Constitutional Conference, A Briefing Paper on Constitutional Review Activities and Discussions within the Continuing Committee of Officials (8-10 December 1969)

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Date: 1969-12-08
By: Secretariat of the Conference
Citation: Constitutional Conference, A Briefing Paper on Constitutional Review Activities and Discussions within the Continuing Committee of Officials (Ottawa: 8-10 December 1969).
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Cons tièuHô nàl Confereñce:
‘5 December. 1959

A Brviefing
, 2g ; .,
Cons titutionaif. ‘Reviéüàà
1E ,

Discussions ywithin thé Continuihg V

17.0.4 3°,! 488

0mn 2

Ottawa, Càflada,
November 26, 1969..


I have the hànouryto submit tq the ..
Constitutional Conférence the atiàched sècre àry’a
Briefing Pàper. ‘This papèr7has heen.prèpn ‘_kk
the requesi cf thé CoñtïñuÏhgÏCQmmittéé’5f f1c1q1a;‘
to inform First Hiniàteràyôf cbñstitutibnà1’réÿ1eÿ
activities and of discussions’wi€hin the Cbntinüinq
Committee. [A ‘ I


SCC smcxsmnmfr 01? m: coNsnTÙnoNALcomgmcE äîuTà””Ÿ l ÿ

Heniy F. Dav1e,
Secretary of the

The Right Honourab1e‘P.E. Trudeau, P;C.,
Chairman bf the Constitutional Conference,
Ottawa, Ontario. -‘

m4313? 1a sf“

The constitutional Review «cf Àcïîtzÿxyities 7 v _ o
The Spending Power

The Method o for } Deteminmgoooa ongéagonaï .
Consensus -‘ Geiieral Gongiâerjations ‘_ ‘

Alternative- Foïmulae foi‘: Î.
a National Consensus . ‘ J _

ïOtfier Àpproàcheà to Jkatermähiîing à
National consensus

Compensation‘ in Non-—Î’artïç5ï,pàt3ngf1>roÿihcè’ à

Resional Disparitiesà — æheoflàtteÿxæÿaï opfiçigataon

The Taxîng Powers

‘ brîefingpaÿezfiïïagsummaÿy.

‘ ‘or ‘Unis-document, to regiflecîclàs closelyï; p _
‘_views and commente expressedïfbyflthe memb 510:6.’

V _ o une .Ï—”_l969‘,— trie ocana; _
Gonference referma ‘a zxumber thefco’ t

Commï’tt’ee_ .01’ {Officîals oroxä‘ hergexäminätïon. _
zvtaport on discussion

purpose 01‘ ‘ thi—sjbrie1îing çape
cônceming the se ” questions .‘

.’ It ghasabeen ,as’sum

the primary mçthod l’or ‘ oj’
worlb fbo» thçæçflonstitutïona
through . ïerings ‘Îby y
Firstfllïinlgters. fgàt ‘the ain
that 15.17 Jwou1d’_be’ usefulflt hav
preparedlaylgthe Secretariat 01€ the
which coula proÿide. 011e’ s0 ce’ __ _ _
concerning the’ Committee ‘s ‘w A kï hich Âwoüldgb H
all governments; _ ‘ > g . ‘

_f_ Effheïmain ectifionsro
the subjects “ci; the. 3p’
The _purpose or fiheseïséc
considérations aand ‘the
durins ‘the l Continuing
questions ireferred çto “i1:

. Anàther; secicioondescr_

been undertaken “responsa-
Constitutional’ Confezÿence ,1:
related . t0, the subject y o

, It Lwÿasîoæaïàoya ooñàidereÿ

thatj have taken placersînc
Gonstîtutional _’ Gonîexfence’

_ he.

while Levei-y érfärtÿà/Ïias Znïïnaoîye, À À

responsïbility ‘for the document Tests wifihfibheîseoréta ‘ ‘ ‘
of the ConstitutionalŒîbnferenceazy ‘ ‘ ‘ ‘

.. 2 ..

This section gives a swnmaxzy of constituÿlonalyreview
activities that have taken place sincestheseconâ meeting or:
the Constitutional Conference in Februargyà 1969p Ileports on ‘
sctivities up to that time are containednin‘ühelleportÿof
the Continuîng Committee or Officiels andÿthtæsecretarpfls
Briefing Paper which were tabled et the February Conference.

The Constitutional Gonference

The members or the Constitutional conrerencé ‘met ‘in an Ï

informa]. working session :with ‘officiels on‘ June 1l and ’12, 1969. ‘

The conclusions of 17h31; working session, iïogether ‘wäth the ‘ v
conclusions of the two open eonferencesin Isbruary 1968
and Februazy 1969, are appended t0 this paper. ‘ ‘

Committees of . Ministezre ‘

In accordance with conclusions or —the îconîerence in
Febnzazy 1969, four Committees of Ministers have Ïbeen ‘esta-
blished. T0 date, these Committees have met ‘as îollowe‘:

1. Committee or Ministers on Fwmdamental Rights’:

– First meeting: ‘May 28 – 29, 1969.
— Second meeting: flovember 5 – 4, 1969.

2. Gommittee or Minïsters on _7Ehe..Judicia:7: v

– First meeting: May‘ 29, “I969. _
-— Second meeting: November 4, 1969.

5. Committee of Ministers on Qfficial Languages:

— First meeting: H93 27, 1969.
– Second meeting: Nojrember 6, 1969.

4. Committee or Minieters on the Senate:
— First meeting?’ May 26, 1969.

These Commîttees have reported separately on theiz‘
progress to date.

The Continuinq Committee of Officiels

Since Februazy l969,_ the Continuingflomnitvztee has inet
four times, on April l6 —- l8, May 22 – 23, September 30 –
October 1, and November l7 — 19. V

A17 the rirst two meetings, the Committee concentrated on
the general subjects of ïthe taxing power, the spending power
and regional disparitïes, fin ‘accordance with the priorlties
established by the Constitutional Conference a1: rite meeting
lest February. ‘ . ‘

A1: “che lest. two meetings, theoco
primazrily ywith the‘ specificwquest’ n
taxing and spending powers ïanyd _ y
were identifiedyrby the FirstÂVIini t;
session in June. The rollowing sec _ y y y
paper report on the workïoiflthe ‘Commit eeyon hese questions.

Also,_ et its lest meeting,_‘_the (Ion 11111 gy
an exploratory examinstion 502€ ‘theï ‘
and social services based onkaîwofit‘

he fe era delegationsnd ïongce .
In view of the complexity _o.f ‘bhe’ s
t0 be of a preliminazjy nature and
briefing paper.‘ » , ‘

_ S1113 Gommyi-‘oiîeee

The following meetings Ïor eysu’
have elso been held æiuring y1969:.
(1) The Sub-Coinmitteeon Official’ an
and on October 2 4- 5,‘ _ ‘ _ ‘

(2) The Sub-Committée on Sales Taxes Ïynyxei; l’on 1’922.
(a) me Sub-Committee on Death Duties Lxiet onl-dctober 23;,

-914. ..


when the Constitutional Conîerence discussed the
subject Oi- nœhe SpendingPoweif”, lat the Workingk Session

held in June 1969, i1: recoroeo. they following conclusions ‘

with respect to the power oi‘ theyParliament oi‘ Canada

to make conditionel grants to provincial governments:

“It was generally agreed thst the Parliament
of Canada should continue fboy have the power
to make conditional-“grants fbozprovincial
govermnents, provided there is ‘a ‘satisfactory
formula for detemining a national consensus
in faveur of particular programmes, and
provided there is a satisfactory.formula Ior
compensation in nonqparticipating provinces.

with respect to the formula forydetermining
the consensus, there wass—ag—reement— thatuthe
Parliament oi‘ Canada ‘andthje provincial, — —
legislatures —woul<î_ be the appropriate bodies
to detemine ywhether a consensus existe, and
there wasegeneral agreement‘ thst the formula
should reflect the regional character of the
country. However, one province ‘stated that
while it agreed with the principle of
establishing a consensus, it considered that
the formula for amending the :Constitution
might well provide the basis for reaching
consensus. It was further agreedthat the
Continuing Gommittee ofûfîicials should look
again at alternativeiormulae.

There was general agreement that there should

be no fiscal penalty upon the people oi‘ the

non-participating provinces and ‘chat the ways

of achieving this would ‘be discussed at

future meetings.”
In accordance with thé specific instruction from the
Conîerence, the Continuing Committee has given additional
study t0 alternative approaches for determining whenàa
national consensus existe favouring proposed sharedecost
programmes. It has also given iurther attention to the ques-g
tion of compensation in non-participating provinces.
The paragraphs which îolloæsfiypresent inisulnmary îorm they

main points which arose ‘aumng the Committeväs discùssions}


‘ lîàitiobhal

The Method for’ DeteI-mining
i “dons.

Consensus – General flans”,

In general terms, two main [points _o;’t“;iiïe1yrvykk‘wei’e ieflected

in the Committeeÿs discussions‘. Soma xdkéiekgkafiignys favouréa
the approach of writing inboÏifieïCoÀfiÈÈitutibh à Specific
formula for determining a. ziatibiialiizzäjozisehsïis on new
shared-costlprogrlamunes aIk-eäasibf ‘x’ ‘ïisiveëÿibvirylcial
jurisdiction. Other âelegatibniä-géipreèsiedflèôiicéäzäi about

any coynstifyutiohal limitation

the Parliament oî Canada, and sugigésfeÿcîiùstéakäkthat
appropriate consultative or admiràxistzfativé arraflgäements

coula be devised to ensure that viixcial ‘views _.were

‘caken into account before zàlew QBÎJàreda-yèoàt‘ progrämmes were
initiated in areas of provincäial ï uiisdiction. ifiheie was

some queètion as to whether‘ thé’ Cîônÿstitutibnai «Conîerencvs
instruction left the Committeeïfiithäytähè latitude to examine

the latter point of view. iït-ààas ‘thoùght; howeÿer, that

the Committee should not assuäzxe” hàfb “thé; ‘Ïaiteimative
formulae” referred to in theicçàñi” rénceîs conclusion meant
only mathematical trype formulaewhichvwould be written into

the Constitution.

Those favouring a constitutioñal,îïjmùlaimàde thé following
points: _ À À à
(a) I1: is the essence ofäîederàïisïrxthät soie power

must be reserved from the rule of« thepajoxiiîzÿ. Dissatis-
faction ‘caaused ‘by the use oi‘ thé îèhtieryalisjnending pçwer in
the pas‘: was one cf tige main raisons fôrieumching ’

the constitutional review. The aäpproach would
provide‘ for acfcion in the natiohaï ihfienrest in_ areas’ 01’
provincial jurisdibtion, ÿhilègîviniägfsome assurànce to
those who were concerned abouicithe pôtential erosion oi‘

provincial power through the eäïercise ci‘ the federal

spending power.


(b) There would be certain prsäçitical diffioulties

in implementing other angiroachessy‘ For exèäiämpîÿe; it would

be very difficult to dsfine thé term “consultation” in a
way whioh would ensurè a common understandiligzof tÿhat,

was involved or a ‘general agreement as toiwhsn säaityiàsfactory

consultation had been carried out.

(c) The use of a formula‘ would ensure thàt, consultation
would take place, because‘ it coold not bel ‘eamekcted that
Parliament woulâ debate a new sharedacost programme
proposal unless consultations had shown ‘chat tàhefproposal.

was likely to be acceptedÿby moStVpI-Àovinoäes.‘

(d) The- use of a formula coula‘, help to ensurevàdeqùate

recognition of regionàl interests.

Those not favouring ‘a constitutional‘ fomulæïïänado the

following points:

(a) It was necessaxzy, t0 ensure cthe ïzrell-ftei
country as a whole, that the federal govoinnäjen lyîshàoiuld
retain ‘a general, unrestricted Vspending powezfi _
coula exercise in the nàtional interest. Theninterest ci‘
the provinces could be sufficiéntly protected a _
constitutional obligation were plakcäed ‘on ‘thé_.fedei’àl_
government to consult the provincial govemments conceming

matters coming within their jurisdiction.

(b) Any formula would ‘be cumbersome immature Vandwould
prevent the country from reacting quickly to moet new

national needs.

(c) The formula approach could mean that thero would be

no new shared-cost programmes oi‘ national scope.

(d) A formula which was entrenched at this time could
prove to be inappropriate for conditions in the future,
and it might then take a long time to make any adjustments,

due to the usual difficulties in amending constitutions.

(e) There would be a problem in Énowing uhen the formula.
should be applied. It would not always be clear, for
example, when a proposed programme was primarily “national”

or “regional” in nature.

The general observation was made that the discussion on a
consensus formula was complicated-by the fact that there

are two main oategories oi shared—cost programmes:

(a) programmes which are national in scope, to be

applied uniformly across the country (e.g. medicare),
(b) programmes of regional impact (e.g. ARDÀ or FRED)Ç

It was suggested that of major new
“national” shared-cost rrogrammes was largely past, and
that the emphasis in future would be on the regional type
of programme. If this were the case, perhaps a formula

for consensus would be largely redundant in future.


k the national interest; lparticularlyisiñnc

consensus .V Theïollowing paragraphsk

these suseestions andthè diScussi0yI1Ë‘îfÏÉl’a ed’: them.

Sonate Re gion Formula

One proposal was that the “deterxfiinatÿîoonoknf na ional

interest shoulcî be based onthe tal leklïarliament

of Canada and a specifiedîïnumber ‘cf; rovn)

“l le’ islatures r
in at least 5k of the Senatc: division ‘ y

k formula was

put forward by the Goveinmentyforîlanaçkïaàin v)” C’

Provincial Grants and the Spending-Powerä ci‘ ‘Parliamenti”.‘
The follokwing points arosein ‘the discussion vïof ‘this formula:

(a) Sonne delegationseæcipresÿsetï reservationsfre the

use of thé Sonate ‘divisionsyraÿsäyiaiyfr’ ke foromeasuring y
à i om

took thek position that une yoxietmgïakiÿiv ons Ïre not
appropriate for present-I-day Canada Cyläekoausegtfle Àkfkorm and
role of the Sonate wereuunderàreÿvkiew. respdnsäe to tnis
reservation, it was noted’ that the ijaroposal‘ kenviseged ‘a .

modification of the formula’, shouldî-tne définition or ïthe

Senate regions be changed;

Support in each Sonate division woulribe ydefined as follows
(5 out of 4 required): k

(1) approval by the Ontario Legislkature‘

(2) approval ‘oy —the Quebec Législature

(5) approval by at leastk twoleéislatures in theifour

Western Provinces,

(4) approval by legislatures in at Îleast two of the four’

Atlantic Hovinces having: a1; «legs: C16 ofŸthe 3o

Sonate seats L ol‘

atyïregion. . ï ”


(b) Some delegations sugglested that this ‘formula was
unnecessarily complex, and that a Lslmplerîformula would à
be preferable ‘oecause it would “be morereadily ‘undarstood
by the people. Another view Vwaa that soma complexîjby
had to be accepted, 5L1‘ oneloojèîctiÿepvlaààtoy xenaure that
the formula refleoted the regional charactei‘ oî‘ the

country .

(c) Doubt was expressed about thé appropriateness cf

‘che suggestionïshat, in two of ‘bhe :exi’stîlng‘syezlate divisionsgh

the affirmative vote of two ont of four provinces coùld—

‘be taken to represent a conserisus lna zçegiong Ixi- à
response to this, it was notedfhat 1711s formula was meant
to provide a measure cf whethei- or not thore pas szifficient
support for a proposal to warrant “initîatî-ng a sharedV-ecost
programme; a requirelfient for lbljprowäräincesà
would be too stringentufoäi‘ thläts: purpooye. ‘ ‘y—îlÿtkji‘vas pbfuyiteçï’
out that individual garovizgces woüldfilstîlllhave ‘thel option

or net participating, after a favoùralalè ‘cohsènsus haä

19a to the establishment or a’ newlapicgrammefl

(d) It was poinnteld out that itlwas possible onâér ‘chis

formula, with a certain combination ofÿotes, t0 gain a

consensus with the supportvoi‘ provinces representing lèyss
than half oi‘ the population ofl CanadaQ A1; ‘Kïhe Same time,
it was observed ‘chat this waspnot necessarily inappropriate,
depending on how muoh emphasiaait was desired to plakce on

the regional factor.
Population plus Provinces Formula

Another proposa]. was that a sharedJ-cost programme should
only be initiated with the approval or seven out of ten

provinces, containing at least 60% of the population.

This formula was put îorwarä,

Ontario in “The Ontario Pos n,_the Power”.

In the discussion of Ïfo vl thé: following points

(a) In support of this ‘formula-rit; observecl that it
had the virtue of simplioitylard yiitïlfavoiâediloiïiiiging the

Sonate or any other institution intolîthe’ computation.

(b) It was also sugçägestçedylkhÿa-fitllfihe

of provinces plus a peräcentag ‘ ‘_ pulaionyïdiä, tosome

extent, recognize thé regionaly- act r.“ ‘ Anotheiyview vas

that the formulawould not Ïàdeqùateljî-meet tlÿxel objective

of reflecting the regional lof the country.‘
(c) A number of aelegatioris ïwereiconceineçlthatnnder

this formula thePx-ovince ofiüntari coïuldïiti ‘future,

with the support of onlyfioneä. ï’ —a,ji1ù1uber=‘oi’-‘theàotherè
provinces, veto a shared-“ciajst progràmniespæoposàx.

(d) It was observed thatzaïtnze’ votïnïsiÿovyierrof ‘thé? Ismaller

provinces (in fletermining _ à _ p. vvrouldv, eiäfect, be
less under this formula ichanänn er Ïthe one previously à

considered .

Population plus RegionsFormula —

A further suggestion was that a il nsensus coula be achieved
if six provinces, including at leasktione ‘îronreach oi‘
Western Canada, Central‘ Canadalànd-the, Atlantic Provinces,

representing at least 51% or ‘the population, approve cf the

‘omfbination of a number

proposal. I1: was observedthat’ formula coula neet :some l

oi‘ the criticismrof the preäcetîinälfoîärolùla, in that it gave
greater recognition to the regional’ factor and out down on

the potential veto power loi‘ songe ‘provinces.



Regional Formula

Another possibility put forward in the’Ùommittee waspthat
the consensus oonld be based on tne approval or Parliament
and the legislatures (or a maäoritÿ‘ofv1egislatures) in

5 of 5 regions — the Atlantic Iîovinces, Québec, Ontario,
the Prairie Provinces, and Britisn Columbia. lt was
suggested that this approach would_give a better,reflection
or the current regional character or Canada, uhile avcîding

the complication of tieing the fornula to Sonate divisions.
Provinces Formula

Another suggestion was that the approvsl of lärliament

and of a majority of the provincial législatures should
constitute a consensus. The vieu was expresseâ that

all provinces are equal partners, as far as matters

under provincial jurisdiction are concerned, and therefore
a simple majority cf the provincial 1eàislatures’woulâ ‘”

be appropriate.

The point was also made that it’night be desirable for
any formula for measuring consensus to be similar to
whatever formula is devised for amending the Constitution.

Other Approaches to;Determining a National

‘ Consensus. —

Some delegations expressed the view‘that it would not be
wise to entrenoh in the Constitution a specifio arithmetical
formula (see the argunents_described in paragraph 5, above).

They suggested other approaches for taking provincial

interests into account, while leavingàthe federal governmentà

with the power to make conditional grants in areas of
provincial jurisdioticn, after certain conditions had been



_ 12 –

The view was expressed tnat improved arrangements for
federal—provincisl consultation oould be enough to resolve
the dissatisfactions which had led to the proposal of a
constitutional formula. One suggestion was that a constitu-
tional provision which required the federal government to
consult with the provinces prior‘to introducing a new shared-
cost programme might help to ensure improved consultation

in future. Another view envisaäed a three part approach

to shared—cost programmes, invclving:

(a) formal federal—provincial consultations,
(b) bilateral agreements betmeen the federal government
and individuel provinces, V

(c) compensation to nonnparticipating provinces.

Some delegations expressed doubt that it would be suîficient
to rely on consultative arrangements. For one thing, it would
be diffioult to define_what consultation is, or to”agree on
when it had taken place, or to determine witb sufficient
preoision the extent cf provincial approval or disapproval.

It was observed that consultation with different ministers
within a single government often elicits divergent views
within that government, which prevents the.determination cf

a consensus .

The thought was expressed that it might be possible to find
some approach which would provide a happy medium between the
rigidity of a formula and a complete relianoe on good faith
under consultative arrangements. One suggestion was that a
formula for measuring consensus could be established by some
form of administrative agreement, while a rigiâ constitutio-

nal provision oould be avoided.


ythe past, and that the courts éould bäe ‘useä i165

-l5 -*fl

In the course of ‘the diàcussïonä, _cexîtaïai îd‘eas_

appeared which are noted beldw_:y

(a) The suggestion was màdeàæthat if fohe Seknaî:
so that some or a1]. Loi‘ its mémbèrs i-reite Âap À

vincial govemmentà, thenpeàrhäapsäap ÿotey

‘ v».

might “De used t0 determâne ühétherè a {profinciar (zonsensusä ‘

exists favouring a shareziacoàt programme: ÿiïoposà—i.

(b) A suggestionwas also mæàde fthafc perha}; hé

could_ ‘be relied upon more fin the mîéterminatiôù r ‘finej

national interest. Theïviewc_.ÿias exprèssed atïdùrzfént

problems might be duè in,‘ pañ’ 1713i tact,

been too much relianèe oÈnLàd hoc politîcaîltägzrrangemenÿèà

have for the deirelopment oi‘ ‘appropriatye prîneîÿlésäyy à
Compensation in NoñèPaàftîcipating Piïôxyrirxcés‘. _ —

Several delegations enhzfpressed,thewîewthätîkfiiäacoñfieÿt ‘yoäf L

compensation in non-gpartïdipatîifiä Îboäryiräxçzyes zmiètftäôrñi an
integral part c1‘ any approachïtô vshaäecÿl-Àcoèt px-‘bgrammes

in future .

One or ‘bhe prïmary methods for ïycompensatigjnîbeîeïnl
considered would învoive paymèhts tq ‘indîviduals; Àîîndîei‘
17h15 approach, the federal‘ government Ïwodldà gay fzogthé pedpLlé; . à
of non-participating provinces grants equîÿalentv y à à
aggregate to the averaèe’ amoùhfi paiâyto gbïvériimehhts cf jparfirtäi-y Ï,
cipating provinces. In the kdiäcusàiçn, ähé_folnloïwfi.ngyy

were maâe to clarify thisîdïeà:

(a) It was observed that it would not be possible ytoà compizîte «

the exact amount of tax jaaidjby each individual taxpayçar

toward a particular pxfogfäme, [Paymentsä wouldilzàve 17:0!

go 1:0 indiviäua1s on soma dçémbgraphic ‘basis; It’ —was y
suggested ‘chàt paymehts might bè made 1:0 heads .01‘

famines by way ci‘ ‘alloxjlance jmaiklinès.



Tbe no relaitionship {ibetÿiè

w-oläll, -_-.V

Alternatîvely, ‘tîheogiä {zÿs ight tmäde in ooxinèotion. À

with încome ‘bai: ‘réytùÿcñs;

the ‘amount ofävincome
matter of ùsing tue” cçca

action to Àgét the,:‘4obàto_ .

I1; was suggested thafif i1: 1s

there shouliî be someyL-es’

the payments to indiÿidu

that non-participaytihog- provint: Mould- ‘nofb îbe—_àgpeñàliz_o‘d

by the method or ‘computatioÿn,’ as lfihÀeïoosîto _

programme increaséd;

There was some idiscussion o‘

should not be pamoäcàof

the legislatures had no
ohaËoCÏ-oost gæàpèsai k
t0 ensurè thyat à thé; y fedéfy‘
would not gbe ‘loft’ posiî: r;
mighth sïmply rérfissÿäïäàcfäct
cost prograjmoe àhogäî ‘boen

jndividuals Ïèhouio pot‘ Ïbe

action by a governmént, ‘an

loowëonäoiîéïo ähärfo
cost proposais vioulci be’îa_‘_oàtïsracfiôryoguäÿstîfiofiè ‘
a fihàhcial gnenaltÿ. ‘Jänotflîinoor. k à

tionaloblîgatîon or ‘finis Soi‘ moule: “or aa/Ïîbtffzil :3

value, since i1; was ‘âiffioùït on. ïàägo otigexïo à

fox-m oi‘ penalty than‘ îàzhé

oomflii‘ the

obligation were’ mit met’. à ‘ ‘


The main alternative approach which was (liscussed involved
the federal govemment paying directly to a provincial
government, which had rejected a programme, the fiscal
equivalent oi‘ the taxes collecteâ in thet province to
finance that programme. One variation oi‘ ‘thiäs idea vas
that at least 90% oi‘ what a province would ‘have received,
had it decided to participate in the programme, should

be paid directly to the provincial govenamhent‘.

The arguments which were expressed in faveur of compensation ‘

to individuels were as follows:

(a) The federal government has a dimctresponsîbility to ‘
those who pay taxes to it. If certain ci‘ its taxpaflyers
are denied the benefit from a general; scaïïadïkwide
programme, it is these taxpayers shoùldïbè com-
pensated, not a provincial govennnent. ‘à o

(b) It would be illogical not toi make the payments t0

individuels, since the propospal for‘ coinpensation Îxad

been developed to meet the criticism, made in past years’; 1

that the residents cf a province were penalized when
their provincial govenment decided n01: to’ participate
in a shared-cost programme. h k
(c) A shared-cost arrangement 1s designed to compensate
particular provincial governments for adkapting their
priorities and/or progremmes to, an agreednationa].
interest. It would be illogical to compensate
governments cf non—par‘bicipating provinces for not
adapting their prioritiesoand/orprogrammes to the
agreed national interest; this could undermine the

possibility of achieving a national consensus.


The arguments which were expressed in favour of compensation_

_ 16 _

to governments were_as follows:




It would be simpler ana less costly to make one large
payment,to the provincial government rather’than a
multitude of small paynents to individuels. Provincial
governments could return the money indirectly to the
people through increased services, or âecreased taxes
or special grants to municipal governments.

The federal government could not, in any event, return
the specific payments made by each individual taxpayer;
Because of this, the federal action would cause some
alteration of the tax base within a province which
could make it more difficult for a provincial govern—
ment to use certain tax fields for its own priorities.
Furthermore, the approach of making paÿments to
individuels would involve a redistribution of_money.,
Some individuels who had paid no tax would reoeive__

a grant, while other taxpayers would reoeive much‘less
than they had contributed in respect of a particular


Another idea which was discussed was that the federal

government should levy personal taxes for partîcular

shared—cost programmes and that such taxes should be levied

only in those provinces which were participating in those



According to one point of view, it was bad in
principle for the government of a country to impose
different rates of personal taxation in different
parts of the country. It was observed that in the
United States the constitution expressly forbids

differential taxation.

The following points were made on this SubÜ€°Ë=


(b) Another point of vieu was that differential taxation

need not be dangerous, in practice, In affect, it

was argued, the federal government isroollecting

different levels of income taxes now; because of

provincial surcharges (or because of epecial abatements

in one province); it might not seem thatnsignificant,
therefore, if a few less income tax points were V
collected in some provinces because of noneparticipationk
in certain programmes. It was observeâ also that diffee
rential fiscal policy was considered to be appropriate

in some circumstances.

(c) It was pointed out that, under a system of differential

taxation, the tax burâen on a participating province

could be much higher if the wealthier provinces were V’
not participating. In other words, the income redistri— J_
bution element cf shared—cost programmes from highp

income to low income provinces coula ne elîminated if

the bigh income provinces were the ones’to refrain

from participating. In response to tnis,—the_view was
expressed that income redistribution should not, in ä V
any event, take the form of “implicit‘ equalization” uhich,
was hidden in shared—cost programmes; instead equalization‘

should take the form of one specific payment which

could be readily identified. A further observation
was that the general equalization formula would have
to provide for substantially higher payments, if this

view were aäopted.

A further proposal was related to the idea that there should
not be any formula for identifying consensus, but that new
shared—cost programmes should be entered into on the basis

of bilateral agreements between the federal government and

migbt be «devigea which coula ‘be relafiécäïyvïto .1; j * V

18 é‘

individuel provinces, aftèr ‘forîmal rederal à 110:‘ noiaï_ î_ ‘à -L

consultations had ‘beenicarried’ ont; LŸTIÀie ‘propbâ varias‘ :

that thenfederal govàemmehtægayaboùldcmcïäèe ÿ

paymènts only to those pryovixiceà notÿgèçnyt

agreements whoee perÏcapita ixicomeïÿëisgeyqùa :170 oi- loès ”
than the par càpita incomeof thei provincc 1er. zpïbovizicéè_

agreerîng 1:0 the scÎneme ‘bilateralîly, ItÏwas argäieâ

public opinion woùld sùpÿort’ ‘thé abwsefirice

pay-ments to provinces ‘having a béivcàpità, in “Àfiéysfibsà

tantielly higher thanvgthè provinces enfeiäing ‘agréemeäifi

A contrasting argument was thatàthià àfipz-‘oàichiëolouldŸjñeaily,l.fà

in affect, that the richer _pi=’ovi_ncès ïÿfoù1d”bé 113:1: in

the position that they could i101; afîofd _:’cionl—_pài‘_fiicîizan

in respeot of any sharedÿ-costàproäràammi iéq

Another suggesïtion was that a sysvem of ùbicokgîrafitàä” ‘

programmes deemed ‘to be ‘in;thevopationäïiinÿeiëst; tlienä,‘ if: V i
a provincial governmezit did notäwiÿèàiiiizo ‘ente à y À
agreemént with respect Voté one —pxï‘ogräiaxñei, ‘Ait ymighäi‘; 511e, k
be given a grant proviçïed thiss fière ospént oïiàyofbîlriéf“jàro‘graxikzùes-

having a national vinterest. A iziew-was expiiessed th’

would “ne difficult to devise ‘such é; lisit oï‘ firogràmmés
with axxyfkinà ci’ balance in fbhe àmountsoi‘ money ipvoligvéd, —, .
since various programmés diiffer wideijÿivin säizei.‘ I1; vas

also argued that ‘this approach woùld ‘nct“rèa1K1y-méèt_the

objective of leaving room for a particuiar-aotiiah ‘toibe!

taken in the national interesf.

A further point was that the federal government ‘should at
least consult the non-participating ‘provinces concerxiing

the mariner in which the ‘compensation would bè Paîdo



A suggestion was also nade thet if theVfederal‘government
adopted a more flexible attitude ywith respect to shared-
cost programmes in future, thon perhàäps àtheiejäproaoh of
establishing a consensus and_’paying compensation would

not ‘ce required, and e11 the-attendani: compïitaetions could
be avoided. À


RÉGIONAL nisruzzmzns e nm manne on AN OBHGAŒION


y The report on the conclusions of the w/roivkingydîsession or
the Constitutional Conference («Tune 11 to l2, l96i9‘)”_i7ecords
the following: y

“The First Ministers agreed that the objective ci‘ ïredn ing ‘ ‘
disparities across the country should be :written in ‘ he preamble
01’, a revised constitution as a basic ïgoal or the jGanad an people. _
Some provinces argued further that theconstitutiçän onld impose on
the federal government a specific obligation tosalleviatge a _, ‘ ,
disparities. First Ministers agreed ‘that et futnrediscussicns .

on the division of powers, it will be important t0 ens re that ._
p the federal and the provincial governments have appropriate powers
—to, work towards this objeotiveflf

Also at the working session, lit was suggested that the
Continuing Committee might next consider the implications of
spelling out in the Constitution a specific obligation to combat

‘regionel disparities. Since the wonking session, theréfore, the

oncentrated on the advantages and disadvantages of a possible’_


Main points arising out of discussion

the preamble, as had been agreed uponyin June, would in affect
place a moral obligation upon govennnents to take measures to
à combat regional disparities. No arguments were raised aigainst
‘à this kind of obligation. It was suggested that some wording
assimiler to that proposed in the federal governmentfls working
paper “The Constitution and the People oi‘ Canada” might be
appropriate for this purpose:
“T0 promote national economic social and cultural development,
y and the general welfare [and equality oi‘ opportunity for all
Canadiens in whatever region they Inlay live, includzîng the
opportunity for gainful vrork, for just conditions of employaient,

for an adequate standard of living, for security, for education,
and for rest and leisure.”

(Jontinuing Committee has, in its discussions on regional disparities, ‘

Ïl. It was observed that an objective which waslto be written into‘


with an appropriate allocation of pcwers, ‘would belyiallïltbat‘

could be provided withina constitution-tic encounageijthe

alleviation of dispari-ties. Aocoäcding to this view, would ‘
not be practicable to attempt to provide a more speciii-c,
enforceable obligation witbin the substantive parts ‘the ‘ ‘

Constitution. Various difficulties with such approach were

identified as follows: a l i i i, a

a) This type of obligation would have signifiicant
implications for a system of dcmocratic and responsible
government. Such an obligation wouldireduce the À
amotmt cf discrétion available to a goveniment in
malçing judgements concerning when andlhow’ it iÿould à y
deal with zfiegional disparities. Constitutions. do
normally try to direct a legislature as to how it.y
should carry out the powers ‘allocated to it.

b) The provision of a specific obligation y ‘
a role for the courts in enîorcing such constitutional
miles. This oould mean that the courts would
have to review the manner in which governments
exercise their powers. Involvement in polioy making
would be a new functionifor the courts, ‘to vrhich
both the courts and the political institutions
might find it diffioult to adjust.

c) An entrenched and detailed obligation might prove
to be inappropriate foi‘ future Canadien. needs.

It would be difficult to amend, and could have
the effcct of imposing some inopportune prionity

upon the governments oi‘ some future time.

‘— 22 —

d) There would be great difficulty in deiining such an

obligation in a meaningful way;. For àxampie, while the

term “equality of opportunity” miäbtp _part of a
preambular objective, how could one propose to measure

“equality” in a more specific obligatorÿ provision?

5. According to another point cf view, final judgement on the
question cf an obligation should be reserved untildthe form of a
proposed preamble and the extent or form of the allocation or

powers which would be related to the alleviation cf disparity is

À known. At the same time, it was argued that a moâernÜview cf the

responsibilities ofygovernments should_govern—theldevelopment cf
appropriate constitutional provisions. The observation was made
that in 1867 governments were not envisaged as having any real
responsibility_for the standard cf living of people or for

the provision of services to people. Œhe British North America
Act was therefore a legalistic document ygrantingygovernments

the power to make laws. Today, however, there is-a_completely
different concept of the role cf government, and the emphasis

is on the responsibility of governments to meet the social and
economic needs cf the citizen; lf this is accepted, it was
argued, then it would not be suîficient in a new constitution
simply to allocate powers to one level of government or another;
it would be important also that governments would have responsibilities
and the means to carry them out. This wculd imply that the
Constitution should recognize explicitly that some provinces will

require assistance so that they can discharge their responsibilities.

4. A further point of view was that if a constitution were
envisaged as being a purely legalistic document, then it was
indeed difficult to think in terms cf a specific obligation
that would be legally enîorceable. However, if one thought cf

the constitution as being at the same time a social document,


then it should ‘be possible to envisage Àcertainvfoonsfitutional

provisions which would establish princiläïes ‘ozfïdefi À‘ certain

norms, without setting out precise forznulaeyilñïfb yway, the

Constitution could provide something more ‘opaïgobligation,

even though such provisions would n01; be subjeci: o ‘nforcement

by the courts. The value of this type oî‘ iproviysioîvwoulkî be in
the fact that public opinion and politicel processeïs.’ [Ïcoulâ keep
governments under pressure to meet their kobligatioäîrsj,’ eùch as _is
the case et present vlith regard ‘ho constitutionaläfl i-ovisions res-
pecting frequency of parliamentazjy sessions‘, eo ions. Other
delegations expressed the view that it would ne vefydifficult

to come up vrith meaningful definitions of princyîjälës ornorms

for this form of constitutional obligation.

5. The vieæv was expressed ‘chat the related mètçgr oi‘ equaliza-
tien should be treated in the Constitution in acwacyosiîmïlar to
that which had been suggested L501; regional dîspaÿiobiesk;
a) thefe should be a statement of axyobjïective in‘ a pbeamble,
b) ‘chers should be a “substantive provision Vfihîoh would
spell out the prinoîples goveming eqxkzaliààation “but
without taking the form of a précise îozjnula,‘
c) there should be provision oi‘ appropriate ‘powers ‘cc the’

fade ral govemment .

6. A further suggestion advanced in the Committee was thyat
specific mechanisms might be devised to putïpressure on governments
to meet obligations, such as a commission whichàwould report
periodically on the progress bains made. An observation was made
that this concept would raise certain difficult questions also,

concerning such matters as how such a commission would be chosen.


7. One observation was thatyflif ‘sconsbîtutïo’ 1V ofrights
were t0 inolude a statement offsociàl eoonoriÿñÿic rïghts, ythis o
would createka standard amouhtiñâuîfzo a fox-m ‘cri’. J,’ biyigation

V r r soma ïxÿaicàtea

toward the individual. Previoùs disoussioräxs; howev

that many delegaticns have doùbfiîäs about’ the ÿractio“
to inolude a statement of suchrïghts ‘any entreñcheâ. constyîtùtiäonalr’

‘provision. Another observatîofi wàs fthat gthereàîso

fi difference between corstitutionàl provisïonsvresîp<äo mis cyÿundamental À provisions whioh speoify what shouid’ bye doner. rights, which specify what should nov be lions, and ‘biîègaizrory‘ x 8. A further suggestion was that the provisioxïspi‘.îäàsquate ‘ ä maohinery for federal-provincial“relstîonshiosv oÀoiîld-îbe ‘ À important factor in oombatting ‘regioñal disparities. ‘ 9. A point which was stressed. by syeveral deïègations during the Gommittews discossions was ooliägägtîorïls’ Àrelà regional disparities, whatever rem thäey toïolgsvrzouirldfègpply to y both levels of governinent, ànd thatàthe; most impoerkifaärt 1512s}: xyould be to ensure that appropriate fiowäers weré allooaiäed to eàäcli ievel or government to make sure fihaiÿQÏiçhey were equîpoèäŸto méet their obligations . when the Constitutional Conférence âiscnssed the subject c1‘ the taxing powers a1: “the verrait; Èession in June 1969, it recorded the followning conclusions’: _ “With one exception, the Fir Pfinisiqers ‘agreed that Parliament and the provincia L egjislaturecs ‘should generally have access to all tax r ldsgthepower of the Parliament oî Canada applyingjî rossh-the country and the power ofeach provincial ‘legislatuïfie Làpplying within that province. In vapplying Ethis principle,‘ the following objectives were ‘accepted: _ ‘ (i) The ‘within the province’ limitation of provincial taxing powers should generally be applied with respect both} tovdirect and indirect taxes, suas to proteot the f, tæmayer against the taxation ci‘ lhis income, property or jpurchases by more than-one province. ” , . – (ii) The taxing powers offboth Parliament ‘and the provincial legislatùresÿs 111d zbe limited so as to avoitÿthçæerecflsionv oi‘ ‘tax barriers‘ to interprovincialnlzrade, and the power to impose customs ñuties. ‘should continue tobe oonfineà-zrtoïParliament- alone.  r ‘ ‘ . (iii) Considering that both/Iäarliament and ‘the provincial legislatures, would have access in general t0 the saine‘ ‘sfioùrcesfof ftiax ‘revenue, there should ‘ce more iegularÿand adequate federal-provincial consultations; It was recognized that the prînciple’ or ‘ general access t0 all tax fields would net, enable all provincial governments equally ato’ discha-rge their constitutional responsibilities, sana ‘therefore Parl- iament should have the explicit power to make equaliza- tion grants to provincial governments; Oneprovince advocated that, instead of equalization garants to governments, there be established a basic income for all Canadiens. ‘ While some differencesof views were expressed, the First Ministers epgreed that the Continuing Committee of feriez-al and provincial officiels be instructed t0 consider further how these principles, if Iormally _ accepted, might be applied in a revised constitution and, in particular, to consider the alternative method ci‘ their application to the taxation of Vestates, ‘crans- actions and real property. Certain provinces expressed À be excepted from the principle of access. the view that death duties, and real property taxes shouli .;_26.; ._. The Conference recognized 17net Æhedi cussi’ ns on the fuse ‘oy Parliament,_an he legçislatur ” heir; taxing _powers should‘ ïp ceed çccncurrently ‘ constitutionaljdiscussi s,’ Bndggthat such would ‘be of continuing- ji-mportance “in ïrel _ o, the dischargeby gcvenments oï‘ “theïr constitut on 1 — responsibilities.” ‘ —- – ‘ J Dttring its consideration cf ivyhÿe taxation [ouf (death duties) and the taxation of ‘transactions in accordance with “ohe instructione îrom the ‘ce _ Conference, the Gontinuing Commifvtee‘identifie’ä,a umbèaä ‘of alternativeiways for meeting {aine objectives: svtiaizkègar gbove. I1; became apparent {:0 the Committee thaîfibefore adeijuatjîfireport coula be given t0 First Hinistegr-a, fhe many impïiîcäitiorysÿàrof À à the various alternatives wculd havefibo be iceñtiïiäedk and _ assessed. I1: was also concluâeà _in,t1yie Cominittee rthaytethis detailed anaiysis was oï‘ a vexzysiäneciaäiicezäi À nature, and 13h31; the most effectiveyway of proceeàiixg would be tc establish sub-committeeecomposed of ‘experts tiiese tax fields xÿhich could report te fine.iconflgumgivcofimittèé in; e respect ci‘ thèse matters. Two eùÎS-Ëccmmîtteee wereviäherezyfore set up with the following tiermysi referenceî The Subécommittee on Sales Taxee was ‘chargea with À the responsibility oi’ explorizyzygäÿàiîcernative waÿecoîiensuriñg that provincial sales taxes woiild apply only. the i’ province”, with particular reäfægreñce tofibhe following alternatives : (l) Confining provincial transactions ‘taxes to the direct level; (2) Confînïzug provincial transactions taxes to the retail level; ‘ ‘ ‘ ‘ (5) Oonfining provincial transactions taxes ‘to the goods and services used and consumeâ within the province. ‘ The Sub-Committee‘ onisnéiaths Æies —wg=.swgivien the following terme or referencez, (1) T0 identify the Ïifipucatïons oi‘ exclusive. f fecîeraljurisdiction; ‘ — ‘y (2) T0 identify.thefimplications of exclusive’ provincial çjurisdicÿion; j k v (5) To identifÿ the’ iniplicaätiohs cf ‘cohcùrrenti. ‘ jurisdiction; ._ V (4) In examining‘ (1) and (5) .toïcozà1sider “(the problem of_ relating federal‘ estate ÿtpaxlaws “b0 the Civil Çode. ,_ ‘ . ‘ . _ ‘ The Sub-Committeesî have voifldate keach. hafiï 54e, meeting at which they anaa [a sgÿreiimmaxy discussïonror the matters referred t0 ‘themà andnident pied a nùmfier ci‘ _ implications, advantages 5nd fidisadvàÿntages whioh Ïapply to the various alternativesiundezv-review. Tfiey thenÏsubmitted interim reports which were coiisid red ‘by the ‘Confiinuing Committee at its last pœcatingi.’ Ïàontinuizzgä‘ Commitîäee concludeâ that rit wofildinyîeîàçtfilpoäfbentyà fixe Committees i’ V to pur-sue their studios inan toarrive aÿti a ceczqnical’ evaluation or thèse implications. The Continuing Gommitjteeàagreed that it woum report in detail to Firsi: Miziisterseon thèse quesïzions latter the Sub-Committees had been able to complete their inves- tigations . ‘Conclusions of meetings of -tliäe”constituticna First meeting — FebnÜ-Ïys 1968i.‘ Second meeting _- «à ià-Feoruàryjl9e9s. Working Session — APPENDIX 1 Décisions de la Conférence de Conclusions of Ëetruarv l9€8>
février 1968 À ‘ ‘Conférence;

.QU‘une Conférence constituu
tionnelle permanente soit
établie, groupant les Premiers,
ministres ou leurs.délégu6e et
ayant pour objet de diriger les
travaux de la revision consti-


QU’un Comité permanent de _'”THAT a Ôonti uing_Committeei
fonctionnaires soit etebll pour cf officiels b _et up’to1assi tv
aider la Oonférence constitu» the Constitutional Conférence in
tionnelle dans sa tâche;. v 1ts‘task; ‘,“ “,’.-‘J v

QU’un secrétariat soit forme . THAT e.BeH‘e rîàt‘teŸîormed_”
par‘1e gouvernement ñéñérel ,, _by_the feder_ 0 rament» e ‘
apres consultation des_prov1nces,._consultation> ‘ ha provin
lequel s ira, à ce titre, pour ‘ to serve both h —Constitutio 1′

“ne Oontinuing

la Conf renoe.oonstitutionnel1e _ Gonference.end
ficials; ,

et le 0omité’des fonctionnaires; —0ommittee‘of cf

QUE le Comité des fonction— >.-
naires soit habilité à mettre sur.‘

pied des sous—comitës sur des .sub4committees on speci_ c. 5 +
sujets spécifiques; après eppro- questions; with the approbation ;”
bation des Premiers ministres; _ _—of the Prime Ministers;_ ” —‘
QUE, sans limitez- pour autant a nanar; without.limit_ing *
leur mandat et compte tenu des above terme of’reference, ami > s-
débisions prises lors de la pré- ‘ taking into eccount the agre ,entsË”
sente conférence, la Conférence es to_principle ’end action reached [H
constitutionnelle et lejcomité atjtnis Gonferencegjthe}fo1lowihg .
des fonctionnaires étudient les questions be examinedxby the_j me V
questions suivantes: Constitutional Conference and the
_Gontinu1ng Gommittee cf offioislsg’
a) les langues officielles; a)_ official lengusges;’ À
b) les droits fondamentaux; b) ‘fundemental rights;
c) le répartition des oompe— 0) distribution of_powers;k
tences; ., ‘ ‘ _ V
d) 1a.rérorme des,1nst1tutions d) reform cf institutions linked
reliees au federalisme. with federalism, including
notamment le Sénat et la the Senate and the Supreme 1.
Cour Suprême du Canada; Court qf Canada;
e) les inégalités régionales; e) regional disparities;
r) le dispositif de modifdu- r) amenqïinçäprocedurer and
cation constitutionnelle et ‘provlsional arrangements;

les dispositions provisoires;

g) mécanismes des relations g) ‘mechanisms of federaleprovinckùle
féüéraleswprovinciales. , relations. .








Recognition by this Conferéhce ,_L

that, as proposed‘by_the Royal
Commission on Bilingualism and’
Biculturalîsm and as a matter
or equity, French—speaking
Canadians outs1de_of_Quebec
should have the sème rights

as Eng1ish—speaking Canadiens
in Quebec. ‘ _

Recognjtion, as the Royal Com— ‘
mission on Bilingunlism and
Biculturalism-bas recommended,
of çne desirabilîty or proqeed-
ing by’governmental action as
speedily as possible, in ways—

most appropriate in each,prov— _I.

‘1nce*and wïthout’âïmihî8hing‘Ç”
existing rights, recognized by

‘law or usage. V

Establishment of:a spééial coma;
.mïttee to examine the Report
’of.the Royal Commission on B1-

‘lingualism and Biculturalism

and the views expressed at, _,
this Conference on the Report,
and on other matters relating
to 1anguage_rights and theirg

—effect1ve provisibn in practice,“

and to consult on methods or
implementation, including the
nature of possible federal ,
assistance, and on the_form and
the method of constitutional
amendment. ‘

0h89“? apr v

des droit

À— par 1a loi. u

—des modalités d apÿ1îcation;yy}”*
_compris_1a.nature,du concours. j’
fédéral ëñvisagé, et la forme“ 1
et les techniques de la modîfi— ,4

cation cônstitutionnelle.


(a) Thevconstitutional Conferencé

(b) In order to maintain effective _
co—ordination of the constitution» ,_



General objectives—of.the Constig l“‘


ÎAgenda item 2Ïa55

The Constitutional_Ôonference
reaffirms its intent to complète *
a comprehens1ve’review cf the..

Constitution or Canada;—to_assess‘; ‘Le

its adequacy for present and, _
future requirements, and to deterb
mine the extent_to_wh1ch”constitue
tional change is désirable eiÿhèr
through amendment or the existink

Constitution or through promulga-


tion of an entirely new Constitu#‘gÜ‘Ïf

—Procedure for constitutional


.(Amenda item 2(c))

expresses its intentathat the
,reView should proceed et an«
acoelerated pace,’now.that.the
basic organizational and back—‘1
ground work bas beenycarried out.
In this connection, the First
Ministers will endeavour to’hold
more rrequent sessions of the . ,
Constitutional Conference and; in

addition, to have informel working E’

sessions with the Gontinuing
Committee of Officiels, te. —
provide more continuons direction
to the process of constitut1ona1’


al review, the Conference agrees
tbat: : . ‘
(1) allespecial committees cf‘

ministers set up by the
Constitutional Conrerence .
should report to the
Constitutional Conference;-

— ‘ rgéyafîirniej‘ s‘

10 Ide 1 sconstltution ,— — __
>ÎArtic1e 2Îc5.à’l’0rdre du Jour)

“,Laiàonfërence oonstïfutibnnel1e


,,_nuer à’un:rythme’accé1ëre, été

_‘ tentera de se réunir plus _


bëéâure â süîÿneÏ ouf ÏaŸîév

‘xprime_son,désir de voir le;
rooessusndejrévisiona e ’

. .que 1e“traÿa11xde base a
déjà été fait; A-cette fin; 1a_


ïministres auron

. des fonctionnaires, afin ‘ –
»d’assurer de façon plus soutenue >
= 1a direction du processus de, —v

[révision constitutionnelle.

Afin dŸassurer la ooordination
de la révision constitutionnelle,

_ décisions suivantes:

_ s (sillon

tous les oomités ministé4‘,

‘riels mis sur pied par la.

.— Conférence constitutionne}—-
Àrle devront faire rapport a ‘M.
_cel1eFci; — ‘


(ii) the Continuing Committee of
Officiels should assist other
ministerial committees, as
required; ‘

all specîalïoommittees or
tuted as sub—committees of,s
the Continuing Committee of


the Continuing Committee cf
Officiels is authorized to
establish such subecommitees,
workîng groups or tàsk forces
as seem to be required for‘
its purpose;


the Secretariat oî_the
Conference should also serve
all such ministerial commit-
tees and committees of



5. Official Lan a es
(Agenda item 4Îa5)

The Constitutional Conference
yrecognizes—that-important steps;
have been taken by governments in
the’pest year to,encoüragepa-‘ . V
fu1Ier—role’for theïFrench’1àn— –
_guage throughout Canada, and it,
,_affirms that study or linguistic
matters should be continued. In
particular, the First Ministerss
agree that: . ,

‘(a) The recommandations of the Royal
Commission on Bilingualism and ‘
Biculturalism, together with
reports on linguistic matters
from the Continuing Committee cf

-Officials and the Sub-Committee on
Official Languages, should be
referred to a Committee or
Ministers which should consider
bath the constitutional aspects
of linguistic màtters and the
methods of implementation or

. language policies, including the

fvnature of possible federal
[assistance for this purpose.

(b) The Royal Commission’s reports,
together with other aspects of the
_ subject of official languages,_
_shou1d receive such—further

1 les divers gou

5).Les,reconnandetions:de 1a’Ï




(v) 1ehsecsréta_ atlde sla, Vs V
‘onférence d vre flesse
tous s1 c’ é _e,

La Conf renciè colons’: «canons 1s
“reconnaîtjque de 1’ _
‘ importantes on

_ 511.6‘ ‘française

continuer l’étud i,q‘


premiers ministres sont couve

s que: – – —’ s

K Gommission;roya1el
_‘1eÿbil’ gu‘sme
slisme; E s_ ‘ ,_
Vlangues cfficiellesgs, M
tiens linguistiques, f,r. .
l’objet’d‘un renvoi à un comité
de ninistres. ,Ce comité étudie
tant les aspects constitutionnel
‘dessquestions linguistiques que;
‘linguistiques, y compriS;la.rug‘
nature de toute aidofiféderale qui
s pourrait être disponible a cette‘
fin. , . s I ‘

Les rapports de la Commission.’:o
royale, ainsi que les autres _
aspects de la question des lang



consideration by the Continuing
lommittee of Officials and its
Sub—Committee on Official
Languages as may be required to

,assist the Committee ofsflinisters
.in its task.

Fundamental Ri hts
(Agenda item 4Ëb5)

The Constitutional Conference
noting the various views and the
general interest that have been
expressed with regard to guaran—
tees of human rights,.inc1uding
those views brought before the
Ccntinuing Committee of Officiels,
agrees that a Committee of _
Ministers should be established to
study all matters relating’to
fundamental rights, including the
squestion of entrenchment of such

rights in a constitutional charter.

Ë. Distribution of Pcwers

ÎAgenda item 4Îc5Î

‘a) The Constitutional Conference

recognizes as a matter of priority
the study of the distribution of
powers, in particular the taxing
and spending powers, and directs
the Continuing Committee or
sOfficials to give its immediate
attention to this aspect of the

Ïb) The Constitutional Conference,

recognizing the urgency of the

, matter, agrees that the Tax

Structure Committee should bei

convened for the purpose of examin-

ing, and reporting at the earliest

opportunity to First Ministers, on:

(i) the occupancy of available
tax fields by’each of the
provincial governments and
the Government cf Canada,

federal—provincial shared—cost
programme arrangements.

-pour aider le C0

d’études par le Comité permanent
des fonctionnaires et le Sous-

comité sur les, angues officiel-
les, selon ce qu

ministres dans sa tâche.

Droits f nd ment s s .,, s K
ÎArtic1e 4ib5 à l10rdre du Jour}

La Conférence constitutionnelle
a pris note des différents s
points de vue exprimés et de

l’intérêt démontré quant à la _
,garantie,des droits de l’homme,


exprimés au Comité permanent desj
—fonctionnaires et les premiers ‘

comité ministériel sera mis sur
pied pour étudier toutes les

_fondamentaux, y compris 1a_ – .
question de la garantie constitu-

‘ tionnelle de ces droits dans une’



charte. v

Éé artition des ouvoirs . ‘ H
_ÎArticle 4Îc5 a l’Ordre du Jour)

_ ‘La_Conférence constitutionnelle:
‘reconnaît que la répartition des_

pouvoirs est une question
sprioritaire, surtout en ce qui
concerne les pouvoirs d’imposer
et de dépenser; en conséquence,
elle demande au Comité permanents
l’étude de cette question en

La Conférence constitutionnelle,

‘en considération de l’urgence de

cette question, convient que le
Comité sur le.régime fiscal
devrait être convoqué afin .
d’examiner les domaines indiqués
ci-dessous et de faire rapport
aux premiers ministres dans les
plus brefs délais:

(i) l’accès de chacun des gou-
vernements provinciaux et du
.gouvernement du Canada aux»
divers champs d’imposition;

les ententes fédérales; =

programmes a frais partagé‘.

era nécessairesji

.provinciales relatives aux s_—

– Œothis eni} theI/l‘nx,fitructure
Committee_would,cqn{ïider 11e _
. àfçgregate 101″ goveiÿnment _ y ‘
j tuyree and ‘their =ra1y;_e” oj ‘
sources ayvailsble, ‘
À ‘lcàing ‘bhese expendîtuæes, — _
potential of the tjotal t systyem
the rlevelî of bôrpojqingy7by_govern—
yjments and itsÿeffect ujsonflthe” y y _
“Canadian edonomy; dnth alance _
}’s’cal respon îbîlities and À
resources wi_thi‘n‘ each ‘of Çthe yï p . .
provinces and the Governmentxof» z :
. Canäda. – ‘ ‘

6. Re iônal Dis aritieè
_ (Agenda item Me”

Thé ConstitutidnaJ. Conféiénce
=agrees that: . 0

: îonciàñiéntàùxï
‘ estjle=ï_dévelop
les régions, _

(a). the promoîäioræ or the —ru11 develop

_ fiment jof all parts yof Canadaïsëarx-

, ‘essential objective ‘cf ‘ * 1 ‘
ÿconîederation; – ‘

(b) ajcommittee ofîflinistÿers ‘should,
täkîne; inîzo _ac_<ëounïc.,îtbe views ,. _ — ‘ ‘añôÿpxfioposäls ofävthe —v_ — ‘ous; ‘govezjnments, consider the ‘adm, ‘ hnistrative _, ‘ financîayl- ‘anydflficonsule. . tative arrangements‘ orjpoli ïesy “ nand programmes required. imniedi-y _ – atelyto reduce regional dispari- ties; _ , ” c) ïeycëoyñiitë jgoy manexît ‘desïfànètion; ‘(c)’ the Continuingy Committyee‘ of y y_ y y ‘ ,naires_ devr — ccoräçgfiy me . S ‘ Officials should- give ‘speçial >attention to the constitutional 7 _ flattezition” _ iereaux _

aspects of regional disparitiesy, ‘ y {asïäe<;,ts‘jc_ons_t t rmels de lafi wijth a view to reporting toa ‘ 4 questiozx ‘ y yp tés- . . y’ Committee of Tîinisters as soon as . V régionale’ vue de yrfaërç ‘ranâ “ po55ib1—e_ ‘ _ ‘ qfiportlà un‘ omitéy minlsterlejl ‘ ‘ . aussitôt que’ ossible. 7. ‘Retenu of institutions linked 7. Réforme des institutions liées ywith federalism — Œhe oenate n _ ïau federalyisme à-‘Lewsenat , . — Agenda item lkd ‘ « _ (Article 4h15‘ a‘ l’Ordre du Jour) The Constitutional Conference . yLa_ Conférence1coynsÿ_i17yut.i0nnell’ while recognizing that ‘cher _ _ > ‘ ——rec9nnaît*que_1’ _,ï‘eï’9ï‘,me “du, _
reform o}? the Senatäç must Ïbe . — Sénaîï doit, 7H39 :etudléesen_meme,
rzonsfdereâ in theïcohtyeäçt ofqothiär — rïlïempsquexley æyautgesçquestlens
matters relat-ed to theyybasioprin» ‘ “relj es___a_ux.pxilnc,lï>es ‘idem ‘
“oiples, structure‘ gând pciwers cf — ‘ . à la‘ Structure et aux pouvo

Government in Canada. agree that‘ ‘ du fgouvernementdu 03H34?‘
a Committeé 03.” I-îinisters 451101116,
study possible coñstitutional “ _ _

‘ provisions rélating t0 thé _. 4 ‘


y_manner ‘he”pr vinces an

ÎeÏ à





‘A Committee cf Ministers‘shoùld,

[and proposals of the_Various ”


ofgo fic

the sàme tLme adäùstingï
ifn relation me zleg‘ atio
ggnerally; 1. V

The distribution of membershl
shou1d.reflect in an equitabl

‘cf anada;

_ _ Çcanada sa 111d
continue to be responsiblè only
toythe House of Commons

:Th Goÿernment

Reforfiàôfa n

agrees_tha ‘ “

. ‘fi ‘_ ‘
lt faire 1″objét_h
_on constitution-

Thé Consfîtfitîofi shèuld prdvide. :
for the independence cf the ‘


un comite de ministresydevraity
—étudier les àutres c1auses”‘ .
Îconstitutio elles relatives aux

tribuhäùx et à‘1a Cour’suprême,,’
compte tenu des points de vue

et des proposîÿions des divers
_gouvernements. _ ‘ . v ”

taking into account theyviews.

governments, consider further
provisions concerning the
Supreme Court and the Judiciery-

îîeform or institutions linked wxîñh“ Rérozämèïaes ‘izàzstitutibns‘Lliéàes’

federalism — The National Capital _ au.fedéra ‘sme_— la cap1talg;—
(Agenda item 4(d)) = ‘ ‘ j Ï _,nat1ona1e_ï .‘jyy . . = ,_ , _
‘ à l’Ordre du Jour

îArfciycle v (

:f àonstitutiqnnè1
e, de s a: ont —_çc—ommen«
__t être present

The—ConStîtutional Conferençe;”
subject to any comments.that ma
be submitted, agrees thatï_



luis 11 m 12.JUIN 1g Q

cidre du jour de 1 _réu io _
t le suivant: ‘ -‘

Réÿartition dés oOWPéfieñoeä v’;
dans la constitution: z

Aspects constitùt o
V disparités régiona

Rapports prélimiha ré
comités ministéri

Programme de brava; dà 3,‘
révision constitqtjonnelle

yAutres qùeàtionS”:1″n

fiäre du jour — Article lÀ4
o sidérations générales‘ —

‘En étudiant cette question; tous
:gouvernements font remarquér’que
discùssions actue11eà‘anf8ùjet
pouvoirs d’imposer et de dépen——
—sont’suhorâonnées â l’élaboration _g
x ytuelle d’une répartition des
Ompéÿences satisfaisante. ,Lè goy-

e ement du Canada et plusieurs
ernements provinciaux soulignent”

istence d’un gouvernem’ _centra1
.‘ Certaines provincesî éc1arént>’
le_fédéra1isme suppose aussi ‘
Lstence de gouverneménts provîn——
x forts.

Ë lth0VÏlrSÿÀ&
at res*should,,

A une excepLion près, les pre—] . _‘sont—entendus—pour;”—
yque le Parlement et les Assem-
‘ Êgislatives devraient en.—j y
y yl_avoir accèsyê tousyles champs ,
fiposition, la compétence du Parle—_ y ‘
‘ ‘ ppliquant à l’ensemble du V =
de’et la oompéteñce de ohaque_‘
bléejlégislative â l’intérieur
,_rDVince« En application de ce
ptés: ‘ >

(i) La restriction à l’effet que
‘ les pouvoirs provinciaux
d’imposer ne s’appliqueront

que “dans la provinèe“-de—
“_vrait-en général êt mise
en oeuvre dans les; mpôts
directs et indirects;.de,
‘façon à protéger le contri—’
de son revenu; de ses biens
ou de ses achats par plus L
_d’une provinoe.

i Les pouvoirs d’imposer du.
*Parlement et des Assemblées
‘ ,législatives devraient être.
_limités afinïdïéviter que.
tariîaires_àu;détrimént du
>Le pouvoir de prélever des
‘—tarifs douaniers devrait .
continuer à être réservé ex-
clusivement au Parlement. ‘

‘Etent donné que le Parlement
et les Assemblées législe—

tives auraient_généralement«

—.acces aux memes sources

fiscales, il devrait y avoir
des consultations fédérales-
.provincîales plus adéquates.
et à intervalles plus régu-

liers. . –

. on reconnaît ue le principe de_ jIt was reoognized that’the,prin9
accessibilité genérale à tous les y cîple of général access to àll tax‘
Ls=d’imposition ne permettrait _ fields_would‘not enable al ‘
tous les gouvernements de — . cial,governments‘equallyi_ , ,
ezde la même façon à leurs — their‘const’tutional responsybiliti
ions constitutionnelles. Par — ,and{thereio‘ ;Parliame t shoul ‘

ont, le Parlement_devra
der le pouvoir explicite d!oc—yÇ
rdes subventions incondition-

s aux gouvernements provînciaux.ï
rovince propose ue_1fon”remplace
ersementsïdeypér2quation,aux‘ ‘ ‘
’ements provinçiaux par_un,
e revenu garanti pour tous
diens. v‘

.tkè ‘xplioit p

Malgré certaines divergences de
vues, les premiers ministres ont con-
venu de charger le Comité permanent
des fonctionnaires (fédéraux et pro—’ ‘
vinciaux) d’étudier plus à fond laj
façon dont ces principes pourraient,
s’ils étaientyformellement occeptés;j
s’appliquer dans une constitutionï’
revisée. Plus partioulièrement,Ile.

Comité permanent_devra étudier commentd s

ces: rincipes sîappliqueraient à

transactions et de la propriété roué. “’

cière; Certaines provinces sont d’avis
que les droits successoraux et l’impôt

foncier devraient‘feire exception au ‘V
principe de l’accessibilité.’

Les premiers—ministres ont convenu ‘Ï‘

que les discussions sur lïemploi que’:
font leyParlement et les Assemblées
lég’s1atives de leurs pouvoirs d‘impoæ
ser devraient se poursuivre parallèle
ment aux discussions constitutionnelles

et que ces discussions sont importantes
Par les SOU.

pour;1es mesures à prendre
ve‘ ements pour satisfaire a leurs
obl gaticns constitutionnelles.

Ordre du jour A Article 1 b):
‘,1“Le—deukième’Su3et important à‘”‘
l’ordre du jour touchait l’emploi du
pouv _r de dépenser du Parlement du
_ a. ‘La plupart des délégations
sont tombées d’accord pour affirmer
que l’actuel pouvoir du Parlement y
dîe fectuer des versements aux indi-
vid ,_ou aux—institutions ne devrait
fai_e_l’obäet d’aucune restriction—
constitutionnel1e.1 Toutefois, une
province a décidé de réserver sa
position sur le sujet’jusqu’à ce que
l’on ait traité de la répartition des
compétences. D’autres provinces ont V
exprimé l’avis que ce pouvoiryfédéral.
devrait, dans la pratique, être exercé
en consultation avec les provinces.
On a-également noté qu’il serait peut-
être nécessaire d’établir certaines
distinctions entre les institutions
avant‘ ue ce principe puisse être _
accept ,de façon définitive. ‘

On admet généralement qu’il ne
devrait y avoir aucune restriction
constitutionnelle au pouvoir du
Parlement du Canada d’octroyer des
subventions inconditionmelles aux
gouvernements provinciaux.
une province a exprimé l’avis qu’un
impôt négatif sur le revenu, adminis—_
tré par le gouvernement du Canada,
éliminerait la nécessité de tels

Cependant, ‘-



onces or views
irst Ministers
cial officiels

r d the exercisæayof.”

‘qu ‘tien ofpr
y_ ‘powers‘had

: whi e Some,ctherÎ

hould in Prac—-
,was also._

gdtivç,inoomeÏtax Ï
__. ered_byVthe Governe <*
ment of—Canada;would make“suoh_pay

iadmetïgénéralement’ que le _
ment du Canada devrait ‘pouvoir. à
nuerè rlêtanir le pouvoir , _. ‘ ‘
yer des subventions condiè,
les aux gouvernements ‘ revin-
,, à condition‘ Jque _1’. on zpuisse‘
er- une ‘formule, statisfaisente
terminer s’il y son ‘accord
s1 au sujetde l’opportunité
programme ‘particulier et ‘
ionjquwnen arrive â une ‘ _
fisatisfaisante de. compensa-
ans les provinces non-partici-

our ce gui est de 1a formule
rvira, gaâéterminer s’il y ‘a,
nyun accord ‘génzâral, _on”admet v i ‘
_ orientent du canada etfiles” —
rn mente provinciaux’ seraient‘,
nismes appropriés pour ‘déteru
existence de cet accord, v on .
[É également. que la ‘formule’ devrai‘?
ter 1e’ caractère régiÿinal du çay
foie, unejxärovince’ déclare ‘que
quelle soit d’accord avec le‘
ipeven ‘cause; ‘elle considère. que .
rmule de modification de ,15’ ‘
itution gourrait servir de_ base
rriver. ‘a un accord général, ‘ ‘On
nd ide plus pour vconriervau _
it ‘permanent ‘des fonctionnaires —
‘ hedflêtudierär nouveaugles r
.i‘ormu1es possibles.

n s’entend généralement pour. v ‘
que les personnes qui izebiy- ;
y provinces ‘non-aparticipantes, _-
raient pas encourir _un‘eg punition
le’, etque ‘la méthode qui permet- ’
éviter cette difficulté devrait j
l’objet de discussions ‘subsé-

edu jour – Article 2:

‘ spremiers ministres ‘sont oonveg- ,
ue l’objectif ‘visant laçdiminug-
des disparités régionales‘ au Ïpaÿis
it être inclus dans’ lie-préambule .
dfluneeconstitution revieée —parmi ‘
baeotifs fondamentaux poursuivie j
lepeuple canadien. Certaines ,î
‘ ces sont même allées plusçloiir, _
amant l’insertion dans la constitua!»
d’une disposition. qui obligerait _.
vernementfédéral à travailler ‘
iminuer ces -_di‘sparités. Les‘
rsaxiinistres se sont entendus‘ * ‘ . _ . _ . . .
“dire‘qu”au cours d’une {discussion anqs/Ïhhe Provänciual ‘wverment
sure. sur la répartition des ; * ‘_ âPPï-“Omïata ZWWBPS îîqworkk-toxv
onces il sera important ‘de. =ï W115 °b39°ËiVer . 1 *
surer que les gouvernements ‘ ‘ — ‘
ral-et provinciaux auront, les ._ ‘
‘ ra nécessaires pour atteindre F
Jecti-f‘. y _ — v ‘

daâäèväd rhrar
n s e 618p
dÿbe ‘

xïiate d
‘ agr

par ent to “ensure ëthst fthe;

our – Article

Les premiers ministres sont_
courant des progrès.acè
s ‘par les comités minis-a

langues officielles
système judiciaire
‘Sénat. ‘

remiers ministres ont pris
es progrès réalisés â ce
,t‘se sont entendus pour
mer que tous les comités
ont poursuivre leurs.

ux et présenter de nouveaux
rts à la Conférence consti-
nnelle avant sa prochaine
on. . –

‘ our — Article 4:

__es premiers ministres con-
nnent de se rencontrer à

sieur les sujets suivants:

au d’ici la fin de 1’année.:

nda ïIten”
a ‘ ‘ ‘irneïPi-Îimet
—agreed to;mee

_ ers ana Preñiers
gain before the end

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