“The Canadian Confederation”, The Ottawa Union (4 November, 1865)
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Date: 1865-11-04
By: Ottawa Union
Citation: “The Canadian Confederation”, The Ottawa Union (4 November, 1865)
Other formats: TBA
THE CANADIAN CONFEDERATION. (From the Examiner.)
We were the first to doubt the expediency or possibility of the great Canadian Confederation. That project was, on its first announcement, so loudly welcomed by the press in general that we somewhat misdoubted our judgment in objecting to it. But time has rolled on, and a large portion of the press, if not the majority, has come to feel and put forth the very scruples which we at first ventured to pronounce.
We said at the time that if the Confederation of British America was a military measure against the United States it was not calculated to be effectual. The Americans would have full choice of the point of attack, and the time of it, and could easily choose both in such a manner as to preclude the ocean provinces from furnishing any aid to the internal provinces, and vice versa. If there were doubts of our ability to defend the Canadians, or enable them to defend themselves, there could be none whatever of our ability to defend the capital, the mines, and the provinces of Nova Scotia. For these and more reasons than it is desirable to dwell upon, we questioned the policy of our favouring the idea of a Confederation.
That it would not make the entire group of colonies stronger against the only enemy which could assail them was apparent. But it was also apparent that the Confederation, if weak against the Americans, would be very strong against ourselves. Supposing the Confederation formed even in project, there was really nothing with regard to those great regions which we could prudently refuse. If the Confederation, even while yet in posse, demanded to be allowed to purchase the Hudson’s Bay territory, how could it be refused? If they sought to stretch their jurisdiction over the continent to the Pacific, including British Columbia, would it be wise to raise the question of our maintaining that territory independent? All these things have been asked, all these things have been yielded. And what have we got in exchange? Nothing; not the Confederation, nor the tho certainty of Canada’s exerting itself to the utmost for the purpose of defence. We have promised, ceded territory, and shown the Canadians very clearly that we hold to them merely for pride and honor’s sake. They know us, our intentions, our pusillanimity, our economy, and, at the same time, our desire to retain the name of an empire, and our higgling to preserve even that at the least possible cost and risk. What is union, what are sovereignty and allegiance worth upon such conditions?
The Canadians are, however, anxious for the Confederation. It must be important for them to direct and become completely masters of the maritime States. These do not see the matter in the same light. What are our gains, they ask, by having our interests and counsels merged in those of Montreal or Ottawa? They are under the American thrall; New Brunswick is not. New Brunswick, with the greatest sacrifice, could not save the Canadians from whatever fate or sovereignty they might assign thereunto. But New Brunswick may wish to be mistress of its own fate,— and not find itself thrown as a waif or a make-weight, into a bargain or a surrender which would annihilate it. We are not surprised at the objections of the provinces, but more surprised that we should make so light of them.
What is the last news we hear from Upper Canada? It is that all the strong arms and sturdy fellows are [hiking?] to the United States, attracted by the great want and high rewards offered to labour. The New Brunswickers do not participate in that dangerous temptation. But we would throw them into it by facilitating not only their political union, but their physical junction through communication with the interior by an expensive and unremunerating railway. We have gone so far in the business that we cannot now turn upon the Canadians and bid them nay; but it is really too weak of England to be meddling and preaching, and praying for what is clearly no English advantage, but something, in all probability, quite the contrary.