the Federal Parliament would determine the total amounts to be paid for family allowances, old age pensions, including old age supplements, and youth allowances. However, it would be up to the Provincial Governments to decide how this total amount would be distributed among the different programs and to set the scale of benefits under each program. It is our belief that this recommendation meets most of the arguments put forth by the Federal and Provincial Governments.

In determining the total amount paid to the Provinces for these four income support programs, the Federal Parliament could make an even more extensive redistribution of income than now, since the distribution and financing of benefits to individuals under the four programs would continue to be the responsibility of the Federal Parliament.

Our recommendation would make for a redistribution of income better suited to the needs and characteristics of each Province, while allowing the Provincial Legislatures to determine the portion of the total amount which would be allocated to each program. The Provincial Governments could even agree on a formula which would, in their opinion, be best suited to each program. It is quite conceivable, for example, that the family allowance benefit paid for the first child would be different from the benefits paid for the second, third or fourth child. Similarly, Provincial Legislatures would be free to have old age pensions vary according to the recipient’s income.

Since according to our proposal the Federal Government would continue to collect taxes from all Canadians and to send cheques to people throughout the Country, Canadians would still be reminded of the raison d’être of this redistribution—what the Federal Government calls a “feeling of Canadian unity which is both the cause of the redistribution of income between Canada’s people and regions and the result of such a measure.”

We feel that it is very important to be able to transfer payments easily to individuals who move from one Province to another. Such transferability, however, need not imply equality of payments. But the assurance must be

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given that a person will not be deprived, even briefly, of such a payment because he has just moved. Payments are easily transferable when it is the Federal Government that sends out the cheques to individuals everywhere in Canada.

Our proposal implies that the Federal Government would keep control over the tax fields used to finance income support programs, and determine the total cost of these different programs. It would maintain the Federal Government’s power to implement an effective economic policy. This is so because it is less important for the Federal Government to decide who will receive what than to determine the total amount paid for all programs and to keep control over tax fields which serve to finance these programs. Therefore, our proposal adds to the flexibility of the Provincial Governments with respect to these programs and yet maintains the Federal ‘Government’s power to influence the economy.

The Quebec Government has stressed the integration of the different programs with regard to income security and the importance of adapting each program to the characteristics of the regional, economic and demographic structures of the Province. We feel that our proposal meets this view to a large extent. We also meet another argument of the Quebec Government according to which “all the social security measures are in direct relation to the culture of a people and allow it to express itself as an entity.” It is our belief that as far as demogrants and guaranteed income are concerned, the total amount paid is relatively less important to Provinces than its allocation and the social choices this involves. Furthermore, our recommendation would allow a Provincial Government to create and finance a given program which will meet specific needs.

For these reasons we believe that the comprehensiveness of our proposals is consistent both with principle and with the needs of the country as a whole.

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Chapter 27 — Criminal Law

RECOMMENDATIONS

85. Since we believe that each Province should be able to regulate the conduct of its own people in such matters as the operation of motor vehicles, Sunday observance. betting. and lotteries. the Federal Parliament should have the right to delegate even to a single Province legislative jurisdiction over any part of the criminal law.

86. Because there is some ambiguity resulting from current practice. if not from the Constitution. the Federal power over the administration of criminal justice should be made clear so that the Federal Parliament would be seen to have clear and undoubted jurisdiction to enforce its own laws in the criminal field.

Because of the limitations which the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council placed upon the General Power and the Trade and Commerce Power, the Criminal Law Power in section 91(27) has turned out to be one of the most comprehensive powers possessed by the Federal Government. However, while this power is stated to be exclusively Federal, the Provinces are given jurisdiction by section 92(15) over “The Imposition of Punishment by Fine, Penalty, or Imprisonment for enforcing any Law of the Province made in relation to any Matter coming within any of the Classes of Subjects enumerated in this section”, coupled with jurisdiction over provincial prisons (section 92(6)) and over the administration of justice in the Province (section 92(14)).

What this amounts to in fact is that there is a concurrent jurisdiction over criminal law, the Provincial power being narrower and subject to Federal paramountcy in cases of unresolvable conflict. This concurrency is nowhere more evident than in a series of recent Supreme Court of Canada decisions (O’Grady v. Sparling, [1960] S.C.R. 804; Mann v. The Queen, [1966] S.C.R. 238; R. v. Binus, [1967] S.C.R. 594; and R. v. Peda, [1969] S.C.R. 905). In order to uphold Provincial jurisdiction over the offence of careless driving in the face of the Federal offence of dangerous driving, the Court finally felt forced to establish overly refined degrees of advertence within the mens rea (guilty mind) necessary for conviction. We do not disapprove of the result of these cases, but we do believe that they leave very little reason for maintaining the fiction that criminal law is an area of exclusive Federal jurisdiction. We have therefore had to face the question whether the Constitution should explicitly recognize the concurrent Provincial power over criminal law which we believe actually exists.

We believe there is an even better reason for a Provincial role in the criminal law area than the clarification of concepts and the improved resolution of conflicts. The criminal law is, after all,,an expression of the moral views and the mores of a people, and it is obvious that the views of Canadians in matters of behaviour differ considerably across the country, and often markedly from Province to Province. In the United States this is recognized by locating the criminal law power principally in the state governments with a merely supplementary power in the federal government. We see no need for so radical a change in Canadian federalism, but we can also see no reason why each Province should not be able to regulate the conduct of its own people in matters such as the laws relating to the operation of motor vehicles, lotteries, betting, and Sunday observance. For instance, Ontario would like greater latitude with respect to off-track betting, Quebec with respect to lotteries and gaming generally. To some extent Provincial option is now provided for by Federal law, but on a piecemeal and limited basis. We favour greater freedom for the Provinces to control the behaviour of their people, and to experiment on a province-wide scale.

Since the matters over which we would like to see provincial jurisdiction fall largely into what we think of as the regulatory area, we gave some consideration to recommending Provincial jurisdiction over mala prohibita (things which are evil mainly because prohibited), while retaining an exclusive Federal power over mala in se (things which are evil in themselves). The distinction between the two categories, however, is not always clear within the criminal law. In addition, often what causes social conflict is the very question of classification. For instance, some regard gambling as at worst a malum prohibitum, whereas to others it is a malum in se. Moreover, such a distinction would preclude even the possibility of Provincial jurisdiction in the area of mala in se.

We have therefore decided to recommend, in this one area, a power of delegation from the Federal to the Provincial Legislatures. We believe it should be exercisable at the option of a single Province, subject to the concurrence of Parliament. Obviously, Parliament would not delegate a power to one Province which it was not prepared to delegate to others, but one Province might wish to institute, for example, government-controlled off-track betting, while other Provinces might have no interest whatsoever in obtaining such a power. We assume that Parliament would not delegate to one Province jurisdic-

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tion over matters like the use of marijuana which might then embarrass the other Provinces and the Federal Government because of smuggling across provincial borders. Naturally we hope that the Provinces would be prepared to establish uniform legislation in those parts of delegated fields where uniformity may be of importance. But we believe that the delegation of many subjects within the criminal law power to the Provinces would be beneficial in allowing people to have criminal legislation which more closely reflected the consensus in their part of the country as to socially tolerable behaviour. We see this as a gain for democracy, and in line with our other recommendations for fuller Provincial control over the quality and style of life.

There is one matter within the area of criminal justice where we believe Federal jurisdiction should be more clearly delineated and exercised. We refer to the administration of criminal justice. Section 91(27) gives jurisdiction to the Federal Government over “The Criminal Law except the Constitution of Courts of Criminal Jurisdiction, but including the Procedure in Criminal Matters”. ‘Section 92(14), on the other hand, provides for Provincial jurisdiction over “The Administration of Justice in the Province, including the Constitution, Maintenance, and Organization .of.Provincial Courts, both of Civil and of Criminal Jurisdiction, and including Procedure in Civil Matters in those Courts.” The existing Federal power over procedure in criminal matters is probably wide enough to establish complete Federal control in all prosecutions under criminal legislation, and the Federal Government takes the position that the largely Provincial administration now existing in this area is a matter of Federal tolerance, not a constitutional right. We believe it would be desirable to have a clear constitutional solution, and that the Federal Parliament ought to have jurisdiction with respect to the enforcement of its own laws.

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Chapter 28—Marriage and Divorce

RECOMMENDATIONS

87. In keeping with our principle of control by the Provinces of their social destiny. the jurisdiction over “Marriage and Divorce” should be transferred to the Provincial Legislatures. subject to an agreed common definition of domicile.

There are very few areas of the law which come more directly or more intimately in contact with the lives of the average citizens of a country than the law relating to marriage and divorce. Under section 91(26) the legislative power over “Marriage and Divorce” is an enumerated power given to the Parliament of Canada. In addition, the British North America Act also grants the exclusive authority to make laws in relation to “The Solemnization of Marriage in the Province” to the Provinces under section 92(12). The interpretation of these respective heads of Federal and Provincial power has been argued in the courts on a number of occasions.

One of the issues argued has been: does the provincial power over solemnization extend only to the regulation of the formalities by which the contract of marriage is to be authenticated or can it also affect in any way the validity of the marriage itself? In Re Marriage Legislation in Canada [1912] A.C. 880, Viscount Haldane, L.C. said on this issue that the “jurisdiction of the Dominion Parliament does not, on the true construction of ss. 91 and 92, cover the whole field of validity.” The Privy Council considered that section 92(12) operated “by way of exception to the powers conferred as regards marriage by s. 91, and enables the provincial Legislature to enact conditions as to solemnization which may affect the validity of the contract”. Viscount Haldane later said:

Prima facie these words appear to their Lordships to import that the whole of what solemnization ordinarily meant in the systems of law of the provinces of Canada at the time of confederation is intended to come within them including conditions which affect validity.

As an example of the application of Viscount Haldane’s principle, it was decided in Kerr v. Kerr et Al., [1934] S.C.R. 72, that there was no doubt that, in the exercise of its jurisdiction under section 92(12), the Legislature of a Province may lawfully prescribe the consent of the parents or guardian to the marriage of a minor, as an essential element in the ceremony of marriage itself. As Chief Justice Duff said:

Nor have I any doubt that by s. 17(1) [of the Ontario Marriage Act] the consents required are prescribed as elements in the ceremony. These requirements apply to all marriages celebrated in Ontario, and to no marriages but those celebrated in Ontario, whether the parties to the marriage be domiciled in Ontario or elsewhere. The legislature is, I think, dealing with the solemnities of marriage and not with the capacities of the parties.

Chief Justice Duff said later in his judgment:

The authority of the provinces, therefore, extends not only to prescribing such formalities as properly fall within the matters designated by “Solemnization of Marriage”, they have the power to enforce the rules laid down by penalty, by attaching the consequence of invalidity and by attaching such consequences absolutely or conditionally. It is within the power of a province to say that a given requirement shall be absolute in marriages. This, of course, is always subject to the observation that a province cannot under the form of dealing with the “solemnization of marriage”, enact legislation which, in substance, relates to some part of the subject of “marriage”, which is not reserved to the provinces as a subject of legislative jurisdiction.

As Mr. Justice Lamont said in the same case:

The provincial legislature is, therefore, competent by apt legislation to make the preliminaries, leading up to the marriage ceremony, conditions precedent to ‘the solemnization of the marriage. From this it follows, in my opinion, that the legislature is also competent to declare that in the event of these conditions precedent not being complied with no valid marriage has taken place.

Provincial Legislatures have considerable authority at the moment to deal with many aspects of family law in Canada. Professor Bora Laskin, as he then was, points out:

Legislative power to deal with the substantive law of alimony has been held to belong to the Provinces ….So, too, legislative power in relation to maintenance. . . . Equally, it is within provincial legislative power to deal with the protection of children and with their custody and support, or the support of spouses inter se… (Laskin, Canadian Constitutional Law, 3rd edition, 1028)

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The Divorce Act (Canada) 1968 provides for certain auxiliary relief in an action for divorce including alimony, and maintenance for a spouse and children of a marriage.

Throughout the world social attitudes vary widely on marriage and divorce. Some societies view marriage almost exclusively as a religious ceremony in which the state has only a marginal interest; others treat marriage as purely a social contract in which the state may or may not have a substantial interest. There are different religious, ethical and social views of marriage and divorce in Canada, and particularly of divorce, but, of course, the variations are within much narrower limits. Yet there certainly have been important differences (although perhaps relatively fewer now) between regions in Canada. By having the legislative power over “Marriage and Divorce” a Federal power under section 91(26), it has been argued that this makes divorce law less responsive to change. It is argued that the law is framed to meet the objections of those groups which are least amenable to change—that the tail wags the dog, so to speak. On the other hand, if the legislative power were to be transferred to the Provinces it is likely that the laws would conform more closely to the social and ethical values of the Canadians living in that Province, and be a more genuine and particular expression of their social philosophy. There does not appear to be any real merit in the argument that Canada ought to have any “national standard” with respect to divorce.

It is true that almost all Canadians abhor marriage breakup and its attendant family and social problems. But in this area the law is largely a procedural device for ameliorating the effects of a situation which has developed for extra-legal reasons. The substantive law of divorce results in remedies to those in its jurisdiction who have already decided that their marriage is dead. The relative degree of ease in obtaining a divorce induces very few to leave any real marriage—so long as the law does not countenance the completely frivolous causes of action. It does not imply that any jurisdiction views marriage with any less sanctity, or that a particular jurisdiction hoped any less at the outset of the marriage that it would succeed. The transfer of jurisdiction over divorce means that, if a marriage has failed, one jurisdiction may choose to grant relief for reasons emanating from its particular social philosophy, whereas another, with a differing philosophy, may choose not to give relief. The reason for the difference may be readily understood. The fact, however, that one Canadian living in a particular province might get a divorce where another might not should not offend anyone deeply. (For many years, prior to the Divorce Act (Canada) 1968, Nova Scotians could get a divorce on the basis of cruelty while other Canadians could not.) We accept this phenomenon in the rest of the world as a condition of pluralism. We ought to be able to do the same for our fellow countrymen.

In view of the general principle supported in this Report that, broadly speaking, social policy ought to be within Provincial jurisdiction where possible, we believe that a transfer of jurisdiction over “marriage and divorce” is desirable. This would allow for a more integrated approach to family law within Provincial jurisdictions. It would also allow for a more integrated family law approach within the two legal systems in the country, the civil and common law systems.

Of course, in the event such a transfer of jurisdiction to the Provinces were to occur, certain protections would be required for Canadians, especially an agreed common definition of domicile. It would be more than unseemly if a Canadian citizen were married in the eyes of one Province and not in another! But we are confident that many problems which might grow out of our recommendation can be met within the developing framework of our present law. The values to be achieved by the transfer of jurisdiction, through making the law of divorce more relevant to the community in which it will be applied and of which it, we hope, will be an expression, are worth some inconvenience in the inter-jurisdictional recognition of divorce decrees.

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Chapter 29—Education

RECOMMENDATIONS

88. Education as such should remain an exclusively Provincial power as at present, subject to the guarantees for minorities set out elsewhere in this Report.

89. The Provinces should create a permanent office for cooperation and coordination in education. and Federal participation should be confined to the area of Federal jursidiction over the education of native peoples. immigrants, and defence personnel and dependents.

If it is recognized that people are the greatest resource of Canada, then it follows that Canadians should have equal opportunity regardless of what part of a province or what region they live in. We apply the same principle to education. Since it moulds the lives of the citizens as well as in a sense the future of the country, it is of prime concern to the government and to the citizens. Canada is basically a bilingual and multicultural country, and this fact should be appropriately reflected in her educational policies.

Under the provisions of the British North America Act, and subject to section 93 as well as the corresponding legislation concerning Manitoba, Saskatchewan and Alberta and the 1949 Amendment regarding Newfoundland, education comes under the jurisdiction of the Provinces. Since the passing of the Act, great changes have taken place in the character of the population and in economic, technological and social conditions, which have produced a progressive, affluent, urban-oriented society. Consequently the Federal Government has had to assume an indirect and limited role in education.

Many Witnesses favoured a definite role in education for the Federal Government. Many others, particularly in Quebec, favoured the retention of, or return to, full Provincial jurisdiction in education, and opposed any interference by Federal authorities. The majority, however, supported the idea that, under a federal system, and mainly for reasons of mobility, more coordination should be developed between various Provincial programs. Most of them suggested that a mechanism be provided for the coordination and cooperation of the Provinces in general educational policies; they also favoured the working out of a formula which, without affecting the jurisdiction of the Provinces in this field, would be in their best interest as well as that of the country as a whole.

After carefully considering all the views that were expressed across the country and fully respecting the concern of the Provinces, especially Quebec, the Committee has come to the conclusion that education as such should remain an exclusively Provincial power as at present under section 93 of the B.N.A. Act. Despite the undoubted value of a subordinate Federal role in education, especially in promoting bilingualism, we feel that it would be preferable for the Federal Parliament to pursue its legitimate goals in education, culture and research through existing Federal powers, like the spending power, rather than through a direct, even though subordinate, power in the field of education.

We hope that the Provincial Governments will continue to meet at the ministerial level to discuss cooperation and coordination and that these meetings will be put on a more permanent basis. In our view it would be highly desirable if the Provinces created a permanent national office for cooperation and coordination. The Federal Government could have a subordinate participation confined to the extent of its constitutional jurisdiction in the educational field as regards native peoples as well as through the departments of Defence and Immigration.

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Chapter 30—Communications

RECOMMENDATIONS

90. The Parliament of Canada should retain exclusive jurisdiction over the means in broadcasting and other systems of communication.

91. The Provinces should have exclusive jurisdiction over the program content in provincial educational broadcasting. whatever means of communication is employed.

The question of communications in its contemporary sense was not a large one for the Fathers of Confederation, since in 1867 “communications” meant mainly “transport”, except for the newly-born telegraphic system. Thus the British North America Act deals with this subject only in section 92(10)(a) and (b), where it establishes Federal jurisdiction for “Lines of Steam or other Ships, Railways, Canals, Telegraphs and other Works and Undertakings connecting the Province with any other or others of the Provinces, or extending beyond the Limits of the Province” and “Lines of Steam Ships between the Province and any British or Foreign Country”. Telephones as we know them, let alone radio, television and satellites, were hardly imaginable then. Our discussion in this chapter relates only to communications and does not include transportation.

In 1932 the Privy Council, relying in large part on the Federal General Power, held the regulation and control of radio communications to be within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal Parliament. Since that time Parliament has regulated radio, and subsequently television, broadcasting.

The Province of Quebec, which has always jealously claimed and preserved its exclusive jurisdiction in the field of education under section 93 of the B.N.A. Act, early claimed an extension of that jurisdiction to the field of communications, and in 1945 passed its own Broadcasting Act authorizing the creation of a Provincial broadcasting system. In the face, however, of the refusal of the Federal Government to issue a broadcasting licence to Provinces or corporations owned by them, the Quebec Government proceeded no further, though the Act was not repealed.

While the desirability of Federal jurisdiction was reaffirmed in 1957 by the Report of the Fowler Royal Commission on Broadcasting, an Advisory Committee to the Secretary of State recommended in 1965 that “licences should in future be granted to educational institutions or corporations, even if they are wholly or partly owned’ by the provincial Governments. . . .” (Report of the Committee on Broadcasting, 1965, p. 278). In 1966 the Federal Government announced in a White Paper on Broadcasting that it was prepared to enter into agreements with any Province to make public service facilities available, and the Broadcasting Act of 1968 set out that position in these words: “facilities should be provided within the Canadian Broadcasting System for educational broadcasting” (section 3(i)).

Consequently from 1932 to the 1968 Federal Broadcasting Act we can detect some evolution from exclusive Federal control of the field of communications to an acceptance by the Federal Government that Provinces might share Federal facilities in the field of educational broadcasting. Moreover, in 1968 the province of Quebec revived the 1945 Broadcasting Act creating Radio-Quebec. The position of Quebec was clearly stated in the brief presented by its Government at the Constitutional Conference in Ottawa in February 1968:

Another area to which the Quebec Government attaches the utmost importance concerns media for the dissemination of education and culture, particularly radio and television. As things now stand, the provinces are a long way from playing the part that should normally be theirs in this field. Since frequencies are controlled by Ottawa, allocation of radio and television stations within Quebec boundaries was made without our Government being given the slightest voice in the matter. This situation results from the interpretation given by the Courts to our constitution, and is unacceptable to Quebec.

The changes required in this area will have to take into account the various components of broadcasting; we refer particularly to such organizations as the Board of Broadcast Governors and the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation . . . . Airwaves are rightfully considered to be in the public domain; they cannot and must not be the federal government’s appanage. Just as program content, allocation of frequencies can have serious repercussions at the cultural level. Quebec cannot tolerate any longer being kept outside a field where her vital interest is so obvious, especially in view of the potential impact of audio—visual means of mass communication in educating both children and adults. (Government of Quebec, Brief on the Constitution presented to the Constitutional Conference, February 5-7, 1968, pp. 15-16).

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In 1969, Quebec introduced the Quebec Broadcasting Bureau Act to update the 1945 Act. Although the Bureau was granted wide powers, programs produced by it were required still to be transmitted by Federally licensed stations. Following this legislation the Federal Government cancelled its plans to establish a Federal Educational Broadcasting Agency, and moved towards the recognition of a Provincial role in educational television.

The principal constitutional problem has not been provincial rights in the field of education as such, but rather what type of broadcasting constitutes education. Ontario and Alberta were as interested as Quebec in arriving at a solution, and in 1969 the Secretary of State and the Council of Ministers of Education worked out a definition acceptable to all for purposes of implementing the new policy. Professor Ronald Atkey has commented:

The new definition appears to be more in accord with the provinces’ exclusive constitutional jurisdiction in the field ofeducation . . . .

Related to the definition and Iinancial matters (above) is the question whether the “broadcasting framework” provided by the Federal Government for educational broadcasting is indeed a viable one within which each of the provinces can effectively carry out its constitutional responsibilities. (“The Provincial Interest in Broadcasting under The Canadian Constitution”, Ontario Advisory Committee on Confederation, 1970, Volume 2, pages 228-229).

Under this new arrangement Alberta and Ontario have already set up their own extensive systems of educational television.

In the meantime another development has occurred— broadcasting by satellite. The Federal Government has been actively involved in a satellite program in the past few years. Faced with this important technical advance and limited by its own financial means, the Province of Quebec has been involved in talks with France on the question of sharing the French satellite system which is itself based on a Franco-German satellite project agreement.

We recommend that the Provinces should have exclusive control over program content in Provincial educational broadcasting, and that this principle should be carried through from radio to television to telephones to satellites and to any new invention in the same field. In other words we recognize that, as an extension of their exclusive rights in the field of education, the Provinces are solely responsible for the content of Provincial educational programs distributed through any means of communication.

On the other hand we also recommend that the Federal Government should retain its sole jurisdiction over the means in broadcasting and other systems of communications. We propose no change in the Federal Government’s general jurisdiction over broadcasting.

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PART VI—THE REGULATION OF THE ECONOMY

Chapter 3 1—Economic Policy

RECOMMENDATIONS

92. The Federal Parliament and Government should retain the primary responsibility for general economic policy designed to achieve national economic goals. This means that they must have sufficient economic powers to regulate the economy through structural. monetary and fiscal policies.

93. National economic policies should take more account of regional objectives through coordinating mechanisms between governments and through considerable administrative decentralization in the operation of the Federal Government and its agencies.

94. Provincial and municipal governments should also take more account of national economic objectives.

The economic policy of Canada must operate in a particularly difficult context. First, the fact is that our economy is very open. Since more than a quarter of the total demand in Canada hinges on external factors, it is very important for the Federal Government to be equipped with anticyclical policy instruments which are efficient, yet flexible enough to cope with sudden economic changes. This sensitivity to economic decisions made by other countries was clearly shown on August 15, 1971, when the United States imposed a 10% surtax on imports. Then, too, the fact that our regional economic structures vary across Canada means that national anticyclical policies cannot perfectly fit all regions at the same time. Each region has its own people, often its special institutions, its own climate, its own geography, and, generally its own needs and costs for public and private goods. Each region has its own conception of economic development. The existence of these regional imperatives makes it more difficult to work out a national policy.

Finally, Canada as a federal state, with various levels of government, has certain built-in delays to Federal intervention in the economic field in the interests of consultation. The existence of independent regional administrations also implies that the economic policy of the Federal Government may be thwarted by those administrations. This is a particularly significant problem for the management of the economy in that nearly half the public sector falls under regional administrations. Despite these difficulties the need for a coordinated economic policy involving both the Federal and the Provincial levels of Government is obvious. We shall deal with their respective roles later, after dealing with the more fundamental problem which We now discuss.

For many witnesses who appeared before our Committee, the only logical solution to the difficulties we have outlined was centralization. Thus, one expert felt that Canada must be recentralized to become economically efficient:

Finally, with respect to stabilization policies, the greater the degree of decentralization the more hopeless the situation becomes. In this specific case, I would like to point out an experience that is one, to my mind, of the more ravaging that exists in Canada and that has to do with public investment. Most public investment in Canada is done by 10, 12 or 14 agencies at the very most, say, at the federal level, the Department of Transport and the CNR, two or three education departments because of school buildings in Canada, two or maybe three highway departments, three major hydroelectric companies, the City of Montreal, the City of Toronto, the City of Vancouver and the City of Winnipeg. In other words, there are 12 or 14 major public agencies that account for most of public investment in the country.

These agencies are, by and large, autonomous with respect to borrowing and in the case of several of them, autonomous with respect to fiscal resources with the result that they do exactly what they want. These agencies have never met to my knowledge for the last 10 years with respect to a public investment program in this country. Furthermore, they have never felt the necessity to do so with the result that the federal government that wants to achieve responsibilities with respect to anticyclical policies must compensate for completely irrational policies of some of these agencies, irrational in the terms of what is required by the economic situation. In that sense I would like to recall the period of 1955 to 1957 when inflationary pressures were fanned by half a dozen of these major corporations with the result that when the recession started in 1957 there was nothing left on the shelf as far as public investment was concerned. We asked, then, the federal government to compensate for a gigantic hole in public investment that, of course, could not be compensated for because everything had been spent in the previous two years.

In that sense there is no doubt at all in my mind that Canada must be recentralized to be economically effi-

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cient both with respect to growth and anticyclical policies. It does not have to be done through an overhauling of the Constitution. The Constitution as it exists now allows for this quite easily. I recognize that in the United States over the last six months or so there has been a tendency away from centralization. In other words, the recent Nixon program allows for some unconditional transfers to the states and their municipalities. I would like to suggest, however, that this is entirely new in the United States. If I understand Mr. Nixon properly or his program what is implied here is an attempt to put a little flexibility in a system where there has never been any and where, in fact, the whole thing had become exceedingly centralized. In Canada it is probably the other way around. It is probably the opposite policy that has to be followed: in other words, a very definite attempt to recentralize Canada. (3.44:11).

For another witness this economic efficiency could be reached by cooperation rather than by centralization:

The solution to this incoherence does not reside necessarily in the centralization of powers as Mr. Parizeau has concluded, who is ready to sacrifice the flexibility of decentralization in favour of a political efficiency that he illustrates by pointing to us the example of the United States. No. In West Germany at the time of the budget preparation there is a tripartite official cooperation between the federal government, the states and the municipalities for the purpose of harmonizing the economic and financial policies in relation to the needs of the various levels of government. Cooperation is the introduction of coherence in a decentralized society. It alone allows at the same time flexibility and efficiency. Therefore it is not a question of knowing which of the various levels of government will have the last word; it means ensuring, on the one part, that the division of responsibility corresponds to the real nature of the problems which are total and non-sectorial and, on the other hand, to ensure that the various levels of decision are coherent in their action.

The fundamental constitutional problem, in the long run, is therefore to institutionalize this cooperation. (3.57:15)

The members of this Committee believe that the cost of centralization would be much too high in Canada. We believe also that real economic efficiency cannot be reached without taking into account both the regional and the national interest. It is possible, moreover, to reconcile the efficiency of a national policy and the flexibility of a regionalization of this policy. Given the Canadian reality, the interdependence of governmental activities and the diversity of economic structures in Canadian regions, we can only conclude that efficiency must imply cooperation between governments.

This interpenetration of governmental operations is a reality of life in Canada. Thus such local activities as municipal borrowing (especially from foreign sources) may sometimes frustrate national policies. Again, certain national policies, like credit restriction by the Bank of Canada, may not be adapted to the economic conditions of certain areas. At the local and national levels, therefore, efficiency must take into account both national and regional objectives. The same arguments which in the political field led Canada to adopt a federal and not a unitary system require flexibility and coordination in matters of economic policy.

We do not, however, question the fact that the Federal Parliament should retain the primary responsibility for general economic policy in the country. It is axiomatic that the Federal Parliament and the Federal Government are the only bodies which can effectively act for the whole country, taking into account international and interprovincial factors. Consequently prime responsibility for the achievement of our national economic goals must fall under these institutions and their general economic mandate. This means that the Federal Parliament must have sufficient economic powers (1) in terms of the structural regulation of the economy, for example, over securities, financial institutions, interprovincial trade, etc., and (2) in terms of its overall influence on the economy through its monetary policy and through its aggregate expenditures and taxes.

Consequently, when there is a need to regulate the structure of the economy for national economic purposes, we generally recommend a Federal power, either exclusive or paramount. For the same reasons, we think that monetary policies should remain a Federal responsibility. In terms of powers, this constitutes a large degree of centralization. We feel, however, that through considerable administrative decentralization in the operation of the Federal Government and its agencies, Federal policies in those fields can be regionally adapted.

We have already expressed the view that decentralization of decision-making has a certain value in itself in a country as vast and as diverse as Canada. Most Crown Corporations could have their headquarters outside Ottawa, as many already are. Federal departments like Agriculture, Energy, Mines and Resources. Environment, National Defence and Transport could have their principal offices elsewhere, and many other departments could give their regional offices more authority. Even when Ottawa must remain the effective centre of administration, a greater effort can be made to encourage regional input.

Obviously not all economic policies can be selective. Thus monetary policy can hardly vary between regions because of the mobility of capital. Even in the United States, where there are twelve Federal Reserve Banks, credit conditions always follow similar patterns. That is not saying, however, that monetary policy can disregard regional factors altogether. When it appears that a particular monetary policy which is justified for national reasons is hardly, or not at all, suited to one or several regions, it becomes important to compensate for the inequitable side-effects through other anticyclical instruments, such as Federal expenditures, which can be easily made selective. Another way the Federal Government can offset the harmful regional effects of these national policies would be to facilitate public borrowing by regional governments where necessary. This type of selective policy seems to us essential in Canadian federalism. But economic powers are also present, though indirectly, in every expenditure made and every tax levied by government. With respect to this overall influence it is clear that the Federal Government must be able to have a decisive effect on the economy through its aggregate expenditures.

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We do not think that this objective necessarily implies a control on all aspects of these expenditures. Our recommendations relating to the spending power of Parliament and to many programs in the field of social security are such that they allow aggregate Federal control over the amounts which are spent while giving much flexibility to the Provincial Legislatures in the determination of the nature of these expenditures. Consequently, where the objective is to regulate the structure of the business climate for national purposes, we would give the Federal institutions the powers they need. But where the purpose of the expenditure is largely social or broadly cultural we would let the Provinces establish priorities, reserving to the Federal authority sufficient economic leverage, in aggregate terms, to carry out its prime responsibilities in the fiscal field.

But the success or failure of anticyc.lical policies in Canada depends in large part, on the efficiency of our intergovernmental mechanisms of consultation and coordination. One condition for the realization of a coordinated and flexible economic policy is for the main public bodies in Canada to meet periodically. Another condition is that those public bodies be able to work together efficiently. We have made recommendations above towards augmenting the prestige and influence of Federal-Provincial conferences. With regard to the economic policy more particularly, we think that nonpolitical bodies such as the Bank of Canada and the Economic Council of Canada should be more directly involved in these conferences. Their contribution would certainly increase the efficiency and the prestige of the group and very likely the quality of the decisions taken.

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Chapter 32—Trade and Commerce

RECOMMENDATION

95. Parliament should have exclusive jurisdiction over international and interprovincial trade and commerce. including the instrumentalities of such trade and commerce. Intraprovincial trade and commerce should remain under the jurisdiction of the Provincial Legislatures.

“Regulation of Trade and Commerce” is a power conferred on the Parliament of Canada by section 91(2) of the British North America Act. Language of such breadth might appear to give Parliament control over the whole field of trade and commerce, but the Privy Council early came to the conclusion that the words could not be read as having their ordinary meaning. As it was put by Lord Hobhouse in the case of The Bank of Toronto v. Lambe:

. . . it has been found absolutely necessary that the literal meaning of the words should be restricted, in order to afford scope for powers which are given exclusively to the provincial legislatures. ([1887], 12 App. Cas. 575, at p. 586).

For one thing no distinction was made between “trade” and “commerce”, so that their conjunction did not extend their individual meaning. This was stated by Mr. Justice Henry in Citizens Insurance Co. v. Parsons:

‘Trade’ means the act or business of exchanging commodities by barter, or the business of buying and selling for money—commerce—traffic—barter; it means the giving of one article for another for money or money’s worth. ‘Commerce’ is only another term for the same thing. ([1880], 4 S.C.R. 215 at 287).

Moreover, the power to regulate was held not to include the power to prohibit, since ‘regulation’ implies the conservation of the thing to be made the subject of regulations. Lord Davey put it this way in Municipal Corporation of the City of Toronto v. Virgo:

. . . their Lordships think there is a marked distinction to be drawn between the prohibition or prevention of a trade and the regulation of governance of it, and indeed a power to regulate and govern seems to imply the continued existence of that which is to be regulated or governed. ([1896] A.C. 88, at p. 93).

Further in the 1881 case of Citizens Insurance Co. v. Parsons ([1881], 7 App. Cas. 96 at p. 112), Sir Montague Smith made it clear for the Privy Council that section 91(2) could confer jurisdiction on Parliament only over international trade arrangements, matters of interprovincial concern, and what he called “general trade and com- merce”, which appeared to be limited to the general regulation of federally incorporated companies. This might have been a solid basis for Federal jurisdiction, but in the ensuing years the trade and commerce power was further eroded to the point where Lord Haldane could suggest that it was a merely “ancillary” power:

It is, in their Lordships’ opinion, now clear that, excepting so far as the power can be invoked in aid of capacity conferred independently under other words in s. 91, the power to regulate trade and commerce cannot be relied on as enabling the Dominion Parliament to regulate civil rights in the Provinces. (Toronto Electric Commissioners v. Snider, [1925] A.C. 396, at p. 409).

This dictum was later expressly repudiated by Lord Atkin in a 1931 case, (Proprietary Articles Trade Association v. Attorney General of Canada [1931] A.C. 310, at p. 326) but it indicates the low estate to which section 91(2) had fallen.

The judicial fate of the trade and commerce power stands in stark contrast to the judicial extension of the American commerce clause which reads:

The Congress shall have Power . . . to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes; (Article 1, Section 8).

So broadly has the U.S. Supreme Court been willing to push the limits of this power that Mr. Justice Murphy was able to declare that “the federal commerce power is as broad as the economic needs of the nation.” (American Power & Light Co. v. Securities & Exchange Commission, [1946], 329 U.S. 90, at p. 104.)

The Commonwealth Parliament in Australia is given jurisdiction by section 5 (i) of the Constitution over “trade and commerce with other countries, and among the States”, and legislation of the Commonwealth is given paramountcy over State legislation. This appeals to us as a reasonable statement of Federal power, and we recommend it for Canada. We believe that Parliament should be able to regulate a product where the principal market is outside of the province of production or where trade is carried on throughout the country by transactions that ignore provincial boundaries, and of course with respect to all aspects of international trade. While it is possible that the Courts will hold such jurisdiction to belong to

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Parliament. even under the present Constitution, the matter is too central to Federal control over the economy to leave to chance.

The Federal power should also include jurisdiction over the instrumentalities of national and international trade and commerce. For example, under the present Constitution Parliament has had to designate grain elevators, mills and feed warehouses “Works . . . for the general Advantage of Canada” under sections 91(29) and 92(10)(c) in order to gain a satisfactory measure of control over the grain trade. It might be desirable if an open-ended power such as that in section 92(10)(c) (of declaring any work to be for the general advantage of Canada or for the advantage of two or more provinces) were eliminated from the Constitution, and more narrowly drawn powers (e.g., over transportation and communication) made available to the Federal Parliament. But in any event Parliament should have adequate power to control the instrumentalities of trade and commerce.

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Chapter 33—Income Controls

RECOMMENDATION

96. In cases of national emergency. as defined by the Parliament of Canada. the Provinces should delegate to the Federal Parliament all additional powers necessary to control prices. wages and other forms of income, including rent. dividends and profits. to implement its prime responsibility for full employment and balanced economic growth.

One of the themes which constantly recurred in the evidence we heard was a concern across the whole of Canada about inflation. Without entering into a debate about its economic causes, we would conclude that Canadians wish to place in the hands of their governments effective jurisdictional tools to tackle the problem. To a large extent they would probably be content if anticyclical policies of governments were effective in balancing economic growth with relative price stability. On the other hand, should such anticyclical policies fail to control prices adequately, we might be faced, ultimately, with the question of direct controls over prices, wages and other forms of income including rents, dividends and profits.

The leading case with respect to jurisdiction in this field is the Board of Commerce case (In Re The Board of Commerce Act and the Combines and Fair Prices Act, [1922] 1 A.C. 191, 60 D.L. R. 513). This Board of Commerce established by Parliament had, inter alia, jurisdiction to regulate profits. The Privy Council held the legislation ultra vires of Parliament and observed that:

It was passed in 1919, after peace had been declared, and it is not confined to any temporary purpose, but is to continue without limit in time, and to apply throughout Canada. . . . It may well be that the subjects of undue combination and hoarding are matters in which the Dominion has a great practical interest. In special circumstances, such as those of a great war, such an interest might conceivably become of such paramount and overriding importance as to amount to what lies outside the heads in sec. 92, and is not covered by them.

Although the Privy Council conceded, reluctantly from the context, that such a power might exist in time of peace, it added:

. . . it is quite another matter to say that under normal circumstances general Canadian policy can justify interference, on such a scale as the statutes in controversy involve, with the property and civil rights of the inhabitants of the Provinces (emphasis added).

In Fort Frances Pulp and Power Co. Ltd. v. Manitoba Free Press, [1923] A.C. 695, the Privy Council referred to the Board of Commerce case and said that in the event of a “very different case, such as that of sudden danger to social order arising from the outbreak of a great war”, Parliament might act “under other powers which may well be implied in the Constitution” (emphasis added). Later the judgment stated:

This principle of a power so implied has received effect also in countries with a written and apparently rigid constitution such as the United States, where the strictly federal character of the national basic agreement has retained the residuary powers not expressly conferred on the Federal Government for the component States. The operation of the scheme of interpretation is all the more to be looked for in a constitution such as that established by the British North America Act, where the residuary powers are given to the Dominion Central Government, and the preamble of the statute declares the intention to be that the Dominion should have a constitution similar in principle to that of the United Kingdom.

It is apparent from these cases and others that effective direct control over prices and incomes is a power which the Parliament of Canada cannot lightly, or indeed easily, assume. Perhaps this is as it should be. We do not feel, however, that it is in the national interest to allow the Federal power over wages and prices to be so circumscribed as to be exercisable only in time of war or famine, or alternatively to be implied in times of highly exceptional circumstances. In practice we trust Parliament would be very circumspect in the use of any such power. But constitutionally we do not feel it is in the interests of the nation to have the power ambiguous at best, and conjectural at worst.

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Consequently, we recommend that the Parliament of its, to implement its prime responsibility for full employ- Canada be given the following power: in cases of national ment and balanced economic growth. In other words, emergency, as defined by the Parliament of Canada, the Parliament should have whatever powers are necessary in Provinces shall delegate to the Federal Parliament all the this area, as they are required. Technically, this means additional powers necessary to control prices, wages and that there should be Federal paramountcy as in section 95 other forms of income, including rent, dividends and prof- of the British North America Act.

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Chapter 34—Securities and Financial Institutions

RECOMMENDATIONS

97. The matter of securities regulation, which has hitherto been under provincial jurisdiction. should become a concurrent jurisdiction with paramountcy in the Federal Parliament.

98. Where financial institutions (trust companies, insurance companies. finance companies, credit unions, caisses populaires) do business in more than one province. they should have to meet national standards as defined by the Federal Parliament; where they confine their activities to a single province. the Province should retain exclusive jurisdiction.

The marketing of securities in Canada is a subject of major concern to Canadians. Difficulties arise from the fact that while the securities market and our financial structures are national, the jurisdiction to regulate them is Provincial. This has led to a lack of uniformity in laws and regulations from Province to Province and, consequently, to a lack of protection for the investor. In general, the major devices used in the regulation of security trading are the licensing of dealers, and laws requiring the disclosure of information to the public. At the present time this regulation is carried out by Provincial securities commissions. Federal jurisdiction is limited to sections of the Criminal Code prohibiting fraudulent dealing in securities.

Some experts have argued that the Federal Parliament possesses greater jurisdiction than it now exercises by virtue of its powers over trade and commerce, federally-incorporated companies, and the Post Office. This position, however, has not been accepted by the courts, and in practice the Provinces have occupied the field for many years. The “trade and commerce” power, which is the constitutional head under which one would expect to find the regulation of securities, was so restricted by judgments of the Privy Council that the Provinces acquired jurisdiction over the regulation of securities under their wide power over “Property and Civil rights”.

Under our present system there is a lack of legislative uniformity east of Ontario and a disparity of administrative enforcement of identical laws west of Ontario. These two factors tend to undermine the welfare of Canadian

In addition, Canada needs strong regulation to compete with American and other foreign securities standards. The weakness of Provincial laws in Canada drives investors away, in most cases to American exchanges.

While most of the above arguments favour a national jurisdiction for securities regulation, there are certain opposing views. Some fear that Federal control over securities would add to the already objectionable tendency to draw capital resources from the smaller urban centres and regions to the major markets of Toronto, Montreal and Vancouver. It might result in a one-way flow of money into these areas.

Consequently, it would be beneficial to have a system with minimum national standards but enough flexibility to provide for regional needs. There are two possibilities: Federal regulations could be used which would take account of regional interests; or the Provinces could work toward legislative uniformity through intergovernmental cooperation. After considering both possibilities, the Committee recommends that there be concurrent jurisdiction with paramountcy in the Federal Government. This would allow the Federal Government to provide minimum standards of protection for the investor, and permit the Provinces to provide additional protection.

A similar principle should also apply to financial institutions. Where financial institutions (trust companies. insurance companies, finance companies, credit unions, caisses populaires) do business in more than one province, they should have to meet national standards as defined by the Federal Parliament; where they confine their activities to a single province, the Province should retain exclusive jurisdiction.

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Chapter 35—Competition

RECOMMENDATION

99. The Federal Parliament ought to have a concurrent power with the Provincial Legislatures over competition in order that the regulation of unfair competition in all its aspects be subject to the national interest. In the event of conflicting legislation. the Federal legislation should be paramount.

The Federal Parliament has dealt with restrictive trade practices, that is, combinations tending to limit competition, mainly under its criminal law power. It has also joined to combines’ offences other provisions allowing initial investigation and report on possible combines. The investigative body may then recommend prosecution for the substantive offences.

It seems, however, that the regulation of business combinations and the conditions under which firms might combine, consolidate or be absorbed has been considered closed to Federal regulation. There is no clear explanation why the Federal Parliament cannot regulate interprovincial or international trade, and the new Federal Compeitition Bill indicates a new attitude to this matter.

The primary object of restrictive trade practices legislation is to establish ground rules so that the public good will not be impaired by private conduct designed to injure consumers, producers or others (Transport Oil Co. Ltd. v. Imperial Oil Co. Ltd., [1935] O.R. 215). By analogy, the primary object of adulteration legislation “is the public safety—protecting it from threatened injury” (per Macdonald, J.A. in Standard Sausage Co. v. Lee, [1933] 4 D.L.R. 501 (B.C.)), and the primary object of restrictive trade practices legislation is the economic “safety” of the public to protect it from any threatened injury which might result in a lessening of competition to the detriment of consumers and producers.

When the complexities and size of modern corporations are taken into account, as well as their national and international activities, it seems necessary to give the Federal Parliament constitutional power to control and regulate them in respect of competition. Many markets are dominated by a few major firms, and the degree to which a market economy exists in the classical sense has already been questioned. The ability of provinces, especially the smaller ones, to control effectively such large economic units is open to question. Consequently, the field of restrictive trade practices in the anti-trust or combines sense, as well as the expanded concept of unfair competition in relation to consolidation, mergers and other kinds of takeovers, ought to fall under a Federal power in the Constitution.

But what kind of Federal power? Should it be exclusive, or should it be concurrent, with Federal paramountcy in case of conflicting legislation? As we have already mentioned, although the Federal Parliament under the present Constitution could perhaps legislate with respect to unfair competition in the export trade and in interprovincial trade, the practical difficulties involved in a constitutional power of that sort are obvious. For example, if an industry did not extend beyond the limits of a Province, no matter what its economic leverage might be, under an interprovincial formula the Federal Government would not have any power to regulate it. It would be free to enter into any kind of merger or take-over, despite possible repercussions on competition, and, so long as it did not extend beyond the limits of one province, regulation would be impossible. On the other hand, the Provinces might be uneasy about conferring on the Federal Parliament so important a power as that of regulating the economic climate in which business develops. The Provinces might fear that the emasculation of the Federal trade and commerce power in the present Constitution might lose its effect if the Federal Parliament secured the exclusive power to regulate competition.

The main consideration for making the Federal power exclusive lies in the fact that a very large industry might gain monopoly control over a resource or a market within a single province in Canada. However, even if the power over competition were made concurrent, this might give the Federal Parliament a large enough role. If this were done, the Federal Government would have paramountcy for reasons of overall control, but if a Province did an effective job of regulating its own business climate, there would be no need for the Federal Government to intervene with overriding legislation. It would appear that the net result of this constitutional allocation of power might be that the Federal Government would largely set standards for the export and interprovincial trade areas and the Province would basically regulate local business. However, should the Federal power be required because of the particular position of one industry located wholly within a Province then that power would be available. Giant business would then have to deal with our biggest government.

An exclusive Federal power would probably be too radical a change in View of the present state of develop-

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ment of constitutional law in Canada, particularly the development of the trade and commerce clause. A concurrent power with Federal paramountcy would be a convenient half-way house between the wide powers of the Congress of the United States over interstate commerce and the much more narrowly-defined Federal power in relation to commerce now in the constitution. If economic forces continue to reward bigness, not only at national but even more at supranational levels, then Canadians may be forced to enlarge further the Federal power to supervise the rules of the economic game.

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Chapter 36—Air and Water Pollution

RECOMMENDATIONS

100. Control over the pollution of air and water should be a matter of concurrent jurisdiction between the Provincial Legislatures and the Federal Parliament. and. as in section 95 of the British North America Act. the powers of the Federal Parliament should be paramount.

101. The concurrency of jurisdiction over air and water pollution would necessitate both Federal-Provincial and Province-to-Province planning and coordination of programs.

102. We endorse the work of the Resources Ministers Council as a means of continuing consultation on matters of renewable resources.

In recent years a totally new challenge has developed from the growing global crisis of the environment. Not only is man learning that the world’s resources are finite, but also that their ever increasing consumption, particularly by the economically-developed nations, may even threaten our long-run physical and psychological survival. The dimensions of our ecological crisis are both potentially awesome and immediately urgent.

The rapid growth of population, the immense expansion of industry, and the urbanization of life have been intensified by an exploding and seemingly ungovernable technology. It is not surprising, therefore, that this subject matter, unknown and unthought of in 1867, has emerged in the current review of the Constitution.

In the evidence we heard, several themes dominated: first of all, there was a sense of urgency; also, there was a growing, militant and popularly based anti-pollution movement. The overriding feeling was that positive and extensive governmental action is needed.

Because pollution control is so urgently needed, we feel that any confusion which exists in constitutional powers should be ended as quickly as possible.

Canada is seriously affected, although there is clearly a global scope to the phenomenon of environmental pollution. Lake Erie, we are told, is in danger of dying and her sister lakes may gradually succumb. Wildlife is being poisoned by pesticides. Cities are enveloped in smog affecting health. Rising crescendos of noise threaten tranquillity everywhere. Clean air, clear water and the purity of our soil and our sea products can no longer be assumed in Canada.

Our evidence revealed a deep concern to protect that peace and beauty essential to sustain the human spirit. Our witnesses also recognized that, increasingly, havens of peace and beauty are being surrounded and eliminated by air and water pollution.

It was conceded by virtually all witnesses that concerted action on the international, national, provincial and urban levels of government will be required. Any constitutional approach must, therefore, be flexible.

There seems to be widespread agreement that jurisdiction over pollution is at present complicated at best and confusing at worst. Federal and Provincial sources in the B.N.A. Act for pollution control are many. For example, Provincial jurisdiction may stem from “Property and Civil Rights in the Province”, “Municipal Institutions in the Province”, “Local Works and Undertakings”, “Generally all Matters of a merely local or private Nature in the Province”. Federal jurisdiction, on the other hand, depending on the class of subject dealt with in the legislation, might arise from “The Criminal Law”, “Navigation and Shipping”, “Sea Coast and Inland Fisheries”, and “The Regulation of Trade and Commerce”.

The possibilities for jurisdictional overlapping here revealed show the difficulties of determining constitutional and political accountability. Although the respective powers are legally and narrowly “exclusive” in the strict sense, pollution problems do not always fit into such neat, compartmental packages. Consequently, the lines of political accountability are not clear. The voter is left with his annoyance; the politician with his constitutional enigmas. What is clear is that the witnesses who appeared before us recognized that pollution has local, provincial, national and international aspects. Rather than getting bogged down as to whether the pollution to be cured was a “Fisheries” or a “Navigation” or a “Management of Public Lands” or a “Local Works and Undertaking” problem, they felt that pollution itself should be the subject matter of concern to Parliament and the Legislatures. They felt that pollution of air and water, because of their many facets, should be a concurrent power shared by both Parliament and the Legislatures.

The object in making air and water pollution a specific head of power is to avoid, as completely as possible, jurisdictional conflicts based on existing powers: for

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example, whether the legislation is, in pith and substance, in relation to “Public Lands” (Provincial) or “Inland Fisheries” (Federal). The same reasoning compels us to acknowledge that, in the event of conflict between the new concurrent Federal and Provincial powers in the area of air and water pollution, Federal legislation should be paramount. Consequently, we recommend a similar concurrent formulation for jurisdiction over pollution of air and water as already exists in section 95 of the British North America Act, with respect to Immigration and Agriculture. A similar power in this area might read this way:

In each Province the Legislature may make Laws in relation to the control of air and water pollution in the Province; and it is hereby declared that the Parliament of Canada may, from Time to Time, make Laws in relation to the control of air and water pollution among the Provinces; and any Law of the Legislature of a Province relative to the control of air and water pollution shall have effect in and for the Province as long and as far only as it is not repugnant to any Act of the Parliament of Canada.

Apart from the purely legal considerations which call for a paramount Federal power in the area of air and water pollution, there are compelling economic arguments. Because of the disparities in economic terms which exist between the Provinces in Canada, to fail to have a paramount Federal power would be to invite Provinces to compete for industrial development on the basis of more relaxed pollution laws. It is only recognizing the obvious to suggest that some economically-weaker Provinces would be unable to resist the temptation.

We would envisage, because the new pollution power would be concurrent, that necessarily greater Federal-Provincial and Province-to-Province planning and co- ordination would result. The superior financial and research capabilities of the Federal Government, especially in relation to the smaller Provinces, can be brought into play through the concurrent power itself and through the Federal spending power, if necessary.

Although we have provided for Federal paramountcy, this does not mean that we contemplate a total and complete Federal occupation of the field of air and water pollution. Indeed we expect legislative coordination between the two levels. We support Federal paramountcy to ensure, however, that should the national interest require it, the Parliament of Canada can ensure that no Province could become a pollution haven. Of course, it would also ensure that pollution of the air and water of one Province by another, and pollution with international effects, could be governed by Federal legislation if deadlock arose or if there was irreconcilable legislation.

The whole question of environmental management is a very broad one. It covers not only pollution control but many other subjects such as land use control, control over mining, lumber, wildlife and fish, agriculture, land reclamation and abandonment, weather forecasting and weather modification, recreation and leisure activities, transportation, electric power, multiple—use water management, housing and urban planning and noise abatement.

It is not possible, at the moment, to see how far this concept goes. Consequently, we have rejected the idea of describing the specific pollution power in the Constitution as a power over “environmental management”. That is why we have limited our recommendations to a constitutional formulation to cover jurisdiction over air and water pollution.

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Chapter 37—Foreign Ownership and Canadian Independence

RECOMMENDATIONS

103. The power of the Federal Parliament with respect to aliens should be clarified to ensure that Parliament has paramount power to deal with problems of foreign ownership.

104. The Federal Parliament should have the clear power to nationalize industry and expropriate land threatened by foreign takeovers or control contrary to the national interest.

105. The Federal Parliament should have jurisdiction over citizenship, and that power should include the power to promote national unity and a national spirit and to create institutions for these purposes.

Throughout the hearings of the Committee there was a recurring concern for Canadian independence, sovereignty, unity and identity. Certain witnesses expressed their alarm over the large percentage of Canadian land, resources and industry owned by non-Canadians and especially by Americans. They referred to our recreation land, our mining, oil and gas industries, our publishing and text-book industries, etc. It was established that American investment is 80% of the total foreign investment in Canada and that 76% of all companies in Canada with assets over $25 million are foreign owned. Fears were expressed that Canadian citizens might lose political as well as economic control of their own country; that they would be barred from the best jobs and the best land; that they would be run by absentee landlords; and that Canadian people and resources would be working for the enrichment of other peoples and other lands.

This concern over the economic domination of our country can be closely related to other concerns expressed before the Committee, such as the lack of national unity ‘and a vigorous national purpose, the tendency to regionalism, the proliferation of hyphenated Canadians who cling to the nationality or symbols of their mother countries, misunderstanding and differences between French-speaking and English-speaking Canadians, old and new Canadians, older and younger Canadians, native born Canadians and immigrants. As a multicultural country, it is all the more important for Canada to insist on a substratum of national unity. Unless Canadians do develop a definite solidarity among themselves and a conscious attachment to their country, territory and resources, they will not be able to deal with the threat of foreign economic domination and may not survive as a nation. There must be not only a regional solidarity and attachment, but a national one. All Canadians must con- sider themselves undivided owners of all Canadian terri- tory and partners or trustees in its management. There should be no second-class citizens and all must feel at home in every part of the land. To develop a positive nationalism we must know more about our country and each other. We must take more interest in our history, our music, our arts, our national institutions and associations. On our success in these things our independence, our sovereignty and our unity will depend. We shall become “masters of our own house” in Canada.

It is proper to ask what the constitutional implications of these concerns and aspirations are. ‘With respect to national unity, national symbols and national powers, there is no doubt. We have discussed these in other chapters. Here, however, we must emphasize that these matters cannot be discussed in isolation. They are closely related to the problems of foreign ownership and of economic and political independence. Without Canadian institutions to promote a Canadian national spirit, there will be no political will to act resolutely against foreign ownership. Consequently, the Federal Parliament must have the necessary powers to deal with all aspects of political and economic independence.

There was some discussion by witnesses as to whether or not the Federal Parliament did have such powers. Witnesses pointed out that jurisdiction over land and resources is overwhelmingly Provincial, while naturalization and aliens and citizenship are Federal responsibilities. There is some uncertainty, however, as to how effectively the powers over aliens and citizenship could be used to control foreign corporations, investors, and entrepreneurs operating in Canada. While Section 24(1) of the Canadian Citizenship Act does set out certain rightsvfor aliens and asserts that they can hold property, this jurisdictional head of the B.N.A. Act has never been much used. In a sense the Provinces partially occupy the field through the enactment of mortmain acts and other similar measures. Consequently, while the Federal use of the power over aliens could be pushed to greater limits, it might not prevail over Provincial powers, especially those relating to land and resources. This uncertainty is compounded by the disagreements relating to the Federal treaty-making power and international relations.

We therefore recommend that the Federal power with respect to aliens be clarified so that the Federal Parliament would have, beyond any dispute, paramount power

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to deal with problems arising from foreign ownership. Further, the Federal Parliament should have the clear power to nationalize and expropriate land, resources and industries which are threatened by foreign takeovers or control contrary to the national interest. Finally, the Federal Parliament should continue to have jurisdiction over citizenship, and that power should include the power to promote national unity and a national spirit and to create institutions for these purposes.

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SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

PART I—THE CONSTITUTION

Chapter 1—Constitutional Imperatives

1. Canada should have a new and distinctively Canadian Constitution, one which would be a new whole even though it would utilize many of the same parts.

2. A new Canadian Constitution should be based on functional considerations, which would lead to greater decentralization of governmental powers in all areas touching culture and social policy and to greater centralization in powers which have important economic effects at the national level. Functional considerations also require greater decentralization in many areas of governmental administration.

Chapter 4—Patriation of the Constitution

3. The Canadian Constitution should be patriated by a procedure which would provide for a simultaneous proclamation of a new Constitution by Canada’ and the renunciation by Britain of all jurisdiction over the Canadian Constitution.

Chapter 5—Amendments to the Constitution

4. The formula for amending the Constitution should be that contained in the Victoria Charter of June 1971, which requires the agreement of the Federal Parliament and a majority of the Provincial Legislatures, including those of:

(a) every province which at any time has contained twenty-five per cent of the population of Canada;

(b) at least two Atlantic Provinces;

(c) at least two Western Provinces that have a combined population of at least fifty percent of the population of all the Western Provinces.

Chapter 6—The Preamble to the Constitution

5. The Canadian Constitution should have a preamble which would proclaim the basic objectives of Canadian federal democracy.

PART II—THE PEOPLE

Chapter 7—Self—Determination

6. The preamble of the Constitution should recognize that the Canadian federation is based on the liberty of the person and the protection of basic human rights as a fundamental and essential purpose of the State. Consequently, the preamble should also recognize that the existence of Canadian society rests on the free consent of its citizens and their collective will to live together, and that any differences among them should be settled by peaceful means.

7. If the citizens of a part of Canada at some time democratically declared themselves in favour of a political arrangement which were contrary to the continuation of our present political structures, the disagreement should be resolved by political negotiation, not by the use of military or other coercive force.

8. We reaffirm our conviction that all of the peoples of Canada can achieve their aspirations more effectively within a federal system, and we believe Canadians should strive to maintain such a system.

Chapter 8—Native Peoples

9. No constitutional changes concerning native peoples should be made until such time as their own organizations have completed their research into the question of treaty and aboriginal rights in Canada.

10. The preamble of the new Constitution should affirm the special place of native peoples, including Métis, in Canadian life.

11. Provincial governments should, where the population is sufficient, consider recognizing Indian languages as regional languages.

12. No jurisdictional changes should be made in administrative arrangements concerning Indians and Eskimos without consultation with them.

Chapter 9—Fundamental Rights

13. Canada should have a Bill of Rights entrenched in the Constitution, guaranteeing the political freedoms

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of conscience and religion, of thought, opinion and expression, of peaceful assembly and of association.

14. The Bill of Rights should include a provision requiring fair and equitable representation in the House of Commons and in the Provincial Legislatures.

15. The right to citizenship, once legally acquired, should be made inalienable under the Bill of Rights.

16. The individual person should be constitutionally protected in his life, liberty and the security of his person so as not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.

17. The individual person should be constitutionally protected against the arbitrary seizure of his property, except for the public good and for just compensation.

18. The Constitution should prohibit discrimination by reason of sex, race, ethnic origin, colour or religion by proclaiming the right of the individual to equal treatment by law.

19. Discrimination in employment, or in membership in professional, trade or other occupational associations, or in obtaining public accommodation and services, or in owning, renting or holding property should also be declared contrary to the Bill of Rights.

20. Other provisions already contained in the Canadian Bill of Rights (1960) protecting legal rights should also be included in the Constitutional Bill of Rights: protection against unreasonable searches and seizures, the right to be informed promptly of the reason for arrest, the right to counsel, the right to habeas corpus, protection against self-crimination, the right to a fair hearing, the right to be presumed innocent and not to be denied reasonable bail without just cause, the right to an interpreter, the proscribing of retroactive penal laws or punishments, and the right not to be subjected to cruel and unusual punishment.

21. The rights and freedoms recognized by the Bill of Rights should not be interpreted as absolute and unlimited, but should rather be exercisable to the extent that they are reasonably justifiable in a democratic society.

Chapter 10—Language Rights

22. French and English should be constitutionally entrenched as the two official languages of Canada.

23. The Constitution should recognize:

(a) the right of any person to use either official language in the Federal and Provincial Legislatures and the Territorial Councils;

(b) the right to have access in both official languages to the legislative records, journals, and enactments of Canada, New Brunswick, Ontario, Quebec and the Territories;

(c) the right to use either official language in dealing with judicial or quasi-judicial Federal bodies or with courts in New Brunswick, Ontario, Quebec and the Territories;

(d) the right to communicate in either official language with Federal departments and agencies and with provincial departmental head offices or agency head offices in New Brunswick, Ontario, Quebec and the Territories.

24. All of the rights in recommendation 23 (b) (c) and (d) should also be exercisable in:

(a) any Province where each language is the mother tongue of ten per cent of the population;

(b) in any Province where the legislature declares French and English the official languages of the province.

25. The Constitution should recognize parents’ right to have English or French provided as their child’s main language of instruction in publicly supported schools in areas where the language of their choice is chosen by a sufficient number of persons to justify the provision of the necessary facilities.

26. We support the general objective of making French the working language in Quebec. We hope that through the studies being carried out in Quebec on this matter, this objective can be reached with due respect for certain Quebec Anglophone institutions, and taking into account the North American and world reality.

27. The preamble to the Constitution should formally recognize that Canada is a multicultural country.

28. The Constitution should explicitly recognize the right of Provincial Legislatures to confer equivalent status with the English and French languages on other languages. Federal financial assistance to support the teaching or use of other languages would be appropriate.

Chapter 11—Regional Disparities

29. The equitable distribution of income should be recognized in the preamble of the Constitution as a dynamic and humane objective of our social policy. Consequently, we agree with the principle stated in the Victoria Charter that:

The Parliament and Government of Canada and the Legislatures and Governments of the Provinces are committed to…the promotion of equality of opportunity and well-being for all individuals in Canada.

30. We agree with the statement in the Victoria Charter that:

The Parliament and Government of Canada and the Legislatures and Governments of the Provinces are committed to . . . the assurance, as nearly as possible, that essential public services of reasonable quality are available to all individuals in Canada.

This objective should be recognized in the preamble of the Constitution.

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31. The preamble of the Constitution should provide that every Canadian should have access to adequate Federal, Provincial and municipal services without having to bear a disproportionate tax burden because of the region in which he lives. This recommendation follows logically from our acceptance of the principle of equality of opportunity for all Canadians.

32. We completely accept the following objective as stated in the Victoria Charter:

The promotion of economic development to reduce disparities in the social and economic opportunities for all individuals in Canada wherever they may live.

As in the case of redistribution of income among individuals and for the same reasons, this objective should be recognized in the preamble of the Constitution.

PART III—FEDERAL INSTITUTIONS

Chapter 12—The Head of State

33. Because of the state of divided opinion in Canada, the Committee does not recommend any change in the monarchical system at the present time.

34. The Committee itself prefers a Canadian as Head of State, and supports the evolutionary process by which the Governor General has been granted more functions as the Head of State for Canada. Eventually, the question of retaining or abolishing the Monarchy will have to be decided by way of clear consultation with the Canadian people.

Chapter 13—The Senate

35. The present full veto power of the Senate over legislation should be reduced to a suspensive veto for six months according to the following formula: a bill may become law without the consent of the Senate (1) if the House of Commons, having once passed it, passes it again no less than six months after it was rejected or finally amended by the Senate, or, (2) if, within 6 months of third reading of a bill by the House of Commons the Senate has not completed consideration of it, and the House of Commons again passes it at any time after the expiration of the 6 months, but any period when Parliament is prorogued or dissolved shall not be counted in computing the 6 months.

36. The investigating role of the Senate, which has gained more importance in recent years, should be continued and expanded at the initiative of the Senate itself, and the Government should also make more use of the Senate in this way.

37. The Government should be entitled to introduce in the Senate all bills including money bills but excluding appropriation bills, before their approval by the House of Commons, provided that, in the case of money bills, they should be introduced by the leader of the Government in the Senate on behalf of the Government.

38. The distribution of Senators should be as follows: Newfoundland 6, Prince Edward Island 4, Nova Scotia 10, New Brunswick 10, Quebec 24, Ontario 24, Manitoba 12, Saskatchewan 12, Alberta 12, British Columbia 12, the Yukon Territory 2, and the Northwest Territories 2: a total of 130.

39. All Senators should continue to be appointed by the Federal Government: as vacancies occur in the present Senate, one-half of the Senators from each Province and Territory should be appointed in the same manner as at present; the other half from each Province and Territory should be appointed by the Federal Government from a panel of nominees submitted by the appropriate Provincial or Territorial Government.

The personal requirements for appointment to the Senate should be limited to those required for eligibility as an elector in the Canada Elections Act, plus residence in the province for which a Senator is appointed. The Quebec structure of electoral divisions should be abolished.

The compulsory retirement age for all new senators should be seventy years. Upon retirement, Senators should retain the right to the title and precedence of Senators and the right to participate in the Work of the Senate or of its Committee, but not the right to vote or to receive the indemnity of Senators.

Chapter 14—The House of Commons

42. The mechanism of redistribution of seats in the House of Commons as well as the limitations implied in the 15 per cent rule and the Senate rule should be retained in the Constitution. The formula of representation, however, subject to our recommendations on the Bill of Rights, should be the exclusive prerogative of the House of Commons, to be dealt with by ordinary legislation.

43. Every House of Commons should continue for four years, from the day of the return of the writs for choosing the House and no longer, provided that, and notwithstanding any Royal Prerogative, the Governor General should have the power to dissolve Parliament during that period:

(1) when the Government is defeated

(a) on a motion expressing no confidence in the Government; or

(b) on a vote on a specific bill or portion of a bill which the Government has previously declared should be construed as a motion of want of confidence;or

(2) when the House of Commons passes a resolution requesting dissolution of Parliament.

Chapter 15—The Supreme Court of Canada

44. The existence, independence and structure of the Supreme Court of Canada should be provided for in the Constitution.

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45. Consultation with the Provinces on appointments to the Supreme Court of Canada must take place. We generally support the methods of consultation proposed in the Victoria Charter, but the Provinces should also be allowed to make nominations to the nominating councils which would be set up under the Victoria proposals if the Attorney-General of Canada and the Attorney-General of a province fail to agree on an appointee.

46. The Provinces should be given the right to withdraw appeals in matters of strictly provincial law from the Supreme Court of Canada and to vest final decision on such matters in their own highest courts, thus leaving to the Supreme Court of Canada jurisdiction over matters of Federal law and of constitutional law, including the Bill of Rights. The issue of whether a matter was one of strictly provincial law would be subject to determination by the Supreme Court of Canada.

Chapter 16—The National Capital Area

47. There should be a movement by stages towards the possible creation of an autonomous Canadian Capital.

48. The Canadian Capital should be generally the areas of Ontario and of Quebec now defined in the schedule to the National Capital Act (1959).

PART IV—THE GOVERNMENTS

Chapter 17—The Division of Powers

49. The use of exclusive lists of Federal’ and Provincial powers, but with an extended list of concurrent powers, should be continued.

50. Concurrent powers which predominantly affect the national interest should grant paramountcy to the Federal Parliament and those which predominantly affect Provincial or local interests should grant paramountcy to the Provincial legislatures.

51. The Constitution should permit the delegation of executive and administrative powers (as at present), but not of legislative powers except where expressly specified in this Report.

Chapter 18—The General Legislative Power of Parliament

52. The “Peace, Order, and good Government” power should be retained in the Constitution as an expression of the overriding Federal legislative power over matters of a national nature.

53. Since the Federal General Legislative Power is counterbalanced by a Provincial power over matters of a Provincial or local nature, there is no place for a purely residuary power.

Chapter 19–Taacing Powers

54. Generally speaking and subject to recommendation 55, we endorse the principle that the Federal and Provincial Governments should have access to all fields of taxation. However, in order to bring about a division of revenues that may accurately reflect the priorities of each government, there should be Federal-Provincial consultations to determine the most equitable means of apportioning joint fields of taxation in the light of:

(a) the projected responsibilities of each level of government in the immediate future;

(b) the anticipated increases in their respective expenditures;

(c) economic and administrative limitations, such as preserving sufficient leverage for the Federal Government, by means of its taxation system, to discharge effectively its function of managing the economy.

55. Provincial legislatures should have the right to impose indirect taxes provided that they do not impede interprovincial or international trade and do not fall on persons resident in other Provinces. These limitations could be satisfied by tax collection through an interprovincial or Federal-Provincial collection agency, or by tax collection agreements.

Chapter 20—The Federal Spending Power

56. The power of the Federal Parliament to make conditional grants for general Federal-Provincial (shared- cost) programs should be subject to the establishment of a national consensus both for the institution of any new program and for the continuation of any existing one. A consensus would be established by the affirmative vote of the Legislatures in three of the four regions of Canada according to the following formula: the vote of the Legislatures in the Atlantic region would be considered to be in the affirmative if any two of the Legislatures of Nova Scotia, New Brunswick or Newfoundland were in favour; the vote of the Legislatures of the Western region would be considered to be in the affirmative with the agreement of any two of the four Legislatures. The consensus for existing joint programs should be tested every 10 years.

57. If a Province does not wish to participate in a program for which there is a national consensus, the Federal Government should pay the Government of that Province a sum equal to the amount it would have cost the Federal Government to implement the program in the Province. However, a tax collection fee of about 1 per cent, equivalent to the cost of collecting the money paid to the Province, should be deducted from the amount paid to such«non-participating Provinces.

58. In order that the objectives of joint programs may be more effectively realized, conditional Federal grants should preferably be based on the cost of the programs in each Province. However, since a 50-50 cost-sharing formula, when applied to the expenditures made in each Province, constitutes too great an incentive in high-income Provinces, conditional Federal grants should not be made for that portion of Provincial expenditures which lies above the national average cost of the service. The maximum per

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capita amount to which a Province would be entitled would thus correspond to the per capita national expenditure, and additional expenditures by a Provincial Government would in no way increase the Federal grant to that Province.

Chapter 21—Intergovernmental Relations

59. More communication and fuller cooperation among all levels of government are imperative needs. The achievement of these ends involves the improvement and simplification of the means of liaison and, where necessary, the creation of new mechanisms.

60. The Constitution should provide for a Federal-Provincial Conference of First Ministers to be called by the Prime Minister of Canada at least once a year unless in any year a majority of the First Ministers decide to dispense with the Conference.

61. The Federal Government should appoint a Minister of State for Intergovernmental Affairs to respond to the political challenges and opportunities resulting from closer intergovernmental relationships.

62. A permanent Federal-Provincial secretariat for intergovernmental relations should be established.

63. A tri-level conference among Federal, Provincial and Municipal governments should be called at least once a year.

Chapter 22—Municipalities

64. While we recognize the difficulties of larger cities in providing for their needs, financing their programs and determining their own priorities, as well as in negotiating with the Provincial and Federal Governments on works which seriously affect municipal planning, and also their need for more status and more autonomy in order to achieve these goals, we do not see how these matters can be entrenched in the Constitution. They should be negotiated between the cities and the Provincial Governments under whose jurisdiction they fall.

65. The municipalities in each Province, in conjunction with their provincial and national bodies, should determine which representatives from what municipalities would attend the annual tri-level conferences we have recommended in Recommendation 63.

66. Such tri-level meetings would not have the power of veto over any Federal or Provincial programs but would rather operate by way of moral suasion.

67. In the light of the injustice done municipalities by their having to rely on the property tax for the bulk of their revenue, there should be a sharing of tax fields between Governments that would allow municipalities direct access to other sources of revenue.

68. Where feasible, representatives of municipalities should meet with other levels of government to discuss common problems particularly in the area of economic planning through representation at meetings of the Ministers of Finance and Provincial Treasurers.

Chapter 23—The Territories

69. The objective of Government policy for the Yukon and the Northwest Territories should be the fostering of self-government and provincial status.

70. The provisions of the British North America Act, 1871, section 2, which provide for the admission of new provinces by action of the Federal Government alone, should be continued, provided that no territory should become a province without its consent.

71. The Yukon and the Northwest Territories should each be entitled to representation in the Senate.

Chapter 24—Offshore Mineral Rights

72. The Federal Government should have proprietary rights over the seabed offshore to the limit of Canada’s internationally recognized jurisdiction, and the Federal Parliament should have full legislative jurisdiction over this subject matter.

73. There should be no constitutional provision as to the sharing of the profits from the exploitation of seabed resources. Nevertheless, we feel strongly that the Federal Government should share the profits of seabed development equally with the adjacent coastal Province rather than with all of the Provinces.

74. Sable Island should be recognized by the Constitution as part of the Province of Nova Scotia.

Chapter 25—International Relations

75. Section 132 of the British North America Act should be repealed.

76. The Constitution should make it clear that: the Federal Government has exclusive jurisdiction over foreign policy, the making of treaties, and the exchange of diplomatic and consular representatives.

77. All formal treaties should be ratified by Parliament rather than by the Executive Branch of Government.

78. The Government of Canada should, before binding itself to perform under a treaty an obligation that deals with a matter falling within the legislative competence of the Provinces, consult with the Government of each Province that may be affected by the obligation.

79. The Government of a Province should remain free not to take any action with respect to an obligation undertaken by the Government of Canada under a treaty unless it has agreed to do so.

80. Subject to a veto power in the Government of Canada in the exercise of its exclusive power with respect to foreign policy, the Provincial Governments should have the right to enter into contracts, and administrative, reciprocal and other arrangements with foreign states, or constituent parts of foreign states, to maintain offices abroad for the conduct of Provincial business, and generally to

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cooperate with the Government of Canada in its international activities.

PART V—SOCIAL POLICY

Chapter 26—Social Security

81. In the area of social security, there should be a greater decentralization of jurisdiction with a view to giving priority to the Provinces according to recommendations 82, 83 and 84.

82. With respect to social services, the present exclusive jurisdiction of Provincial Legislatures should be retained.

83. With respect to income insurance (including the Quebec and Canada Pension Plans), jurisdiction should be shared according to the present section 94A of the British North America Act, subject to the following exceptions:

(1) Workmen’s Compensation should be retained under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Provincial Legislatures;

(2) Unemployment Insurance should be retained under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Canadian Parliament.

84. With respect to income support measures:

(1) Financial social assistance (Canada Assistance Plan, allowances to the blind, disability allowances, unemployment assistance) should be under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Provincial Legislatures;

(2) Veterans’ allowances and allowances’ to Eskimos and Indians living on reserves should continue to be the exclusive responsibility of the Canadian Parliament;

(3) Demographic grants (old age pensions, family allowances and youth allowances) and guaranteed income payments (guaranteed income supplement) should be matters of concurrent jurisdiction with limited Provincial paramountcy as to the scale of benefits and the allocation of Federal funds among these income support programs. Thus the Federal Parliament would retain concurrent power to establish programs and to pay benefits to individuals under these programs. However, a Province would have the right to vary the national scheme established by Parliament with respect to the allocation within the Province between the various programs of the total amount determined by the Federal Government and with respect to the scale of benefits paid to individuals within the Province according to income, number of children, etc., within each program; provided that the benefits paid to individuals under each program should not be less than a certain percentage (perhaps half or two-thirds) of the amounts which would be paid under the scheme proposed by the Federal Government.

Chapter 27—Criminal Law

85. Since we believe that each Province should be able to regulate the conduct of its own people in such matters as the operation of motor vehicles, Sunday observance, betting and lotteries, the Federal Parliament should have the right to delegate even to a single Province legislative jurisdiction over any part of the criminal law.

86. Because there is some ambiguity resulting from current practice, if not from the Constitution, the Federal power over the administration of criminal justice should be made clear so that the Federal Parliament would be seen to have clear and undoubted jurisdiction to enforce its own laws in the criminal field.

Chapter 28—Marriage and Divorce

87. In keeping with our principle of control by the Provinces of their social destiny, the jurisdiction over “Marriage and Divorce” should be transferred to the Provincial Legislatures, subject to an agreed common definition of domicile.

Chapter 29—Education

88. Education as such should remain an exclusively Provincial power as at present, subject to the guarantees for minorities set out elsewhere in this Report.

89. The Provinces should create a permanent office for cooperation and coordination in education, and Federal participation should be confined to the area of Federal jurisdiction over the education of native peoples, immigrants, and defence personnel and dependents.

Chapter 30—Communications

90. The Parliament of Canada should retain exclusive jurisdiction over the means in broadcasting and other systems of communication.

91. The Provinces should have exclusive jurisdiction over the program content in provincial educational broadcasting, whatever means of communication is employed.

PART VI—THE REGULATION OF THE ECONOMY

Chapter 31—Economic Policy

92. The Federal Parliament and Government should retain the primary responsibility for general economic policy designed to achieve national economic goals. This means that they must have sufficient economic powers to regulate the economy through structural, monetary and fiscal policies.

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93. National economic policies should take more account of regional objectives through coordinating mechanisms between governments and through considerable administrative decentralization in the operation of the Federal Government and its agencies.

94. Provincial and municipal governments should also take more account of national economic objectives.

Chapter 32—Trade and Commerce

95. Parliament should have exclusive jurisdiction over international and interprovincial trade and commerce, including the instrumentalities of such trade and commerce. Intraprovincial trade and commerce should remain under the jurisdiction of the Provincial Legislatures.

Chapter 33—Income Controls

96. In cases of national emergency, as defined by-the Parliament of Canada, the Provinces should delegate to the Federal Parliament all additional powers necessary to control prices, wages and other forms of income, including rent, dividends and profits, to implement its prime responsibility for full employment and balanced economic growth.

Chapter 34—Securities and Financial Institutions

97. The matter of securities regulation, which has hitherto been under provincial jurisdiction, should become a concurrent jurisdiction with paramountcy in the Federal Parliament.

98. Where financial institutions (trust companies, insurance companies, finance companies, credit unions, caisses populaires) do business in more than one province, they should have to meet national standards as defined by the Federal Parliament; where they confine their activities to a single province, the Province should retain exclusive jurisdiction.

Chapter 35—Competition

99. The Federal Parliament ought to have a concurrent power with the Provincial Legislatures over competition in order that the regulation of unfair competition in all its aspects be subject to the national interest. In the event of conflicting legislation, the federal legislation should be paramount.

Chapter 36—Air and Water Pollution

100. Control over the pollution of air and water should be a matter of concurrent jurisdiction between the Provincial Legislatures and the Federal Parliament, and, as in section 95 of the British North America Act, the powers of the Federal Parliament should be paramount.

101. The concurrency of jurisdiction over the air and water pollution would necessitate both Federal-Provincial and Province-to-Province planning and co-ordination of programs.

102. We endorse the work of the Resources Ministers Council as a means of continuing consultation on matters of renewable resources.

Chapter 37—Foreign Ownership and Canadian Independence

103. The power of the Federal Parliament with respect to aliens should be clarified to ensure that Parliament has paramount power to deal with problems of foreign ownership.

104. The Federal Parliament should have the clear power to nationalize industry and expropriate land threatened by foreign takeovers or control contrary to the national interest.

105. The Federal Parliament should have jurisdiction over citizenship, and that power should include the power to promote national unity and a national spirit and to create institutions for these purposes.

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APPENDIX A

Extracts from the British North America Act

Powers of the Parliament

91. It shall be lawful for the Queen, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate and House of Commons, to make Laws for the Peace, Order and good Gov- ernment of Canada, in relation to all Matters not coming within the Classes of subjects by this Act assigned exclusively to the Legislatures of the Provinces; and for greater Certainty, but not so as to restrict the Generality of the foregoing Terms of this Section, it is hereby declared that (notwithstanding anything in this Act) the exclusive Legislative Authority of the Parliament of Canada extends to all Matters coming within the Classes of Subjects next herein-after enumerated; that is to say,-

1. The amendment from time to time of the Constitution of Canada, except as regards matters coming within the classes of subjects by this Act assigned exclusively to the Legislatures of the provinces, or as regards rights or privileges by this or any other Constitutional Act granted or secured to the Legislature or the Government of a province, or to any class of persons with respect to schools or as regards the use of the English or the French language or as regards the requirements that there shall be a session of the Parliament of Canada at least one each year, and that no House of Commons shall continue for more than five years from the day of the return of the Writs for choosing the House: Provided, however, that a House of Commons may in time of real or apprehended war, invasion or insurrection be continued by the Parliament of Canada if such continuation is not opposed by the votes of more than one-third of the members of such House.

[No’rE: Added by the British North America Act (No. 2), 1949, 13 Geo. VI, c. 81 (U.K.).]

1A. The Public Debt and Property.

[NOTE: vRe-numbered 1A by the British North America Act (No. 2), 1949, 13 Geo. VI, c. 81 (U.K.).]

2. The Regulation of Trade and Commerce.

2A. Unemployment insurance.

[NOTE: Added by the British North America Act, 1940, 3-4 Geo. VI, C. 36 (U.K.).]

3. The raising of Money by any Mode or System of Taxafion.

4. The borrowing of Money on the Public Credit.

5. Postal Service.

6. The Census and Statistics.

7. Militia, Military and Naval Service, and Defence.

8. The fixing of and providing for the Salaries and Allowances of Civil and other Officers of the Government of Canada.

9. Beacons, Buoys, Lighthouses, and Sable Island.

10. Navigation and Shipping.

11. Quarantine and the Establishment and Maintenance of Marine Hospitals.

12. Sea Coast and Inland Fisheries.

13. Ferries between a Province and any British or Foreign Country or between Two Provinces.

14. Currency and Coinage.

15. Banking, Incorporation of Banks, and the Issue of Paper Money.

16. Savings Banks.

17. Weights and Measures.

18. Bills of Exchange and Promissory Notes.

19. Interest.

20. Legal Tender.

21. Bankruptcy and Insolvency.

22. Patents of Invention and Discovery.

23. Copyrights.

24. Indians, and Lands reserved for the Indians.

25. Naturalization and Aliens.

26. Marriage and Divorce.

27. The Criminal Law, except the Constitution of Courts of Criminal Jurisdiction, but including the Procedure in Criminal Matters.

28. The Establishment, Maintenance, and Management of Penitentiaries.

29. Such Classes of Subjects as are expressly excepted in the Enumeration of the Classes of Subjects by this Act assigned exclusively to the Legislatures of the Provinces.

And any Matter coming within any of the Classes of Subjects enumerated in this Section shall not be deemed to come within the Class of Matters of a local or private Nature comprised in the Enumeration of the Classes of subjects by this Act assigned exclusively to the Legislatures of the Provinces.

Exclusive Powers of Provincial Legislatures

92. In each Province the Legislature may exclusively make Laws in relation to Matters coming within the Classes of Subjects next herein-after enumerated; that is to say,—

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1. The Amendment from Time to Time, notwithstanding anything in this Act, of the Constitution of the Province, except as regards the Office of Lieutenant Governor.

2. Direct Taxation within the Province in order to the raising of a Revenue for Provincial Purposes.

3. The borrowing of Money on the sole Credit of the Province.

4. The Establishment and Tenure of Provincial Offices and the Appointment and Payment of Provincial Officers.

5. The Management and Sale of the Public Lands belonging to the Province and of the Timber and Wood thereon.

6. The Establishment, Maintenance, and Management of Public and Reformatory Prisons in and for the Province.

7. The Establishment, Maintenance, and Management of Hospitals, Asylums, Charities, and Eleemosynary Institutions in and for the Province, other than Marine Hospitals.

8. Municipal Institutions in the Province.

9. Shop, Saloon, Tavern, Auctioneer, and other Licences in order to the raising of a Revenue for Provincial, Local, or Municipal Purposes.

10. Local Works and Undertakings other than such as are of the following Classes:—

a. Lines of Steam or other Ships, Railways, Canals, Telegraphs, and other Works and Undertakings connecting the Province with any other or others of the Provinces, or extending beyond the Limits of the Province:

b. Lines of Steam Ships between the Province and any British or Foreign Country:

c. Such Works as, although wholly situate within the Province, are before or after their Execution declared by the Parliament of Canada to be for the general Advantage of Canada or for the Advantage of Two or more of the Provinces.

11. The Incorporation of Companies with Provincial Objects.

12. The Solemnization of Marriage in the Province.

13. Property and Civil Rights in the Province.

14. The Administration of Justice in the Province, including the Constitution, Maintenance, and Organization of Provincial Courts, both of Civil and of Criminal Jurisdiction, and including Procedure in Civil Matters in those Courts.

15. The Imposition of Punishment by Fine, Penalty, or Imprisonment for enforcing any Law of the Province made in relation to any Matter coming within any of the Classes of Subjects enumerated in this Section.

16. Generally all Matters of a merely local or private Nature in the Province.

Education

93. In and for each Province the Legislature may exclusively make Laws in relation to Education, subject and according to the following Provisions:—

(1) Nothing in any such Law shall prejudicially affect any Right or Privilege with respect to Denominational Schools which any Class of Persons have by Law in the Province at the Union:

(2) All the Powers, Privileges, and Duties at the Union by Law conferred and imposed in Upper Canada on the Separate Schools and School Trustees of the Queen’s Roman Catholic Subjects shall be and the same are hereby extended to the Dissentient Schools of the Queen’s Protestant and Roman Catholic Subjects in Quebec:

(3) Where in any Province a System of Separate or Dissentient Schools exists by Law at the Union or is thereafter established by the Legislature of the Province, an Appeal shall lie to the Governor General in Council from any Act or Decision of any Provincial Authority affecting any Right or Privilege of the Protestant or Roman Catholic Minority of the Queen’s Subjects in relation to Education:

(4) In case any such Provincial Law as from Time to Time seems to the Governor General in Council requisite for the due Execution of the Provisions of this Section is not made, or in case any Decision of the Governor General in Council on any Appeal under this Section is not duly executed by the proper Provincial Authority in that Behalf, then and in every such Case, and as far only as the Circumstances of each Case require, the Parliament of Canada may make remedial Laws for the due Execution of the Provisions of this Section and of any Decision of the Governor General in Council under this Section.

[NOTE: Altered for Manitoba by section 22 of the Manitoba Act, 1870, 33 Vict., c. 3 (Canada) (confirmed by the British North America Act, 1871); for Alberta by section 17 of the Alberta Act, 4-5 Edw. VII, c. 3 (Canada); for Saskatchewan, by section 17 of the Saskatchewan Act, 4-5 Edw. VII, c. 42 (Canada); and for Newfoundland by Term 17 of the Terms of Union of Newfoundland with Canada, confirmed by the British North America Act, 1949, 12-13 Geo. VI, c. 22 (U.K.).]

Uniformity of Laws in Ontario, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick

94. Notwithstanding anything in this Act, the Parliament of Canada may make Provision for the Uniformity of all or any of the Laws relative to Property and Civil Rights in Ontario, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick, and of the Procedure of all or any of the Courts in those Three Provinces, and from and after the passing of any Act in that Behalf the Power of the Parliament of Canada to make Laws in relation to any Matter comprised in any such Act shall, notwithstanding anything in this Act, be unrestricted; but any Act of the Parliament of Canada making Provision for such Uniformity shall not have effect in any Province unless and until it is adopted and enacted as Law by the Legislature thereof.

94A. The Parliament of Canada may make laws in relation to old age pensions and supplementary benefits,

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including survivors’ and disability benefits irrespective of age, but no such law shall affect the operation of any law present or future of a provincial legislature in relation to any such matter.

[NOTE: Substituted by the British North America Act, 1964, 12-13 Eliz. II, c. 73 (UK.) for section 94A which was originally added by the British North America Act, 1951, 14-15 Geo. VI, c. 32 (U.K.).]

Agriculture and Immigration

95. In each Province the Legislature may make Laws in relation to Agriculture in the Province, and to Immigration into the Province; and it is hereby declared that the Parliament of Canada may from Time to Time make Laws in relation to Agriculture in all or any of the Provinces, and to Immigration into all or any of the Provinces; and any Law of the Legislature of a Province relative to Agriculture or to Immigration shall have effect in and for the Province as long and as far only as it is not repugnant to any Act of the Parliament of Canada.

121. All Articles of the Growth, Produce, or Manufacture of any one of the Provinces shall, from and after the Union, be admitted free into each of the other Provinces.

132. The Parliament and Government of Canada shall have all Powers necessary or proper for performing the Obligations of Canada or of any Province thereof, as Part of the British Empire, towards Foreign Countries, arising under Treaties between the Empire and such Foreign Countries.

133. Either the English or the French Language may be used by any Person in the Debates of the Houses of the Parliament of Canada and of the Houses of the Legislature of Quebec; and both those Languages shall be used in the respective Records and Journals of those Houses; and either of those Languages may be used by any Person or in any Pleading or Process in or issuing from any Court of Canada established under this Act, and in or from all or any of the Courts of Quebec.

The Acts of the Parliament of Canada and of the Legislature of Quebec shall be printed and published in both those Languages.

[Page 106]

APPENDIX B

Canadian Constitutional Charter

Constitutional Conference, Victoria, June 14-16, 1971

PART I—POLITICAL RIGHTS

Art. 1. It is hereby recognized and declared that in Canada every person has the following fundamental freedoms:
freedom of thought, conscience and religion,
freedom of opinion and expression, and
freedom of peaceful assembly and of association;
and all laws shall be construed and applied so as not to abrogate or abridge any such freedom.

Art. 2. No law of the Parliament of Canada or the Legislatures of the Provinces shall abrogate or abridge any of the fundamental freedoms herein recognized and declared.

Art. 3. Nothing in this Part shall be construed as preventing such limitations on the exercise of the fundamental freedoms as are reasonably justifiable in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, order, health or morals, of national security, or of the rights and freedoms of others, whether imposed by the Parliament of Canada or the Legislature of a Province, within the limits of their respective legislative powers, or by the construction or application of any law.

Art. 4. The principles of universal suffrage and free democratic elections to the House of Commons and to the Legislative Assembly of each Province are hereby proclaimed to be fundamental principles of the Constitution.

Art. 5. No citizen shall, by reason of race, ethnic or national origin, colour, religion or sex, be denied the right to vote in an election of members to the House of Commons or the Legislative Assembly of a Province, or be disqualified from membership therein.

Art. 6. Every House of Commons shall continue for five years from the day of the return of the writs for choosing the House and no longer subject to being sooner dissolved by the Governor General, except that in time of real or apprehended war, invasion or insurrection, a House of Commons may be continued by the Parliament of Canada if the continuation is not opposed by the votes of more than one-third of the members of the House.

Art. 7. Every Provincial Legislative Assembly shall continue for five years from the day of the return of the writs for the choosing of the Legislative Assembly, and no longer, subject to being sooner dissolved by the Lieutenant-Governor, except that when the Government of Canada declares that a state of real or apprehended war, invasion or insurrection exists, a Provincial Legislative Assembly may be continued if the continuation is not opposed by the votes of more than one-third of the members of the Legislative Assembly.

Art. 8. There shall be a session of the Parliament of Canada and of the Legislature of each Province at least once in every year, so that twelve months shall not intervene between the last sitting of the Parliament or Legislature in one session and its first sitting in the next session.

Art. 9. Nothing in this Part shall be deemed to confer any legislative power on the Parliament of Canada or the Legislature of any Province.

PART II—LANGUAGE RIGHTS

Art. 10. English and French are the official languages of Canada having the status and protection set forth in this Part.

Art. 11. A person has the right to use English and French in the debates of the Parliament of Canada and of the Legislatures of Ontario, Quebec, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Manitoba, Prince Edward Island and Newfoundland.

Art. 12. The statutes and the records and journals of the Parliament of Canada shall be printed and published in English and French, and both versions of such statutes shall be authoritative.

Art. 13. The statutes of each Province shall be printed and published in English and French, and where the Government of a Province, prints and publishes its statutes in one only of the official languages, the Government of Canada shall print and publish them in the other official language; the English and French versions of the statutes of the Provinces of Quebec, New Brunswick and Newfoundland shall be authoritative.

Art. 14. A person has the right to use English and French in giving evidence before, or in any pleading or process in the Supreme Court of Canada, any courts established by the Parliament of Canada or any court of the Provinces of Quebec, New Brunswick and Newfoundland, and to require that all documents and judgments issuing from such courts be in English or French, and when necessary a person is entitled to the services of an interpreter before the courts of other provinces.

Art. 15. An individual has the right to the use of the official language of his choice in communications between him and the head or central office of every department and agency of the Government of Canada and of the governments of the Provinces of Ontario, Quebec, New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island and Newfoundland.

Art. 16. A Provincial Legislative Assembly may, by resoluti.on, declare that any part of Articles 13, 14, and 15 that do not expressly apply to that Province shall apply to the Legislative Assembly, and to any of the provincial courts and offices of the provincial departments and agencies according to the terms of the resolution, and thereafter such parts shall apply to the Legislative Assembly, courts and offices specified according to the terms of the resolution; and any right conferred under this Article may be abrogated or diminished only in accordance with the procedure prescribed in Article 50.

Art. 17. A person has the right to the use of the official language of his choice in communications between him and every principal office of the departments and agencies of the Government of Canada that are located in an area where a substantial proportion of the population has the official language of his choice as its mother tongue, but the Parliament of Canada may define the limits of

[Page 107]

such areas and what constitutes a substantial proportion of the population for the purposes of this Article.

Art. 18. In addition to the rights provided by this Part, the Parliament of Canada and the Legislatures of the Provinces may, within their respective legislative jurisdictions, provide for more extensive use of English and French.

Art. 19. Nothing in this Part shall be construed as derogating from or diminishing any legal or customary right or privilege acquired or enjoyed either before or after the coming into force of this Part with respect to any language that is not English or French.

PART III—PROVINCES AND TERRITORIES

Art. 20. Until modified under the authority of the Constitution of Canada, Canada consists of ten Provinces, named Ontario, Quebec, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Manitoba, British Columbia, Prince Edward Island, Saskatchewan, Alberta and Newfoundland, two Territories, named the Northwest Territories and the Yukon Territory, and such other territory as may at any time form part of Canada.

Art. 21. There shall be a Legislature for each Province consisting of a Lieutenant-Governor and a Legislative Assembly.

PART IV—SUPREME COURT OF CANADA

Art. 22. There shall be a general court of appeal for Canada to be known as the Supreme Court of Canada.

Art. 23. The Supreme Court of Canada shall consist of a chief justice to be called the Chief Justice of Canada, and eight other judges who shall, subject to this Part, be appointed by the Governor General in Council by letters patent under the Great Seal of Canada.

Art. 24. Any person may be appointed a judge of the Supreme Court of Canada who, after having been admitted to the Bar of any Province, has, for a total period of at least ten years, been a judge of any court in Canada or a barrister or advocate at the Bar of any Province.

Art. 25. At least three of the judges of the Supreme Court of Canada shall be appointed from among persons who, after having been admitted to the Bar of the Province of Quebec, have, for a total period of at least ten years, been judges of any court of that Province or of a court established by the Parliament of Canada or barristers or advocates at that Bar.

Art. 26. Where a vacancy arises in the Supreme Court of Canada and the Attorney General of Canada is considering a person for appointment to fill the vacancy, he shall inform the Attorney General of the appropriate Province.

Art. 27. When an appointment is one falling within Article 25 or the Attorney General of Canada has determined that the appointment shall be made from among persons who have been admitted to the Bar of a specific Province, he shall make all reasonable efforts to reach agreement with the Attorney General of the appropriate Province, before a person is appointed to the Court.

Art. 28. No person shall be appointed to the Supreme Court of Canada unless the Attorney General of Canada and the Attorney General of the appropriate Province agree to the appointment, or such person has been recommended for appointment to the Court by a nominating council described in Article 30, or has been selected by the Attorney General of Canada under Article 30.

Art. 29. Where after the lapse of ninety days from the day a vacancy arises in the Supreme Court of Canada, the Attorney General of Canada and the Attorney General of a Province have not reached agreement on a person to be appointed to fill the vacancy, the Attorney General of Canada may inform the Attorney General of the appropriate Province in writing that he proposes to convene a nominating council to recommend an appointment.

Art. 30. Within thirty days of the day when the Attorney General of Canada has written the Attorney General of the Province that he proposes to convene a nominating council, the Attorney General of the Province may inform the Attorney General of Canada in writing that he selects either of the following types of nominating councils:

(1) a nominating council consisting of the following members: the Attorney General of Canada or his nominee and the Attorneys General of the Provinces or their nominees;

(2) a nominating council consisting of the following members: the Attorney General of Canada or his nominee, the Attorney General of the appropriate Province or his nominee and a Chairman to be selected by the two Attorneys General, and if within six months from the expiration of the thirty days they cannot agree on a Chairman, then the Chief Justice of the appropriate Province, or if he is unable to act, the next senior Judge of his court, shall name a Chairman;

and if the Attorney General of the Province fails to make a selection within the thirty days above referred to, the Attorney General of Canada may select the person to be appointed.

Art. 31. When a nominating council has been created, the Attorney General of Canada shall submit the names of not less than three qualified persons to it about whom he has sought the agreement of the Attorney General of the appropriate Province to the appointment, and the nominating council shall recommend therefrom a person for appointment to the Supreme Court of Canada; a majority of the members of a council constitutes a quorum, and a recommendation of the majority of the members at a meeting constitutes a recommendation of the council.

Art. 32. For the purpose of Articles 26 to 31 “appropriate Province” means, in the case of a person being considered for appointment to the Supreme Court of Canada in compliance with Article 25, the Province of Quebec, and in the case of any other person being so considered, the Province to the bar of which such person was admitted, and if a person was admitted to the bar of more than one Province, the Province with the bar of which the person has, in the opinion of the Attorney General of Canada, the closest connection.

Art. 33. Articles 26 to 32 do not apply to the appointment of the Chief Justice of Canada when such appointment is made from among the judges of the Supreme Court of Canada.

Art. 34. The judges of the Supreme Court of Canada hold office during good behaviour until attaining the age of seventy years, but are removable by the Governor General on address of the Senate and House of Commons.

Art. 35. The Supreme Court of Canada has jursidiction to hear and determine appeals on any constitutional question from any judgment of any court in Canada and from any decision on any constitutional question by any such court in determining any question referred to it, but except as regards appeals from the highest court of final resort in a Province, the Supreme Court of Canada may prescribe such exceptions and conditions to the exercise of such jurisdiction as may be authorized by the Parliament of Canada.

[Page 108]

Art. 36. Subject to this Part, the Supreme Court of Canada shall have such further appellate jurisdiction as the Parliament of Canada may prescribe.

Art. 37. The Parliament of Canada may make laws conferring original jurisdiction on the Supreme Court of Canada in respect of such matters in relation of the laws of Canada as may be prescribed by the Parliament of Canada, and authorizing the reference of questions of law or fact to the court and requiring the court to hear and determine the questions.

Art. 38. Subject to this Part, the judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada in all cases is final and conclusive.

Art. 39. Where a case before the Supreme Court of Canada involves questions of law relating to the civil law of the Province of Quebec, and involves no other question of law, it shall be heard by a panel of five judges, or with the consent of the parties, four judges, at least three of whom have the qualifications described in Article 25, and if for any reason three judges of the court who have such qualifications are not available, the court may name such ad hoc judges as may be necessary to hear the case from among the judges who have such qualifications serving on a superior court of record established by the law of Canada or of a superior court of appeal of the Province of Quebec.

Art. 40. Nothing in this Part shall be construed as restricting the power existing at the commencement of this Charter of a Provincial Legislature to provide for or limit appeals pursuant to its power to legislate in relation to the administration of justice in the Province.

Art. 41. The salaries, allowances and pensions of the judges of the Supreme Court of Canada shall be fixed and provided by the Parliament of Canada.

Art. 42. Subject to this Part, the Parliament of Canada may make laws to provide for the organization and maintenance of the Supreme Court of Canada, including the establishment of a quorum for particular purposes.

PART V—COURTS OF CANADA

Art. 43. The Parliament of Canada may, notwithstanding anything in the Constitution of Canada, from time to time provide for the constitution, maintenance, and organization of courts for the better administration of the laws of Canada, but no court established pursuant to this Article shall derogate from the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Canada as a general court of appeal for Canada.

PART VI—REVISED SECTION 94A

Art. 44. The Parliament of Canada may make laws in relation to old age pensions and supplementary benefits including survivors’ and disability benefits irrespective of age, and in relation to family, youth, and occupational training allowances, but no such law shall affect the operation of any law present or future of a Provincial Legislature in relation to any such matter.

Art. 45. The Government of Canada shall not introduce a bill in the House of Commons in relation to a matter described in Article 44 unless it has, at least ninety days before such introduction, advised the government of each Province of the substance of the proposed legislation and requested its views thereon.

PART VII—REGIONAL DISPARITIES

Art. 46. The Parliament and Government of Canada and the Legislatures and Governments of the Provinces are committed to:

(1) the promotion of equality of opportunity and well being for all individuals in Canada;

(2) the assurance, as nearly as possible, that essential public services of reasonable quality are available to all individuals in Canada; and

(3) the promotion of economic development to reduce disparities in the social and economic opportunities for all individuals in Canada wherever they may live.

Art. 47. The provisions of this Part shall not have the effect of altering the distribution of powers and shall not compel the Parliament of Canada or Legislatures of the Provinces to exercise their legislative powers.

PART VIII—FEDERAL-PROVINCIAL CONSULTATION

Art. 48. A Conference composed of the Prime Minister of Canada and the First Ministers of the Provinces shall be called by the Prime Minister of Canada at least once a year unless, in any year,~a majority of those composing the Conference decide that it shall not be held.

PART IX—AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION

Art. 49. Amendments to the Constitution of Canada may from time to time be made by proclamation issued by the Governor General under the Great Seal of Canada when so authorized by resolutions of the Senate and House of Commons and of the Legislative Assemblies of at least a majority of the Provinces that includes

(1) every Province that at any time before the issue of such proclamation had, according to any previous general census, a population of at least twenty-five percent of the population of Canada;

(2) at least two of the Atlantic Provinces;

(3) at least two of the Western Provinces that have, according to the then latest general census, combined populations of at least fifty per cent of the population of all the Western Provinces.

Art. 50. Amendments to the Constitution of Canada in relation to any provision that applies to one or more, but not all, of the Provinces may from time to time be made by proclamation issued by the Governor General under the Great Seal of Canada when so authorized by resolutions of the Senate and House of Commons and of the Legislative Assembly of each Province to which an amendment applies.

Art. 51. An amendment may be made by proclamation under Article 49 or 50 without a resolution of the Senate authorizing the issue of the proclamation if within ninety days of the passage of a resolution by the House of Commons authorizing its issue the Senate has not passed such a resolution and at any time after the expiration of the ninety days the House of Commons again passes the resolution, but any period when Parliament is prorogued or dissolved shall not be counted in computing the ninety days

Art. 52. The following rules apply to the procedures for amendment described in Articles 49 and 50:

(1) either of these procedures may be initiated by the Senate or the House of Commons or the Legislative Assembly of a Province;

(2) a resolution made for the purposes of this Part may be revoked at any time before the issue of a proclamation authorized by it.

Art. 53. The Parliament of Canada may exclusively make laws from time to time amending the Constitution of Canada, in relation to the executive Government of Canada and the Senate and House of Commons.

[Page 109-110]

Art. 54. In each Province the Legislature may exclusively make laws in relation to the amendment from time to time of the Constitution of the Province.

Art. 55. Notwithstanding Articles 53 and 54, the following matters may be amended only in accordance with the procedure in Article 49:

(1) the office of the Queen, of the Governor General and of the Lieutenant-Governor;

(2) the requirements of the Constitution of Canada respecting yearly sessions of the Parliament of Canada and the Legislatures;

(3) the maximum period fixed by the Constitution of Canada for the duration of the House of Commons and the Legislative Assemblies;

(4) the powers of the Senate; :

(5) the number of members by which a Province is entitled to be represented in the Senate and the residence qualifications of Senators;

(6) the right of a Province to a number of members in the House of Commons not less than the number of Senators representing the Province;

(7) the principles of proportionate representation of the Provinces in the House of Commons prescribed by the Constitution of Canada; and

(8) except as provided in Article 16, the requirements of this Charter respecting the use of the English or French language.

Art. 56. The procedure prescribed in Article 49 may not be used to make an amendment when there is another provision for making such amendment in the Constitution of Canada, but that procedure may nonetheless be used to amend any provision for amending the Constitution, including this Article, or in making a general consolidation and revision of the Constitution.

Art. 57. In this Part, “Atlantic Provinces” means the Provinces of Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island and Newfoundland, and “Western Provinces” means the Provinces of Manitoba, British Columbia, Saskatchewan and Alberta.

PART X—MODERNIZATION OF THE CONSTITUTION

Art. 58. The provisions of this Charter have the force of law in Canada notwithstanding any law in force on the day of its coming into force.

Art. 59. The enactments set out in the first column of the Schedule, hereby repealed to the extent indicated in the second column thereof, shall continue as law in Canada under the names set forth in the third column thereof and as such shall, together with this Charter, collectively be known as the Constitution of Canada, and amendments thereto shall henceforth be made only according to the authority contained therein.

Art. 60. Every enactment that refers to an enactment set out in the Schedule by the name in the first column thereof is hereby amended by substituting for that name the name in the third column thereof.

Art. 61. The court existing on the day of the coming into force of this Charter under the name of the Supreme Court of Canada shall continue as the Supreme Court of Canada, and the judges thereof shall continue in office as though appointed under Part IV except that they shall hold office during good behaviour until attaining the age of seventy-five years, and until otherwise provided pursuant to the provisions of that Part, all laws pertaining to the court in force on that day shall continue, subject to the provisions of this Charter.

THIS SCHEDULE IS NOT FINAL, SUBJECT TO CONFIRMATION

Enactments Extent of Repeal New Name
British North America Act, 1867, 30-31 Vict., c. 3 (U.K.). Long title; preamble; the heading immediately preceding section 1; sections 1, 5, the words between brackets in section 12; sections 19, 20, 37, 40, 41, 47, 50, the words “and to Her Majesty’s Instructions” and the words “or that he reserves the Bill for the Significat-ion of the Queen’s Pleasure” in section 55; sections 56, 57, 63; the words between brackets in section 65; sections 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 83, 84, 85, 86; the words “the Disallowance of Acts, and the Signification of Pleasure on Bills reserved” and the words “of the Governor General for the Queen and for a Secretary of State, of One Year for Two Years, and of the Province for Canada” in section 90; head (1) of section 91; head (1) of section 92; 94A; sections 101, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 119, 120, 122, 123; the words between brackets in section 129; sections 130, 134, 141, 142; the heading immediately preceding section 146; sections 146, 147; the First Schedule; the Second Schedule. Constitution Act, 1867.
An Act to amend and continue the Act 32 and 33 Victoria chapter 3; and to establish and provide for the Government of the Province of Manitoba, 1870, 33 Vict., c. 3 (Can.). Long title; Enacting clause; sections 3,9,10,11,l2,13,14, 15,16, 18, 19, 20, 25. Manitoba Act, 1970.
Order of Her Majesty in Council admitting British Columbia into the Union, dated the 16th day of May 1871. The whole except terms 4, 9, 10, 13, 14 in the Schedule. British Columbia Terms of Union
British North America Act, 1871, 34-35 Vict., c. 28 (U.K.), and all acts enacted under section 3 thereof. Long title; Preamble, enacting clause; sections 1, 6. Constitution Act, 1871.
Order of Her Majesty in Council admitting Prince Edward Island into the Union, dated the 26th day of June, 1873. The whole, except the conditions in the schedule relating to the provision of steam service and telegraphic communication between the Island and the mainland, the condition respecting the constitution of the executive authority and the Legislature of the province, and the condition applying the British North America Act, 1867 to the province. Prince Edward Island Terms of Union
Parliament of Canada Act, 1875, 38-39 Vict., c. 38 (U.K.). Long title; Preamble, enacting clause. Parliament of Canada Act, 1875.
Order of Her Majesty in Council admitting all British possessions and Territories in North America and islands adjacent thereto into the Union, dated the 31st day of July, 1880. The whole, except the last paragraph. Adjacent Territories Order.
British North America Act, 1886, 49-50 Vict., c. 35 (U. K.). Long title; section 3. Constitution Act, 1886
Canada (Ontario Boundary) Act, 1889, 52-53 Vict., c. 28 (U.K.). Long title; preamble; enacting clause. Canada (Ontario Boundary) Act, 1889.
Canadian Speaker (Appointment of Deputy) Act, 1895, Session 2, 59 Vict., c. 3 (U.K.). Long title; preamble, enacting clause, Section 2. Canadian Speaker (Appointment. of Deputy) Act, 1895.
Alberta Act, 1905, 4-5 Edw. VII, c. 3 (Can.). Long title; enacting clause, sections 4, 5, 6, 7, 12, 13, 15, 16(2), 18, 19, 20, Schedule. Alberta Act.
Saskatchewan Act, 1905, 4-5 Edw. VII, c. 42 (Can.). Long title; enacting clause; sections 4,5, 6, 7, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16(2), 18, 19, 20, Schedule. Saskatchewan Act.
British North America Act, 1907, 7 Edw. VII, c. 11 (U.K.). Long title; preamble, enacting clause, section 2, Schedule. Constitution Act, 1907.
British North America Act, 1915, 5-6 Geo. V, c. 45 (U.K.). Long title; enacting clause, section 3. Constitution Act, 1915.
British North America Act, 1930, 20–21 Geo. V, c. 26 (U.K.). Long title; fourth paragraph of preamble, enacting clause, section 3. Constitution Act, 1930.
Statute of Westminster, 1931,22 Geo. V, c. 4 (U.K.). insofar as it applies to Canada. Long title; the words “and Newfoundland” in sections 1 and 10(3); section 4 insofar as it applies to Canada; section 7(1). Statute of Westminster, 1931.
British North America Act, 1940, 37-4 Geo. VI, c. 36 (U.K.). Long title; preamble, enacting clause, section 2. Constitution Act, 1940.
British North America Act, 1943, 7 Geo. VI, c. 30 (U.K.). The whole.
British North America Act, 1946, 10 Geo. VI, c. 63 (U.K.). Long title; preamble, enacting clause, section 2. Constitution Act, 1946.
British North America Act, 1949, 12 and 13 Geo. VI, c. 22 (U.K.). Long title; third paragraph in preamble; enacting clause; sections 2, 3; terms 6(2), (3), 15(2), 16, 22(2), (4), 24, 27, 28, 29 in the Schedule. Constitution Act, 1949.
British North America (No. 2) Act, 1949 (U.K.). 13 Geo. VI, C. 81 (U.K.). The whole
British North America Act, R.S.C., 1952, c. 304 (Can.). Section 2. Constitution Act, 1952.
British North America Act, 1960, 9 Eliz. II, c. 2 (U.K.). Long title; preamble; enacting clause; sections 2, 3. Constitution Act, 1960.
British North America Act, 1964, 12 and 13, Eliz. II, c. 73 (U.K.). Long title; enacting clause; section 2. Constitution Act, 1964.
British North America Act, 1965, 14 Eliz. II, c. 4, Part I, (Can.). Section 2. Constitution Act, 1965.

[Page 111]

APPENDIX C

Extracts from the Report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, Volume 111, p. 560.

42. We recommend that in the private sector in Quebec, governments and industry adopt the objective that French become the principal language of work at all levels, and that in pursuit of this objective the following principles be accepted: a) that French be the principal language of work in the major work institutions of the province; b) that, consequently, the majority of work units in such firms that until now have used English as the principal language of work in middle and upper levels become French-language units; and that such firms designate all management and senior positions as posts that require bilingual incumbents; c) that the majority of smaller or specialized firms should use French as their language of work, but that there should be a place for firms where the language of work is English, as there should be a place anywhere in Canada for such firms where the language of work is French; and d) that the main language of work in activities related to operations outside the province remain the choice of the enterprise.

43. We recommend that in the private sector throughout Canada, the Canadian head offices of firms with extensive markets or facilities inside Quebec develop appropriate bilingual capacities, including French-language units and bilingual senior executives.

44. We recommend that the government of Quebec establish a task force to consist of representatives of government, industry, the universities, and the major labour unions with the following general terms of reference: a) to launch discussions with the major companies in the province concerning the current state of bilingualism and biculturalism in their organizations and the means of developing institutional bilingualism more fully; b) to design an overall plan for establishing French as the principal language of work in Quebec and to set a timetable for this process; c) to initiate discussions with the federal government and with the governments of New Brunswick and Ontario, to discover areas of potential co-operation in implementing the plan; and d) to make recommendations to the provincial government for the achievement of the goal and for the establishment of permanent machinery of co-ordination.

45. We recommend that the government of New Brunswick establish a task force charged with suggesting steps to be taken in education, in the provincial public service, and in the private sector so that French can become a language of work like English, bearing in mind the economic and social conditions in the province.

46. We recommend that the government of Ontario establish a task force charged with preparing a programme of action with the objective of ensuring the progressive introduction of French as a language of work in enterprises in bilingual districts, on the basis of a co-operative and concerted effort by government and industry.

47. We recommend that the firms at issue in Recommendations 42 and 43 make an explicit policy commitment to establish institutional bilingualism in their operations; and that they immediately designate certain units within their head offices and their operations in Quebec, and in bilingual districts, as future French-language units and designate those executive and senior positions that in the near future will require bilingual incumbents.

48. We recommend that, immediately after designating French-language units in their organizations, the firms also designate a substantial number of professional, technical, and managerial positions as French-language posts.

49. We recommend that the firms make every effort to interest Francophone students on business careers, by providing full information in career opportunities to the appropriate officials in French-language educational institutions and by sending recruiting teams to these institutions both within and outside Quebec.

5_0._We recommend that the firms make their internal training programmes fully available in the French language for their Francophone employees.

51. We recommend that, where internal training programmes are presently unavailable in French, the firms consult with French-language institutions of higher education in Canada and elsewhere about the possibilities of providing the needed programmes.

52. We recommend that the firms seek to equalize the opportunities for job transfers for their Francophone employees, while at the same time taking steps to minimize the difficulties that these transfers entail.

53. We recommend that all material relevant to the promotion process and the preparation for it be made fully available in French.

54. We recommend that all Francophone candidates have the option of expressing themselves in their own language in all oral and written examinations and interviews, and that the examiners take into account the difficulties that the candidate may have had to face during his previous work experience as a result of the obligation to work in a second language.

55. We recommend that where firms designate positions as bilingual posts they take steps to ensure that the required level of competence in French and English is clearly defined and that they use this factor as a criterion in promotions to these positions.

56. We recommend that all information relevant to federal government contracts and other services to private enterprise, including technical specifications and documents, be made available simultaneously in French and English, and that in all official relations among federal government personnel, business firms, and unions, appropriate action be taken to ensure that the French language is fully used in the appropriate circumstances.

57. We recommend that, as a matter of policy, the federal agencies concerned make available to private firms all the data arising from developments in translation services, bilingual lexicons, and language training that may be of assistance to the firms in their transformation process.

[Page 112]

APPENDIX D

List of Witnesses who appeared before the Committee showing the Session and Issue in which their Evidence appears.

Abel, Albert 3:19

Action League for Physically Handicapped Advancement 3:62
Owen, William

Adam, J 3:87

Adamson, Agar 3:2

Adler, Leo 3:19 & 3:21

Alain, Viateur 3:65

Albert, Daniel 3:70

Alberta School Trustees Association 3:84
Martini, Catherine

Alexander, Wayne 3:29

Allan, Mervyn 3:63

Allen, C. D . 2:7

Alliance for Life 3:57
Cooper, Mary
Lapointe, Marielle
Lusignan, Joan

Alliance pour la Vie 3:57
Cooper, Mary
Lapointe, Marielle
Lusignan, Joan

Allnutt, JoAnn 3:27

Alpha Omega Ukrainian Students Club University of British Columbia 3:29
Semotiuk, Andrew

Anderson, Andrew 3:32

Anderson, F. L. P. 3:28

Andres, Peter G 3:30

Andrews, Bruce 3:27

Angell, Joseph E 3:30

Angers, Philippe 3:68 & 3:69

Angevine, Donald 3:22

Ansine, Glen 2:12

Archibald, Clinton 3:67

Ares, Richard 3:42

Argall, Jacqueline 3:54

Armstrong, Irwin 2:16

Armstrong, Jack 3:14

Arnold, J.R. 3:29

Arundel, Anthony 3:26

Asselin, Celia J. 3:86

Association anglaise de l’instruction catholique de l’Ontario 3:92
Brisbois, Edward J.
Carty, Michael
Fogarty, P. H.

Association canadienne-francaise de l’Alberta 3:85
Boucher, Jacques

Association culturelle franco-canadienne de la Saskatchewan 3:11
Lalonde, Roger
Rottiers, Rene

Association de la jeunesse ukrainienne du Canada 3:61
Nakoneczny, Richard

Association democratique italo—canadienne, Toronto 3:62
Mastrangelo, Rocco

Association des administrateurs d’ecole du Quebec (Section de la Rive Sud) 3:73
Fransham, J. H.

Association des commissaires 3:30 d’écoles catholiques de la Colombie-Britannique
Van Adrichem, M. C. J.

Association des commissaires d’écoles de la Saskatchewan 3:12
Dunbar, Frederick L.

Association des commissaires des écoles publiques catholiques du diocese de Kamloops 3:31
Beesley, J. F. B.

Association des commissaires d’écoles de la Colombie—Britannique 3:27
Powell, P. C. D.

Association des eleveurs de betail de la Colombie—Britannique 3:31
Guichon, Gerard
Pilling, Ron
Woolliams, Neil E.

Association des enseignants des Territoires du Nord-ouest 3:86
Jenkins, Robert

Association des enseignants du district de Kamloops 3:31
Phillips, A. M.

Association des enseignants francophones du Nouveau—Brunswick 3:80
Desjardins, Gerard
Richard, Jean

Association des etudiants de la Saskatchewan 3:14
Brown, Larry

Association des etudiants ukrainiens du Canada 3:19
Bandera, Andrew
Fedchun, Gerry
Kucharyshyn, Marusia

Association des Indiens du Quebec 3:88
Hill, George
Plourde, Nora

Association des libertes civiles de la Colombie-Britannique 3:26
Hird, Lynda
Stanton, John

Association des libertes civiles de Regina 3:11
Beke, John

Association des Nations Unies 3:14
Williams, Colwyn D.

Association des Nations Unies au Canada 3:72
Bazar, Bernard (Mrs./Mme)

Association des progressistes—conservateurs de Riviere-la-Paix—Prince—George 3:30
Rankle, Peter

Association des travailleurs sociaux, division du Nord de la Colombie-Britannique 3:30
Dallamore, Vern

Association des universites et colleges du Canada 3:51
Andrew, G. C.
Dunton, A. Davidson
Guindon, Roger

Association du Barreau canadien, subdivision albertaine de la section du droit constitutionnel et international 3:84
McDonald, David C.

Association esquimo-indienne du Canada 3:76
Gupta, Ram K.

Association for Reform in Education 3:69
Smith, Allane Reid
Trasler, Ian

Association liberale de Toronto et de la region (Comité des néo-canadiens) 3:61
Gilbart, John

Association liberale du district de Toronto 3:19
McLaughlin, Claire

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Association humaniste du Canada 3:71
Morgentaler, Henry

Association nationale tcheque 3:29 du Canada (cellule de Vancouver)
Drabeck, Jan
Schoenbach, Gustav

Association of Social Workers, Northern Branch of British Columbia 3:30
Dallamore, Vern

Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada 3:51
Andrew, G. C.
Dunton, A. Davidson
Guindon, Roger

Association pour la réforme de l’education 3:69
Smith, Allane Reid
Trasler, Ian

Association pour l’égalite des droits des femmes indiennes 3:68
Dore, Cecilia Phillips

Association pour le perfectionnement des parents seuls de Regina 3:12
Tutt, Sherrie

Association urbaine et municipale de la Saskatchewan 3:11
Murphy, J.

Atkey, Ronald G. 3:9

Atraghji, Edward 3:39

Aubry, Jean-Paul 2:11

Audet, Sarah 3:72

Axworthy, A. 3:39 & 3:40

Axworthy, Lloyd 2:9

Baboolal, Reginald R. 3:19

Balan, William 3:19

Balcer, Barbara 3:71

Baldwin, Allen 3:20

Bailey, Allan 3:13

Bailey, Leah 2:10

Bailey, L.F. 3:12

Bailey, R. C . 2:10

Baillargeon, Paul-F. 3:73

Baker, Henry H.P. 3:11

Ball, John 3:46

Baltic Federation in Canada (Montreal Branch) 3:71
Freibergs, Vaira

Bandera, A 3:61 & 3:62

Bannerman, Andrew 3:69

Barbeau, Leon 3:47

Barry, Rita 3:78

Basich, Susan 3:46

Bastarache, Michel 3:78

Bastien, Ovide 3:55

Batchelor, Ronald 3:72

Bayly, Ian M 3:1

Beach, M. 3:22

Beaudoin, Bernard 3:65

Beaudoin, Gerald A 3:93

Beaudoin, T. Moore 3:70

Beaudry, Francoise 3:47

Beaulieu, Jacques 3:80

Beauvais, Real 3:57

Beck, Carl 3:62

Beck, Gerry, K. J 3:85

Bedard, Jean 3:54

Belanger, Armand 3:46

Belcourt, Rick 3:30

Bell, Alfred 3:33

Bell, J. M 3:85

Belleau, Charles 3:57

Bellware, Fred 3:39

Beltrano, Frank M 3:47

Belzil, Paul 3:84

Benedict, Ernest 3:19

Bennett, M 3:31

Benoit, Delphis 3:53

Beresh, Brian 3:11

Bergeron, Edmond—Louis 3:67

Bergeron, Gerard 3:74

Bernard, Ken 2:8

Bernier, Madeleine 2:11

Bets, John, (Mrs./Mme) 3:79

Beune Antony 3:85

Bevan, George H 3:19

Beveridge, J. M. R. 3:2

Bhattacharya, B 3:77

Billot, Deloras 3:55

Bilodeau, Michel 3:57

Bilomaa, Barbara 3:46

Bilsky, Frank 2:17

Binder, Ellen 3:87

Bird, J. W 3:78

Bishop, Arthur A 3:33

Bishop, Charles 3:31

Bissley, Giselle 3:28

Bisson, Antonio 3:46

Blake, Mary 3:43

Blanchard, Thomas 3:19

Block, Gilbert 3:69

Board of Evangelism and Social Service, United Church of Canada 3:83
MacDonald, W. Clarke
Stewart, Gordon K.

Bobb, Rubin 3:34

Bobitt, Greg 3:11

Bock, Paul 3:71

Boehm, David 3:26

Boileau, Andre 3:40

Boileau, Gerald 3:56

Boisvert, Napoleon 3:54

Boivin, Stanley 3:46

Bojeun, Mark 3:19

Bolden, William 3:33

Bolduc, Yvon 3:54

Bolger, Allan 3:69

Bolton, Kenneth 3:22

Bommes, D. W 3:48

Bonenfant, Jean-Charles 3:89

Bonneau, Lorenzo 3:73

Booth, Peter 2:17

Borgford, Brian 3:11

Bot, Mario C 3:47

Botiuk, Y. R . 3:19

Bouchard, Julien 3:66

Bouchard, Sylvie 3:47

Boucher, Gaetan 3:65

Bourassa, Fernand 3:69

Bourdege, Oscar 3:34

Bourke, Thomas P 3:22

Bourque, Claude 3:4

Bousquet, D 3:70

Boutin, Guy 3:53

Bouwman, Roland 3:71

Bowker, Wilbur F 3:84

Bowns, Wilfrid 3:32

Boyd, Bert 2:16

Boyd, Maureen 3:27

Boyd, Stephen 3:4

Brack, Bob 3:23

Bradley, Mary 3:57

Bramucci, Norman 3:72

Bremmer, Rusty 2:15

Brigham, Royden 3:19

British Columbia Beef Cattle Growers Association 3:31
Guichon, Gerard
Pilling, Ron
Woolliams, Neil E.

British Columbia Civil Liberties Association 3:26
Hird, Lynda
Stanton, John

British Columbia School Trustees Association 3:27
Powell, P. C. D.

British-Israel World Federation (Canada) Incorporated 3:29
Brewer, Dawn

Brockelbank, John 3:12

Broddy, Bill 3:30

Broderick, Charles 3:80

Brokenshire, J. W 3:77

Bronfman, Peter, (Mrs./Mme) 3:69

Brown, James 3:22

Brown, Joyce 3:26

Brown, Kingsley 3:4

Brown-John, Lloyd 3:23

Brown, R. A. C 2:9

Brunet, Henri 3:46

Bryant, Frank 3:40

Bryce, R. B . 2:6

Buckwold, Sidney, L. 3:14

Bugeaud, Eugene 3:67

Burau, Karl 3:20

Burchill, C. S . 3:28

Bureau, Marc 3:53

Burgess, Arthur 3:27

Burgess, Rod 3:33

Burnham, George 3:28

Burns, R. M . 3:15

Burns, Ronald 3:45

Burns, Susan 2:14

Burns, Tom 3:48

Burnyeat, Grant 3:27

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Burridge, E. A., (Mme/Mrs.) 3:65

Business and Professional Women’s Clubs of Alberta 3:84
Armstrong, Ellen C. T.

Buteau, Gaston 3:46

Butler, Robert D 3:34

Cabana, Serge 3:53

Cairnduff, Malcolm 3:62

Caldwell, Jeri Anne 3:23

Caledon Contemporaries 3:62
Coles, Stuart
Somerville, Janet

Calle, James L 3:23

Calver, Marshall 3:22

Cameron, Hugh 3:22

Campbell, Adam 3:85

Campbell, Albert 3:19

Campbell, Bryan 2:12

Campbell, Dorothy 3:4

Campbell, Douglas 3:62

Campbell, Maureen 2:10

Campbell, R. A 3:2

Canada Committee 3:68
Lemay, Henri-Paul
Malcolm, T. R. Anthony

Canada Press Club 2:8
Dojack, Charles
Roeder, Hans-Hermann

Canada Uni, Respect et Egalité 3:69
Beale, Robert G.

Canadian Bar Association, Alberta Subsection, Section on Constitutional and International Law 3:84
McDonald, David C.

Canadian Federation of Business and Professional Women’s Clubs 3:72
VanDine, Charlotte I.

Canadian—German Group 3:73
Wiss, Jules

Canadian League for Ukraine’s Liberation (Toronto Branch) (section de Toronto) 3:61
Shymko, Yuri

Canadian League of Rights, Manitoba Branch 2:10
Belows, J. H.
Walsh, Patrick

Canadian Loyalists Association 3:39
Crawford, Stewart
Leguerrier, Rene
Yarymowich, B.

Canadian School Trustees Association 3:85
Reder, F.M.
Smedley, J. V.
Whitney, C. H.

Canadian Teachers’ Federation 3:37
Fieger, Peter P.
Fredericks, Rod G.
Sparkes, Wendell J.
Goble, Norman M.

Canadian Ukrainian Committee 2:8
Lynka, Izdiore H.
Swystun, W. M.
Syrnyck, John H.
Yaremowich, Anthony

Canadian Unity, Rights and Equality 3:69
Beale, Robert G.

Candela, Rafael 3:80

Canuel, Leonidas 3:66

Caplan, Joseph 3:19 & 3:20

Caragata, Warren 3:11

Carbonneau, Madeleine 3:70

Carney, Bob 3:11

Caron, Roger 3:54

Carpenter, Marian 3:33

Carr, Richard (Mrs./Mme) 3:78

Carricato, Patrick 3:47

Carriere, Paul 3:56

Casey, Kenneth 3:71

Catholic School Trustees’ Association of British Columbia 3:30
Van Adrichem, M. C. J.

Cavarzan, John 3:23

Chamberland, Claude 3:53

Chamberlist, Norman 2:15 & 2:16

Chambre de commerce de Kenogami, (Que.) 3:67
Turcotte, Jean—Jacques

Chambre dc commerce de Lethbridge, (Alberta) 3:32
Bond, W.
Tanner, Morley

Chambre de commerce de Magrath, (Alberta) 3:32
Spencer, J. A.

Chambre de commerce de Regina, (Sask.) 3:11
McLeod, R. A.

Chambre de commerce regionale du Saguenay, (Que) 3:67
Lavoie, Jean

Chambre de commerce de Thompson, (Man.) 2:12
Johnston, B.

Chambre de commerce de Trois-Rivieres, (Qué.) 3:53
Chevrette, Lucien

Chambre de commerce de Whitehorse, (Territoire du Yukon) 2:16

Chandler, John G 3:22

Chandler, Sharon 3:22

Chapitre national du Canada de l’I.O.D.E 3:62
Morrison, W. R. (Mrs./Mme)
Tait, George E. (Mrs./Mme)

Charbonneau, V 3:29

Charman, Eric 3:28

Chartrand, R 3:70

Chateauneuf, Denis 3:72

Chaumont, Christine 3:47

Chaumont, Gislaine 3:47

Cheffins, Ronald I 3:28

Cheramy, Arthur 3:30

Chernenkoff, C 3:13

Chevrier, Jean 3:72

Chevalier, Jean-Claude 3:55

Cheychux, Joan 2:12

Chimen, M. A 3:19

Chinese/Asian Cultural Association of New Brunswick 3:78
Hum, Gordon

Chong, Gladys 3:26

Chrapko, Metro 3:84

Chretien, Hon. Jean, Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development 3:18

Chretien, l’hon. Jean, Ministre des Affaires indiennes et du Nord canadien 3:18

Christie, Terry 3:78

Christy, Gil 3:62

Church, John 3:22

Citizenship and Legislative Committee of Local 444 U.A.W. (Windsor) 3:23
McNamara, Pat

Clark, Anne 3:30

Clark, Elaine 3:2

Clark, Glenn 3:30

Clarke, David 3:31

Clarke, Luther 3:23

Clarkson, Stephen 3:19

Clermont, Jean Bernard 3:70

Clermont, Jean 3:68

Cloutier, Denis 3:55

Club Alpha Amega des etudiants ukrainiens, Universite de la Colombie-Britannique 3:29
Semotiuk, Andrew

Club ukrainien de l’Universite Western Ontario, London, Ont 3:22
Dubas, O.

Clubs de Femmes de carrieres liberales et commerciales de l’Alberta 3:84
Armstrong, Ellen, C. T.

Cochrane, John 2:10

Cohen, Lotte 3:34

Cohen, Maxwell 3:92

Coles, Geoffrey 3:86

Coles, Stuart 3:19

Colle, Philippe 3:53

Collins, Michael 3:26

Collins, Richard 3:48

Comartin, Joe 3:23

Comeau, Leger 3:1

Comité Canada 3:68

Comité canadien des Ukrainiens (Toronto) 3:19

Comité jeunesse Canada, Burnaby, Colombie-Britannique 3:27
Bishop, Robert
Hughes, Robert

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Comité de Toronto du droit a la vie 3:62
Fish, Belvia
Hezewyk, B. Van
Landolt, Gwendolyn
Morris, Heather
Vennir, W. G.

Comité des Canadiens-Ukrainiens 2:8
Lynka, Izdiore H.
Swystun, W. M.
Syrnyck, John H.
Yaremowich, Anthony

Comité des citoyens francophones de Sudbury et la region 3:46
Beauchamp, Rheal

Comité du Parti communiste du Canada pour la ville de Toronto 3:62
Massie, Gordon

Comité legislatif, Conseil du travail de la region de Windsor 3:23
Batterson, Les

Comité municipal conjoint sur les relations intergouvernementales 3:50
Burns, R. M.
D’Amour, M.
Dent, I. G.
Newman, D. G.
O’Brien, A.

Comité ukrainien du Canada, section de Montreal 3:73
Hykawy, J.
Karpishka, Roman B.

Commandement provincial du Quebec des anciens combattants de l’armée, de la marine et de l’aviation du Canada 3:70
Fedosen, Phil

Commission des droits de l’homme du Nouveau-Brunswick 3:78
Kinsella, Noel

Commission des écoles separées du Toronto metropolitain 3:92
Fullerton, J . A.
Heenan, C. B.
McDonald, D. F.

Commission scolaire protestante de Montreal 3:69
Tilley, A. Reid

Committee for Original Peoples Entitlement 3:87
Cournoyea, Nellie
Rubin, Abraham
Semmler, Agnes

Communist Party of Canada, Central Executive Committee 3:81
Demers, Claire
Kashtan, William

Communist Party of Canada, Manitoba Provincial Committee 2:11
Ross, William

Communist Party of Canada, Metropolitan Toronto Committee 3:62
Massie, Gordon

Communist Party of Quebec 3:81
Walsh, Samuel J.

Confederation des residants et des contribuables 3:19
Hayes, Derek

Confederation of Resident and Ratepayer Associations 3:19
Hayes, Derek

Congres canadien polonais 3:72
Kawaczak, Andrew
Romer, Tadeusz

Connaughton, Graham, W 3:23

Conrad, James 3:20

Conseil d’administration de la societe Saint-Jean Baptiste diocesaine de Rimouski 3:66
Daigneault, René

Conseil de l’évangélisme et de service social, Eglise unie du Canada 3:83
MacDonald, W. Clarke
Stewart, Gordon K.

Conseil de la tribu indienne de
Squamish 3:27
Mathias, Joe

Conseil des Associations paroissiales, Notre-Dame-de-Lourdes, Timmins, Ont. 3:56
Maynard, Dominique L.

Conseil diocesan de Saint-Jean de la ligue des femmes catholiques du Canada 3:78
McLean, Muriel

Conseil du travail de Toronto metropolitain 3:61
Montgomery, D. K.

Conseil national des femmes du Canada 3:74
Booth, Ann
Steadman, S. F.

Cook, George 3:30

Cook, Ramsay 3:74

Coolican, Denis 3:39

Copp, Victor 3:21

Corbeil, Madeleine 3:72

Corbett, Donald J 3:47

Corbett, F. M 3:67

Corlett, James M 3:26

Corey, Jim 3:34

Corrigan, J. R 3:39

Corry, J. A . 3:36

Cosgrove, Fred 3:20

Cosgrove, W. J 3:70

Costain, William 3:28

Cote, Eva (Mrs./Mme) 3:66

Cotton, Frank 3:32

Cottonwood Island Residents Association 3:30
Mossman, Lucille

Coulombe, Jean—Maurice 3:67

Coupal, Ed 3:46

Cousins, Brian 3:87

Craik, Robert L 3:28

Cramer, Jack 3:56

Cranley, W. J 3:32

Crawford, Louise 3:31

Creery, R. A . 2:17

Creighton, Donald G. 3:64

Crinem, Ray 3:33

Crosbie, Patricia 3:28

Cuddihy, Paul E 3:4

Current Affairs Workshop Education Committee, Parish Council of the Annunciation
Comité de la Paroisse Annonciation 3:73
Paz, Pamela

Currie, Don W 3:30

Cyr, Daniel 3:67

Cyr, Jean—Marc 3:53

Czechoslovak National Association of Canada (Vancouver Chapter) 3:29
Drabeck, Jan
Schoenbach, Gustav

Daigle, Phil 3:29

Dalaire, Didier 3:72

Dale, Peter 3:1

Dalton, W. J 3:1

D’Amour, Marcel 3:57

Dandeneau, Egide 3:57

Dandurand, Jean-Pierre 3:70

D’Anjou, Guy 3:66

D’Anjou, Rene 3:65

Dansereau, Auguste 2:11

Dansereau, Guy 3:54

Dansereau, Jean 3:53

Daoust, Paul 3:65

David, Bob 3:86

Davidson, Murray 3:46

Davis, H. F . 2:1

Davis, R. T. (Mrs./Mme) 3:62

Davis, Trevor, C. M. 3:28

Dawkins, Zella 3:56

Dawrant, A. Geoffrey 3:85

Dawson, George S 3:28

Daykin, H. E . 3:29

Dean, Art 3:19

Decarie, Graham 3:5

Dechamplain, Jean-Luc 3:66

Dehler, Ronald 3:43

de Jong, Renee 3:19

Delaney, Eileen C 3:65

Del Villano, Leo 3:56

DeMarsh, Roy 3:62

Demers, Juliette 3:66

Dennison, William 3:19

Dent, Ivor G 3:85

[Page 116]

Deraspe, Raymond 3:90

Desrosiers, Lawrence 3:66

Desrosiers, Noel (Mme/Mrs.) 3:66

Destonaus, Margaret 3:70

Dewar, Barry 3:2

Dewar, George 3:5

de Wolf, John 3.29

Dickerson, Mark O 3.34

Dickman, Beth 3:28

Dickman, Phil 2:17

Dielschneider, Peter J. 3:13

Dion, Leon 3:60

Dion, Robert 3:53

Dionne, Charles 3:79

Dionne, Jean-Marie 3:79

Dionne, Jean-Pierre 3:90

Dittrich, Douglas 3:87

Dodd, Cecil 3:33

Dodd, Gail 3:33

Dodd, J. G 3:39 & 3:40

Dodson, Robert 3:26

Doig, Hugh 3:46

Donahue, Bob 3:85

Donison, Michael 3:28

Donnelly, Murray 2:9

Drabek, Stan 3:34

Drapeau, Jean 3:68

Duff, Donald J 3:1

Duffy, George 3:79

Dufour, Anatole 3:67

Dufour, Francis 3:67

Dugas, Jacqueline 3:70

Dumas, Guy 3:45

Dumas, J. Raymond 3:70

Dumont, Robert S 3:14

Dunn, John 3:46

Dunne, Patrick B 3:77

Dunsmore, Ross 3:45

Dupuis, Frank 3:65

Durocher, Cy 3:91

Durocher, Jean—Yves 3:72

Durocher, Paul—André 3:56

Duttle, Karl 3:45

Eager, Evelyn 3:48

Earl, John 3:22

Egan, James 3:28

Egan, John 3:84

Elder, James S 3:61

English Catholic Education Association of Ontario 3:92
Brisbois, Edward J.
Carty, Michael
Fogarty, P. H.

Epstein, Linda 3:1

Equal Rights for Indian Women 3:68
Doré, Cecilia Phillips

Erdman, Victor 3:32

Erickson, D. R . 3:14

Erickson, Hilda 3:47

Erickson, William 2:17

Etudiants de Sciences sociales, CEGEP de Matane 3:66

Paradis, Pierre—Paul 3:66

Etudiants du departement de sciences politiques Université de Lethbridge 3:32
Runge, Ken
Slemko, Brian

Evans, Marjorie 3:27

Evans, Richard J 3:23

Evans, Una 3:85

Everett, Richard 3:62

Fabio, Prime 3:48

Fair, Bill 3:14

Fakete, Tony 2:16

Falkenberg, Eugene 3:32

Faribault, Marcel 3:58

Faris, Ronald 3:11

Faubert, Denis 3:56

Fawzy, Nabil 3:62

Fédéralistes mondiaux du Canada 3:83
Smyth, Ross

Féderalistes mondiaux du Canada (division de Calgary) 3:34
Macqueen, R. W.

Fédéralistes mondiaux du Canada (Montreal) 3:71
Arnopoulos, P. J.

Fédération balte du Canada (section Montréalaise) 3:71
Freibergs, Vaira

Fédération canadienne des enseignants 3:37
Feiger, Peter P.
Fredericks, Rod G.
Sparkes, Wendell J.
Goble, Norman M.

Fédération canadienne-francaise de la Colombie-Britannique 3:26
Albert, Roger
Paquette, Romeo

Fédération de la jeunesse ukrainienne du Canada 3:22
Nakoneczny, Richard

Fédération des écoles indépendantes de la Colombie-Britannique 3:27
Waller, J. F.

Fédération des Indiens de la Saskatchewan 3:14
Gordon, Walter

Fédération des Métis du Manitoba 2:9
Eagle, Thomas

Fédération des Métis, (Section Thompson) 2:12
Deschambault, Ethel
Head, Edward

Fédération mondiale britannique—israelienne (Canada) Incorporee 3:29
Brewer, Dawn

Federation of Independent School Associations in British Columbia 3:27
Waller, J. F.

Federation of Saskatchewan Indians 3:14
Gordon, Walter

Fenton, John 3:20

Fenwick, Lawrence 3:19

Ferguson, D. K 3:69

Ferguson, Howard 3:40 & 3:43

Fernihough, William 3:67

Ferris, John 3:47

Fifield, Robert 3:77

Fillipoff, P 3:40

Fingland, Frank 3:18

Finlay, Frank 3:61

Finlay, Norine 3:62

Finlayson, D 3:86

Finlayson, Norman 3:27

Fitch, R. H. (Mrs./Mme) 3:80

Fitzpatrick, Patrick 3:78

Fletcher, Paula 3:47

Flis, Henry 3:19

Fogarty, Kenneth 3:39

Fogarty, Brian 3:27

Fogarty, Stephen 3:69

Foley, Carl J 3:30

Forestell, Ray 3:46

Forget, Roger 3:22

Fortin, Gaetan 3:67

Fortin, Jean-Pierre 3:54

Fortin, Paul R 3:70

Fortin, Richard 3:65

Foucault, Jules 2:12

Fournier, Peter 3:47

Fournier, Raymond—Marie 3:67

Fox, Christie 3:56

Fradsham, Allan A 3:33

Francis, Glen 3:56

Francis, Jerry 3:56

Frankin, Peter 3:30

Franklin, J. N 3:73

Franklin, John A . 3:46

Fraser, D. G. L . 3:2

Fraser, Eon McKay 3:39 & 3:43

Fraser, Simon 3:27

Fraternité des Indiens des Territoires du Nord-ouest 3:88
Bird, Ed.

Fraternité indienne du Manitoba 2:9
Courchene, David

Fraternité nationale des Indiens 3:88
Marule, Marie
Manuel, George
O’Reilly, James

Frawley, Flo 3:33

Frechette, Raynald 3:53

Freimuts, Robert 3:19

French-Canadian Association of Alberta 3:85
Boucher, Jacques

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French-Canadian Federation of British Columbia 3:26
Albert, Roger
Paquette, Romeo

Frolek, E 3:31

Frolek, Joseph 3:31

Fulton, E. D . 3:27 & 3:64

Funk, Gilbert 3:84

Fyfe, Stewart 3:45

Gagne, Bertrand 3:66

Gagne, Camille 3:67

Gagne, Laurent 3:66

Gagnon, Magloire 3:54

Gagnon, Yvon 3:67

Galgay, Frank 3:77

Gallant, E 2:2

Gamble, G. Alvan 3:20

Garcia, Diego 3:70

Gareau, Camille 3:66

Garlick, Carolyn 2:9

Garnes, Rolf 3:40

Gaudet, Jocelyn 3:53

Gaundrone, Margaretta 2:13

Gauthier, Andre 3:53

Gauthier, Clovis 3:73

Gauvin, Denise 3:47

Gauvin, Gilles 3:66

Gedye, Cynthia 3:46

Gendron, Daniel-Eugene 3:53

Gentles, Ian 3:62

Geoghean, Anthony 2:12

Ghandour, Hussein 3:90

Gibbs, Ronald 3:53

Gibson, Dale 3:7

Giglio, Joseph 3:61

Gilbert, Fernand 3:53

Gilmore, J. W . 3:27

Girard, Pierre 3:65

Girvin, J. A 3:30

Gobeil, Jean 3:57

Gonick, Cy 2:9

Goodwin, Ross 3:65

Gord, Leslie 3:62

Gorman, T. W . 3:4

Gosselin, Narcisse 3:72

Goulet, Denis 3:57

Graauwmans, Casey, H. A. 3:84

Graham, Campbell 3:40

Gram, Minerva 3:56

Grandbois, Denis 3:47

Grant, Gary 3:2

Grassby, J. N . 3:46

Gray, Brian J 3:27

Grayson, Thomas B. 3:62

Greater Montreal Anti-Poverty Co—ordinating Committee 3:70

Poirier, Peggy

Greenaway, Harold, E 3:84

Greenshields, Leslie 3:70

Grennell, (Mr./M.) 3:30

Griffith, N., (Miss) 3:70

Groos, Charles 3:28

Groos, Harold 3:28

Groupe canadien—allemand 3:73
Wiss, Jules

Guerin, Delbert 3:26 & 3:27

Guiho, Joseph 3:55

Guilbault, Fernand 3:79

Gupta, S. N . 3:69

Guy, James 3:3

Hado, Steve 3:61

Haeck, Louis 3:72

Haegert, Joseph 3:28

Haenlein, Otto 3:68

Hager (Mrs./Mme) 3:27

Hamill, Sally 3:28

Hamilton, Darcy 3:32

Hancoy, Eric J 3:46

Hankia, Garry 3:86

Hanna, Jessica D . 3:85

Hannaford, Ivan 3:48

Hanratty, John 3:3

Hansen, Oscar 3:26

Hanson, Samuel B. 3:34

Har, Sabharwal 3:84

Hargrave, G. G. (Mrs./Mme) 3:57

Harper, Allen 3:27

Harris, Alfred 3:34

Harris, John 3:30

Harrison, Arthur 3:22

Harrison, John 3:27

Harrison, Susan 3:23

Hartnell, Tony 3:30

Hartney, Michael 3:55

Haydu, Steve 3:19

Hayward, John C . 3:29

Heald, D. V 3:12

Hearn, Ed 3:1

Heaslip, Vernon 3:20

Heinrich, Jack 3:30

Helling, Rudolph 3:23

Henderson, W. R. S. 3:33

Henham, R . 3:29

Hennessy, Michael 3:48

Henneveld, Hank 3:27

Heraldry Society of Canada 3:37
Beddoe, Alan B.
Beley, George M.
Cartwright, John R.
Nunn, Norman A.

Herperger, Don 3:11

Hewitt, John 3:22

Hill, Cynthia 3:87

Hill, Richard M. 3:87

Hitschfeld, W. F. 3:90

Hodgkin, B. D . 3:33

Hodgkinson, R. A . 2:16

Hodgson, W. Thomas 3:57

Hogan, Lena 3:39

Hogue, Martial 3:68

Holloway, David 3:26

Holter, Ian 3:13

Hooke, Robert 3:39

Horricks, J.T. 3:31

Horsford, Gregory 3:47

Horton, Laura 3:56

Hotson, Alan 3:46

Hougen, Rolf 2:16

Houle, Robert 3:65

House, Henry Donald 3:21

Howard, Lawrence 3:22

Hewlett, Alphonsine 3:69

Howley, Ian 3:27

Hubbs, David 3:67

Hubka, Brian F 3:33

Huddart, Geoffrey 3:26

Humanist Association of Canada 3:71
Morgentaler, Henry

Humphries, Don 3:11

Hunt, A. D 3:18

Huot, Gilles 3:55

Hurley, Daniel 3:78

Hutton, Edith 3:26

Indian Brotherhood of the Northwest Territories 3:88
Bird, Ed.

Indian-Eskimo Association of Canada 3:76
Clark, G A
Cumming, Peter
Redditt, J. J. D.

Indian Society of Edmonton 3:84
Gupta, Ram K.

Institut National Champlain 3:65

Indians of Quebec Association 3:88
Hill, George
Plourde, Nora

Institut Politique de Trois-Rivières 3:54
Thérien, Marcel

Institut Voluntas Dei 3:54
Avila-Oliver, Phillip B.

Instrumentation Society of America 3:29
Stirling, P. H.

Irwin, F. R 2:6

Irwin, Hugh 3:29

Isert, L 3:31

Italo-Canadian Democratic Association, Toronto 3:62
Mastrangelo, Rocco

Ivany, Otto 3:47

Iwanusiw, Olaf 3:61

Les Jaycees du district de Winnipeg 2:8

Braid, Arthur 2:8

Jackson, George 3:21

Jacob, Marcel 3:72

Jacobsen, Gunnar 3:28

Jaffary, Karl D 3:19

Janvier, Aline 3:54

Jarry, Claude 3:69

Jarvis, Donald M 3:39

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Jaycee Units of Metropolitan Winnipeg 2:8
Braid, Arthur

Jasmin, Jean-Pierre 3:70

Jasmin, Therese 3:65

Jenkins, Henry 3:65

Jenkins, Paul 3:22

Jerusalem, Carol 3:48

Jeunes socialistes 3:84
Poholko, Dave

Johnson, A. W 2:4

Johnson, C. D. Paisley 3:31

Johnson, Chris 3:46

Johnson, Jack 3:33

Johnson, J. M . 3:34

Johnson, Ron 3:26

Johnston, Ron 2:12

Joint Municipal Committee on Intergovernmental Relations 3:50
Burns, R. M.
D’Amour, M.
Dent, I. G.
Newman, D. G.
O’Brien, A.

Jones, I. C. (Mrs./Mme) 3:28

Jones, Leonard C 3:80

Joy, S. J. (Mrs./Mme) 3:30

Joyal, Marcel 3:39

Julien, Pierre-Andre 3:54

Kacaba, Michael 3:19

Kalevar, Chaitanya 3:20

Kalevar, C. K 3:19

Kamloops Diocesan Catholic Public School Trustees Association 3:31
Beesley, J. F. B.

Kamloops District Teachers’ Association 3:31
Phillips, A. M.

Kan, Fred C. 3:20

Kanee, D. 3:29

Katz, Leon 3:58

Kear, A. R. 2:11

Kearney, G. A 3:48

Kearns, Brian 2:15

Keast, J 3:47

Keehr, O. J . 3:11

Keffer, T. C . 3:34

Keefer, Thomas 3:62

Kehoe, Gerard 3:31

Keliher, T. L . 3.39

Kemp, Gavin Neil 3:32

Kennedy, James 3:22

Kenogami Chamber of Commerce 3:67
Turcotte, Jean—Jacques

Kerbel, Joel Anthony 3:29

Kerner, Ilona 3:70

Kernighan, Murray S. 3:19

Keyes, Kenneth 3:45

Keyes, Tom E 3:12

Keytop, William A 3:32

Kilbourn, William 3:19

Kilfoil, Cecil J 3:79

Kilgore, Harry W . 3:19 & 3:21

Killen, Stewart 3:3

King, Teresa 3:32

Kingwell, P. J 3:70

Kitts, James 3:80

Kizerskis, Al 3:71

Knechtel, Keith 3:28

Knoll, John A 3:13

Knott, Ernie 3:27

Kobluk, W. D . 3:84 & 3:85

Koern, Heinz 3:19

Kohut, Myroslaw 3:48

Konash, Michael 3:85

Kordyban, William 3:30

Kowasl, Michael 3:85

Krepakevich, Duane 3:13

Kripps, Agnes 3:26

Kristiansen, John 2:17

Kroeker, John 3:43

Krueger, Leonard 2:11

Kucharyshyn, Marusia 3:20 & 3:61

Kuyek, Joan 3:46

Kuziak, A. G . 3:13

Kwavnick, David 3:40

Labour Council of Metropolitan Toronto 3:61
Montgomery, D. K.

Labuda, Joe 3:28

LaChance, Claire 3:72

Lacourciere, Gerald 3:56

Lacroix, Joseph 3:65

Ladyman, J. T 3:63

Lafond, France 3:72

Lafontaine, Christopher 3:12

Lahey, William 3:77

Laing, Gordon 3:2

Lajeunesse, Claude 3:54

Lalonde, E 3:46

Lalonde, Jacques 3:55

Lalonde, Judy 3:56

Lambie, James T 3:28

Lamothe, Charles 3:72

Lanari, Robert 3:80

Landry, Robert 3:67

Landry, Simone 3:71

Lang, Leopold 3:79

Langley, Ken 3:3

Langlois, Alain 3:66

Langlois, Jacques 3:57

Langlois, Paul 3:54

Langlois, P 3:67

Langmark, Otto C . 3:21 & 3:61

Lanthier, Aldema 3:46

LaPierre, Laurier 3:41

Lapierre, Paul—Eugene 3:53

Laplante, H 3:70

Lapointe, Bernard 3:67

Lapointe, Roland 3:55

Lapointe, Romeo 3:67

Laskin, Saul 3:48

Latham, Johnston 3:30

Lauder, Jim 3:39

Lauzon, Patrick 3:47

Lavoie, Eudore 3:79

Lavoie, Raymond 3:65

Lawton, Ernest 2:17

Laycock, Francis E 3:13

Lazarus, Felix 3:68

Leblanc, Charles N 3:80

LeBlanc, Guy 3:66

Leblanc, Jean—Andre 3:57

Leblond, C. P 3:70

Leclerc, Antoine 3:65

Leclerc, Louis 3:65

Leddy, J. F 3:23

Lederman, William 3:6

Leduc, Francois 3:66

Lees, W. S 3:21

Legendre, Guy 3:57

Leger, Jules 2:3

Lemieux, B. J 3:27

Lepage, Alma 3:70

Leslie, Peter 3:45

Lesser, David A 3:29

Lethbridge Chamber of Commerce 3:32
Bond, W.
Tanner, Morley

Lauszler, Winnie 3:26

Levesque, Rodrigue 3:43

Lewis, Don 3:28

Liberal Party of Alberta 3:85
Russell, Robert

Liberal Party of Canada (Quebec) 3:82
Blouin, Denise
Cote, Micheline
Fortier, Jean
Guilbault, Jacques
Labelle, Maurice
Lefebvre, Jean-Paul
Rodger, Ginette
Tardif, Real

Lidster, Echo L. R. 3:86

Ligue canadienne des droits de l’homme au Manitoba 2:10

Ligue monarchiste du Canada (la section Vancouver) 3:29
Young, J. C.

Ligue des Monarchistes du Canada 3:39
Galloway, Strome
Williamson, E. L. R.

Likely, Frank 3:2

Lim, William A 3:29

Limbrick, D. H 3:48

Lindsay, William Jack 3:28

Linton, W. Ivan 2:6

Lipton, Charles 3:68

Lithwick, Harvey 3:91

Llanos, Marc 3:61

Long, Edward 3:19

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Long, Harold 2:11

Lord, Maxime 3:55

Lort, Tony 3:27

Lotchell, J. L 3:19

Lott, Shirley 2:15

Love, J. D 3:28

Lower, A. R. M 3:75

Ludwig, John 3:85

Lutczyk, M 3:19

Lyon, Noel 3:16

Lysyk, K 2:4 & 3:59

Maberly, Collier 3:29

MacAdams, Douglas 3:26

MacCormack, J. R 3:1

MacDonald, Alex 3:29

Macdonald, Angus 3:26

MacDonald, Bill 3:2

MacDonald, Calvin 3:70

Macdonald, David 3:26

MacDonald, David 3:29

MacDonald, Vincent 3:3

MacDougall, G. A. (Mrs./Mme) 3:67

Macdougall, John, H. 3:4

MacKasey, S 3:1

MacKenzie, Angus G. 3:34

MacKenzie, Brenda 3:43

MacKenzie, Douglas 3:22

MacKenzie, James 3:26

MacKinnon, Frank 3:33

MacLean, David G . 3:4

MacLelland, Kathleen 3:5

MacLeod, Gregory J. 3:3

MacLeod, W. D . 3:28

MacNeil, Kenzie 3:3

MacPherson, Jim 3:2

MacQuarrie, Bob 3:86

Magmuson, Bruce 3:19

Magrath Chamber of Commerce, Magrath, Alberta 3:32
Spencer, J. A.

Maguire, Derek P 3:33

Maguire, Stephen 3:45

Mailhiot, Claude (Mme/Mrs.) 3:73

Mailhiot, Magdeleine 3:70

Mainville, Claude 3:68

Major Claude 3:57

Maki, Marilyn 3:46

Makoski, H. E. F . 3:28

Maley, Jack 3:27

Mallalieu, Norman 3:34

Mallory, D. R. G . 3:31

Mallory, J. R 3:24 & 3:90

Maloney, John, H 3:5

Manitoba Indian Federation 2:9
Courchene, David

Manitoba Metis Federation 2:9
Eagle, Thomas

Manitoba Metis Federation (Thompson Section) 2:12
Deschambault, Ethel
Head, Edward

Manning, Donald M 3:29

Manning, E. Preston 3:85

March, Roman 3:21

Marcoux, Alain 3:66

Marshall, Hilda A. J. 3:28

Marshall, Joe 3:3

Martin, C 3:39

Martin, C D . 3:47

Martin, Chris 3:40 & 3:43

Martin, Dennis H 3:62

Martin, Murdo 3:56

Martini, I. C . 3:34

Martyn, R. E . 3:34

Mass, Phyllis 3:70

Massicotte, Gerald 3:55

Maten, Steve 3:68

Matheson, Don 3:13

Matkin, James 3:52 & 3:29

Matte, Louis-Joseph 3:30

Maxim, James M 3:33

Maxim, (de Bane), Paul 3:90

Maxwell, D. S 2:5

Maxwell, Hubert, V. 3:56

Maxwell, Wendell J. 3:80

McAllister, Kenneth 3:26 & 3:29

McCabe, Earle 3:48

McCallion, Frank 2:17

McCallum, Jean 3:85

McCann, Marie 3:45

McCarthy, J. V .3:77

McClennan, Scott 3:22

McCloskey, T. J . 3:30

McCormick, Earle 3:46

McCormick, J. L . 3:19

McCrory, Sue 3:46

McCurry, Brian 3:47

McCutcheon, Gordon 3:48

McDonald, Patrick 3:85

McEwen, John 3:46

McGarvie, David 3:27

McGeer, Patrick L 3:27

McGill University, Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research, Montreal, (Que.) 3:90
Bates, David
Douglas, Virginia
Hitschfeld, W. F.
Mallory, J. K.
Maxwell, M.
Pavlase-k, T. J.
Yaffe, L.

McGregor, David J. 3:28

McIver, Bernice 2:17

McKamey, Ray 2:14

McLaughlin, Brian 3:26

McLaughlin, Claire 3:63

McLaughlin, W . 3:29

McLean, Dave 3:30

McLeod, D. A . 3:12

McMahon, Peter 3:34

McMath, R. A 3:27

McNeill, Mary 3:61

McTaggart, Lloyd 3:46

McWhinney, Edward 3:10

Medcalf, Jack C . 3:27

Melancon, Claude 3:55

Melkvi, Zoltan 3:84

Menard, Michel A . 3:53

Menard, Pam 3:23

Menear, David W 3:22

Merits, Roxanne 3:48

Metcalfe, Thomas 3:68

Metropolitan Corporation of Greater Winnipeg 2:8 & 2:11
Rebchuck, S.
Willis, Jack
Wolfe, B. R.
Zuken, J.

Metropolitan Toronto Separate School Board 3:92
Fullerton, J. A.
Heenan, G. B.
McDonald, D. F.

Middleton, H. A. (Mrs./Mme) 3:62

Miljours, Henri 3:55

Millar, Dean 3:29

Miller, Bertha 3:78

Miller, Jim 2:13

Milne, David 3:5

Minard, Marilyn M 3:68

Miners, Joan 3:67

Minov, Nick 3:22

Moeller, Paul 3:23

Moffat, H. A 3:30

Monarchist League of Canada 3:39
Galloway, Strome
Williamson, E. L. R.

Monarchist League of Canada (Vancouver Branch) 3:29
Young, A. C.

Monbourquette, Joanne 3:47

Morassut, Carla 3:47

Moreau, Charles A 3:65

Morgan, David 3:48

Morgan, Fay 3:68

Morin, Jacques—Yvan 3:75

Morin, Roger 3:78

Morris, Fred 3:40

Morrison, Ann 3:46

Morton, Murray D 3:22

Morton, W. L . 3:38

Mosdell, B 3:26

Mosdell, William 3:27

Mouton, Joseph 3:73

Mowers, Cleo 3:32

Mozol, Stan 3:28

Mundy, John 3:45

Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto—Municipalité de Toronto 3:63
Campbell, A. M.

Munroe, Lillian 2:13

Murry, P. J 3:77

Myers, Marie 3:56

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Nabess, Andrew 2:12

Nadeau, Robert 3:40

Naduriak, Robert 3:11

Naidu, M. V. 2:10

Nash, Mark 3:27

National Chapter of Canada of the I.O.D.E 3:62
Morrison, W. R. (Mrs./Mme)
Tait, George E. (Mrs./Mme)

National Council of Women of Canada 3:74
Booth, Ann
Steadman, S. F.

(The) National Farmers Union (New Brunswick District) 3:79
Dionne, James

National Indian Brotherhood 3:88
Manuel, George
Marule, Marie
O’Reilly, James

National Institute of Champlain 3:65
Boulanger, Georges

National Society of the Acadians 3:80
Cormier, Hector J.
Godbout, Victor

Neely, Barbara 3:23

Neish, Elgin 3:28

Nelligan, John 3:40

Newbound, Lyndell 3:85

New Brunswick Francophone Teachers’ Association 3:80
Desjardins, Gerard
Richard, Jean

New Brunswick Human Rights Commission 3:78
Kinsella, Noel A.

New Canada and North America Union Party 3:63
Reiner, Fred

New Democratic Members of the Saskatchewan Legislature 3:11
Blakeney, Allan

Nielsen, Erik 2:13

Noble, Madeline 3:29

Nolan, Peter John 3:40

Nordling, Axel 2:13

Normand, Antoine 3:65

Norris—Elye, Michael 3:40

Northerners United for Equality 3:86
Demelt, Stuart

Northwest Territories Teachers’ Association
Jenkins, Robert

Nouveau Parti Democratique de l’Assemblee Legislative de la Saskatchewan 3:11
Blakeney, Allan

Nouveau Parti Democratique de l’Ontario 3:19
Lewis, Stephen
Renwick, James

Nova Scotians United for Life 3:80
Moir, Mildred

Novini, Andrew 3:23

Nutik, Allen E 3:69

O’Brien, Allan 3:1

O’Brien, B 3:48

Oddson, Lief 3:84

Odellel, Albert 3:46

O’Donahue, Anthony 3:19

O’Hearn, Peter, J. T. 3:1

Ohs, Don 3:31

Ontario New Democratic Party 3:19
Lewis, Stephen
Renwick, James

Operation Dignite 3:66
Banville, Charles

Oppel, Magnus 3:28

Orange, Robert J 3.86

O’Reilly, Edward A 3:47

Osland, Les 2:17

Osler, Cam F 2:11

O’Toole, Ronald 3:68

Oucharek, Bob 3:11

Palanthara, Vincent 3:68

Palazzio, F. Mrs 3:68

Palmer, A. E 3:32

Palmer, John R. N . 3:61

Papineau, Alfred 3:39

Paquette, Omer 3:31

Paradis, Claude 3:65

Parent, Marcel 3:66

Parizeau, Jacques 3:44

Parris, Bob 3:30

Parti communiste canadien, Comité central de direction 3:81
Demers, Claire
Kashtan, William

Parti communiste du Canada, Comité provincial du Manitoba 2:11
Ross, William

Parti communiste du Québec 3:81
Walsh, Samuel J.

Parti liberal de l’Alberta 3:85
Russell, Robert

Parti liberal du Canada (Québec) 3:82
Blouin, Denise
Cote, Micheline
Fortier, Jean
Guilbault, Jacques
Labelle, Maurice
Lefebvre, Jean-Paul
Rodger, Ginette
Tardif, Real

Parti progressiste conservateur de la Colombie-Britannique 3:29
de Wolf, John

Parti Québécois du Comte de Portneuf 3:65
Gagnon, Guy

Parti Québécois, executif regional, Saguenay-Lac-St-Jean 3:67
Bédard, Marc-André

Patenaude, Pierre 3:53

Paterson, A. Ben 3:54

Patterson, Charles A. M. 3:26

Patterson, Dennis 3:1

Pattie, Brian 3:31

Pattison, Stephen 3:28

Patton, Jamie 3:2

Paulik, Ozy 3:68

Payne, John L 3:33

Peacock, Anne 3:69

Pearson, William 2:10

Peckford, Ewart 3:77

Peel, Kenneth 3:71

Pelletier, Pierre 3:69

Pelletier, Rene 3:53

Penna, James 3:14

Penner, Benny 3:86

Penton, M. J . 3:32

People Helping People Society 3:85
Loring, Marion

Perreault, Michel 3:85

Pettenuzzo, Donna 3:47

Philibert, Olivier 3:66

Philibert, Robert 3:57

Phillips, Arthur 3:26

Phillips, D 3:13

Phillips, Margaret 3:48

Phipps, Peter 3:2

Pilon, Aurele 3:57

Pilon, Gregory A 3:39

Pilon, Henriette 3:28

Pittman, George 3:63

Plamondon, Jean 3:71

Polish Canadian Congress 3:72
Kawaczak, Andrew
Romer, Tadeusz

Pontbriand, Denis 3:53

Portnuff, H. (Mrs./Mme) 3:13

Porter, Gary 3:29

Potter, Calvin C 3:81

Potter, J. Lee 3:80

Potter, Winifred 3:71

Potvin, Andre 3:73

Pouget, Gerald A . 3:23

Powell, John C 3:43

Powell, Peter 3:27

Powell, S. A 3:71

Powers, Robert E 3:32

Pozer, Phylis 3:79

Prasow, David E 3:33

Predeman, Jane 3:27

Presunka, Peter 3:57

Pretulac, Nick 3:56

Previsch, Nick 3:32

Price, Trevor 3:23

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Prince George-Peace River Progressive Conservative Association 3:30
Rankle, Peter

Prociuk, Alex Wm. 3:14

Progressive Conservative Party of British Columbia 3:29
de Wolf, John

Promethean Society, Montreal 3:91
de Ruijte, Frans
Rybikowski, M.
Tchipeff, A.N.

Protestant School Board of Greater Montreal 3:69
Tilley, A. Reid

Proulx, Mario 3:53

Provincial Organization of Business and Professional Women’s Clubs of Alberta 3:84
Armstrong, Ellen

Puziak, Dan 3:86

Pye, Bill 3:39

Quebec Association of School Administrators (South Shore Local) 3:73
Fransham, J.H.

Quebec Provincial Command of Army, Navy and Airforce Veterans of Canada 3:70
Fedosen, Phil

Quebec Union of Ukrainian Students 3:91
Pryszlak, Thor
Yakimiw, Evhen
Yakimiw, Françoise

Radicals for Capitalism of Toronto 3:21
Wilson, Raymond Todd

Rainbow, Gordon 3:62

Rainville, B. 3:71

Rakobowchuk, Gerald 3:39

Rapoch, Andrew J. 3:39 & 3:40

Rasmussen, George 3:27

Ratushny, E. 3:23

Ray, Pat 2:13

Rayburn, Judith 3:61

Rayner, F.J. 3:30

Raz, Victor M. 3:27

Redmond, Gerald 3:28

Regina Chamber of Commerce 3:11
McLeod, R.A.

Regina Civil Liberties Association 3:11
Beke, John

Regina Single Parents Improvement Association 3:12
Tutt, Sherrie

Reimanin, Richard John 3:33

Reiner, Fred 3:61

Rempel, Patricia A.M. 3:33

Renaud, Jean-Charles 3:68

Reuter, Joe 3:31

Reynolds, Gregory 3:56

Reynolds, Keith A. 3:11

Richard, Norman E. 3:48

Richard, Guy W. 3:69

Richards, David G. 3:27

Rickard, Bruce 3:26

Rickwood, Roger 3:19

Rimer, Jim 2:15

Rioux, Conrad 3:73

Rivard, Télesphore 3:73

Robb, D.W. 3:28

Roberts, Helen 3:67

Roberts, J.A. 3:28

Robertson, Alastair Howard 3:78

Robertson, R.G. 2:2

Robichaud, Raoul 3:73

Robidas, Jacques 3:53

Robinson, B. 3:18

Robinson, George W. 3:78

Rooney, John 3:61

Rosamilia, Raphael 3:53

Ross, Darryl 3:2

Rotenberg, Ted 3:19

Rothney, G.O. 2:11

Rouzier, Gilbert 3:66

Roy, Alfred 3:65

Royer, Maurice H. 3:39

Royer, Roland 3:65

Ruben, Max 3:62

Rubin, Stephen 3:68

Rudnyckyj, J.B. 3:89

Ruest, Jean-Louis 3:66

Rumack, Martin 3:62

Russelle, Lorenzo 3:31

Ryan, Chuck 3:3

Ryan, Edward 3:19

Ryan, John Wayne 3:26 & 3:27

Ryan, William F. 3:35

Sagle, Fred M. 3:46

Saini, G.R. 3:78

Saint-Aubin, Cléophas 3:70

Saint John Diocesan Council of the Catholic Women’s League of Canada 3:78
McLean, Muriel

Sakowski, Henry 3:27

Salem, Phil 3:48

Salois, Fabien 2:13

Sametz, Z.W. 3:77

Sanders, Dougas 3:23

Sansom, Lucy 3:78

Saskatchewan Association of Students 3:14
Brown, Larry

Saskatchewan School Trustees Association 3:12
Dunbar, Frederick L.

Saskatchewan Urban Municipalities Association 3:11
Murphy, J.

Satchell, Charlie 3:19

Salnier, Al 3:46

Savage, Helen (Mrs./Mme) 3:79

Savaria, Jeannine 3:70

Savaria, Georges 3:70

Savoie, Anne-Marie 3:79

Savoie, Roger 3:80

Say, Vivian 3:27

Sayer, Bernadette 3:57

Scalzo, Rudolph 3:68 & 3:71

Schelew, Bernie 3:80

Schelew, Michael 3:80

Schmeiser, Douglas A. 3:49

Schmidt, Camille 3:68

Schmidt, Carl C. 3:72

Schwab, Robert 3:4

Schwarz, A.D. 3:72

Scott, F.R. 3:6

Scott, Frank 3:17

Scott, J. Russell 3:61

Scott, W.A. 3:28

Scratch, H.H.M. 3:22

Searle, David H. 3:86

Segsworth, Heather 3:46

Segsworth, R.V. 3:46

Self, G.M. 3:34

Sewell, John 3:61

Shaw, E.C. 2:9

Shaw, Ethel 3:28

Shaw, R.L. 3:31

Shortt, Ken 2:16

Sick, Nigel S. 3:23

Silbert, Morris 3:21

Simard, Louis 3:79

Simard, Louis-Michel 3:67

Simoneau, Jean 3:53

Simpson, Michael 3:86

Sims, David 3:63

Sinclair, Seeta G. 3:22

Singer, Allan 3:70

Singh, H. 3:46

Silverman, S. 3:20

Snedker, J.E. 3:34

Snyder, Ken 2:13

Société anti-pollution et de contrôle du milieu (Vancouver C.-B.) 3:26
Mallard, Derrick

Société d’instrumentation d’Amérique 3:29
Stirling, P.H.

Société Franco-Manitobaine 2:11
Mannin, Michel

Société héraldique du Canada 3:37
Beddoe, Alan B.
Beley, George M.
Cartwright, John R.
Nunn, Norman A.

Société des Hindous d’Edmonton 3:84
Gupta, Ram K.

[Page 122]

Société historique régionale de Trois—Rivieres 3:54
Godin, Conrad

Société Nationale des Acadiens 3:80
Cormier, Hector J.
Godbout, Victor

Société nationale des Québécois du Saguenay-Lac-St—Jean 3:67
Bouchard, Phillippe—Auguste

Société Prométhéenne, Montréal 3:91
de Ruijte, Frans
Rybikowski, M.
Tchipeff, A. N.

Sirant, Bahlan 3:84

Sirois, Langis 3:80

Sirois, Vincent 3:67

Sloan, Christopher 3:86

Small, Ella 3:28

Smedley, Audrey 3:30

Smeenk, Theodore 3:22

Smiley, Donald V 3:25

Smith, Brian 3:28

Smith, Denis 3:75

Smith, Howard 3:26

Smith, Jean 3:62

Smith, Peter 3:45

Smith, Rick 3:46

Smith, Robert 3:28

Smith, Sandra 3:2

Smith, T. B. 2:5

Smyth, Ross 3:68

Sociétés Saint-Jean-Baptiste de Sherbrooke, Amos, Québec, Ste—Anne—de—la-Pocatiere et Valleyfield 3:53
Deserres, Louis
Hubert, Jean
Roberge, Yvon
White, Peter G.

Sociétés Saint-Jean Baptiste 3:65
Hubert, Jean

Société technique des Ukrainiens du Canada 3:61
Spolsky, Yuri

Society for Pollution and Environmental Control (Vancouver, B.C.) 3:26
Mallard, Derrick

Society to Overcome Pollution 3:71
Retallack, Evelyn

Sommerville, William 3:1

Sopha, Elmer 3:46

Sopha, Wendy 3:46

Spalton, Edward 2:11

Spark, R. (Mrs./Mme) 3:45

Speckeen, F. J 3:30

Spencer, André 3:28

Spiegel, Mel 3:68

Squamish Indian Band Council 3:27
Mathias, Joe

St-Arnaud, Yolande 3:70

St-Cyr, Mark 3:73

St-Laurent, Benoit 3:55

St. Laurent, Ray 3:85

Stathatos Jean 3:70

Steen, John 3:22

Stein, Michael 3:71

Steinhart, James R 3:40

Steinle, Dennis 3:28

Stevens, David 3:86

Stewardson, Dave 3:11

Stewart, Gordon 3:33

Stewart, John 3:4

Stewart, P 3:34

Stirling, Leonard 3:77

Stirling, Mark 3:26 & 3:27

Stony, Jamie 3:80

Stortini, Helen 3:47

Strauss, William 2:17

Strayer, B. L . 2:3

Strong, Heather 3:80

Submarwal, Paul 3:84

Sullivan, Patrick W. 3:4

Sundstrum, James 3:19

Sutherland, Ray 3:68

Sutter, D. B 2:10

Swan, Doreen L 3:32

Sykes, P. S . 3:30

Sykes, Rod 3:33

Symons, J. W. D . 3:28

Syndicat national des fermiers (district du Nouveau—Brunswick) 3:79
Dionne, James

Szentandrasi, Michael 3:27

Szoboszloi, Zoltan 3:19

Tanguay, André 3:72

Taraboulsi, Nicolas 3:70

Tarasoff, Ann 3:28

Tardif, Yves 3:72

Tarnopolsky, Walter 3:8

Taylor, Arthur 3:23

Taylor, Don 2:15

Taylor, Erwin 3.53

Taylor, T 3:40

Tellier, J H 3:70

TenHolder, William 3:57

Tennant, Elizabeth 3:34

Tennant, Walton 3:31

ter Heide, Jill 3:30

Tésu, Lorenzo 3:90

Thériault, Aimé 3:53

Thériault, Jacques 3:72

Thiffault, Wilbray 3:54

Thomlinson, S. A 3:34

Thompson Basin Pollution Probe 3:31
Balf, Mary

Thompson Chamber of Commerce 2:12
Johnston, B.

Thompson, David 3:27

Thompson, Donald 3:28

Thompson, P. W. (Mrs./Mme) 3:27

Thomson, Brian 3:19

Thomson, Greg 3:11

Thorburn, Hugh C 3:45

Tickner, Larry 3:28

Tieman, Janet 3:47

Tillema, Ken 3:84

Timmons, Mike 3:67

Timmons, Pat 3:66

Tingley, C 3:30

Tobac, Addy 3:87

Todd, John 3:70

Toming, Voldemar 3:63

Tool, Robert 2:15

Torok, S 3:56

Toronto and District Liberal Association 3:19
McLaughlin, Claire

Toronto and District Liberal Association (Ethnic Committee) 3:61
Gilbart, John

Toronto Right to Life Committee 3:62
Fish, Belvia
Hezewyk, B. Van
Landolt, Gwendolyn
Morris, Heather
Vennir, W. G.

Toth, Tom 3:23

Tremblay, André 3:88

Tremblay, Jean 3:26

Trimbee, James W 3:19

Troestler, Paul—Pierre 3:67

Trois—Rivières Chamber of Commerce, Trois-Rivières, (Qué.) 3:54

Tuchel, Albert 3:19

Tucker, Marion 3:33

Tupper, D 3:29

Tupper, David 3:80

Turcotte, Georges—Jacques 3:65

Turner, Edward 2:11

Turner, Hon. John N., Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada 2:1
Turner, l’hon. John N. ministre
de la Justice et procureur général du Canada

Turner, Paul 3:28

Tyner, Colleen 2:13

Uberall, Eugene 3:26

Ubriaco, Rita 3:48

Ukrainian Alumni Association, Toronto, Ontario 3:61
Darewych, J. W.
Petryshyn, W. R.

Ukrainian Association of Northwestern Quebec and Northwestern Ontario 3:55
Chayka, Léo

Ukrainian Canada Committee (Montreal Section) 3:73
Hykawy, J.
Karpishka, Roman B.

[Page 123]

Ukrainian Canadian Committee 3:19 (Toronto Section)
Zaroswky, Bohdan

Ukrainian Canadian Students Union 3:19
Bandera, Andrew
Fedchun, Gerry
Kudurisysdyn, Marusia

Ukrainian Club of the University of Western Ontario, London, Ontario 3:22
Dubas, O.

Ukrainiens du Nord—Ouest du Québec et du Nord—Ouest de l’Ontario 3:55
Chayka, Léo

Ukrainian Heritage Association of Canada 3:62
Melnyk, Roman

Ukrainian National Youth Federation of Canada 3:22
Nakoneczny, Richard

Ukrainian Professional and Business Men’s Club of Edmonton 3:84
Barabash, Harry
Decore, Laurence G.
Dzenick, Russell
Faryna, Les H.
Hyrak, Wasyl
Kostash, William
Savaryn, Peter

Ukrainian Technical Society of Canada 3:61
Spolsky, Yuri

Ukrainian Youth Association of Canada 3:61
Bardyn, I. N.
Luczkin, Maria
Zazula, Roman

Union des chefs de la Colombie-Britannique 3:88
Wilson, Bill

Union des chefs indiens de la Colombie-Britannique 3:27
Tyndall, Donna T.

Union des étudiants ukrainiens du Québec 3:91
Pryszlak, Ihor
Yakimiw, Evhen
Yakimiw, Francoise

Union des Indiens de la Nouvelle-Ecosse 3:88
Doucette, Noel

Union des Indiens de l’Ontario 3:88
Peters, Omer

Union des Indiens du Nouveau-Brunswick 3:88
Francis, Anthony

Union of British Columbia Chiefs 3:88
Wilson, Bill

Union of British Columbia Indian Chiefs 3:27
Tyndall, Donna T.

Union of New Brunswick Indians 3:88
Francis, Anthony

Union of Nova Scotia Indians 3:3 & 3:88
Doucette, Noel

Union of Ontario Indians 3:88
Peters, Omer

United Nations Association 3:14

Williams, Colwyn D.

United Nations Association in Canada 3:72

Bazar, Bernard (Mrs./Mme) 3:72

University of Lethbridge, Department of Political Science Students, Lethbridge, Alberta 3:32
Runge, Ken
Slemko, Brian

University of Lethbridge, Faculty Members of the Department of Political Science, Lethbridge, Alberta 3:32
Université de Lethbridge, Département de sciences politiques (Membres de la faculté)
Doerr, Audrey
Elton, David
Hoyt, Martin

Université McGill, faculté des études graduées et de la recherche 3:90
Bates, David
Douglas, Virginia
Hitschfeld, W. F.
Mallory, J. R.
Maxwell, M.
Pavlasek, T. J.
Yaffe, L.

Universities of British Columbia; Notre Dame University of Nelson; Simon Fraser University; University of British Columbia; University of Victoria 3:27
Universités de la Colombie-Britannique: l’Université Notre-Dame de Nelson; l’Université Simon Fraser; l’Université de la Colombie-Britannique; l’Université de Victoria
Clark, Robert M.

Unka, Bernadette 2:15

Unterberg, Paul 3:72

Vaive, Marcel 3:57

Valiquette, Réal 3:66

Vanovcan, Steve 3:90

Velanoff, John 3:46

Verney, Douglas V . 3:82

Viau, Patricia 3:33

Vicevic, Irene 3:56

Vieira, William 2:12

Vien, Ginette 3:56

Villemaire, Roland 3:53

Vinslov, Nina A 3:85

Viola, Charles 3:21

Viola, Rose 3:47

Voynaud, Pierrette 3:55

Waddington, M .3:31

Wagenberg, R. H . 3:23

Wagner, Kathleen 3:46

Walkem, Forrest 3:31

Walker, Elizabeth 3:26

Walker, Howard 3:61

Walker, Micheline 3:26

Walkley (Mr./M.) 3:62

Wallot, Hubert 3:53

Ward, Michael 3:26

Ward, Norman 3:14

Ward, William 3:20

Wark, Brian 3:26

Wasteneys, Geoffrey 3:43

Watson, Steve 3:28

Waywood, W 3:27

Wearn, Arnold 3:22

Webb, Howard 3:30

Wedderburn, H. A. J. 3:1

Weiland, Angelika 3:2

Westell, Anthony 3:40

Western Canada Party 3:85
Beck, G. K. J.

Westmount Action Committee 3:71
Carrothers, David

Whalen, Hugh 3:77

Wheaton, Robert 3:27

Whent, J. A . 3:48

White, Archie 2:16

White, Howard 3:78

White, Walter 3:23

White, W. E 3:70

Whitehorse Chamber of Commerce, Whitehorse, Yukon Territory 2:16
Hudson, R. E.

Wilkins, Robert 3:39

Williams, Dennis 3:87

Williams, Tom 3:40

Wilson, Doris 3:11

Wills, Harold A . 3:46

Wilton, Pam 2:16

Wilton, W. H 2:10

Windsor and District Labour Council (Legislative Committee) 3:23
Batterson, Les

Wing, George 2:16

Wing, Peter 3:31

Wishlaw, Jack 3:61

Wodiuk, William 3:61

Wong, Peter 3:26

Wood, Gary 3:46

Woods, John 3:34

World Federalists of Canada 3:83
Smyth, Ross

[Page 124]

World Federalists of Canada (Calgary Branch) 3:34
Macqueen, R. W.

World Federalists of Canada (Montreal Branch) 3:71
Arnopoulos, P. J.

Wright, Diana 3:14

Wright, L. H . 3:66

Wright, W. N. 3:62

Wrynn, Edward 3:80

Yaffe, L 3:90

Yalden, M F 2:3

Yate, Tom 3:87

Yip, Michael 3:87

Young, Aurele 3:80

Young Socialists 3:84
Poholko, Dave

Youth on Canada Committee (Burnaby, British Columbia) 3:27
Bishop, Robert
Hughes, Robert

Yukon Chamber of Mines 2:14
Hilker, R. G.
Robertson, H. David

Zacks, Ted 3:27

Zalm, William N. Vander 3:26

Zaseybida, N. (Mrs./Mme) 3:85

Zip, Martin 3:14

Zitouni, Sid A 3:69

Zivku, John 3:56

[Page 125]

APPENDIX E

List of other Submissions

The following are individuals and groups whose submissions were not printed since they did not testify before the Committee.

Académie ukrainienne libre des sciences, Winnipeg, Manitoba

Adams, D., Toronto, Ontario

Adams, D. R., Vancouver, British Columbia

Adie, Alan, Yorkton, Saskatchewan

Alberta Catholic School Trustees Association, Edmonton, Alberta

Alberta Teachers’ Association, Edmonton, Alberta

Alexander, John, Willowdale, Ontario

Anciens combattants de l’Armée, de la Marine et de l’Aviation du Canada, Unité 367 de Chambly, Québec

Andrews, Paul, Glovertown, Newfoundland

Ashby, Irene M., Toronto, Ontario

Ashworth, G. W., West Vancouver, British Columbia

Association Canadienne d’Hygiéne Publique, Toronto, Ontario

Association canadienne pour l’hygiéne publique, section de la Colombie-Britannique, Burnaby, Colombie-Britannique

Association contre l’avortement, Vancouver, Colombie-Britannique

Association Dentaire Canadienne, Toronto, Ontario Association des Commissions des Ecoles Bilingues d’Ontario, Ottawa, Ontario

Association des commissaires des écoles catholiques de l’Alberta, Edmonton, Alberta

Association des commissaires des écoles catholiques du Canada

Association des enseignants de l’Alberta, Edmonton, Alberta

Association des loyalistes de l’Empire uni du Canada, Toronto, Ontario

Association du barreau canadien, sous-section de la régionale de l’Ontario, droit constitutionnel et international, Toronto, Ontario

Association pour nos drapeaux du siècle, Victoria, Colombie-Britannique

Austin, R. W., Downsview, Ontario

Bailey, A. L., Burlington, Ontario

Baldwin, R. M. (Mr. and Mrs.) Ottawa, Ontario

Bande indienne de Cooks-Ferry, Colombie-Britannique

Barnabe, Claire M., Port Burwell, Northwest Territories

Baxter, Larry, Halifax, Nova Scotia

Bazinet, André

Beange, W., Wasaga Beach, Ontario

Bedi, A. D., Vancouver, British Columbia

Béland, J. N. Roland, Ottawa, Ontario

Bennett, Charles, St-Norbert, Manitoba

Bensh, S. A., Nanaimo, British Columbia

Bernard, Claude, Québec, Québec

Bond, Margaret, Toronto, Ontario

Bonhomme, R. L. Hull, Québec

Bonner, Grace, Toronto, Ontario

Bourgeois, Pierre, New Westminster, British Columbia

Bournival, Simon, Trois-Rivieres, Québec

Bowden, David, Vancouver, British Columbia

Bowen, J. A. C., Toronto, Ontario

Bowring, David, Oshawa, Ontario

British Columbia Parent-Teacher Federation, Burnaby, British Columbia

Brown, A. (Mr. & Mrs.) Scarborough, Ontario

Brown, Brian, Victoria, British Columbia

Brown, Richard A. C., Winnipeg, Manitoba

Buerting, James, Kipling, Saskatchewan

Burion, Yvonne, Dawson City, Yukon Territory

Campbell, Burt, Castlegar, British Columbia

Canadian Army, Navy and Air Force Veterans, Unit no. 367, Chambly, Quebec

Canadian Bar Association (Ontario Branch) Constitutional and International Sub-section, Toronto, Ontario

Canadian Catholic School Trustees’ Association

Canadian Dental Association, Toronto, Ontario

Canadian Home and School and Parent—Teacher Federation, Toronto, Ontario

Canadian Institute of Public Health Inspectors, Vancouver, British Columbia

Canadian League of Rights (Saskatoon Branch) Saskatoon, Saskatchewan

Canadian Public Health Association, British Columbia Branch, Burnaby, British Columbia

Canadian Public Health Association, Toronto, Ontario

Carder, Ralph, West Vancouver, British Columbia

Carignan, Louise, Montréal, Québec

Carrier, Jean, Thetford Mines, Québec

Carson, William, Vancouver, British Columbia

Chambly-Richelieu Protestant Board of School Commissioners, Richelieu, Québec

Chamber of Commerce of the Province of Quebec, Montreal, Quebec

Chambre de Commerce de la Province de Québec, Montréal, Québec

Chapeskie, H. J., Barry’s Bay, Ontario

Checklin, G. A., Vancouver, British Columbia

Chree, Anna, West Vancouver, British Columbia

Clavelle, W., Montréal, Québec

Coles, L. H., (Mrs.), Ottawa, Ontario

Commissaires des écoles protestantes, Saint-Jean, Québec

Commonwealth Society for Economic Education, Aldergrove, British Columbia

Communist Party of Canada, Vancouver, British Columbia

Conseil des écoles protestantes de Bedford, Bedford, Québec

Conseil des écoles protestantes de Chambly-Richelieu, Richelieu, Québec

Conseil des écoles protestantes de Cowansville, Cowansville, Québec

Conseil des Territoires du Nord—Ouest, Yellowknife, Territoires du Nord—Ouest

Conseil du Patronat du Québec, Montréal, Québec

Conseil scolaire regional des Cantons de l’est, Sherbrooke, Québec

Coolidge, R. B. Montréal, Québec

Cooks-Ferry Indian Band, British Columbia

Copeman, G. W., Langley, British Columbia

Corbin, Frank, S. Nashwaaksis, New Brunswick

Coté, Georges, Cté Montmorency, Québec

Council of Employers of the Province of Quebec, Montreal, Quebec

Council of the Northwest Territories, Yellowknife, Northwest Territories

Cowan, A. W., Ottawa, Ontario

Cowansville Protestant School Board, Cowansville, Quebec

Creed, George E., Stoney Creek, Ontario

Crosby, Emily, Ganges, British Columbia

[Page 126]

Croyen, Peter, Newmarket, Ontario

Crysler, Marylou, Font Hill, Ontario

Curtis, Hugh A., Saanich, British Columbia

Dafoe, G.A., Fort Coquitlam, British Columbia

D’Amour, Joseph, Montréal, Québec

Danis, Eugene J., Champs-neufs, Abitibi—Est, Québec

Davidson, Douglas, Calgary, Alberta

Davidson, Nora, Calgary, Alberta

Davies, Alan, T., Toronto, Ontario

Davis, Pierre, Sudbury, Ontario

Decaire, G.A., Ridgeway, Ontario

Delparte, D., Abbotsford, British Columbia

Derrah, Brian, Bristol, New Brunswick

De Weerdt, Henry-Eugene, Toronto, Ontario

Dickinson—Starkey, P.J., Vancouver, British Columbia

Dolan, Tom, Golden, British Columbia

Donnelly, Robert, Calgary, Alberta

Drummond, Elizabeth R., Vancouver, British Columbia

Dumas, Albert, Québec, Québec

Dunseath, P.S., Ottawa, Ontario

Dunsmore, Lily N., Toronto, Ontario

Early, Joe, White Rock, British Columbia

Eastern Townships Regional School Board, Sherbrooke, Quebec

Easton, Norman, M. (Mr. and Mrs.), Regina, Saskatchewan

Ecole secondaire catholique centrale, Lethbridge, Alberta

Ecole secondaire Hill Park (classe d’histoire), Hamilton, Ontario

Edgar, K.M. (Mrs.), Vancouver, British Columbia

Elias, Mildred (Mrs.), Vancouver, British Columbia

Environmental Crisis Operation

Evans, M., Chilliwack, British Columbia

Féderalistes mondiaux du Canada (section de Winnipeg), Winnipeg, Canada

Fédération canadienne des parents et des enseignants, Toronto, Ontario

Fédération des parents et des enseignants de la Colombie-Britannique, Burnaby, Colombie-Britannique

Fischer, Ernst, Oshawa, Ontario

Fischer, Hugo, Ottawa, Ontario

Ford, Arthur, London, Ontario

Forget, Claude E., Montréal, Québec

Forsyth, Smirle A., Amherst View, Ontario

Fortin, L. Florian, St—Come Liniere, Québec

Fowler, L.A., Calgary, Alberta

Franco, Guilda, Ritzville, Washington, U.S.A.

Franklin, Lottie, Fredericton, New Brunswick

Frenette, Marc-Andre (Mme), Quebec, Quebec

Garrie, Eva B., Winnipeg, Manitoba

Galay, L., Victoria, British Columbia

Gélinas, Claude, Laval, Quebec

Gemme, Andrea, St-Amable, Cté de Vercheres, Québec

George, Grace, Winnipeg, Manitoba

Gibson, R.D., Winnipeg, Manitoba

Glave, F.E., Hazeldean, Ontario

Godin, Jean, Trois-Rivieres, Québec

Gohier, Noel, Montréal, Québec

Graham, I.M., Montreal, Quebec

Grand Orange Lodge du Canada, Toronto, Ontario

Grand Orange Lodge of Canada, Toronto, Ontario

Green E. (Mrs.), Victoria, British Columbia

Green, H.V., Victoria, British Columbia

Group of students, Catholic General High School, Lethbridge, Alberta
Dimnik, Martha
Fauville, John
Hartman, Ray
Machaljewski, Joyce
Miron, David
Pittman, Delphine
Previsch, Nick
Reilander, Roger
Previsch, Nick
Reilander, Roger
Schefter, Annemarie
Seaman, John
Sefrer, Margie

Group of Toronto Students: Groupe d’étudiants de Toronto:
Apurtl, J.
Furbush, Nancy
Graham, Lloyd, B.
Ho, Emeline
Hutchings, Mary
MacLellan, Allan
McQuade, Linda
Partington, Karin
Robbins, J. Robbins
Sharkman, Janice
Smiley, Jack

Haas, T. L.

Hall, Herbert L., Victoria, British Columbia

Hamilton, Jock, Victoria, British Columbia

Haney, Richard, Toronto, Ontario

Hanson, W. J., Sharon, Ontario

Hardy, Phyllis Montreal, Quebec

Harragin, Tennant, Vancouver, British Columbia

Hauser, Daphne, Ottawa, Ontario

Hea, H., Victoria, British Columbia

Heaton, Joyce, Montreal, Quebec

Heffler, Wendy, Ottawa, Ontario

Henderson, R. C., Vancouver, British Columbia

Hill Park Secondary School (History Class), Hamilton, Ontario

Hollaman, E. H. (Mrs.), Don Mills, Ontario

Holtslander, Dale, Edmonton, Alberta

Hooper, W. H., Courtenay, British Columbia

Hovell, Anne, ‘Esquimalt, British Columbia

Hubert, Kenneth, Ottawa, Ontario

Hughes, C. P., Ottawa, Ontario

Hull, Mary H. (Mrs.), Saskatoon, Saskatchewan

Hunt, C. Warren, Calgary, Alberta

Idington, John, Salmon Arm, British Columbia

Institut canadien des inspecteurs d’hygiene publique, Vancouver, Colombie-Britannique

Jardine, Robert, Calgary, Alberta

Johnson, E. M. (Mrs.), Ottawa, Ontario

Johnson, S. E., Ottawa, Ontario

Jollow, Muriel, Brandon, Manitoba

Jones, Hugh, Prince George, British Columbia

Jones, R. M. P., DeWinton, Alberta

Jones, Isabelle, Victoria, British Columbia

Jones, Trevor, Victoria, British Columbia

Jones, Winnifred, Calgary, Alberta

Johnston, Louise Mary, Vancouver, British Columbia

Juergens, D. H., Calgary, Alberta

Kan, Leslie, Vancouver, British Columbia

Kendrew, G. R., Sooke, British Columbia

Kenney, William E., Calgary, Alberta

Keys, G. E. (Mrs.), Regina, Saskatchewan

Kingerlee, John (Mr. and Mrs.), Sidney, British Columbia

Kovacs, Istvan, Toronto, Ontario

Krauseneck, Hans, Clearwater, British Columbia

Laatsch, H. K., Calgary, Alberta

Lanthier, Aldéi, Montréal, Québec

Latham, W. D. (Mrs.), Burnaby, British Columbia

Lebeau, Jules, Montréal, Québec

Lee, D. B., Sooke, British Columbia

Leguerrier, René, Ottawa, Ontario

Lemieux, Barney, White Rock, British Columbia

Lexow, Kjell, Pointe Claire, Québec

Ligue canadienne des droits (section de Saskatoon), Saskatoon, Saskatchewan

[Page 127]

Ligue monarchiste du Canada, (Section de Régina) Regina, Saskatchewan

Lingley, Robert, Saint John West, New Brunswick

Lutes, Allen, W., Moncton, New Brunswick

Lynch, Thomas, Whitbourne, Newfoundland

Macdonald, R. S., Victoria, British Columbia

Macfarlane, W. E., Beaconsfield, Québec

MacIntosh, Freda, Toronto, Ontario

MacKenzie, D., London, Ontario

Mackenzie, D. D., Vancouver Island, British Columbia

Mahaffy, Bryan, Ottawa, Ontario

Mahood, H., Richmond, British Columbia

Mallard, Gwen, Vancouver, British Columbia

Manis, Martin, Montréal, Quebec

Manning, Louis, Toronto, Ontario

Marshall, Donald, Doe River, British Columbia

Martin, J., Calgary, Alberta

Martin, James, Montréal, Quebec

Mather, R. W. (Mrs.), Nashwauksis, New Brunswick

Matte, Ed, Prince George, British Columbia

Mayer, Philippe, Montréal, Québec

Meindl, Leopold, Vancouver, British Columbia

Mika, John, Ottawa, Ontario

Mizne, L. A., Montréal, Quebec

Moase, Thomas, Toronto, Ontario

Monarchist League of Canada, (Humboldt-Muenster Branch), Meunster, Saskatchewan

Monarchist League of Canada, (Régina Branch), Regina, Saskatchewan

Monarchist League of Canada, (Silton Branch), Silton, Saskatchewan

Morton, James, West Vancouver, British Columbia

Moscovitch, Marie, West Vancouver, British Columbia

McArthur, Thomas C., Calgary, Alberta

McCloskey, T. J., British Columbia

McDougall, A. K., London, Ontario

McEwen, A. (Mrs.), Regina, Saskatchewan

McKenzie, Bruce J., Scarborough, Ontario

McLaughlin, R. N., Toronto, Ontario

McLeod, D. A., Regina, Saskatchewan

McLeod, Elta R., Sault Ste. Marie, Ontario

McLewin, Anna, Ottawa, Ontario

McMurchy, R. C., Toronto, Ontario

McMurran, James, London, Ontario

McNainy, E. (Mrs.), Coquitlam, British Columbia

Naay Kens, J. J., Prince George, British Columbia

Nadler, Joseph Y., Montréal, Quebec

National Union of Christian Schools, British Columbia District, Burnaby, British Columbia

Neal, James, Cultus Lake, British Columbia

Neidermayor, Frances, Timmins, Ontario

Neild, P. J., North Vancouver, British Columbia

Neish, Elgin, Vancouver, British Columbia

Nelligan, L. P., Montréal, Quebec

Neulan, A.,

Newell, R. H., Mellgrove, Ontario

Noble, Madaline (Mrs.), Richmond, British Columbia

Noquet, John, Montreal, Quebec

North America Union Party, Toronto, Ontario

O’Brien, Evelyn (Mrs.), Ottawa, Ontario

O’Gorman, Denis K., Vancouver, British Columbia

Olson, A. O., Toronto, Ontario

Ontario Separate School Trustees’ Association, Toronto, Ontario

Opération environnement

Opperman, Norman (Mr. & Mrs.), Toronto, Ontario

O’Reilly, J. V., Prince George, British Columbia

Osborn, E. M., Victoria, British Columbia

Our Flags of the Century Association, Victoria, British Columbia

Pacey, J., Vancouver, British Columbia

Palmgren, Carl H., Victoria, British Columbia

Parsons, Lucille, Vancouver, British Columbia

Parti communiste du Canada, Vancouver, Colombie-Britannique

Parti de l’union de l’Amérique du Nord, Toronto, Ontario

Paul, L., Saskatoon, Saskatchewan

Peachey, Edmund, Islington, Ontario

Perkins, Harry Grant, Frobisher Bay, Northwest Territories

Peterson, B. N., Calgary, Alberta

Piché, Arthur, Québec, Québec.

Pinnell, John E., Lachine, Quebec

Pitcairn, Brian, Dartmouth, Nova Scotia

Plante, Jean Alonzo, Toronto, Ontario

Pond, William, Ottawa, Ontario

Powell, C. E. (Miss), Winnipeg, Manitoba

Protestant Board of School Commissioners of Bedford, Bedford, Quebec

Protestant Board of School Commissioners, St. Johns, Quebec

Protestant School Municipality of Chaleur Bay, New Carlisle, Quebec

Protestant School Municipality of Pontiac County West, Campbells Bay, Quebec

Protestant School Municipality of Trois-Rivieres, Cap-de-la-Madeleine, Trois-Rivieres, Québec

Purdon, E. J. (Mrs.), Pouasson, Ontario

Purkis, Walter L., Verdun, Quebec

Quittner, J. K., Toronto, Ontario

Racz, Frank, St. Thomas de Joliette, Quebec

Reconfederation, Picton, Ontario

Reconfédération, Picton, Ontario

Reeves, W. F., Surrey, British Columbia

Reid, W. C., Bowser, British Columbia

Renaud, Leo J., Chatham, Ontario

Riverim, George Henri, Arvida, Quebec

Roberts, Gordon, Ottawa, Ontario

Robson, John C., Toronto, Ontario

Rudelsheim, J. L., North Vancouver, British Columbia

Ruggles, Susan

Ryder, S., Ottawa, Ontario

Sarton, M. F., Campbell River, British Columbia

Savasvuo, Peter, Toronto, Ontario

Say, Vivian I., (Mrs), Vancouver, British Columbia

Scott, Douglas, Hamilton, Ontario

Scott, Marjorie, Asbestos, Quebec

Seafarers’ International Union of Canada, Montreal, Quebec

Seligman, A. L., Vancouver, British Columbia

Shearwan, Marilyn E., Edmonton, Alberta

Shelly, Reg., Vancouver, British Columbia

Silbernagel, Jonathan, Vancouver, British Columbia

Simpson, Henry, Timmins, Ontario

Simpson, Lyslie, G. (Mrs), Vancouver, British Columbia

Sims, Esther C., Winnipeg, Manitoba

Sinay, Jack, Montreal, Quebec

Singer, Allan, Montreal, Quebec

Skelton, Len, Victoria, British Columbia

Skuce, R., Victoria, British Columbia

Smart, Philip, Toronto, Ontario

Smelt, Norman, Vancouver, British Columbia

Smith, Douglas N., Drummondville, Québec

Snedker, J. E., Regina, Saskatchewan

Socialist Labor Party of Canada, Toronto, Ontario

Society for Pollution and Environmental Control, Campbell River Branch, British Columbia

Société pour le bien public et l’éducation dans le domaine de l’économie, Aldergrove, Colombie-Britannique

Société pour vaincre la pollution, Montréal, Québec

Soutter, D. (Miss), Winnipeg, Manitoba

Spencer, J.A., Magrath, Alberta

Spiridonakis, Basile, G., Sherbrooke, Quebec

St. George, J.J., Deer Lake, Newfoundland/Terreneuve

[Page 128]

Stephaniuk, Bernard, Wishart, Saskatchewan

Stevens, John R., Burnaby, British Columbia/Colombie-Britannique

Stewart, K.N., (Mrs), Fernie, British Columbia

Stewart, Patrick David, Victoria, British Columbia

Stone, E. Georgia, Toronto, Ontario

Stone, Ida K., Toronto, Ontario

Storozuk, E., Winnipeg, Manitoba

Stovel, W.D., Calgary, Alberta

Stranack, R.S. (Mrs.), Ladner Delta, British Columbia/Colombie-Britannique

Styles, Effie L., Vancouver, British Columbia/Colombie-Britannique

Sullivan, K.H., (Mrs), Ottawa, Ontario

Symons, R.D., Silton, Saskatchewan

Symthies, R.E., Victoria, British Columbia

Systems Research Group, Toronto, Ontario

Talbot, W., Pointe Claire, Quebec

Taylor, Sandra

Tennant, W., Kamloops, British Columbia

Terry, Ilace (Miss), Victoria, British Columbia

Terry, Robin, Victoria, British Columbia

Tetley, William, Montreal, Quebec

Theckedath, George, Ottawa, Ontario

Thomson, Donald, Victoria, British Columbia

Thompson, Gordon L., Windsor, Ontario

Thomson, Marion A. (Mrs.), Toronto, Ontario

Thuillier, H.S., Victoria, British Columbia

Tittley, Georges, Ottawa, Ontario

Truman, Thomas, Hamilton, Ontario

Ukrainian Free Academy of Sciences, Winnipeg, Manitoba

Union internationale des marins canadiens

Union nationale des écoles chrétiennes, District de la

Colombie-Britannique, Burnaby, Colombie-Britannique United Empire Loyalists Association of Canada, Toronto, Ontario

Villeneuve, Berthold, Jonquiere, Québec

Vickery, H. (Miss), Winnipeg, Manitoba

“Voice of the Unborn” Association, Vancouver, British Columbia

Wall, Jack, Calgary, Alberta

Wardle, Thomas H. Scarborough, Ontario

Watts, G. K., Lethbridge, Alberta

Weiss, George, R., Beaupré, Québec

Weninger, B., Lethbridge, Alberta

Wensley, William K., Lac Vert, Saskatchewan

Wertheimer, Leonard, Toronto, Ontario

Wessel, H. (Mrs.), Monte Creek, British Columbia

Westerhof, Wilma L. T. K., Toronto, Ontario

Whitmore, B. G., Winnipeg, Manitoba

Williams, Gordon D., Regina, Saskatchewan

Wills, Harold A., Cochrane, Ontario

Wilson, F. J. L., Victoria, British Columbia

Wilson, Raymond T., Hamilton, Ontario

Wintermeyer, G., Ottawa Ontario

Wisla, A., Vancouver, British Columbia

Wolfe, Evan, Vancouver, British Columbia

Woods, H. D., Fredericton, New Br.unswick

Woodward, E. F. (Mrs.), Little Fort, British Columbia

World Federalists of Canada (Winnipeg Branch), Winnipeg, Manitoba

Wozney, Stanley, Vancouver, British Columbia

Wright, Conrad P., Ottawa, Ontario

Wushke, Ralph, C., Wapella, Saskatchewan

Yaroslava, R., Alliston, Ontario

Zuzens, Didzus, Winnipeg Manitoba

A copy of the relevant Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence (Issues Nos. 1 to 18 of the 2nd Session and Issues Nos. 1 to 94 of the 3rd Session) is returned and a copy of the Minutes of Proceedings (Issue No. 1) of the present Session is tabled.

Respectfully submitted,

GILDAS L. MOLGAT MARK MacGUIGAN

Joint Chairmen

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