._ (a) GENERAL:

5‘.

1. ‘ 01″ENI—_I\¥Gk STAmErmrxTs

‘2.

‘ BASIC? ‘PRI-

*>(c)

. G)

L (2?)

‘ —co 1mnn IAL

– INDEX ‘TO BRIEFING MA’m§R1AL~
L .mmm’.v1oN’mo ‘I.‘HE~:‘~.GEN1)A A.
_c<jNS?Id:U$:oNAL CONFERENCE L VL * ~ February :10, 11 anaL12 ‘ ‘Reréfe‘n§_ mg . L OBJECTiVES by mus CONSTITUTIONAL comrnfim ‘ (1)) REPORT or can ‘coNT1NUiNé comixmm (c) PROCEDURE FOR CONSTITUTIONAL gzyxnw THE‘.OBJ_J’;;C§’l‘IVES_OF conimnméxmom mi) _ NCIPIJES or mm comsmxavrmon . ‘0bje,b§ti:fs_ ‘dé _1a_ Canfédérigxtion . _ __ s1>Ec:FIc. ‘_§CQ1\I£k371‘L‘i_\U’I’IOIk\IAL QUESTIONS ‘

(a) OFFICIAL LANGUAGES
_‘O.fficiéa1 Languages ‘

:FUNDAP’1ENfl?AL R1‘ <;1{‘1\s T
Fundame ntal Rights

‘ DISTRIBUTION OF POWERS (I1x’CLU_1)Il\‘G§
‘CONS’I‘3LTU‘.C£ONAL ASPECTS OF _TAXATI‘0l\‘
AND SPENDING POWERS) ~ – . j

‘ Distributi<>n—of Powers

Provincial ’.l‘a.1c:’.ng I Powers
The ‘Spending Power ‘ ‘

REFORM OF INSTI‘l‘U’l‘IONS_‘LINKED ~
~wI”H~ FEDERALISE’: _ ‘ V 1 _ .~ ~
Institutions ‘of Federalism _. ~ _
In’stituti_ons of Federalism ;-‘-. _-Se_nate_ _
Institutigns of Federalism —”1‘h.e _J_ud_i_c ‘cure:

gmsclomz; ,n1sieAR:1‘xnsL
= Regiona1_ Disparities _.

AMENDING PROCEDURE
~ ARRANGEMENTS ‘

Amending Procedure

Arrangements _ V

MECHANESMS OF FEI>ERAL~pRovnJcI“AL” ~
L RELATIOFIS ‘ —. —
Mechanisms of ~Fede1~al-Provincial
Relations _ . . I = ‘ ‘ ‘
OTHER QUESTIONS ‘ ‘ _ . ‘
‘Etude comparative sommaire des systémes‘

(b)

(d)

.‘Pi2QVISI_dN!;L ;

ami ,Pr<‘:-1‘risi<_>na1

(3)

c,ongressio1{mel et; parlamentaire

‘ Decentraliz afion
_ I;elp1ateau‘<_:ontinent,a1 _ _
[management du territoire

OE DOCUMENT EST LA PROPRIETE DU GOUVERNEMENT DU CANADA
CONFIDENTIEL
NOTES POUR LE PREMIER MINISTRE

Conférence Constitubionnelle, février 1969
OBJECTIFS DE LA CONFEDERATION

Résumé des notes

1 ~ La révision de la Constitution est
un exercice A long terme.

2 — Cependant, il est esaentiel de procéder
dés maintenant A des rénlisations
concrétes.

5 — Les progrés accomplis seront portés
au erédit de tous les gouvernements.

4 — Nécessité d‘un accord de principe sur
1’existence d’un préambule qui énoncera
lee objectifs de la Confédération.

5 — Raisone pour lesquelles un préambule

est souhaitable.
6 — Projet de préambule du gouvernément
canadien.

1e2u—Janviér, 1969.

cu DOCUMENT mu LA P1201-“u1m.*u on ooUv£)31nm;:;rw: nu <:;mm>.1

CONFIDENTII
NOT“S POUR LE PREMIER MINISTRE
Conférence Conscitutionnelle, février 1969

OBJECTIDS DE LA CONEEDERATION

No es gour le Premier m fii$ re

1. Le gouvernement canadien est conscient que la
révision de la Constitution est un exercise do longue

haleine. On ne rédige pas on quelques mois la loi fon~

damentale d‘un pays comme

@5fi§EEZ’7fi$f“Exis0e~depuis

le, qui repose sur la vouloir vivre oollectif

plus d’un m
de deux peuples fondateurs, qui bénéficie do l’enrichis-
sement de deux langues officielles et de plusieurs cultures,
qui posséde une histoire den plus riches et dos plus
variées et qui jouit d’un dos plus hanks niveaux de

développement an monde.

2. En méme temps nous sommes oonscients que les
pourparlers constitutionnels ne doivent pas s’étevniser
afin d’éviter que lo processus de révision s’enlise at
échoue. C‘esL pourquoi nous crayons 5 la nécessité de

ncrets duranpflcettc oonférence.

réaliser dos objecti

Sans bousculer 1 ordre oes événements ob sans exercer
dos pressions induem, nous souhajtons ardemment one dog
progrés réels soiont accomplis durant ces troin jours.

7

1. Les progrés que nous réalisorons seronb portés

an orédit non seuLnmeut du gouvcvnement Canadian mais oe

tous les gouvornoments qui participant 5 cetto réunion.

Chacnn ; gouvernomonts qui siégent autour do cetto
table sera en mesure do fairs part é la population qu’i1
représento ot qu’i] gouverne dos progrés qne nous avons

accomplis enmomhlo, ici, oolleotivement.

…/2

M. 11 est essential que les chefs dos divers

gouvernemonts qui font partie de la fédération cana~

dienno se mettent d’accord sur les objectifs do notro

union politiqua. C’est dams cot esprit que je propose

que nous donnions nobre accord do principe A ce qua la

nouvelle Constitution (ou la Constitution rovisée) du

Canada soit

pvécédée d’un préambule qui énoncerait les

principaux objectifs que nous poursuivons et les prin—

cipos de la Constitution que nous allons élaborer.

5. Le gouvernement canadien croit qu‘un préanmule

est sauhaitable pour plusieurs raisons.

Il aura une valeur éducative. I1
pormettra é tous les citoyens do
prendre connaissance des objeotifs
de notre fédération et des prinoipes
fondamexwtzmx de notre C<>ns1;itu1:i0rx.
Le présont préambule do l‘Acto do
].‘iunéI-ique (in nord britannrlque no

posséde pas oebte valeur éduoative.

he préambulo pourra oontribuor a
développer chez tous nos concitoyons

un sentiment do nationalo.

Nous devons nous efforoor do rédiger
Uflfi constitution qui sore compréhen—
saiblzy 5 la popuIl.za1;i-‘>n czznadirznne oi.

qug‘; luj 1’JCI‘}‘I}<§17tI‘€,: do mieux co1npI’enL‘2r'(:

.15. m1’l;u1‘o at lo f‘on<:1;1′.onnen1<:nL de nos

113123 tnti ans p:fl.iT.1I_q’:m:-‘. .

-5-

— Ce préambule devrait d’autre part

faciliter dens l’avenir l’interpré—
bation de la constitution. Toute consti—
totion, aussi olaire soit—el1e, doit un
jour étre interprétée par les tribunaux.
Le préambule constitue alors une aide
trés précieuse pour faire la lumiére

sur les intentions véritables du 1é~

gislateur.

Le préambule permetbra d’attirer
l’attention de la population sur les
valeurs qui prééident 2‘: l‘oz’ganisati.on

de la société que nous voulons ériger.

Un accord do principe sur le préambule
oonshituora une réalisation ooncréte
inporvanto dans l‘é1aboration de la

nouvello constitution.

Lo préambule germettra enfin do con~
sacrev oertains droits inaliénables du
oitoyen. Il est logique que 1’expression
de ces droits précéde le texte do la loi
fondamentale. C’est dunner é ces droits
l’imnortance qui leur revient. Nous
sommos tons d’accord 5 protéger les
droits do 1’indiv1du avant ceux des
gouvernements. Cette préoccupation
commune doit Se réfléter dans la

pvéambule.

…/4

..L¢,..

5- C’e5t pour ces raisons que le gouvernement
du Canada propose que les objectifs suivants soient

énoncés dans le préambule de la nouvelle constitution:

l. Etablir pour 19 Canada un régime fédéral
de gouvernement fondé sur les principes

de la démocratie.

2. Protéger les droits fondamenbaux de

l‘homme, y compris les droits linguistiques.

5. Prmuouvoir le progrés économique, social
et cultural du pays, le bien—6tre général
de la population at l’égalité des chances
pour tous Les Canadians, quelle que soit
la région 06 L19 vivent, y compris l’accés
an travail rémunérateur, A de justes
canditions d‘emploi, A un niveau de vie
satfsfaisant, A la sécurité, A l’éducation,

at an repos et aux loxsire.

4. Contribuer A la réalieation de la paix
et de la sécurité mondiale, an progrés
social et A l‘nmél1oration du niveau

de vie de toute l’humanité.

7. Le gouvernement Canadian reconnait que cette
liste d’objectifs pourra évidemment étre complébée par

les suggestions que les proyinces pourront faire. Nous
proposons que cette Conférence donne son accord de principe
A 1’existence d‘un préambule de la constitution et que

le contenu précis de celui—ci soit étudié par le Comité

permanent de fonctionnaires.

1e 24 janvier 1969.

-Ccinférencfe Constituyticyinrkzellie , ‘

, mm-£10}: :

_ Erosibibn i‘éc1éru1e:-‘Le gouverneméjit cénadieri prop’o’sé . _
_cer’l7__ains obgectx s.de_,la‘fédératioh, canadienriei ‘soiejnt, non
‘dans _le pr-,éambu_1e d_e la constituticn. { ~: – v ‘ ~.
‘ Les ohjectifs prc)posés’fsozit: __é_tafpl‘ir. uh r
Iédéral fondé sur des principes dém crati<11isés; :
d .o‘it_s fon<1:::m=.ntuu‘x (ylcomprisles droits lingu
: _omouvoiz’_le~‘pr_ogr‘és économique; —soc_ia1~et_cu
, ‘b,J.G1fl-7é1JI‘€ de la population et l’égalité_ dés c_
‘ les Cenadiens_; constribuer é la ‘c,omm‘unauté_ mo

K “2. i”i~i)vj.nc‘e<: ‘z;vor.ables‘z7x laf.posit;‘i.onk ‘:“éd‘érakle_ v.2i.2§_b :2 K
. . : Nouvelle ucosse et Ontario se sont; I~ononcé5‘¢xp_1?e.ssém

~ en faveur _d’—un_kpréambule de 122 Qqnstitution, K
– :’~ Les a_u1_;res‘pr_o’v1nce‘s n‘-oz‘:tfexpri:‘né aucuné.‘
K _ .su‘ ?ce1;1;e qu_estj<_)n.j ‘ . _
3. Réiac5c‘ion’s gosmies 1- ‘J1 ‘ést péu ‘~prbbébie’_’q7.xé s provinces‘
‘ . s’ opposent ‘en grincipe nu pjrojep _<1e‘ 1,-édac_1;ion‘ ‘<1 ‘préambule
K‘ LL Lfependant;L22;2222ia22,111 se’peut”qv jcerta LS 1,’
pz\ovin_c_e_s_‘s’opposem;_a<ce__;stade-ci.;£\,un‘p,ro;jetIde p am ule,‘
. _¢sbimant qua —ce_t; exercice est_:‘ ppématuxég.‘ .~

. _ _ ,concépts—suive§nts ‘peuvent;_auss,i~ étre pro1§dsé ‘comrné_nt
I ‘ie,V’3\l’1t reéire Partie du préambule: ~ ~ ‘ ‘

C<$_x1″si_e_:;\{éjz”§kle syétéhxé’jparleVmen1fnir¢: ‘(N _
Proc,1anie1_’.~ _q_ue_ “union,car1adienne est fine ‘fédérat ix ‘

K V 1;,une_kassoc:Latiou_de. deux nations (Québec).‘

-— ‘P1’-o{:éger la .1iber1:é (Québec). ‘
‘ ‘ Visera ;L’éga1ité_,é;:onomiqué deS‘Etéts-meinb e_

A‘s’_su1§er_l’okrd1‘e_in13eI‘nke , (Qué‘1_;_e_¢)y, _. ‘ ‘

L _._Réa1is_eI?jl’éga1ité culturelle des deuit _n‘:{1:L1<$nLs’(hQi:éb,§c )h. »
V V»; Reconnaitre,-.’L_e r6le spécia_1 du‘Québec‘ filans la‘_.r_éI§1isati =<1_e‘l_’7égalit_é c_u1t_ure_11ek (kauébec). _’ ‘_ j _
‘7—_Re_é<_5nr’_iaitre la iiiveq-s_ité‘cukltu;:*e‘1k3.e at lin_gt}xis_t‘_K7que_](I‘{.}~E
Pr_oin_ouvbi:* 1’éga_1ité linguistique ‘da_an,s’1é”;1pn1_af‘_Lne de
_l.’éducation (Ontario). _ = ‘- ,. .– I
Iiecbnniiitre le caréctére bi_13’.né:u‘e at n;uf.l.Kt21c_u1‘c:t_zre,“‘<Vie‘_‘ _

:_t;out 1e —Can_ad_a (,()x‘D‘.:e_\1‘i0). _ K K_ _ .
-“Pi‘<3_mot1kv0irk1‘1§nité :nationale (Nouvéau:Brun$wi91$)_«.-T ,-
‘gzfieconneitre 1:’ ex1st;ence_ _de_ ‘dgux__ pe_up1e_s fond‘

*anv:§ri;9e9; : ”

CE nocunmm EST LA PROPRiE‘E nu aouvxnnxmmnm DU CANADA“
CONFIDENTIEL:
POINTS DE Dxscfisslow‘

Conférence‘Constitutionnélle, février 1969 f

Objectifs de la Confédération

1. Objection: Il est prématuré de tenter’de réa11ser~‘
un accord sur un préambule‘qui décrirait
les objectifs de la fédération et~1es ‘
principea de 13 Constitution avant ~o K
méme d’avo1r disouter ce que oontiendra
cette Constitution; . ~ .

Régonse: i) Toute négociétion doit avoir un poinfi
de départ. Il est logique_de commence?
par le préambule qui constitue lYétape‘~
initiale de toute constitution. ‘ ~ ’

ii)rIl ne s’agit pas de rédiger la version .
finale du nouveau préambule mais’de,§e_
mettre d’accord sur la nécessité d’un‘ .
tel préambule et sur les grandes lignes
de son contenu. ~. ‘ – .-

2. Objection: Le préambule devrait contenir beauooup ~ –
_ plus que ce que le gouvernement Canadian _
Vpropose. ‘ ‘ ”
Réponse: Il est souhaitable de limiter ie~oohténh
du préambule pour les poisons suivant
1) Certeins concepts n’ont pas ‘ __.
besoins d’étre exprimés puisqu‘ils T
sent implicites ou~découlent’de=
la nature méme de la Constitution

ii) Le contenu du préambule doit étre
rédigé de faqon é éliminer au _
maximum lee difficultés futures.
dfinterprétation. . —

yiii) La concision du préambule
, facilitera son adoption; ’81 ~
trop de concepts y sont énonqés,‘
il sera difficile de 1e_rendre
acceptable A toutes les parties
en cause. “ ‘

iv) La proposition fédérale hieéf pg
exhaustive; 1e‘gouvernement_canad&en,
sera réceptif a touts euggestioh
que les provinces pourront faire.‘

1e 24 janvier 1969.

THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF CANADA

CONFIDENTIAL

NOTES FOR PRIME MINISTER
SUMMARY

The Constitutional Conference ~ February, 1969

OFFICIAL LANGUAGES

SUNARY OF NOTES

(a) 1967 Consensus on Language Rights.

(1) Federal Government‘s Bill on Official
Languages.

(11) Provincial programs: language use in
legislatures and schools.

(b) Renewed offer of financial and technical
assistance to provinces.

(c) Sub—Committee on Official Languages: work
done and proposed program.

(d) B.& B. Report Vol. II: suggested referral
to Continuing Committee.

(e) Constitutional aspect of language rights.

[Lt

Tflld DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF CANADA
CONFIDENTIAL
NOTES FOR PRIME MNISTER

The Constitutional Conference ~ February, 1969
OFFICIAL LANGUAGES
NOTES

One subject on which considerable progress has been
made in the peat year is the matter of official languages. It
will he recalled that last February the Constitutional Con-
ference issued a consensus on language rights recognizing
“that Frenoh—speaking Canadians outside Quebec should have the

same rights as Englishaepeaking Canadians in Quebec”.

At that meeting the federal government declared
its intention to implement the recommendations in Volume I of
the Report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and
Biculturalism, in so far as they applied to the federal govern-
ment. Since that time we have been proceeding with our
official languages program; and we have introduced a Bill on
Official Languages which, if approved by Parliament, will
among other things have the effect of making English and French
theofficial languages of the Parliament of Canada, of the
Federal Courts, of the Federal Government and of the federal

administration.

During the past year most of the provinces have
also taken some steps toward the implementation of the first
B.& B. Report. The use of the English and French languages
has been authorized in the legislative assemblies of Newfound-
land, Prince Edward Island, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and
Ontario Just as their use in the legislature of Quebec has
long been authorized by the Constitution. Also, as a result
of measures introduced during 1968, the use of either language
as a language of instruction has, for the first time in our

history, been authorized to some extent in all ten provinces.

These are impressive accomplishments, and I believe
that all governments concerned should be encouraged by the
progress that has been made. There have been setbacks, and
much cemainu to he done to give full effect to the Commission’s
guiding principle, “the recognition or both official languages,
in law and in practice, wherever the minority is numerous
enough to be viable as a group”. I hope however that the
forward momentum on the subject will be sustained. The federal
Vovornmont has previously indicated that it stands ready
and willing to provide financial and technical assistance to
provinces undertaking official language programs: however as
needs and programs may differ widely from province to province,
each province is invited to formulate its own program and
let us know of it, so that we may consider how best to help

in each case.

Last summer a suh«committee of officials of our
various governments was established to examine the first volume
of the B.& B. Report, methods of implementation including
the nature of possible federal assistance, and the form and

method of constitutional amendment. I am happy to confirm that

the federal government approves the steps that have been taken”

hy the suhwcommittec on official languages. The government
also agrees that the sub~committee should proceed with studies
of the manner in which certain aspects of a language regime
may be undertaken. The intention would be to convert the
rather general propositions of the B.& B. Report into specific
techniques. It is hoped that provinces will support this
further program of work. As in the past, the suh~committee
will work under the supervision of the Continuing Committee of
Officials.
A few months aago the B.& B. Commission issued
Book 11 of its Report, dealing with linguistic and cultural

aspects of education in Canada. If it is the wish of this

Ié ’

KN

Conference, Book 11 might be referred to the Continuing
Committee for study and report by such procedure as it thinks
best. Because Book II deals with language problems different
from those dealt with in Book I, some other means for its
study may seem appropriate.

Turning to the constitutional aspect, I may say
that the Government of Canada remains prepared to support a
constitutional provision on the oubject of official languages.
I recognize that this question raises the same kinds of
considerations as those relating to the proposal to entrench
fundamental rights and freedoms in a Charter of Human Rights,
and I shall have something to say about that subject. For
the presant may I éimply say that the federal government
believes that the words in any constitution dealing with
language rights have great practical and symbolic value, and
that our constitution should clearly provide that English and
French are the two official languages of Canada, and should

include general rules for the application of this principle.

W115 nooufiméb IS @1113 PROPERTY or T}{E’GOVEl?l\‘1‘1Il2\’l£‘OF.<5A1§IADA‘_ _SUMI’JAR1( ‘ OF FOSITIONS ” —.The Constitutional Goni‘erenoe — February, 1969 * ‘ omwxcui LANGUAGES 1.; Federal Position ~ Linguistic ri5h.ts should be proteoteld by in _ 7 constitutional provisions. A comprehensive Official Lzingfuages ‘Bill has been introduced to ‘provide‘legislative protection ~ \ in the interim. ‘ ‘ ‘ l 2. l §Provinces‘Supportihg I-‘ederal Position‘-—k N.B. (Feb. Proc. K V ,:,p._.95;/+69; Prop. 3.4.15); Nfld. (Fefb. 1°i_’oo._p. l8l; Prop. o.2.7_); N.S (Feb.~I>roc. _p. 77-79; Prop. 2.1.1); P.E.I. (Feb. ’.P:coc‘._ ‘ ‘
K Que. (Prop. 14.9.14) ‘ _ ~ . _ ~ 1

ovincles of Different Positions: ‘

_§;_jG_§.: -?~”‘Voluntary ap1$reciati_on” better then constitjitionel
pI’QV eione. Does not accept union of two races and two‘ ‘ K
ioul res as ha:-Jio of Confederation. Opposed to Official
enguages 13111. (Feb. 1>roc. 1). 1619169, 477; Prop. 8.1.1,“ ‘
* s.e°:7,ga.s.9>y . L L

_;§_,_Q. —_—“ Constitutional provisions have little ‘effect on how
‘people live’ in so far as language ‘and culture are concerned.
‘ Gonétittitional protection of French and”Dnglis}i”would ~;1iake‘7~
_s,e_corid_’-” class citizens of Canadians whose et1mi_o_ origin is ‘
_ _neither French nor English. Violently opposed to Official:
i_ Laiiguages Bill. (B.C. Proposals on‘ the _Coiistit;ution, December

1963s is; 14-5) L L L L L

. K lilies reserved its position on either constitutional
nor legislative onactmemt in this field. __ \ ” ”
‘§_g_s3_. — Has taken steps to implement bilingual programs, gybut
~ does riot think that ‘extefxsion or the French language should ,
‘ be ‘1‘e‘q_ui1‘e<i_by-_pI’ovisions in the Constitution (Feb._Proc; p_. 147 _l49;_3?rop. 7.2.10)“ ‘ ‘A :1«*eb‘.- 3,‘ 1959 — _l§;._t_;§,, _f.‘3g_£_1_1_c_., and 31:11.. have united in strongj; ~ opposition to the Oiricial Languages Bill. iiii(DRA1T)i 1. .2. ‘Ia. ‘Comment: The Bill relates chiefly to the use of both languages inTfedera1_~1nst_itut ns‘ _, ment would not affect or modify the provisions of Section 133 BNA:~ everyo ‘ of one language that does not arise . auihority over provincial courts. K _ d — comm: Bykvirtue of Head 27 of Section 91, BNA Act, “procedure in_crin1i _‘ matter. court to exercise its discretion. ‘Comment: -Some -provinces do not * language ‘ rights . ~ Comment: Protection of the use of both languages in the provision of‘ ed‘ —puEI1c services will be primarily entrusted to the Comnissioner o_f_0£,fi, ‘ ‘governments on this subject if desired. K Issue: The federal government should without delay announce the nature‘b 1% financial and technical assistance to provinces undertaking programsjto , _ ‘_ – rather than to recurring operating expenditure . ‘HHS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF THIECOVERNMIENI‘ OF d d 1 cominunnu – oxsuxss1oN“~‘1>onn*s _

The Constitutional Conference, February, 1969 ‘
OFFICIAL LANGUAGES ‘

Issueg Provisions on official languages in an entrenched Charter wouldheia : ‘
Eederal invasion of provincial jurisdiction. K ‘ , F:
Comment: The Charter would not transfer powers as between governments: fit,

Ekoncerned with placing fundamental rights, including language rights; ‘-‘beyond; 1 ~
the legislative competence of both federal and provincial governments. * 3:

Issue: The federal Official Languages Bill, ‘even as related to ,s:trict_lyk’fede’ral ~
purposes, amounts to a unilateral amendment of the BNA Act (Section_.l33J._ ,

and does not impose any obligations on private citiz,en_s_.‘jI1;s*;enac
. in . X
Canada would continue to enjoy the same rights and privileges in_Ire,spec,t:of both, ,
languages under Section 133 as at present. In Section 133 both 1anguages,__now»“
stand in precisely parallel positions: there is no implied 1imitat;_ion_on ‘th —
equally in respect of the other. . 1 ‘

and agencies ,

Issue: The federal Official Languages Bill (Section 11(3)) Kinvadesk-provin

matters‘ is a subject of federal jurisdiction; andlanguage‘ use is aproc u 1
Moreover Section 11(3) of the Bill is permissive only: it enable,
The New Brunswick Supreme Court recently _
that under existing law the province has no competence and the iprovinc_ia1 co ts
have no discretion on the subject. ‘ ‘ ‘ – _’ ‘ .. . ‘ .

Issue: Creation of federal. bilingual districts would tend to forceprovinces
1’6IT6w suit. — _ _ ~ ~ — ~

___ share this view, for they have i ,
will not for the present establish provincialbilingual districts; _
Commission recommended that both the federal and provincial governments ,5
establish bilingual districts in appropriate areas, and the federal ‘gover
agrees that this would be an important step in the defining and ensurin

Issue: A pennanent federal-provincial Official Languages C,onmission‘should_‘ e
estafilished to facilitate exchange of information and to ensure more uni
decisions on language ‘rights. — ~

Languages, _ he will report directly to Parliament and not to the governmen
This however does not necessarily preclude arrangements for consultation

Ti’na—ncia1 assistance it will offer to provinces for their official =langu_‘_a e , *
programs relating to Vols. I and II of the B&B Report. I ‘ ‘ _ ‘ ‘

Coment: The federal government has indicated its readiness to provide-’50‘?

implement the B&I3 Report. However as provincial needs and*programs__ma‘y.vBry
widely, provinces have been invited to formulate their programs so thatythe‘
federal government may consider how best to help in each case.~ In_g_enera1
federal financial assistance wi,.L1__A;V ‘ ‘t’ l i lememza ts

(Nova Scotia has submitted a pilot project, with cost estimates;) .‘

p “.31

Quotations from Premiers‘ statemants made on February

10, 1969, on fundamental rights.

QUEBEC
Summary: No stated position
“Que nous ayions besoin d’une charts des
droits de 1’homme, soit; mais nous avons

besoin aussi at tout autant d’une cfiarte

des droits &es provinces.“

NEW BRUNSWICK

Summary: Support federal position

“At the same time, the constitution must .
be a fortress, with entrenched basic fundamenta
human rights for all Canadians.

PRINCE EDWARD ISLAND

Summary: No stated position

NOVA SCOTIA
Summary: No stated position
NE\»fFOKIII1>L{;_:\§>_

Summary: ‘No stated position

BRITISH_§OLU§BIA

“For the reasons which I have already
referred to} British Columbia would
not support a Bill of Rights which
would entrench linguistic rights.
Moreover, linguistic rights are not
the kind of natural rights which
traditionally have been the subject of
constitutional protection in those
jurisdictigns that have enacted Bills
of Rights

“The first implication of an entrenched
Bill of Rights is that it amounts to

a restriction on the principle of
legislative supremacy, which has been
the underlying philosophy of our
parliamentary system.“

“There are more significant ways to
effectively ensure that our laws do
not offend basic human rights and are
kept up to date.and in keeping with
our ideals of justice and freedom.“

SASKATCHEWAN

ALBERTA

ONTARIO

mnuxwong

“With certain qualifications, Saskatchewan
agrees with the proposal that a Bill of_
Rights guaranteeing fundamental democratic
rights, be made part of the Constitution.

However we also feel that great care must
be taken that only fundamental democratic
rights should be entrenchedJ

These are —
‘ freedom of religion
freedom of speech
freedom of assembly and association

freedom of press
: No stated position

: No stated position

: No stated position

}ggu DOCUMENT 15 THE PROPERTY OF THE GOVIHEWENT OF CANADA

4».

CONFIDENTIAL
NOTES FOR PRIM MINISTER
SUMMARY

flpo Constitutional Conference ~ February, 1969

\

VDAMENTAL RIGHTS

2
Federal policy for some time has given priority to
fundamental rights in the constitutional review process.

Once the rights of people are adequately defined we
can turn to the rights of governments.

An ontreuchment Charter would (a) override public or
private action denying the guaranteed rights, and

(b) be subject to change only by constitutional amend-
ment procedures.

The loss of parliamentary sovereignty is not a major
objection: we don’t have it now anyway in a pure form;
our courts are not likely to extend their functions
unduly in the area of policy-making; the goal is worth
the risk.

No new powers would be given to the federal government.

The details of the contents of the Charter can be
discussed further, also the timing and method of appli—
cation, once we agree on the principle of having a
Charter.

We propose:
(a) agreement in principle on having constitutional
guarantees;

(b) establishment of a committee of Attorneys General
to consider contents and method of application of
a Charter.

Tnls DOCUMENT lg THE PROPERTY OE wHE GOVERNMENT OF caning
QQNFI BNTlAL
Noihs FOR PRIME H1NlSTER
The Constitutional Conference ~ February, L369

NDAMENTAL RIGHg§

1: has for some time been the view of the Government
of Canada that fundamental rights should be among the first
matters to be examined in any review of the constitution.

You will recall that a year ago, before the first meeting of
this Conference, I was responsible for publishing a policy
paper ~ A Canadian Charter of Human Rights ~ which argued the
importance of this subject. we proposed than the entronchmenc
of a charter in the constitution which would protect the rights
of individuals against interference by governments.

in our most recent policy statement, ggygjggggyitugign
ggggjggzJ§ggQlgV£g;jggngig, we have set out a detailed proposal for
the contents of a Charter of Human Rights. We have also
explained there why we feel the subject of fundamental rights —
involving the rights of people — should be considered before
matters such as the distribution of powers — involving the
rights of governments. Iv seems to me that in any revised
constitution, the rights of people should be given a high
priority. we do not have constituhions or governments for
their own sake; we have them in order to secure for our people
those values, those things, which they most cherish. It is
therefore appropriate that we try at an early stage to write
inho the constitution those individual rights and freedoms
which all Canadians would expect to see preserved in their
country. Once we have given this priority to the rights of
people, we can turn to the rights of their governments.

I continue to believe, as 1 have stated on several
occasions before, that the guarantees in a oonstitutional
Charter of Human Rights would provide an important shield for
the individual against injustice at the hands of his govern~
mcnt or of his fellow citizens. The legal effects of such
constitutional guarantees would be twofold.

First, they would invalidate both official and
private action which interfered with fundamencal rights.

… 2

X;
L?‘

Federal or provincial legislation, or administrative orders,
which conflict with the guarantees would be of no effect.
Actions or arrangements by private persons which deprived

other persons of their human rights could be considered invalid

and possibly the subject of redress through lawsuits.

secondly, the rights guaranteed in the charter
would be relatively secure. As part of the constitution,
they could only be changed by the more difficult process of
constitutional amendment. In this way we could provide
relative continuity for fundamental rights even in times of

rapid political or social change.

It is true, of course, that once we set up such
constitutional standards for our Parliament and legislatures,
it will be possible for the courts to strike down enacted
laws because they conflict with constitutionally guaranteed
rights. This would to some extent limit legislative
supremacy as we now icnow it, and would give the courts an
expanded role. Bears have been expressed about the erosion
of legislative supremacy and the substitution of judicial
supremacy. Frankly, I am unable to share these fears.

In the first place, the idea of absolute supremacy
of the legislative bodies — an idea which is often said to
be fundamental to the British parliamentary system — has never
been fully applied in this country. In Canada, as in any
federal system, we allow the courts to decide on the validity
of leggislation which may conflict with the distribution of
powers in our written constitution. And looking elsewhere,
we can see that many of the newly independent Commonwealth
countries, which inherited the same system of government as
we did, nevertheless place guarantees of human rights in their
constitutions. The United Kingdom itself, by adhering to
the European Convention of Human Rights, has in some ways

limited its own parliamentary sovereignty.

16.

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figwaw ,4:/124 /«am _ %
«/v«—/a»wL<,c [1’\—-«—v'[()~1.<.‘[,_(L,« : /v»~a,w ¢;,.,¢A.., ,“/W1/W ‘,Z,Z{M_; {M Z;r/(“CV/F 6 Secondly, I think it is wrong to assume that our oourta would try to assert a dominant role by frequent and extensive invalidatioc or legislation. Our predictions here must be based on our own unique history and on our own judicial traditions. And we cannot begin to see the scope of the judicial role under a Charter of Human Rights until we are pre awed to discuss its contents. 9 Thirdly, even if there is an element of uncertainty in the effects of such A charter, I do not think we should refuse to adopt it for that reason. Any change, any advance- ment in human progress, brings with it uncertainties and risks. Value Judgements must be made to decide whether the goal is worth the risks involved. The goal here is the better protection of human rights and freedoms, and that is a goal which I suggest is worth a few risks. While some fear that a Charter of Human Rights would take away too much power from all governments, others fear that it would give new and excessive powers to the federal government. It has been suggested that the Parliament of Canada would somehow gain new authority to enforce the rights protected by the Charter. ‘The normal effect of such constitutional guarantees is quite the contrary. A Charter of Human Rights entrenched in the constitution would not transfer powers from one govern- ment to the other: it would take powers away from all govern- ments. To make this point amply clear, however, we have included in our detailed proposal for the contents of a Charter a section (6) which would expressly provide that no government is to gain new powers through its Adoption. As a result, the power to ggggg human rights would be taken away from both Parliament and the provincial legislatures; the power to enforce and Qrotect human rights would remain where it now is. .27., 4 As I mentioned previously, we have made a fairly detailed proposal for the contents of a Charter as we would like to see it. But this is in no way our final View of what the Charter must contain. The contents are negotiable and we would welcome detailed discussions with other governu ments as to what should be included. If there are serious practical problems involved with our wording (for example, in.the field of law enforcement) we would like to study these problems with other governments to see if a better wording can be devised. It may be that the time has not yet come when some of the proposed rights should be defined in the constitution, or when they can be made applicable in all parts of the country at the same time. The details of the contents or the Charter can he considered as an issue separate from the question as to whether we should have a constitutional Charter. whether or not we should have such a Charter is a question which I would hope this meeting will .onsider. we might best advance the study of other and more detailed problems — such as the contents of the Charter — by referring them to a special committee. Because of the many questions of policy involved, I would suggest that a committee of ministers would be most appropriate. I would therefore propose that before this meeting of the Conference Chdo, we should: (1) Agree in principle to the inclusion in the constitution — in either the existing %r a revised constitution — of guarantees of fundamental rights. (3) Agree to establish a committee of Ministers of Justice and Attorneys General to study and make recommendations to this Conference on: (a) the guarantees of fundamental rights which could most appropriately be included in the constitution; and $18. (b) the manner in which these guarantees could be included in the constitution, and made applicable to the various jurisdictions within Canada . 1Q sears oocmmm is em»: PROPERTY or one covmmmxm o1?.cAN.r.DA? ” ‘ CONFlDEN’l‘IAL ‘ SUMMARY 03* rosxauous The Constitutional Conference 4- February, 1969 L FUNDAIENTAL RIGHTS V 1. ‘réaerai Position ~ A charter or human rights shculd__b.e r ‘entrencfiea’ in the constitution including political, legal,’ egalitarian and linguisticrights. __ ~ 22- 11.15. (Feb. Prod.“ p. ) . , } . , (FEET Proc. p. 195 Prop. 0.2.9); P.E,_I_. (Feb. Proo. p. 139). – ‘ ‘ 2 .. Provinces 3.‘ Provinces of Different Positions _ Alta. -— would limit legislative sovereignty, could ‘ giimpeae law enforcement. Re: linguistic rights – it -is unrealistic to expect early agreement,‘ they won’t: . _ produce desired results, “voluntary appreciation” better.‘ . (Feb. Proc. 1). 163-69, 505-15; Prop. 8.l_.;*,‘ 8.1.4). – _ 13.0. — Too rigid, restricts ‘legislative suyremaoy, ,_re3uces provincial powers, places policy xiecisions in . the courts, present system not manifestly wrong. ‘ (Feb. Pi-cc. l.29~5l) Linguistic rights make others — seconds-class, citizens. ‘ ‘ ” @. —- Not enthusiastic, but is “prepared … to: participate in devising 8. Canadian charter of human _~rights“. K (Feb. Proo. p. 107). ~ ‘ ‘N.S. — Doubtful but not completely opposed. Is‘ _ 1 concerned theta charter might sanction license, making . law—en£orcement difficult. (Feb. P:-co. p. 515). it .Out. — Not altogether ‘opposed, but concerned about loss of legislative supremacy and the way in which the rights might be expressed. (Feb. _l?roc. p. 279-87). . K‘ Que. —~ Reserved its position. Believes in principle V ‘ entrenchment of rights inbcth provincial and federal constitutions. Skeptical about federal proposal ‘ ‘ _ because ‘many of these matters are within provincial ~ jurisdiction, the ultimate Judicial -tribunal would impose a “homogeneity of ethical concepts”. Group rights are not mentioned. (Feb. Proc. pp. 2895501). Enforcement of rights should remain unchanged (Prop. l+.25.1+6). Linguistic rights should be entrenched. (Prop. 4.9.14). v ~ Sask. — Not impressed with the need. would accept a‘ ~T5i’IT limited to “fundamental democratic rights”. ~ rotherwise should preserve legislative supremacy. . . ~ ‘Linguistic ‘rights in ~B.N.A. Act should remain unchangerl. _ (Feb. ‘Proc. p. 151. Props. 7.2.10, 7.2.11). ‘ – V was DOCU‘M}&NT IS THE 1512012131202‘: or THE oovxnmvuzmusdos GANADA _ L i “A K oonstifutional adjudication. Their powersin applyigx ~ federal criminal law power. Linguistic rightsrwould‘ *a;€:€ect both orders ofgovernment. “Civil rights_’—“ comm DENTlAL K mzscussmn POlN_1‘S _ – The Constitutional Conference —‘February, 1969 Funnmmmm alums Iseue: An enfrenched ‘Charter would impair legislative Eovereignty. . Comment: The rights _of,t:he citizens should prevail “ . over tfie rights of legislatures. Moreover,‘ legislativ _ sovereignty is already qualified in some parliamentary . systems: in Canada, by the B.N.A. Act 3. 95 and~»S_.f 53 in newly independent Commonwealth countries which hav Bills of Rights; in the 11.35., which bound itself by the European Convention on Human Rights. ‘ 1 V‘ Issue: An entrenched Charter would give the courts, too much power, making them supreme in certain areas. Comment: The courts al14ead:y’T};>lay‘a similar role ‘in

a Charter would still be limited to interpretation;
their policy-making within carefully defined lim_its_

‘Issue: The Charter would make ‘law en£oxjcement_difl‘io

Comment: If carefully worded, ~11; need not interior
wi‘EE any legitimate activities of the police. — The
precise wording is a matter for discussion. ~

Issue: Entrenchment of a Charter would mainly intezzfeir ‘‘
wifi provincial matters such as “property and civi1.r’Eh_
not ‘federal matters. ‘ . ‘

Comment: Guarantees of freedom of speech, press,“
association and religion would mainly reduce 1_‘ed_era1j
jurisdiction as most as ects of these mattersare‘ “
federal. “Legal Rights‘ would more se:ciouely‘ai‘£_e,c

“yroperty and civil rights” cannot be equated with
‘civil liberties”, “fundamental freedoms”, “human r.l_

Issue: A better method of protecting individual rlght
:.s‘t:Erough Law Reform Commissions, ombudsmen, Human
Rights Commissions, etc. ‘ ‘ ~

Comment: Those institutions are also very~impo1‘tazi’I;~
in addition, but they cannot perform the unique
functions or constitutional guarantees.

Issue: An entrenched Charter would give new and :
Broad powers of enforcement to Parliament, perhaps
under “criminal law”. ~ .~

‘Oommenti Our draft section 6 specifically provides .

tn‘ at no new legislative power is to be conferred by the
adoption of the Charter. ‘ _ _

as

THIS DOCUIEQU IS THE PROPERTY OF TWE GOVERNHENT OF CAUADA

CONFIDEHTIAL
NOTES FOR THE
PRIME NINISTER:
SUHHAR!

The Constitutional Conference — February, 1969

DISTRIBUTION OF POWERS

Introduction

1. Legislative powers must be divided in the
context of the kind of federal state you want
(e.g. no special status): hence our desire to
sneak of Charter and Institutions of Federalisw

first.
2. One of most complex and diverse aspects of
Constitution: total review will be lengthy,

difficult process

General Federal Position

1. was outlined in Federalism for the Future.

2. will advocate the division of powers which
will be most efficient in achieving the goals
of Confederation.

Goal: To Achieve a Balanced Federal Svstem

1. Neither excessive centralization nor wholesale
transfers of powers to provinces.
2. Equality among provinces — no “special statu§M

3. Respect for the Constitution.
Flexibility in division of powers to meet needs
of future.

Goal: Economic, Social and Cultural Development.
and Equality of Occortunity for Indlvlinal Cannilaa:

1. Some of benefits of Confederation should be
guaranteed in Constitution: human and linguistic

rights. Many will be achieved through individual
effort.
2. . In dividing powers should not over—emphasize one

goal at the expense of others: e.g. protecting
regional or cultural differences gs growth and

development and individual opportunity (or vice versa).

3. Give each government the job it is best able to
do, to benefit of individual.
h. Examples of federal powers, per these criteria:
a) Common market and monetary union
(b) Wide range of economic powers, including
power to attack regional disparities
(o) Distribution of benefits of economic growth —
income redistribution
(d) Canads—wide social and cultural development –

e.g. czac
(e) Research and technology of benefit to all.
5. Examples of provincial powers, per these criteria:

(a) Preservation of regionel and provincial diversity
(h) Primary and secondary education

(c) Social welfare for families in need

(d) Direct health services

(e) Area economic development.

Distribution of Powers should be based not Iron
Doctrine. but upon the deeds of the Peoole

36>.

ConF\dontldl

The Constitutional Conference

Februar 394

DISTRIEUTION OF PC3325

1. The next item on the Agenda is the
Distribution of Powers – that is to say the division

of the powers to legislate and to govern between the
Parliament of Canada and the Lekislatures of the
Provinces. This unquestionably is one of the central
asoects of any federal constitution; the one which is
inevitably of greatest concern to aovernments and

oublio services. For having determined what povernments
may not do — what individual riphts may not be infringed
by lepiclativc or covernmental action; and havinr
determined what form novernments will take — the
character of the institutions of novernhont; the next
and central question is what each order of rovernmeht
created by the Constitution gay do, or will be eroowered
to do.

2. The Government of Canada has not soucht

at this stage to set out a detailed set of prouosals

on the distribution of nowers. We have said, of course,
what general Shane we think these sections of the
Constitution ought to take: our views were set forth

as early as a year are in Federalist for the Future

(p.p. 36-UH). But we have felt — and still do feel —

that when it comes to the details of the Constitution,
first priority ought to be given to those asoects which
have to do with the oeople of Canada – their rights, the
Judicial system which has so much to do with these rights,
and the methods by which governments shall be made
responsible and resnohsive to the oeople. Yoreover the
distribution of mowers is such a complex asuect of the
Constitution, covering as it does all areas of government
social, economic and cultural — that we would not be
serving the Canadian people well if we were to wake hasty,
or piecemeal, or ill-considered judpments on the question.
we will require all of the objectivity, all of the
Judgment, all of the foresight we can muster if we are

to do a orooer job on the‘distribution of lerislative
powers. For this is a Job for 100 years, not for this
year.

I

3. The kind of division of uowers you think
Canada should have deoends greatly upon your views on
two questions. First, what relative importance do you
attach to the different, the several, objectives of
Confederation: should our rreatest concern be with
increasins onportunities for individual Canadians,

for example, or should it he to nurture the social and
cultural differences to he found between promos of
P80Dle or defined georraohic areas? Secondly, do you
believe that Canadian federalism ourht to be preserved
exclusively through governments and the powers that
are given to them, or do you believe that in addition,
indeed from the beginning, certain individual rinhts
ought to be guaranteed — such as language rights –

and that provision ouvht to be wade for representinr
adequately in the institutions of government the interests
of people in the different regions of Canada. These

‘o
l

are fundamental questions indeed. I know and I
believe others around this table know that di??eredt
answers to these questions lead to different answers
on how legislative oowers ourht to be divided.

h. I believe that the best service I can do
this Conference and the neoole of Canada, at this

stage of the Constitutional Review, would be to address
myself to these questions ~ to sneak of ny general
philosophy of the division of towers, as it affects
individual Canadians

A Federal System Based on
Democratic Values

5. we have said in The Constitution and the
Peonle of Canada that the first objective of th
Constitution should he the preservation of the Federal

system of government, based on democratic values. Hhat
does this mean to individual Canadians?

6. It means, first, that Canadians should
continue to be served by two orders of flovernment –

the federal government servinr their interests as
Canadians, and nrovincial wovernments servinv their
interests as residents of narticular orovinces. Real
federalism calls for a balance of comers between these
two levels of government: neither an excessive
centralization of powers in the hands of the federal
government, nor the fravmentation of the country through
wholesale transfers of power to orcvincial rovernnents.
“Canadian federalism must be a balance between these
extremes” (Federalism For the Future, cafe 1‘). Ge
believe that there can he — that there are – strong
crovincial governments nnd a stronn federal government.
It is a matter of determining which services can best
be provided, to individual Canadians, by which order of
povernment.

7. It is our view that the movornment elected
by all Canadians ourht, in general, to speak and act
for Canadians wherever country-wide oroblems are
involved, and wherever the interests of individual
Canadians or of regions of Canada cannot adequately

be advanced by their provincial governments. Provincial
governments, on the other hand, ouyht to sue and act
for the provincial and local concerns of the 1 oeoole,
and to provide and adapt the more oersonal onblic
services to the oarticular needs and interests of their
citizens

8. Federalism means, too, that each or.-r of
government must resuect the resuonsibilities a. towers
of other rovernments. If they don’t – if the orovincial
Governments try to anyrandize mowers at the exneise of
the federal government, or if the Federal rcvcrnnent
tries indirectly to fiirect the affairs of‘ the pro inoes —

neither will he able to do ‘the job exnocted of‘ t. em by
their electors and taxgmyers.
9. At the same time the division of oowers

must orovide a built-in flexibility: we must reconnize
that what is a provincial nroblem today may be a
national problem tomorrow, and vice versa. The
cSn5d1&h_Deople would not be well served by a
constitution which put each level of governnent in a
straight Jacket.

– 3 _

10. These are the ruidlincs we think should
be followed in tryinv to achieve, in the distribution
of cowers, the first objective of the Constitution:
“a federal system of Povernnonr h1se* on ionocrotic
values“.

To Promote National Economic, Social and
Cultural Development, and Equality of
Oncortunity for Individual Canadians

11. The second objective of Confederation
which we have put before this Conference we have
stated this way:

“To uromote national economic, social and
cultural dcvelonment, the veneral welfare

and equality of opportunity for all Canadians,
in whatever rcmion they may live, including

the opportunity for gainful work, for Just
conditions of emnloyment, for an adequate
standard of livinp, for security, for education,
and for rest and leisure.”

12. This is the objective which concerns
individual Canadians most directly and most personally:
the economic, social and cultural growth of the country,
and how the benefits of this growth are to flow to
individual Canadians. Governments can contribute to
this growth, but only if each does what he is best at
doing. The test, in other words, as to what powers

the federal government should have and which the
provincial governments oumht to have should be efficiency:
which will brinn the most rapid growth in our economy,
and in our social and cultural well—beinP? Moreover,
the distribution of the benefits of rrowth oucht to be
the responsibility of the covernwents which are best
able to ensure an effective and equitable distribution
across the country, and within the nrovinces or reeions.

13. There are, as we have said, some benefits
which ought to be cuirantecd in the Constitution, rather
than provided by oovernments throurh the exercise of the

powers which are divided between then. I have mentioned
these before: human rights, democratic rights and
linguistic rights. He must recognize, moreover, that

the individual wants to be resnonsible for a substantial
part of his gyg social and cultural development –
oroviding his human, democratic and linguistic rirhts
are protected wherever he goes in Canada, and nrovidinf
he is assured of a decent standard of living as a result
of his efforts, over the years, for himself and for

his family. It would be improner to think of concentratinv

the whole Job of cultural development in the hands of
government, or in the hands of any particular government.

1%. Having said this, the fact remains that
governments can contribute rmterially to the rate of
growth of our econonw, and to the social and cultural
well-being of the oeople of Canada. In reviewinr the
division of legislative mowers between the federal and
provincial governments we must be sure, as I have
said, that each government is Fiven the Job it is best
at doing. But we must also be sure that a reasonable
balance will result as between social development,
cultural develooment, and economic develoument.

15. It would be nossihle, for examnle, in the
name of orctecting regional or cultural fiiffernnccs

to so weaken the ability of the Federal vovernrcit

to promote economic fievelocmcnt anc economic sterility,
thet the economic wc1l«he1ng of the indivioual – his
income anfi his economic opocrtunities – wouli he
reduced.

16. In toflay’s – and tomorrow’s – economy the
federal government must have stronv economic mowers
if this is to be avoided. For examcle, Canada’s
common economic market and monetary union must be
operated and regulated as an entity in the interests
of efficiency. There must be an intezrated financial
market, regulated in the common interest; a free
market for goods where institutional structures and
market standards are the concern of one government
rather than ten; and a hirhly trained and mobile
labour force in n free labour market. All of these
will make Canada more efficient and will raise the
income of individual Canadians

17. The federal government, too, must have a
sufficiently wide ranve of economic covers — monetary,
fiscal, balance of nayments and other more selective
policy instruments — that it can vary its policies for
different and for emerfling economic needs enfl
circumstances. It must be able to use its taxiny

and spending powers so as to promote the balanced
growth and develourent of the several sectors and
regions of the Canadian economy. Otherwise the rernovel
of regional disparities will be simnly a slogan.

18. Similarly the distribution of the benefits
of economic growth can in certain aspects be handled
better by the federal covernmeht than by the provinces
It is the only government able to redistribute income
between persons by means of a tax system which acclies
across Canada, and income maintenance cayrnents which
apnly across Canada. It is the only government which
can equalize the provincial public services of Canada
through the equalization of crovincicl revenues

19. Similarly there are certain aspects of
social and cultural development which are Canada—wide
in‘character, and which the central government can
contribute to more effectively than urovincial
governments. One example is the orovision of certain
nation-wide cultural facilities – the CBC, national
galleries and museums, the Canada Council, and similar
bodies as they are required in the future. Another
example is the develonment of national tics — ties of
Canadian unity — throunh the crovision or re~ulation
of certain common public services, includinn today
such facilities as railroads and airlines, and
tomorrow such services as satellite communication.
Still another examole is the stimulation of research
and innovation and technological develooment, which
will inevitably bestow benefits on all Canadians.

20. Having sale this, it would be possible,

on the other hand, to so emnhnsize the need For
economic efficiency as to suuoress cultural differences
in the interests of excessive economic uniformity. For
example, there is a price to be paid for bilinnualism
in Canada, and for the benefits of cultural diversity

– a price which should be maid throunh anorooriate
linguistic uuarantees. There is a price to be maid

for enabling the nrimary and secondary educational
curricula to be tailored to the different auuroaches
taken to education by the different crovinces

– 5 ;

2]. It is more efficient, too, to leave to
orovincial governments the determination of the
needs of individual families, in different cities
and different areas, where these families are in
need of assistance from the state. The orovinces
similarly can msnave or renulate hosoitals more _
effectively, in relation to local needs, than can
a large federal government. And the diversity of
Canada’s provinces and regions can more readily be
taken into account by smaller units of government –
the provinces and municipalities – than by larger
ones — the federal government — in nrovidinp the wore
personal oublic services

22. These are the kinds of criteria which
should be used, in our view, in reviewinr the division
of powers. we would be fearful of a division of mowers

based on doctrine rather than on the needs of the neonle
There is really only one unchanrinv element o’ Canada,
and that is the basic rights of oeoole: these cell
for entrenchmont in the Constitution. The changing
elements of Canada – our social, cultural and economic
evolution – call for a division of powers, for powers
to tax and to spend, for residual uowers, which are
capable of adaptation to changing circumstances
Rigidity designed to keen either the provincial
governments or the federal government “in its olace”,
or to keen things neat, may serve bureaucracies, but
it doesn’t serve people.

Provincial Taxing Powers (OPTIOKAL PA3AGRAPH8)

23. Perhaps I should add a word about the
taxing powers of the nrovinces – a subject which

seems to oreoccuny two or three oreriers more than
almost any other. I am quite orenared to defend the
policies of the Government of Canada in resnect of
federal-provincial fiscal relations. The fact is that
provinces and municioalities now have a share of total
tax fields approaching 50 per cent. The fact is that
the high income provinces have a hixher per canita

tax base than the Government of Canada, and that with
the exception of one province only they have been
financing consistently at a surolus. The fact is that
federal assistance to the lower income nrovinces has
almost doubled under the new fiscal arrangements –
from $318 million in i965~66 to $566 million this year.
The fact is that the lower income provinces receive
anywhere between 30 and 60 per cent of their gross
revenues from the Government of Canada, and that all
nrovinces combined receive nearly 30 per cent of their
revenues from this source.

_ 2U, But I would hone that current issues could

be debated in the aporopriate forum – a Federal-Provincial
Fiscal Conference. Here our job is to review the
Constitution of the future, to think beyond current
differences, to look ahead 50 or 100 years, In this
context, in the Pwce of this resnonsibility which we
have assuned, I would hope that discussions of the
taxing powers would take a constitutional form. I

would hone that the Premiers would make_soccific
proposals as to the taxing mowers they w nt in the
Constitution, which they do not currently have; that
they would tell us what new taxing mowers they would
recommend which would not lead us toward interurovincial
tariff barriers or the taxation of the residents of one
province by the government of another, I want to make
this quite clear: my collearues and I 3;; orenared

to discuss orovincial taxing powers; we are nrepared

to give this question a hirh priority in the discussion

of the division of mowers. Qut we Rn not want to
turn this Conferencs into just one were squabhle
about how much money the Government of Caaafla ouvht
to be turning over to the governments of the
provinc e s.

Conclusion

25. The review of the distribution of mowers

is going to be long and difficult. It will call

upon, indeed will tax the resources of our several
governments in such diverse fields as economics and
education, cultural affairs ans ouhlic finance, health
and communications, financial markets and social
welfare, research and technolory and income fieiistributimm
we will require all the foresight and imagination,

and all the patience and jut ant we can muster. Put
out of it ounht to some a clearer statement of the
powers which the peoule of‘ Cansxia wish to assirjn to
their governments, and a clearer understandinn too

on the part of each government as to its role in
serving the people of this country‘

(‘4)

1

e divided in the

eral state you I nt
(c.g. no special status he:.e our desire to
speak of Charter and Institutions of Federalism
first.

One of most complex ané fiivcrsc aspects 01
Constitution: total review will be lengthy,
difficult process,

2.

K0

‘Neither

Foualitv of OD0Orv

To Achieve a B37

zcessivc centralizatio“ nor wholesale
transfers of s to prcvinc
Equality amo provinces ~ no “special status”.
Respect for the Constitution.
Flexibility in division of p9
of future.

s to meet needs

Eocnonich_Sooinl and Qultural Develovm=’“

tv for Individual Ca

Some of he”efits of Confederation should be
guarante in Constitution: human and linguistic
rights. ny will be achieved through individual
effort.

In dividing
goal at the
regional or
dcvelo[.
Give eacn government the job
do, to benefit of indiviaual.
Examples of federal powers, per these criteria:

“ohasize one
protecting
gro

powers should not ovev—
expense of others: e.g.
oultu*:l differences vs

it is best able to

a Common market ani monetary union

(b) Wide r.age of economic powers, including
power to attack regional disparities

(0) Distribution of bcnéfits of economic gr wth
income redistribution

(d Canada ride social and cultu al development –
e.g. CT.

Lc) “arch ané tee ology of benefit to all.

s of provinoill no ers, per these criteritx
Pres‘“vation of regional and provincial.diveAsity
) and secondary education

(c) welfare for families in need

(1) Direct health services

(5) Area economic development.

f “overs sh’
ucon the

.A.w. Johnson,
Jan. 29, 1969.

nt and individual opportfihity (or vice versa).

THIS DOCUIEMT IS T33 D

DISCUSSION POINTS

nee 5 Februarv, igéq

«PTO. OF FOW?3§

Issue: The distribution of powers should be discussed
before other aspects of the Constitution.

Co t: A general perspective as to the nature of
feoerelism in Canada (linguistic guarantees; ‘
representation in Senate) is required before
discussing distribution of powers. Moreover, only
one government (Quebec) is ready to discuss this
complex and diverse subject, to judge from the
propositions submitted.

gssue: The only issues of importance in Sections 9;
and 92 are the taxing-powers of the provinces and the
spending power of the Parliament of Canada.

ggmme ‘ The several elements in the distribution of
power are thorou:’ , related: cannot change one

nithout affoctin others. Examples: expenditure
responsibilities and boxing powers; fiscal powers and
economic powe s- economic powers and regional economic
development. Are willing to start with taxing and
spending powers. But Government of Canada, like
Government of Quebec, believes a comprehensive review
is necessary.

gssue: There should be a sweeping transfer of powers
to the provinces, with provision for delegation from
the provinces to the Parliament of Canada.

Qgnment: The Government of Canada could be so weakuned
it could not discharge its national responsibilities —
economic policy, regional development, income redistribu-
tion, equalization, etc. It would be up to the provinces
to say whether sufficient powers would be “re-delegated”
to the federal ~ ich really means Ontario and Quebec
Governments would be governing Canada.

: Let’s settle individual issues such as
nsibility for securities regulation and social
security, etc.; and let the division of powers “evolve”.

This would be tantamount to saying that
and unintegrated decisions are better than

, 1 and comprehensive ones. It would also make
the distribution of powers the subject of continuous
political bargaining, where strength rather than
reason would prevail.

A.w. Johnson,
Jan; 29, 1969

THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF CANADA

CONFIDENTIAL

NOTES FOR THE
PRIME MINISTER

The Constitutional Conference – February 1969

DISTEIBUTION OF POW ‘

1. Lead in Remarks

(a)

(b)

The direction on the thinking of the Government
of Canada as to the division of oowers was
outlined in Federaiism for the Future pages 36-40.

We have not attempted to set out detailed
propositions on the division of powers. for
two reasons:

(1) We attach priority to Charter and to
central institutions of federalism
(Federalism for the Future, last
oaragraph page 3

(ii) The division of powers is such a
complex area of the Constitution ~
covering as it does all areas of
government, social, economic and
cultural that we would not be
serving the Canadian people well if
we were to make hasty or 111-
oonsidered Judgments on the
question.

2. Relationship between Division of
Powers and the Objectives of Confederation

(a)

(M

The kind of division of powers you come up with
depends on your basic views on two questions:

(1) The relative importance which should be
attached to the several objectives of
Confederation ~ whether for examnle your
greatest concern is with increasing
opportunity to individual Canadians, or
whether it is with social and cultural
differences within defined geographic
areas.

(ii) It depends secondly on the other
provisions of the Constitution — whether
for example there are language guarantees
and apnropriate institutions of federalism.

I thought the best service I could do this

Conference and the people of Canada, so this
stage of the Constitutional heview, would be
to speak of our general philosophy about the
division of powers – as it affects individual

Canadians.

3. _0b3eoCivo: Canada should have a federal system

(a)

of government based on democratic values

we have said in The Constitution and the People

of Canada that the first objecvive of the
Constitution should be the preservation of
the federal system of government tased on

(c)

(d)

(e)

_ 2 –

democratic values. what does this mean to
individual Canadians?

It means that Canadians should continue to
have two orders of government serving their
interests – the federal government serving
their interests as Canadians, and provincial
governments serving their interests as
residents or particular provinces

Federalism means neither an excessive
centralization of powers in the hands of the
federal government nor the fragmentation of
the country through wholesale transfers of
government powers to provincial governments.
“Canadian federalism must be a balance between
these extremes” (Federalism for the Future,
page 16). we believe that there can be —
that there are – strong provincial govern-
ments and a strong federal government. It

is a matter of determining which services

can best he provided, to individual Canadians,
by which order of government.

In general the government elected by all
Canadians ought to speak and act for
Canadians wherever country»wide problems
wemwmwamwmmmrwemmmmsd
individual Canadians or of regions of Canada
cannot adequately be advanced by their
provincial governments; provincial govern<
ments ought to speak and act for the
provincial and local concerns of their
people, and to provide and adapt the more
personal public services to the particular
needs and interests of their citizens.

Federalism means, too, that each order of
government must respect the responsibilities
and powers of other governments. If they
don’t – if the provincial governments try to
aegrandize powers at the expense of the
federal government, or if the federal govern»
ment tries indirectly to direct the affairs
or the provinces ~ neither will be able to

do the Job expected of them by their

electors and taxpayers.

At the same time the division of powers must
provide for built in flexibility: we must
recognize that what is a provincial problem
today may be a national problem tomorrow,
and vice verso. The Canadian neople would
not be well served by a constitution which
put eoch level of government in a straight
jacket.

These are the guidelines we think should be
followed in trying to achieve, in the

distrihution of powers, the first o
of the Constitution: “a federal s st
oovornment based on democratic values .

,t1Ve

1 if

1+.

b ective:

-3-

To promote national economic, social

0 3
an cultural development, the general welfare and

(a)

(d)

(e)

equality of opportunity for all Canadians in
whatever repion they live and to whatever
linguistic group they belong. including the
opportunity for gainful work, for just conditions
of employment, for an adequate standard of living,
for security, for education, and for rest and

leisure.

This is the objective of Confederation which
concerns individual Canadians most directly:
the economic, social and cultural growth of the
country, and how the benefits of this growth
are to flow to individual Canadians.

The rrowth will be maximized if each government
is given the job it is or can be most efficient
at doing. If this isn’t done, then the growth
of the country will be slower, and individual
Canadians will pay the price.

Moreover the distribution or the benefits of

growth ought to be t e rcsnonsibi ity of the

governments host able to ensure an effective

and equitable distribution across the country
and within the provinces or regions.

There are some benefits which ouvht to be
xuaranteed in the Constitution, rather than
provided by governments through a distribution
of powers. These are:

(1) The basic human rixhts
(ii) The democratic rights
(iii) Linguistic rights

Must recognize that the individual wants to be
responsible for a substantial part of his own
social and cultural development – nroviding
his human, democratic and linguistic rights
are protected wherever he goes in Canada, and
oroviding he is guaranteed a decent standard
of livinm (by the efficient use by governments
of an efficient distribution of power).

It would be improper to think of concentrating
the whole Job of cultural development in the
hands of government, or in the hands of any
particular government.

The oowers of movernment must he divided in such
a wav as to get a rcascnetlc talance in social
develooment. cultural development, and economic
dovelonment.

(i) It would be possible in the name of
proteotinm regional or cultural
differences, to so weaken the ability
or the federal government to promote
economic development and economic
stshility, that the economic well being
of the individual — his income and his
economic opportunities — would be
diminished.

In todayls economy the federal government
must have strong economic powers if this

‘4 I, ..h

(11)

(111)

– Q –

is to be avoided. For example:

— the common economic market and
monetary union must be operated
and regulated as an entity in the
interests of efficiency: an
integrated financial market,
regulated in the common interest;
a Free market for goods where
institutional structures and
market standards are the concern
of one government rather than ten;
and a highly trained and mobile
labour force in a free labour market.

– all of these will make Canada more
efficient and will raise the income
of individual Canadians.

– the federal government must have a
wide enough range of economic powers –
monetary, fiscal, balance of payments
and other more selective policy
instruments — that it can vary its
policies for different and for
omerzinz economic needs and
circumefnnoes.

—- the federal government; must be able
to use its taxing and spending powers
so as to promote the balanced growth
and development of the several
sectors and regions of the Canadian
economy. otherwise the removal or
revional disparities will be simply
a slogan.

Similarly the distribution of the benefits
of economic growth can in certain aspects
be better handled by the federal zovern~
ment than by the provinces

~ redistribution of income between oersons
via a tax system which applies across
Canada and income maintenance payments
which apply across Canada

— equalization of provincial public
services of Canada via the equalization
of provincial revenues.

Similarly there are certain aspects of
social and cultural development which are
Cana<leo,sI:1ioNs

irxtis Documsum IS an

K’ ‘ The~Conetitutione1 Conference ~—7Februkaz-V, 1963

,1. ~ Federal Position –

–

4.1

a_nc1_.
‘Hue. »
‘generally iwant high

‘is

‘ ‘Provinces‘—’§3uR2orting:

. zfisays now 5 not

‘ 5) _

Provinces Differing:
special su —comm:L ee fox-y detailed’ study; Que. _

5.27-75′?) wants discussion now‘, same i‘or_N.S. (Prop. _
‘Man. Feb. Prop. 1:, 115) because of regional disparit_iee_ K
, 13.0.‘, P..E.I;, Mia. ail”: ‘ ‘ ‘
oulci ‘be ‘based ‘on prinoip1ee_

75 K K _ Federal Poeition 4-

‘ _’ ‘_ J’Z’.’fovirioe‘e‘Su_t_>_£ortin5: N.S, (Doc. 89,13”. ‘l6‘);kQu_e. (Props:

i V iovixooee ‘Differing: ,i\I.B. (Doc; 89., :9.’ ~16) – ‘there are ‘
~ ,uno xona an doc rinal coneidex-ations;.f_N1‘ld. ,
oonsider regional circumstances; :Sask.
es ‘based o_n_doc_trine; 0nt.~_ __
<1 economic‘ considerations, similerly,‘ V
., B._C. hevke gm clear —k . ‘
knits -ori‘

bxsmiaufifiiom oz.-‘A POWERS
Distribution Lemma be dieoussedeafter V
xfter institutions of _i‘ede_ra1-

the Che
iem.’k’. __ _ K _
_ N.B.. _‘_(P,t~op. 3.’l7_.4’7 and Comment‘ ‘
a time iforwieteileci work; Ont’, (Doc. 89,
Props.’ K ”
2.12) =

.A1ta. (Doc. ‘, 13. 17-8) wants

: . Seek.
er priorijhy for this.
fiistribution an
of lfunctionelism and efficien__cy~.
(Prop. »o.’5.’1é)
(Prop…7.‘l.8 _-
(DOCD 89: 1

Jfshould
“ P9. :14)
foryklkta.‘ ‘(Pi-op. 8.§.

seems ‘to favour principl
– wants social an
‘ _ I ll).
‘ . —1=..~:.—I.,man
position. _ ‘ — _
imhereshoukld be exclusive and .oono_urreh
powers for all governments and li
powers of _aZ_L1_ governments. ~ _ _‘
Que. , is on1y’pro\’ri£io~e piepared foi-k
on of powerskshould [be provided

Eederal Position –
detailed <33′._scussion.

Delegati
f°1‘9‘ 1 . . ,

9.1.2); Que. (Prop. 4.15.28“)
. ; l\I.S, (Prop. 2.5.16). No _stateme1_1t by ‘ _

. _ . _ Federal Position –
. V ~‘15ro\}izices Su oitin ‘: 3.6. (Prop)
_ “ ‘GS E. .Z~?rop; E5 365
_ _ .oth‘ers. ~ :

‘rrovinoiel Poisitionis: ‘

‘ wars nocuxismé IS erbnaieézoysawy orflrne—oov5‘§…-:s§nyo. ‘

‘ and

‘ spending powers.
, . Government of Quebec, believes a oomo2~ehens_1ve_~re
— is necessary. ‘ – ‘ ‘ ‘

i ‘to the federal – which really means ‘Ontario _;and_Qu

‘ Comment: This would be ~tentam_ount to ‘say.1ng

‘conrrmeiuxxin : ‘
A ~ A o1ScUssxo:~I,13o V1‘

The Constitutional Conference -_Febpukary.§,195_9k‘

‘ nxsraraurxomi OF houses

Issue: The dietrlhutioni of powers should be disco
before other ‘aspects of the Constitution. V

Comment: A generalperspective as to the nature o
?ederaI1sm in Cenada‘(_11ngu1st1o guarantees; .,
representation_1n~Senate) isjrequired before ~‘ _
discussing distribution of powers. . Moreover, on
one government (Quebec) is ready to discuss this
complex-and diverse subject, to Judge fromthe
propositions -submitted.‘ ‘ _ – 1

‘Issue: The only issues of imnoictanco in Section‘
2 are the taxing powers of‘ the ‘provinces and t
spending power of the Parliament of Canada.

comment: ‘The [several elements in the distribution
powers are thoroughly;1nterre1ated.:j ‘oan_not_ch,enge_ n
without: affecting the others. Examnleex gexoenrll ur
responsibilities and tax1ng.powers: fisoa _ ,3.
~econom1c‘powers; economic powersend regional‘ _ on
development. -Are w_i111_ngIto‘starb w1thftax1_n1fz‘_and
‘But Government of Canada, like

‘issue: ‘There should be e. sweeping; transfer of 1:0 _
to the provinces, with provisionfor de_1e’gat1_on___t‘r
the provinces to ‘the Parliament of Canedep ‘

Comment:‘ The Government of Canada could be _so__tve
11: could not discharge its nationalresponsibiliti
economic policy, reg1ona1.deve1opment‘, 1nco,me“r,ed
t1on,_equa1izat1on, etc. ~It_wou1d~‘oe up to the

to say whether sufficient powers would be “re-_-delegy

Governments would ‘be .g:overh1ng Canada. ~ ~

Issue: Let’s settle individual 1ssuee_~‘such as _
respons1‘o111ty”t‘cr securities regulation and ‘.s_o_c1
security,_ etc.; and let the division ot‘_ powers _”-‘=

§_<1 hoc and unintegreted decisions ‘are better than logical and comprehensive ones. It would alsomak. the distribution of powers the subject of continu political bargaining,‘ where strength rather than‘ reason would prevail. ‘ _ V ~ . ‘ £>

THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTX OF THE GOVERNMENT OF CANADA

CONFIDENTIAL
NOTES FOR PRIME MINISTER
SUMMARY

The Constitutional Conference — February, 19¢?

PROVINCIAL TAKING POWERS

l. The federal government has been urged to give this
subject high priority at this Conference.

2. We are aware of the urgent need to solve some of the
current issues.

5. However the federal government strongly believes there
must be a global review of the entire Constitution in a
logical and systematic order. I cannot stress this too
strongly: the federal government is ready to discuss
any subject, but in an orderly fashion.

Constitutional Asgeots

1. We are willing, as we have indicated, to discuss
constitutional aspects of the taxing powers.

2. The basic distribution of federal and provincial taxing
powers is round, in theory at least, between Sections
91(5) and 92(2) of the >m»1.A. Act.

3. However in practice, this distinction is insignificant.
From the broad interpretation given by the courts to the
term “direct taxation” in Section 92(2), there have
been two develo ments:

(a) provincial municipal governments occupy 50% of the
government revenue field;

(b) the major tux fields being cultivated may be jointly
federally and provincially occupied.

#. The federal government has a positive interest in provid-
ing to the provincial governments sufficient access to
a wide enough number of tax fields so that they can
themselves finance their growing responsibilities.

5. However, we cannot see that the Constitution should
include a “tax~sharing” formula. Such a formula would
be too rigid and puts a shackle on Parliament and the
legislatures.

6. Neither can we understand the merit in providing, in

the Constitution, for a commission to periodically
determine the share of taxes to each government.

~ It would mean a non—elected body would
be telling Parliament and provincial legislatures how
high their taxes ought to be. This would be unaccept-
able both in terms of democratic theory and practice and
in terms of federal fiscal policy.

ID

46.

— And even if such a commission were

to be chosen by democratically-elected first ministers
in a Fed’l – Prov’l Conference, what Voting powers would
the first ministers have within the Conference? Logically,
the Prime Minister of Canada should have as many votes
as all thePremiers combined. He repres u§iJflm_§eme
number l”ETtIzeheT““‘”—“”‘”““‘”“’ ’’’’’ ‘””’

7. Regarding the request that provinces be given power
to impose indirect taxation, the federal government
is willing to discuss this matter.

Current Asgects — Tax Sharing

1. Before the completion of the constitutional review there
will inevitably be a great many urgent current issues.
Shall we always set aside the revision of the Coneti~
tution in order to deal with those issues?

2. The federal government believes now is the time to get
ahead with the review of our Constitution. Now is not
the time to discuss our.tox—eharing problems.

5. But, you say, this matter is a vital and urgent Canadian
problem, inseparably linked with our constitutional res»
ponslbilities. It must be discussed and dealt with now,
or any constitutional review, being the total and com-
prehensive process that it must be, will be meaningless.

4. And we agree with you. Consideration of our tax—sharing
problems is an integral part of the constitutional review
process. The federal government has no objection to
immediate consideration of tax—sharing. But we stress
that this must be a consideration separate from this
Conference.

5. We are willing to arrange a Federal ~ Provincial Con-
ference at the earliest possible date to do just this.

6. In this way, a full discussion on tax—shari1@ as well as
on the spending power could be undertaken. Other issues
too could be considered to name a few:”tax transfers”,
provincial/municipal deficits versus the federal govern-
ment’s deficit; occupation of shared tax fields.

7. To repeat what I said at the beginning, the federal

government is ready to discuss any subject, but this
must be done in an orderly fashion.

4/9,

‘ _”1§s’11’s‘ 1>ocUnz3x~1’i” ‘1‘!-II-3″PROPk‘:3RTY .0? T}-{IE GovB1§NMENT_- ORCANADA ii

“X1.

gfor-Sn

Féderai Position — The nrpvin¢ial:§o_efinménEs; like
the federal government, must have tax
to_enab1e them to finance their_responsibi1ifiies.

_’§ggg£§;;gg§;g;gg’—_Currént Tax~sha&ing problems éhoqld
;npL he d;scussed now, but at the Federa1—ProV1ncia1 I
Conference of Prime Ministers and Premiers which ex§sts

Thé.Cnnstitntiona1 Conference é’féfi£daty 19$?‘

‘Provinces Su _ortin’f all in generai agreementn

‘O§her.ProVinciai Views:

‘ ¥ Qhe;_— a11 governménts shonid have acfiéss to‘

;é_-N.S. —-need_fu11.eqda1ization nf—a11‘phoVinci§ik

‘ the proposed agenda_as‘it,:eads “(including constitutidnal

‘ dbj§ction.~

_Pfo§inces Différin : :Manitob§ (létfiern bf Névemfier 27 ~5
“and’Jahuary.85 maintains-that-1mmédiate attention should

‘E¢onomic_Counci1 Meeting (Feb; 1/69) there should be

‘ [provinces and federal government.

_ _’ coNE1fiENTiAL

. __surmARY ‘o’x- Posrrxdws –

pr

.pQw¢rs suff;ciEnt _f

‘— Ont; 4 n§ed,$dedun§e faxésnaring ériéngements
‘(_P}:9p. 5.8.16). ’ — . ~ ~ = ‘

, all sources of tax revenue w;th_on1y’property

‘tax—and~succession duties exc1usive_to the
”_ ‘Stat¢s’ and customs revenue éxclusive to the‘ . ,‘
. Cenfiral Government, —(Prop,j 19.35) ‘ ‘

revenues,inc1uding‘muniaipal,revenges.j(Prop.»2i3,3j

ik Alta. ~ must mininiz;_regidn$l3e¢onomi§:dis—
~satis£actidn but at same time must nQt_unjust1y a
‘pgnalize one region to benefit another. —(E:op.‘8.3.11)

ja federa1-provincial-problem;_‘

Pfn§innes‘Sn§gonting:L*n11 provindgs ex§épt‘Prairié Prnvs
are in agreement by lettens either specifically approving

-aspects.of_taxat;on and spending powers)” or raising no‘

bé given “to those urgent problens bf economics and
financefl; ‘ ‘ – —

: Man§g Sask, A1ta;~a3reed at Prairie

consideration of urgent financial qnestiqna invglving

~ ~ conf1dant1e1.’

r”Ac—:vs AND?“ Fxeua

gaovmcxanh §TA)_(k ENGWPOWERS

~ _ frhése faoize r§1gnre$’are‘,éupp1§ied

or ‘the purpose or ‘anrswer1ne;~some of‘ the _cha.rges ‘_ –

‘ being made, by prov1nc1a1_ml_n1_sbera to, .aupport_ ~

their argument that 1:_he_G_overnment or ‘Canada oughti‘. Z

J to 1ncrease_‘che abatement ofr’;_.the_1nd1v1dua1:1ncprne 5

max, in favour of the‘ j;rqv1nc,es.‘* —j_1‘he central
.1ssu,e‘s—or charges are gaummarized, lnthe ‘mars1ne_s1
headings’, and {elated ‘f_a.ct.s_[are listed below them .

,. , Kilt.‘-is 13 51-rose=ovei’s1mniit‘1cet1on‘ in s_
at theprovinoial/municipal‘goyernments are ‘poor,

‘gangs growing gpcorer, “and ‘the ‘federa1~,go’vernment is

‘and_—grow1ng _r:.<:‘her;f*’1‘he rper capita tax base
h1gher‘1ncome_p‘rcv1_ as .(_income, qonsumpvion

ff‘exp’én_<i1tu”x§es, resource base, _e_1;c._) is Ihigheiy t:h_an_. _
‘ that; __<‘>_!‘ __the~Governme_nt or Canada. (who_se’?tax:bas_e_

_=_1s‘~‘obv1’ous1y__the national average‘ of income,‘
‘ . ._c_onsu}np;1on expenditures, Ietc_.,)._‘ – g .

kfiickcept .’f_o“2\k 0nt’ar1o”the”h1g;her _1ncone ~

‘ kpi‘ov1kn¢_es have been f1nano1ng_co_n_s1_s\:ent1y at a _

V‘ Surplus’: _ ‘ ‘ –

1 Number 0!‘. <ie_f‘_1c1t_s ‘and surnluse jdurintrfl ‘ 7t 71 6 – 8‘ ‘ 1 . Suroluses ‘ .De!‘1c1t:s 0nt_ez\1_o ‘ ‘ 7 __ . . _ . 114 ._’Br,1t1sh_C_o1,_umb1a ~ ._ . j ‘ .2 Saskatchewan ‘ ~ – ‘ ‘ “Alberta ‘lb ” ‘ As for the1qwl41nocne‘ r‘ov1nces one ‘ K I Gokiernment of Cgngglna hes‘ almostflgd 1V ,equa11zeet.\1e.en,.enay:nenn. 1 195.5: :- St?uct:ure Committee made’ 1 revenue and ‘ex enditnre ‘ . {prd ecblons – from $313 milklion to, 535__6_6 mlliion ‘ “(19 8-69). Hqreover, the present: Government is _ attaching a very.h1gh_ —j>r1or1ty_,to.,e¢onom1c ‘dew;-lon

an low 1nnome_a2-ens – see the creation of_the_n_ew _
Regional Economic Development :_Department, the ‘ ‘
‘PEI FRED programme; etc. ‘ ., x ‘ .

Calculated by subtracting gross general
~-revenues, DB5 basis; from osa general 2 ~ ‘
-expenditures DBS1″oas1s. F0 _ 1966-67 and 1967.368

net general revenues, and =expénd1tures~_are ‘used

-(the on1y‘_dat_a‘ available); the ‘results ‘shou1d‘7be’
.the same, however, in terms of the ebove

.:_k2

‘5. _~ 7 The _Tax‘Stru‘o__ture Committee? , jecfiioyis,
.which the provinces often quote, showezi at by—_1971-72
_ th’r:’f‘edera_1 government would be in a surplus position,‘
while the provinces and municipalities (combined) would
be in a serious deficit oosition. This brojeotion‘was
. made i_n71965, and was based on programmes.-and taxes as
‘ theyexisted at that time. Since ‘i:_hat_ti.’n_e~the ~
1 _Governmenl:.of Canada has taken on _ar1_dit_:iona1,_ob1ig’cations‘
‘wh1‘ch‘ erase ‘the expectation of a surplus in 1971-72, _-‘”a I
great: many or_whi.c‘n have eased ~t:h_e_ _ _ovinoia1 financial
Ifiufr-;_ir—>2’1.‘ In 1968-69 the federal prove cnment .w11’L spend
£00. million more on ‘r>ro;tz‘ammes -bene itfi mt-provincial
vernznents sham was anticipated in’ he ‘ 965 TSC‘ ‘ ‘

r Jections: I

* _ V1968.-69 . _‘
(Millions ofdoilars)
‘x’_._s.c, Cur~ren‘t1y “

‘Foggecast ‘ Estimated

we) equalization of “ , ‘
‘ ‘ ~ $566

provincial revenues M0 ~ ~
V (b) hospital insurance _ 653 _ . ‘ 791+
_(c’) post;-‘secondary . ~ ‘ s _
‘education ‘ 15 627 ~.
‘ (:1) we‘L1‘ez_‘e payments 211 ‘M3
1 , _ 2,1900

nladdition the Government has relieved the provinces

ff very substantial welfare payments through the ‘

axiom of the old Age ‘Security ‘cuarantieed ‘Inc‘ome____
t (costing szuu million in 1968-69).—

‘ ‘6.“ _ _ The rate -0!‘ increase in‘ Government revenues
and‘ expenditures during? the past ten years _’shows that _.
h‘e“pz’~’ov17‘zces and municipalities have been able to ~ ‘
,ais_efthe1jr revenues almost as fast: -as theirexnenditure
admtttekily with federal aid, particularly to the lower _
orovinces), ‘ _— . ‘ – ‘ –
__ . ‘ . Ra
. federal revenues ‘
. federal expenditures”

. provincial revenues . ‘V _.
. provincial expendit:ures_~.

. municipal reven_3.\e_s g
. municipal‘ expenditures _

‘ .The.’Pz?ovkincial Taxinsz Powers

K , ‘or 00 gimited .

V‘ Thisaryrument ngrowsout of the“‘orovir_1cie.‘1

‘_ ‘px(eo_ocu_pation with ,personal_ income tax. j’In fact, ,
– government activity in Canada is t‘1nance_d_out or .I’c_>_ut_-
ma_1or~k1nds of taxes, of which individual income foaxx:

raises Just over one-quarter. The }grovinci‘a1‘~munici§a1 ‘ *
. share ’01‘-total provernment revenues is approaching 0 . — ~ –

… _

1 > 3. The provincial/municipalyshoresoi‘ the major’-
revenue sources is as t’o1_1ows:_ . ~ , ~ V _ ‘

Total ishare of Tote1~1957e68

Revenues evenues Co 1 cted b —

ot“a11‘ j a .‘ _b -3

Governments Federal . Provincial-
126z—6_8*‘_ Government Municipal

. – ._Governggent _ ‘
‘3°°.°v°A°.° _ % . — ‘ I.
consumption (sales) ‘ ‘ ‘ ‘

taxes ‘ 5
Personal income tax 5

9 .- I
(would be about :6
provinces ‘were to
17 point offer)

Property taxes -2,591 ‘ ‘O 100 ‘
Corporation income tax ‘.2,1+2_6 1 I 75 25 .
Customs: revenue I -— :71:-7 100 ‘ O
Naturairesource revenues , 513 0.1; . _ 99.6
Est_ate‘t:ax/succession ” – ‘ _

_ duties . – . 227 214- I _. 76 ‘

miscellaneous tax and
‘ other revenues from

own sources ~ 2,4222 _ 46 ‘ 51;
Total ; ’12’,§’s1 ’ ‘ ~
9. The only-isignificrintliaxi the federal

[government impose; which provinces cannot, outsideof

‘ customs ‘<1ut1__es, lean indii-,eot_ sales tax; LB_ut; despite
this provincial gnuornmentsmvvraze collecting?!-£3,436
ot‘._(a~1_1 consumpt1on_j:g)5§§__in Canada. _. _1″n““’n‘i~”6vinccs in
which*T re 1owe”i-“bfeoause of lowerincomes, _
~ the Government of Canada pays grants to bring the tax, ‘

yields up, to the national average. ‘ ‘

10. The yirovinoes themselves can raisethelr ‘

ield from the ,persona1′.inc]ome, -tax and -thei‘r_Ishare ‘of 1 ~
tfie tax simply by raising their rates as Saskatchewan‘. _
‘and i’uan1toba‘have~don_e – from 28 per cent to 33 per can
(or any percentage they choose); The provincesdo 391;
‘ ~ have to change their-_ income tawlaws inorder to get _ V
‘ more income ‘tax revenues -jonly their rates. . hr. Roberts

is quoted as having said; ~k _ ~

“The Govern}-nen1:’of Oncariqwill have to
seriously consider moving to an independent
system where we control and collect our own;
income taxes. .’I’his option_;_.’. may be the
only way open ‘to Ontario to _ ecure __ _ ~
sufficient revenues. _ This would result ‘
in the fragmentation or the system of‘ ‘ ‘
taxation used in canaia”. ‘ ‘

*_ ‘ Souroesz. white Paper—t‘or;octoberi1_968 Budgetre
‘ federal revenues: * D.B.S. estimates, of 1967-68
provincial revenues except for natural resource _
revenues which were t,aken,from the D_epe_rtment ‘of
Finance calculation of equalization payments. ‘

1-‘+-

_ In fact, the provinces now can change the1r‘@ ..

~ rates, and they have beeninvlted to discuss the .
tax Ease (the tax law) with the Government L6f~
Canada as soon as a draft income tax bill is
presented to Parliament for dxscussion.

. Thg‘ Federal Governmeni has‘ _
Ignored the Needs of the Provinces j‘

11. ‘ The magnitude of ‘federal f1sc_a1_jass1st:ance
t6 the provinces is re_vea1_ed_by the rec‘: ‘-that gearlx

– _30§’§?of‘ stress mcovincial revenues come from the’ “ederal
-xrbvernment. excludimr. the value of-‘tax abatemen s.

‘% of‘ gross grevincial
revenues from Government: of Canada’‘

12. Zn . 2 _
Newfoundland ‘ _ _ 62% K
Prince Edward Island 62 ~
Nova ‘scotia _ . – 57
New Brunswick : “ /+9
‘ Quebec ‘ . V ‘32
_ Ontario . – 22
‘ Manitoba , _ ‘ 37. –
Saskatchewan ‘ — ‘ 29
Alberta – _22
British Columbia ‘ 20
_ K 10 provinces‘obmb’_ined 1 _ 29$
12.~ , , ‘ At the last full-1‘1e‘d[,zke{1_‘Federal-Pzievincial

_‘ Conference‘ on fiscal matters itwas alleged that the ‘

* _ overnment of cs da had been ” arsimonious“ 1 66 .— —
‘~-Irxgfact; here are the increases infedera ‘aid “c_o the _‘_
rprovinces: ‘ -‘ 3 . –

1966—67— ‘Z1967-68 ‘196a‘..59«~
Actual Estimated Estimated

— (Millions or_<,io_11ars5_~% —~ _

‘ Equalyizetion ‘.3335-5 1 3 . 525-.5 ‘$ 566.3
Pest-secondary ‘ – ‘ V V
‘~erh_1_cat1on ‘ ‘
g w(exc1_ud1ng_ ~
~ a__esx_zmpt1on by
_ __4,i_era1 government ‘
—‘—of‘ 100% of the
‘c_osts ofadult .

training) 311-2.8 _: . _. ‘ “5é1.—u ‘
e 7 ‘ l§6z8.3 ‘ §a,o88.oI’ 3§1,1g2.—g

_ mas Provincial .F‘1nai1c1a1—“Scatiskt;k1cs

. $cufoas:
= and ibepartment of Finance ofcenada.

“*9? __Source: Department of Finance of Caheda

‘ provinces have §;1n1ed,‘and the vague of tax abetemenits

-5‘- ‘K

To shovi how ser1_ousi_y some of; the pfov1hces”m’1§oa1‘eu1‘a_t
the benefits of the new ‘arrangements, ‘Prem1ér‘_Roba_rts‘_
said on October 25, 1966 (0ttayva‘J_ourna1’): :

“0ntaf1o’s lose .c_eu1d be in the ‘
ne;ghbourhop_d of $12,ooo,ooq”e. :h

in net the behefics to Ontario gricgeased my $62 230
(19.57-65 over 1966.67). 1 7 ~ ‘ ‘ ‘ ‘

13. In seven years ‘yferleral gaxments to _t;he_ ~

has almost tirigled. .

K Federel Value of ‘Abaiemen

Payments in Federal Taxes *

1961-62 ‘ —B98m11i1on . 6la1‘m11“11on “
1968-6K9 (ash) 2,811 million ;1,829 m1.111or;

In terms or teaé ggints the provincial share pf incom
and _eet:ates taxes__ has risen as follows: ‘

‘ Individual inéome tax ‘ 5%_;}‘r’1 1952 t‘o”‘2B%:q‘19‘6

Corporatidn inéome ‘tax 5% in 1952 45¢ 10% 1:5‘ 196“

Estates tax/suocyeeksion ‘ K‘ – – _‘ 1
_ duties e —% _ — 50% in 1952 to 75% in 19

CA

THIS DOCUHNT IS THE PROPERTY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF CANADA
CONFIDENTIAL

NOTES FOR THE PRIME
MINISTER

SUMMARY

The Constitutional Conference — February l959

THE SPENDING POWER

The federal government has been urged to give this subject
high priority at this Conference.

I might repeat what I said regarding provincial taxing
powers: The federal government is aware of the urgent need
to solve some of the current issues. But at the same time,
we say again that there must be a total review of the whole
Constitution in a logical and systematic order. The federal
government is ready therefore, to discuss the spending power
in its constitutional aspects.

The basis, as is well known, for the federal spending power
:2 Sections 91(5) and 9l(l»A) of the BNA Act.

We believe the Government of Canada mu$t be able to act for
the national interest. Its spending power must be retairwdz

(a) it is desirable there be some mechanism
to permit federal involvement in matters which once were
local but which for technological or other reasons have become
national;

(b) it is desirable there be Canada- wide
social measures in order to strengthen the bonds of natioh~
hood. The spending power has been used to achieve this
purpose;

(c) it is desirable to provide a vehicle
to help alleviate regional disparities. (e.g. equalization
payments, ARDA, FEED) The spending power has been used to
bring the full force of public opinion to bear on a province
or group of provinces which have been lagging behind the rest
of Canada in regional development.

The federal government has used its spending power extensively:

(a) a large percentage of federal ex-
penditures are based upon it. At the same time a similarly
large percentage of gross provincial revenues come from federal
government payments, nearly all of which are based on the
spending power;

(b) The principal programs established:
equalization payments, post~seeondery education payments to the
provinces, family allowances, hospital insurance, Canada
Asoiotence Plan, ARDA, FRED, Trans ~ Canada Highway, Health
Resources Fund. Medicare is also being started under the
spending power., .

The federal government intends to continue its use of the
spending power in order to maintain and improve the benefits
it brings to the people of Canada. To those of you arguing
for the abolition of the spending power, I ask the following
questions:

(a) Do you oppose all uses of the spending

… 2

Co’

‘III III III III III III III III III III III III III III III IIII III III III III III III III III III

power? Or do you oppose its use only in certain areas
of jurisdiction: federal, provincial or common Jurisdiction?

(b) Are you suggesting the federal govern-
ment should not have the power to make income redistribution
payments between ersons? If so, what of family allowances?
Should the federaE government still be able to redistribute

income between grovincial governments and if so, what is the
logic in this? etc.

(o) Are you suggesting the federal govern-
ment ought not to be able to make payments toorranizations?
If so, what of Area Development Grants and General Incentive
Grants for research and development? Should the federal govern-
ment still be able to stimulate economic growth by making tax
concessions (to companies with taxable profit), but not by
making payments (to companies without taxable profit), and if
so, what is the logic in this? etc.

(d) Are you suggesting the syenéing power
could be used for unconditional rants to provinces, but not
for conditional grants such as equalization payments? Then
what of provinces not qualifying for equalization but receiving
other conditional grants? etc.

61.

3 ms oocimsm IS mm; raopraoy or THE oovranimzfiior ozumm
‘ It i , H‘CONFID_ENTIAL‘
[SUMMARX oivfrosrrions
The Constitutional Conference, Tehruary 1969
THE SPENDING ivomsa 2 ‘

Federal Position: By Section 91 ‘(i1—A)‘the federal govemm,
—lS empowered to use its ‘spending power in fields of “provincial

jurisdiction providing the arrangements‘ under which _pag7m‘e’ntsL

i — are made do not in substance amount to legislation on a
wprovinoial matter. . . ~

Provinces so ortzin‘ — in principle, all
provinces a ree except Quebec, for the
purpose of %s) establishing national
programs and maintaining their uniform
‘ standards _ ~ . _ ‘
(13) making payments 1_:o‘indi-
. _ viduals, institutions, or-companies.
-‘ (l<‘eds:csl—1‘-flrovincial Conferences)

Provinces Differin g- Quebec —.’-has consis-
_ – enmy opposed use of spending power in
* areas of provincial jurisdiction. ‘(Prop. ~
4.20.36 and 1+.2l.56). Q ‘

‘ederkal Position: -The federal spending power is and should “
Be used to estsfilish shared—oost programs (e.g;. _equalizstion
ayments, .mezii<:sre)_. _ . — . _ * . ~ Trovinces Suggorting -— none,rbut all have (‘on u a van age of them; Quebec generally registers its opposition in principle (Federa1~«Provincial_ Conference, July 25, 1960). Provinces Differin -— all provinoeeat one’ . -time or another have been critical. Reasons: disagree with program ‘or whentheir priorities “areupset. ‘ m — r_ “ ‘Federal Position: Medicare is being started as a shared ~-cosfjprogrsm unafer the spending power. ‘ ~ : “ Provinces Su ortin — (‘£‘eders_l-—1?rovincial — _ _ on ex-ence, u y 5) -— ‘Seek. and 13.0. have ‘- started qualifying programs.‘ “ 1 , -. ~ , ‘ .- L» ., Manitoba, ‘N,B., are starting ‘plans on April 1,’ 1969.‘ ” _ , ~ , — New Brunswick has _ introduced legislation but no starting date announced. ‘~ I _ * , ~ – Prince Edward Island ‘says cannot afford to proceed. _~ . . ‘~ : _ Provinces Differing – Quebec‘ opposes medicare without qua ification on both constitutional. and financial grounds. (Minister of —Financ_e , discussions, Nov./67). Also has alternative _ ‘ argument. “ _ ‘ ‘ ‘ -‘ _ . — Ontario, Quebec, Alberta’, . (joined sometimes even byother provinces _ 1 – _ fwhich have indicated intention to star’c_medic_are)..—~ ~_Say federal government has _no-right to use _ m “ ‘ _I‘spendin_g power in fields of provincial juris- _ diction unless provincial governments.concuz’. Lenin. L “ mars Documw ‘Is mHE iikomm ‘The cdnstitutional cox‘xt‘e’rénce’- Febriiarh 1969 THE sPENbI&c POWER he imnortence of the ‘x:*b rammeé based’upo n th 1. ‘ T 2 5 power 5 ould be reco_gn:_lz_e k._ Equalization péymentysk ;_to ‘ provincial governments ‘ Posc—secondary_ education payments to provinces Fam11y‘Al1okwanc‘es Hospital Insurance‘ Canada Assistance Plan TA total _ox‘_.S:1k2S~m111i:oX1 or ‘federalyfunds to ‘beg ‘ 1 _oveg‘ 15_ years‘ I . ARDA (reaéza115ui»1sa1e- tion isjinvolved) FRED’ (th‘ere 1ks spm‘e “ federal Jur1_sd1¢t:1o_n) J ‘Trans-—0anada Highwafi g ‘ ~ (federal Jurisdiction is questioned by the pK:~_o-‘ ~ vlnoes) . V Health Resources Fund: 2. The ma nitéudé o1‘ thk’e“ r3 flamufies ,1:ase;1 oii the spe K can‘ Be Suaegeai 15y tfie grace t_hgt *1 “ ‘ ~_ V ‘ ~ — About 3(J_;¢;1of federal, eip_ei1c‘1i‘tkurex’s at-ké-raged on ‘ the spend_1ng_.p‘owe2- 5(1), _ _‘ .~ ‘ _ _and—. ,, About 30% of é,x‘o‘sa_s,_;>’:1″~o1/121’_c:1_a1 r.éve’nués,.‘cdnie‘rx:~

the federal‘govermnent7{_(near1y‘.a11 ‘ozflwhich ,
are based an the spending power)_({e)__ .

‘A fund of17$§00′.m‘111i6h‘

ofrér i—::70O xxiiilioh hi‘.

I m‘1111‘on
__i29? m11;1¢n
$562 million

i:~.’7L9‘> M11
@413 .;n111_1_

present pr_ogramme_s_‘4§s

V 212 x:x;’11Z.L”1“<>’r2″i‘<$r’Q!a.’

»77 1 m”“,Ne
.-so *” “my

funds has }:een~:exmay1 ed

A ‘uotai oI‘_$5′()O’1:1k:11
funds ,over a 15 L mrm P

K 11) ..

Federal Expendiktureé Based‘
‘ on Sgending Power

, . ~ Ambuncs ‘
V 1252- 3 _§§’vn1111ons[ ‘
fifrahsrers to ‘
.. Govgmments
– ‘Unconditional 652
k«- Conditional 1,573
— fTranskfe2_:sk to Persons – 627
£I’ranst‘,e_rs to _ ~ ‘
_.Inst1tv.t19ns ‘ 79
, Tota1_ _. ‘2,9‘uo,r

.~..__._.—.
.__…_.—.~

L my

. ~ . . 7-‘68 ‘
Newfoundland ~
‘P_;~11frce_ Edward
Nova’Scot1a
, ~ .I\‘ew‘BrunswAo1<. ‘ >Qu_eb__ec . –
– Ontario
_man1__toba 1

e- we 7%

* 3. _ If the Government of Canada were to transfer to the
– orovinces resnonsibility for Family Allowances and old _
“Ame Security, as the Government of Quebec has suggested,
– the province would need ‘ _ ‘ –

36 points of personal 1ncome:tai
plus ‘

3425 to $450 million in additional
equalization and adjustment payments.

‘to pay the allowances themselves (36 points of personal
.income tax would be enough to finance the allowances in
Quebec, but would be less than_enou5h in every other
.prov1nce). ‘ ~‘ V

‘This would leave the Government of Canada with about
15% of the_persona1 income tax in Quebec and about
20% elsewhere, if the other.prov1nces were to assume
. full respons1b111ty for Hospital Insurance and the
‘=*Canada Assxstance Plan. (If this were done the
_ personal income tax could no longer be used for economic
*oo11oy Purboses. ‘ ‘ ~‘ ‘ ‘ ‘

‘it would also mean the Parliament of Canada would have _ . _,‘_

_‘ tcincrease by 80 per oent’the e udlization ments 1t” ‘ ~
‘.the provinces — to just under $5 billion. }?would pay§~g
: Parliament do this for the_purpose of enabling ,.i _
~*prov1nc1a1_governments rather than the federal govern-

:,ment to send out the family allowance and old age-

‘ security cheques?) ‘ ‘~ ~

.?rov1nc1a1 novernmonts have often eupoorted the use of

_ the federa1—s»ena1nv oowcr. Here are some quotes
.concernins the general use of the spending power:

Er. Roberts §ontario): “In a federal state, there‘
is ample justifies ion for the provision of federal
– financial assistance to obtain uniform or minimum
.stondards in certain basic serviceo and to assist
_=o:ov1nces in carrying out particular programs which
are beyond their capacity.” I . __

“‘Federa1_Prov1nc1a1 Ccnfereno
November 26, 1963 V —

“It is appreciated that the federal government should .
have the r1ght, when in its view the national interest
requires it, to launch new programs, even though they
‘requ1re‘prov1ncia1 cooperation for their implementation”
(Mr. Roberts goes on, or course, to make the case for
_ adequate consultation). . _ ~* _ _ r”

Federal frovinciol Conference_
_ July 19. 1965 y _ – ‘_
H . Leeage {Quebec}: “The ex1et1ng_shared—cost programee

have p eyed a stimulating role in the economic and j
social life of the country; in several cases, they have

_ supplemented orovincial 1n1t1at1ve._ But these programs-
‘ are now sufficiently estab11shed…..” ~ ‘ ‘.-

,. “The province of Quebec 13 taking the ‘ . . ,
necessary steps to accept, on a temporary basis, and ”
~ w1thout prejudice to its full sovereignty, all the

yconditionel Prants that it is not now rcce1v1ng.;.;F

n‘Federe1 Prov1ncia1_Conference
~ :Ju1y.25,.l960 ~- *» ‘“

‘oéL:.’n_

– 3 –

Mr. Stanfield gflova Scotis}: “he recognize that through_
conditional and shared-cost programs, the.Government of‘
Canada has participated in the development or programs?‘
which are under provincial jurisdiction s1though_we ‘
would welcome consultation before the Government of
Canada initiates programs involving participation of, V
the provinces.” ‘ –
Federal Prcvincia1.Conferencey

November 25, 1963‘_.

Mr. Robichaud §New Brunswick}: “Much good has come of
these share -cost programs and the conditions undert
which our people live and work have been vastly improved
as a result.” 3

Federal Provincial conference
November 25, 1963_ _‘ v

Hr. Hoblin Manitoba 2 “These Joint programs have been
of very real assistance in advancing the performance of‘
tasks which by reason of the constitution fall to~
provincial governments, but in which there is a broad
national interest.”

Federal Provincial Con?
November 35: 1963

Mr. Show §Prince Edward Island}: “Matching grants

been of great assistance to us and, without them, we
could not offer a comparable standard of living with
that of the more prosperous provinces.” ‘. …

Federal Provincial Con rence‘
November 25, 1963 f

Here are some of the things Premiers said at the Federal
Provincial Conference on October 3, 1955. “‘

hr. Frost {Ontario : ‘ “Ontario asked that this matte_
ea t insurance be placed upon the agenda where it

could be studied with a View to producing a sound; ‘

workatle plan with which we could proceed….”~

– “A comprehensive hospital service plan would
desirably include, therefore ‘ ~ ‘

‘(1) In—patient and out—catient diagnostic‘
services

(2) In-patient care in general, convalescent,
and chronic hospitals _

(3) In¥patient care in mental hospitals end-

tuberculosis sanitoria
(a) Home care services”
Er. Fleminn §New Brunswick}: “The Government or Mgwj
crunswick stro 5_y en orses the principle of health i
insurance. however, provinces with a low per ospits _
income will require commensurately greater assistance;.

K 5. The Hos ital Insurance ‘Pro ramme was supported manv I _ ‘
Premiers – they were not s1I “pushed into the programme”.-‘ –

not ‘be _ret;g‘r<ie

“’1‘he Unemnlo ment Assistance Plan, one qfthe predeceksors
j the _a‘Ass1st:a,nc.e~~i=_ _sn, ‘w_as_ the ,produot,Cor‘_ a

Federal 9:‘ n¢:1s_1_._Cémre_reno‘e.1n —Ap’_I711 1955 a1:;_wmoh
‘ ‘ asked, to ha‘.v‘e‘_ass_1__s1;ance“to~t;h<2_ un__m¢1j
ance) p1aced~on the figendé io’1‘ ..

— fér; Frost ‘bntiekrid 2 1 _<,2o‘n_f’ekr_e’n_c‘e _must_§b‘e K H , cpnc_ez’ned‘m. . ..‘..‘prov1d1ng _ass5_.‘sta_m_:e‘1‘o_r t:_ W._1b_ ‘are -invciuxjfiari ‘y ‘ungmp1oy_ed” ‘ ;71c.ks\”:\7ovsa Scot “Nova Spotla v:¢u_V ‘be 7 . > . ,
pre~.;ar_ed_jto_.d1sc1zss‘gthe ~p3flV1ERD11‘1\}y._Of‘. the ,F<_2gi¢ra1 , V‘ autkor1t1_es.going ‘eve ore. fully into .th,e?quest1on _ — of moking at ‘ ‘nnesnyloyed persons”. ‘ . :4 ;m1e5.~.sm+ ‘ ., _, theirs efwo _‘1;he ‘u.r;,em loyed shptgld be tn_ken._over «by the Federal 1.: ” ~ . ‘ . I “ r‘ ‘zixicli 2 ~ 4’Ti1e~_x§spons1t.ii1c_3}~‘1‘or ‘ _ ~ _*i’!”.ve :wis1:1 :5to ;3£og>or§’e the
V !:_hofe cep_tance by fkzha —Fedar_}a1 f .
11 2‘ ppns1b111_ty…‘fo;* t ireliet‘

. ,C‘o‘1umb1é “we azje not so much
1r.te_res_t;gd ;_1 ceipercentase _ of _1‘_eder_a_1 _.Qon,1> ibixtsons
‘ t>o—unemp_1oymen ‘ s.§1_’s_t_a’nce) as in’ ,t;h,e‘F‘edéra_13Go<fern—_ Wnent participa ng, in _t_:h.e field of ‘the _e:!n!11°Ym_e,nt,’o_f ‘emnloyable ‘pen 2;. . (The). d1ffere“ t_ lexrels ‘or yovernment – shou1d_z:>art1<‘: te 1n the :;orob1em_ 1mmo_3diat.ejlaI._” ‘ ‘ ‘ . skéi:chev:éh- :_ ‘ ‘‘’.’>I‘ _’$hou1kd,_éx’n1fés$ my:
one that t_.e_‘»Pener.a _ ovemment wii11“1:_s3(e‘ gbeps
‘ ‘ .n_t ,s_,ess1on pf Parliament to‘enet;t

* _’1‘l~._e”Cana.da~ —A‘§s1stafice ‘3? an,‘3wh_1ch.:.brou:r ‘1,;_.12.x-x’Ele_z‘r.<:)n‘e_ 7 .
1 unemnljoyment_:ass1stance_;~ o_1_ geassistance, _‘
ss1‘atance_ was ~

Lesage _en‘§i’_er’ed _ti1e_
‘!:h.e‘AfiDA—FaED p;’og_x-

_:y5 _

beenieuppiorted by $11 the provihe_e‘s. These exembles
illustrate two facts: ‘ . ~’

(a) The Provinces were fer from “pushed into“ ?
the shared-cost prograinmes ‘

(b) ‘Indeed. they pressed for them in many‘ ‘caseSi

8. on Medicare itself many provinces suppoited the re _
proposais at the July ‘1965 Federal Provincial Confleren,
Here is what they saici (_canedi_an Press, July 21. K19__65)_

fiiri Smallwood plewfeggdiahdkx _“5’we’_re very happy
_tsaequat;e <_2rua.__- . __ Mr. Robichaud age»: Brunswick): ‘in leaks good re New B:-unswic . ~ _k ‘K . Mr, Lesage {Quebec}: ‘_’we agree with the financi 1’ participation of Ottawa.” At the Conference Mr. Lesagze made it olear “from the outset that constitutional Jurisdiction in this field, lies with provincial governments”. ~ * Mr. Bennett jaritish Columbia}: ~”0ur plan-will be in 9 eat on Septem er 1: is year and it shall continue…_. _when1\:he federal government makes contributions to the plan, we will co-operat;e.”j Mr. Thatcher gséskateihewanzx “I amvery‘ t:ap‘p”y:t_ha t e re era government:, 5 proceeding, and I ‘hope 1; might: be earlier than July 1, 196?.” 9. The Estimated Cost 0!‘ Medieere and the Pfovincial ghar Medical Care Costs 1262-10 ‘ .‘ (all provinces participating) Estirnated cost Estmetcri E ‘ . . of Provincial ‘ Amount of ‘ L._, ..1ir.4>.v.i.r1°s% e,F9de.r?.1 ,°,°!1.“>”‘1.’£’_”‘f’°..1.‘>}_‘-._ ,, ..
‘ (W00»000)
l‘Ie\wf,ound,1cn;1 12.1
Px-.‘\r.cv: Edwzxrd Island 2.6
Neva Sctgtia 17.7
‘ Ikaw Biuuswiclc 11»?
Quebec _ 115.0
Ontario 177.8
Manitoba _ 22.8
Saskatchewan 22 . 7
Alberta 36.8
kx’x’1.$.sh Coluznbia 2.6.7
Eukcn ?er.d km‘ 1.1
Canada 1597.0

10. ‘Premiums Char ed 1: selected Public and Private Iced

‘ Fians. “T? Is no? ?or cfie ‘x“e3eraI governmenf Eo_ sug 5
‘ ‘ wow the provincial governments [should finance their re
of medicare, ‘cut, assuming they were c_o‘u‘se‘the__.p‘re_mi
method, the premiums paid by insured residents could
almost <;ert:ei_n1y. be reduced rromigheir ‘preselfli vel flare are ‘some examples oi‘_t;he_prem_iu:z1_s presen‘ “1 r péoplefiirth tam; _‘$hBh 00.0) ‘2 ‘ V an1sSemcLeL Inc ( e1‘f_eI,>fi1ve.. pr1i1.*19

s’_1~}.e.), .
0136!‘ ‘N011’?

‘Iii.’ Tab1‘a §1f S *6‘ 0:51;‘ ‘Pzjgx-amym K

anew“ new .k

‘ was ‘USE,-DI?'{1‘HE L

4 ’ ‘ rggm smmmc roman

_ December 6, 196.8._— —

Deparizment of Pirtaric
Federal-P_rov1.no1a1 ~
Relations Divisxqn

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PHIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF CANADA

10.

CONFIDENTIAL

Constitutional Conference – February 1969

INSTITUTIONS OF FEDERALISM

NOTES FOR THE PRIME MINISTER
SUMMARY

The institutions of the Government of Canada serve all
Canadians.

The Constitution should provide for the retention of our
Federal system of a responsible parliamentary democracy
which has served the country well.

The Constitution should set forth many of the conventions
which are basic to our system of responsible government
but which have until now been regulated only by convention.

we should maintain the existing provisions which ensure
representative government.

The role and powers of the Senate should be reviewed to
enable it to operate more‘effectively as an institution
of federalism.

In order to achieve this we propose:

(a) that the method of appointment be revised to allow
for a proportion of the appointments to be by
provincial governments;

(b) the term of office of senators should be limited;

(c) the distribution of Senate seats by regions should be
re~examined;

(d) the powers of the Senate should be reviewed with the
view to limiting the power in respect of legislation
to a suspensive veto;

(e) the Senate could be given the authority to approve
certain federal nominations such as Judges of the
Supreme Court, Ambassadors and heads of cultural
agencies;

(f) the Senate might also be given special responsibility
in the areas of official languages and human rights.

A supreme court has a peculiar importance in a federation.
It has a dual role, final court and interpreter of the powers of
the several jurisdictions involved.

The independence of the judiciary is the cornerstone of the
judicature and, hence, of the Supreme Court.

The principle of the independence of the judiciary implies the
judicial, rather than arbitral resolution of disputes.

The proposals made by the Government of Canada are an attempt
to give due weight both to the special role of the court in
a federation and the importance of maintaining a judicial
approach to disputes. –

… 2

C\:
J

ll.

12.

13.

14.

15.

16.

– 2 — CONFIDENTIAL

The Government of Canada has proposed the establishment of the
Supreme Court in the constitution as well as the inclusion
of provisions for the protection of the tenure of judges.

A proposal has been made for the approval of nominations to
the Court by a reconstituted Senate thereby reflecting the
provincial interest in this national institution.

At the same time the current minimum civil law representation
on the Court would be maintained and provision would be made
for gg hoc civil law judges where required.

The ultimate tribunal of the federation should clearly not
be bound by precedent.

The court’s jurisdiction should not be too strictly limited.

The approach proposed by the Government of Canada is intended
to reflect the significant contribution made by the existing
Court as well as the new requirements for the second century
of confederation.

THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF CANADA

CONFIDENTIAL

Constitutional Conference – February 1969

INSTETUTIONS OF FBDERALISM

NOTES FOR THE PRIME MINISTER

The objectives of Confederation which we have been
examining are achieved through the effective operation of
appropriately designed institutions of government, both at the
federal and the provincial level. The institutions of the
Government of Canada serve all Canadians. They protect his
freedoms and promote his interests both nationally and inter-
nationally. They should be responsive to both national and
regional requirements and sensitive enough to respond to public
reaction.

In a country as large, as diverse, and as rapidly
developing as Canada, these requirements are not static. we
are unlikely to find a definitive solution which will suit us
for all time because our problems, like our goals, are ever
changing. we must, therefore, seek a compromise between
institutions strong enough to carry out their task without being
rigid, yet flexible enough to respond to change without being a
prey to impulse.

Governments of course, whatever their nature, are not
self~operating. Their functioning rest in the hand and minds
and hearts of both the governing and the governed. To be
effective then, the system must attract popular support, and
to attract this support it must be fully understood.

Against this background we have concluded that the
system we have had these last hundred years has served us well.
It is admittedly not without its shortcomings and we have at
times been frustrated by its imperfections, but by and large,

we have been able to make it serve individual and national

06
U3

– 2 — CONFIDENTIAL

interests, and we have never feared that the institutions of
government would become our masters. We therefore believe that
we should retain our basic system of a responsible parliamentary
democracy. It would be better to direct our attention at
determining where our system should be improved rather than to
abandon our experience in favour of some different system.

For these reasons therefore we have proposed that the
new Constitution should set out our present system as we know
and operate it, specifying the conventions which are fundamental.
A responsible democracy will be preserved through universal
suffrage and the system of periodic elections and sittings of
Parliament. The executive will be responsible to Parliament
for its conduct of the Government. The Government will have
to abandon power if it loses the support of the House of Commons
and cannot be confirmed by the electorate. To make sure that
the people understand the institutions that are serving them
these concepts should be written into the Constitution. we
would thereby preserve them from change except by the process
of constitutional amendment.

It is in relation to the functioning of the Senate
that our present system is most criticized. There the dilemma
of our Confederation is most clearly seen. In a federation
there must be, at the national level, an institution of govern-
ment which will be responsive to regional and provincial
interest. If those interests are taken into account in national
policy it will preserve and promote national unity and prevent
the divisive consequences of independent espousal of regional
aims by provincial governments. True the government through the
geographic and social pattern of the selection of ministers does
provide for regional representation at the executive level.

The House of Commons, however, is not federally organized.

This limits the effectiveness of regional representations at
the legislative and deliberative level. we have, therefore,
concluded that a reform of the Senate should be attempted to

3
SH‘.

— 3 — CONFIDENTIAL

give provincial interests greater recognition in the national
institutions where they can be promoted and if necessary reconciled
without weakening the central government in meeting its res-
ponsibility for unity of the state.

To this end we believe that provinces should appoint
some of the senators. This could be done either by direct
appointment by provincial governments or with the approval of
their legislatures as they may decide.

In order to assure that senators remain responsive
to the interests they represent, it is suggested that their
term should be limited, say to six years.

The Government feels that such a change would provide
a Senate where regional interests could find valid and timely
expression and where provincial and national objectives could

be co-ordlnated and harmonized.

The powers of such a .anate should also be reviewed.
It would not be appropriate to allow such a body to frustrate

or override the will of the nationally elected Commons, so the
Senate’s power in relation to regular legislation should be

limited to a suspensive veto. Nevertheless the presence of
provincially appointed senators should qualify the Senate to
present a comprehensive consensus on matters within federal
jurisdiction which are of particular concern to provinces.
Therefore in certain areas, such as that of official languages

and human rights, the Senate might be given special responsibility,
free of the overriding authority of the Commons. In addition,
n°minati0nS of particular concern to provinces, such as judges

of the Supreme Court, ambassadors and heads of cultural agencies,
could be subject to Senate approval.

By such a revision we would hope to meet the need for
the adequate representation and protection of regional and
cultural interests at the level of the national government.

Our traditional system of responsible parliamentary democracy

… 4

9’5’.

— 4 w CONFIDENTIAL

would be preserved by specifying that the Government would be
responsible only to the House of Commons.

one other area requiring examination in relation to
Senate reform is that of the distribution of Senate seats. The
basic system of distribution by regions and provinces has not
been revised since Confederation although the original pattern
has been distorted by the allocation of extra seats when New~
foundland joined Confederation. Moreover, the concept under-
lying the original distribution may well have been largely
invalidated by demographic developments. we might therefore
find another pattern more acceptable in today’s conditions.

Changes in these directions would, we believe,
transform the Senate into a significant institution of
federalism.

In relation to the judicature, of course, the
supreme or final court in the federation is the most significant
manifestation of federalism. But its structure and role cannot
be examined without reference to the historical and philo-
sophical bases of the judicial system. By far the most
important element here is the concept of the independence of the
judiciary. The judges‘ position must be such as to guarantee
not only a strict impartiality in the determination of dis—
putes between individuals but, more important, a complete
independence vis—a-vis the executive.

Nous scmmes loin des idées d’antan qui faisaient des
juges Les exécutants de la volonté souveraine qui les a nommés.

Les spectateurs de Tartufe, en 1664, he furent sans doute aucune~

ment choqués d’entendre l’exempt dire du Roi

“D’un souverain pouvoir, il brise les liens

Du contrat qui lui fait un don de tous vos

hiens”.
Depuis lors l’idée de la séparation des pouvoirs a fait son
apparition qui établit 1’indépendance du judiciaire comme clef

de vofite des systémes juridiques occidentaux.

0″
6:

— 5 – CONFIDENTIAL

Nous sommes convaincus que le peuple canadien
n‘appuiera les changements constitutionnels en ce qui concerne
la Cour Supreme qu‘a la seule condition que le ptincipe de
1‘indépendance du judiciaire soit respecté intégralement.
Cette meme indépendance implique que des différends qui
surgissent doivent étre réglés exclusivement selon les
critéres juridiques.

I1 s‘agit donc d’exp1orer les moyens de rendre les
structures de la Cour Supreme plus acceptables et efficaces
en taht que base d’une institution de la fédération sans pour
autant affaiblir son indépendance. I1 nous semble pour le
moment que Ce but peut étre atteint en inscrivant lea grandes
liqnes de cette institution dans la constitution meme, ce qui
n’est pas le cas actuellement, et en assurant le respect des
intéréts légitimes que peuvent avoir les provinces par le
truchement d’un systéme qui verrait les nominations des juges
de cette Cour soumises 3 1‘approbation du Sénat.

In addition to those proposals for setting forth
the general jurisdiction of the Court and the nomination pro-
cedure for its judges in the constitution itself, the Govern-
ment of Canada has felt it important to ensure that there be
adequate civil law representation on the Court. Propositions
have been submitted to entrench the minimum number of civil law
judges and to provide for ad hgg judges where necessary. As
well there has been proposed a clear freedom for the Court
to move away from precedent where that appears desirable. The
independence and tenure of judges should also be provided for
specifically in the constitution and here I am sure we are on
common ground with most of the Provinces.

we think it of some importance that the Supreme
Court’s jurisdiction not be too strictly limited. As it is

,
the final tribunal in disputes relating to the constitution,
including questions of fundamental rights which we hope to
see entrenched, the Government of Canada considers that the

Court should not be isolated from the other currents of the

(2%. 5

~ 6 ~ CONFIDENTIAL

law, indeed, it is felt this is not practical. Usually

more than one question of law is involved in a dispute and
matters of common and civil germane to a litigation which also
raise a constitutional issue should be capable of resolution
by the same Court.

I1 se peut qu’il y ait d’autres voies vars l‘amé1io—
ration de cette institution fondamentale. Nous ne prétendons
pas que ce que nous proposons suit une solution parfaité.
Néanmoins é mes yeux et ceux de mes collégues nous ne
devons pas abandonner les grandes lignes de notre expérience,
qui ressemble d‘ai11eurs é celle de la plupart des grandes
fédérations du monde. Sans minimiser les réalisations de
la Cour Supréme par le passé et sans vouloir bouleverser 1e
systéme actual de fond en comble, nous croyons qu’il nous
faudra nous pencher sur les moyens d’amé1iorer at de modernise:
l‘institution de notre plus haut tribunal. Nous espérons qua,

dans Ce domaine, nos propositions recevtont 1’appui général.

‘THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF CANADA_

‘CONFIDENiIAL

Constitutional Conference – February 1969

INSTITUTIONS OF FEDERALISM

0xscuss1oN”po1uTs

Issue: To what extent should provincial governments_
concern themselves with the details of federal ‘ ~
institutions. ‘ –

Comment: The institutions of the Federal Government a
at the service of all Canadians. _They alone serve and
represent the entire country and are of special signif’
cance as instruments of federalism. ..

Issue:L Should the conventions of the Constitution_
be specified. – ‘ =‘

Comment: A new Constitution should give a meaningf
picture of the institutions of government which sho d
be put beyond impulsive change.‘ ~ ~

Issue: Should the Constitution cover the details of‘
the system of responsible parliamentary government. -‘

Comment: _Provisions in the Constitution should be _,,
limited to matters which are of such importance that they
should only be susceptible of change by the process_of‘
constitutional amendment. _ — ‘ * .’

‘IO

I|Il”I”‘||I”|:|”‘l”

é_der‘_a5. _9asn:i_on ‘

lPfovincgs.§u§gorting:;‘ ‘
the Sen to; ‘e£ormed“‘ ‘
f?rovinces.d “‘ “

_ Brunswick coul
,_not reformed.

}‘Feder§1 Position‘

nine prov noes subjec, to‘
proyinoialf ‘ t

ye powers as
spenai

THIS nocumenw IS THE PROPERTY or THE GOVERNMENT or Cannon

\ Comment: The Senate, as an instrument of federalism

_dealing with matters within the jurisdiction of the

Constitutional Conference — February 1969

INSTITUTiONS OF-FEDERKLISM — SENATE

DIscuss:oN,so1

Issue: The Senate should be elected.

Comment: A senate with new powers and responsibilit e
would have a special role as an instrument of federa ‘
in relation to regional, provincial and special inter
distinct from the general legislative role of the Comm
Election under the influence of party discipline w
tend to produce Houses of similar composition whic
remove the advantages to be gained from provincial an —
federal appointment to the Senate. xmoreover, if the Senate
were elected on the same’hasis as the Commons it would b
difficult to maintain that the Government should b
ponsible to the Commons only;, ‘ ‘_

Issue: All Senators should be provincially appoi‘

is both to represent the diversity and to promote,
unity of the country. .This can best be envisaged by
chamber made up of appointees selected in part by ‘
authorities for their regional or provincial inte
in part by the central authority. .Two sources of
ment rather than being a cause of division and weak
should create a healthy competition in excellence
over, the Senate is aninstitution of the central go

government and as such should not be in the contr
provincial governments. ‘

Issue: A short term of about three years is to he

Comment:‘ A limited term is.desirah1e to assure up-to-dat
identification with issues, but too short a termrwould
frustrate effectiveness. . ,

Issue: The approval of federal appointments by the
foreign to our system of responsible government, wou
diminish the executive power of the Federal Governmen

Comment: This is accepted in order to permit’provin
judgements to be brought to bear on appointments wh c
of particular concern to provinces. It is judged t_a
institutionally our system could accommodate itself to
this novelty. ‘ ‘ ‘” ‘ ‘

gggggx The Senate should have additional_powars in tn
field of Federal~Provincia1 relations. ‘ ‘

ggmmgng: While it is not clear just what this would
the presence of appointees from both the Federal Govern
and the provincial governments in the Senate would assur
the presentation of all points of view on issues of ‘
Provincial relations. ‘ ._ – V

Lars fbocmmx-.{T~ IS; mm .i>‘noz>1§31“m( onrna L

The Conetitukziohakl Confe§”enee‘ -‘ FetK>kru‘ary“ 1969.-
” THE quu:cA*I’uR”“ ’ S ‘ ’

‘ ~l. _ Federal Position -, _’I’he‘I}overnm‘e_r_)c o,1_‘.9_ _ _ . _

– posed a se es of essentiall-y:,funct-iO1’_)i3. or.~.1s_ to _
‘ the Supra. Cbxxrt. .It heesuggesteti spec; 1c gpro-_~. ~ ‘
_visi_on_be made —,t_‘er tyhefcourt in‘_.*_ch‘e”:::ons2;_ ‘ *
that nominaticins cherebb be_a‘pproved-‘by a
tuc_e_d .”»ene.t;e and.that_ further’ steps _jl_;e_ t.
ensure adequate ci‘v_i1_ law represenpatien
.:_tn\‘r‘o1ving that _Z_Law. No‘_chan’ge 15., was
‘_I‘ede:r’a1Vpewer ‘of ‘appointzmeht _o:€’judges ,
_ constituted courz;s_,‘ (Prop-. _’lO.l_’~7_.~6_9

‘Previncee Surnoreiixp Federal Positi

– H.B, je It favours federal .aPPoin,_cm_ent
m1lt;_at:J.on” vrith ,-the P_z‘o’virice“i‘n
‘and Provincial ‘cour_tf p-osit;)‘_.on:_..
_ siderationcf a jchamber~sy‘stem_r_
‘uh ~~co.n, cit/__l__a_’nd ~c_on‘st_:-itut _ X1
. 2 ‘Brunsm‘.ck’_s views are ‘expYfe,$se
~ I they ‘are pxiobetjlfirno ” ‘
‘ federal position *

‘_l§I_.§__._ – It; ‘favours giving ‘cons1_de_n‘at_ n o _

_ of the Supreme-‘Gourt’s ‘jurisdiction on cenemt‘ _
qzzespions end .~civi__1 :law~mattiers. _~ The *’a1>r._i‘tu_d_e r1i:1._n,ot’.

‘ clear but [it is imlikelv to ‘be’ basically‘ hoseile, #0 ‘

” K the i‘eder;:«1.;r>os_it.ioz1.” (i>x‘<_>p.\.2,5k.;_5) . * I

‘ 2’:5ovinges 01‘ Different Posi2‘.tiiens~‘
Alta, Np proposiiione heve izeen :51;
K subjeci; Vendxahere ie no _ ndip_a_t_;i‘on

CB. C. 4 1‘lo 1′>rr{>peei‘t,:§1on_s
[subject anq thexe is _no_

r _ Kah. Nq‘propesi:t,ion5’ha1/e en sL_
f~s1_1bje_cT, and there is no‘ ind ca 0 o

Ogt. – Iehas p_r’oposed,t;‘nat._ V in ‘pa

V upreme C.eu,rt,~an_d 1;he~ter$_ure‘_ ,~

_ injthe _constitv,2tioh.‘ _ _It~’ha’_S,a1s

9.4.‘ the ‘present .fsyste”1,‘ the appoin em:

, judges reflect’ the ‘federal ~.,r.at.1′ “‘

. — .3-revision -1‘ox_‘_}”»z’o_v1.i’xc_:’_La1 parcici

‘lment process‘. It-,i3 :not clear‘
e (Prop, 5.7.1:. 4215, 5.16.35—)_

‘P. I. ;N¢_pro;$osic1énisfnav been
5_1_zbject..ar_xd 1:? re ige_~‘no_‘indicat5.o;1

Quebec —_It haeproposed a ~co._s_t_i1;,t,
which provinces x-xoxild agtpoint Rowe’ 1:
.a‘J?ederal~couz~t of. aypeal:’.i_‘er.,fed_er, ~ *
the‘a;:;>o_in1:meht.,~_ ‘r‘jthe‘1?rovin‘cjes of t e. Judges
‘ ‘ own ceurcs.‘ ~~It‘hr.s further .3: yfosed izhatpthe,
‘ fez“ judges be guaranteed in the _c_0.nStituti0n;~f
_(Prop. 1+.13;21+—-V 1’+_’.l1+._26) ‘ ~ , —.
e____ask_- – ‘It has proposed afiurrem Cw
‘ but ‘it ‘advocates; fbha 1; .
‘(P”°P_-~7.é2‘r13.)‘f I

I9 .
A by mgkiflig —
in.‘f~he._.a .:ooint- g
s wiould ‘_ I_1vo1ve;‘.[

if

nus DOCUZZE :1″ IS THE PROPERTY 0? THE GO‘.’I3}’.l»l2-‘EXIT or c1mADA “ I

cozxrzntxrrrnt ; I“
DISCUSSION POINTS, e

The Constitutional Conference – Februarv, 1965;

THE JUDICATU

1. Issue: The Supreme Court should be transformed into
a Constitutional Court. ‘

Corzuncntst – only one important federation has a‘
separate constitutional court. This is. ‘rlest, Gemanv,
where special considerations following alorld War II‘

played a role in its establishment.

— How would the delays in justice be overcome if
all constitutional points, say raised oven at the
mag;istra‘r.e’s court -level, had to be referred to

a constitutional court‘? . *

2. Issue: Appointments to the Suprerne Court should be
hcxde in part by the Provinces. ‘ ” ‘

Comments: – {lost important federations provide for
ap_no5.ntmont by the central executive. A ‘

« Ii‘ the provinces as miles the Government 01‘
Canada were to appoint judges to the Supreme Court
how could a type of nrbitrotion process be a_vo1_ded?

3. _1_’_ssuq: Civil Law matters arising in iiuébec should. e
‘ finally dealt withby the €)ué‘oec Court of Appeal or
by a special chanfoer oi‘ the Supreme Couu 1:. ~ .

. Comments: — Host appeals to the Supreme Court ‘involve ‘
uore than one question of law and it :‘.s_ sometimes
dif1″icL11t to isolate civil law questions as such. ‘

-— Zlhcre such questions arise now they are dealt with _
by a bench composed oi‘ as majcmity of civil law tralned
Judges. ‘

— It is by no means established that deci’*ions o:£‘ft_hc
Supreme Court relative to the civil law have deformed I
that ,law.- At worst there is 2-. divergence of View on

the point. ‘ ‘

— Guaranteed :’.1ini!.1um civil law representation and 1;:
vision for ggi _h9_c civiliet judges provide asgood, *ii‘~
not better, theoretical answemto the Supposed probl
a syecial chamber or an attempt to restrict app
4<– The Provinces should appoint the judges of it} om‘. _rovincial courts. ‘ ‘ Corrzcntez – The provincial courts interpret and applg, federal, provincial and constitutional law. In these circu stances it is not _illo_f;ical that the Federal “ Government appoint the Judges of provincial courts.~ 7 – Unless we have an independent judiciary with V :_secu1~it:? ““ tenure our liberties are not protected. _ ‘she co_nstitL1t;icn is only as adequate as t ‘jzxdiciarg that interprets it. To date Canada has been well ‘ sowed by its federally-ap;>ointcd ,’}udic‘?c_ry. —~ .

THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF CANADA

UONFI ” WPIJLL

NOTES FOR THE PRIME HINISTER
SUMMARY

The Constitutional Conference — February 196“

REGIONAL DISPARITIEA

A. Introduction

1

2.

One of the fundamental goals of Confederation is the
alleviation of regional disparities.
Towards the achievement of this goal, the federal
government intends to work in closer co~oporotion with
the provinces so that together all governemts can
evaluate and implement regional development. This will
be a long and serious effort;
It cannot be stressed too much the importance of
alleviation of regional disparities as an objective of
Confederation:

— in the premise upon which it is based:

that the citizen be considered first and govarnmen
after;

— in its relationship to the distribution
of powers. The distribution must provide the federal
and the provincial governments with ou:ficivnt powers
to minimize the effeote of regional disparities on the
individual oitixen.

Important too is a definition of terms:

(a) What do we mean by “regional dis-
parities”? I think it generally ogreed there are three
kinds: in provincial public services, in rates of econ-
omic growth, and in the adequacy of living standards.
While we must keep in mind which one or ones we are
talking about, they are all somewhat interrelated.
However disparities in the rates of economic growth
would seem the most basic.

(b) Are we speaking of “el Lnatlon” or
“amelioration” of disparities? Cer .nly it is the
latter. Elimination would mean, with reference to each
kind of disparity, that rural areas should have the same

public aervices as our major cities, that there be equal
per capita incomes as between all regions in Canada,
and that all regions be made to grow at the same rate.

/01. ‘

Present Policies and Programs

1.

The Government of Canada has substantially accomp-
lished amelioration of one area of regional dis~
parities, that of provincial public services through
the new equalization formula.

Existing programs of the Government of Canada: PFRA,
AFPDA, MNBA (all initiated pro-19oz), ADA, ARDA, FRED,
New Start Corpns., ADB, DEVCO, other studies on deep
harbours, mineral resources, electric energy, etc.,
(all initiated since 1962).

Any additional measures for alleviation of regional
disparities should be in the economic development field,
the more basic cause of regional disparities.

Proposed Policies and Programs

1.

The federal government recognizes that more effort is
needed to get at the root causes of regional economic
disparities.

By establishing the new department of regional economic
expansion, we are making a major effort for regional
development.

Our goal is that economic growth, as it relates to
regions, should be dispersed widely enough across Canada
to bring employment and earning opportunities in the slow-
growth regions as close to those in the rest of the
country as is possible without an unacceptable reduction
in the rate of national growth.

Constitutional Aspects

1.

The federal government believes the alleviation of
regional disparities must find explicit expression in
the Constitution.
We propose:
(a) that it be one of the objectives included
in a preamble to the Constitution;
Lb) that it find its realization through
the institutions which are provided for
for in the Constitution — the distri-
bution of powers, provisions for effect-
ive intergovernmental consultation, the
protection of language rights.
The federal government believes the Constitution must
be Che instrument towards regional development and not
just individual efforts by different provinces. Certainly
such will be necessary, but the federal government must
be able to plan and co—ordinate for all of Canada, to avoid
excessive provincial competition, and to develop regional
schemes which extend beyond provincial boundaries.

I0 5’

ocwu-m{ ‘IS ’L‘1iE mo?

o‘ ‘$ujo_2ARy o_F_ ;9OSI;’l}I.0NS

The Constitdtioxxal Conferexxoe —‘FebruayL’r>y,’:
REGIONAL n1s1>A.Ie:m’I‘Es 3

Federal Po ‘ ‘ion: An objective ~oi‘_,Con1‘ederation_ sho_u1d:b_e . __
_.to promotg atlonal economic, 80019.1 and cu1_tu.zfa1‘deve1opment_ ‘
and the general welfare and equality of opportunity for all . ~
Canadians in whatever region they.may.1ive . ” r(lO–1.‘§)¢_‘

Provinces Expected foo Huianoio Federal Position’: _
‘ Max}. -— (Feb. l’:oc.‘1″‘p‘,_.;l5_); ‘_ V ‘
N-B-k – (5._2.‘_€7; 5-‘_+-K12; 3.25.29); K V _ – V H .
. ‘_ N1‘ <1. – (02.8; “’l_‘he‘_Gonsti‘tu_tion ‘sha11‘vestipowez~s_:Ln
‘ . the Central Government ‘to talce ‘speoial measures g
… to ioombat and eliminate -re_g:’LQx1_a1~ disparities
throughout Canada” _0._2_.11);k‘ _ ~ ~ ‘ ‘ _

.- (2.1._2);

“ — 6.5.4); L

. . 1. -— ‘(Fe_b.“Pro‘(:k..p. _l1¥:5);

1~ <4.5.7;>s* L *
saw. « *(7.Kl.l_;_ 74:7). ,

lirovidces I)i.sag>‘ree:Lnj5_ fiith Feclefial Position:

Alta. – (83.11) _—‘ Agrees tha’I:__r_e naldissatisfaotion
~ _ _ in‘ the economic sphere must be minimizombut .3 I
cautions: _‘‘care must be taken 1; __void 1fe‘tard.ing_
further gz-owthgby‘u:qjust13y__pona1izing 1_:11_ose3 ” ‘ ‘
regions oij ‘Canada _’who‘s’e‘ economic. development
contributes mo‘st~to_ nqatxoxiz-11__réve_nues and to the
gross national produ<_:t:~ on which ‘the ‘erity
_ ofthe nation—dependsf?. _ ~ . ‘ ‘ :i_ V *
– 13.0.‘-_ _(“1’roposa1s of ‘the Province o‘f;_Bri,, , _ ,
‘ on the Constitution *o£=Canag3.a_”,,VDe,cemb.r, 1968,
—p. l2»1§) — ‘Fbe;ie‘ves~‘t;he ‘solution 1’_e_sf :Lnj<1i~:.~ect assistance to persons o1Z__1ow_inc_4>me.~;t’ ther ‘t__h‘ar_1‘
iahroughj large .uncon<1itiona_1=p”a_yments fho.,_cer’G%_1iTl j ,
Pzcovinoial Go’ve_:cnments”., _ _ _v_ . _ _ . *

THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPdHTY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF CANADA
CONFIDENTIAL

NOTES FOR PRIME HNISTER
SUWlARY

“he Constitutional Conference « February, 1969

SUI’iI’1ARY

1. Amending procedure and provisional arrangements an important
subject. No doubt we will want a Canadian amending procedure
sometime. At present we are here to listen.

2. we do not wish to discuss it at this time because

(1) the Continuing Commitflee of Officials has not yet
discussed it;

(2) we should know first what kind of constitution we
will have, e.g.,
– if no new constitution, no provisional arrange~
ments needed;
— if very flexible, 3 more rigid amending; procedure
might be adequate;

« if based on ultimate sovereignty of the people,
the referendum might be best for adoption or
amendment;

(3) it has proven in the past to be very difficult and
might jeopardize the whole review: it may be easier
in the context of a new proposed constitution.

5. we recognize many interesting questions must be considered
in future, e.g.,

— is U.K. Parliament to participate in adopting a new
constitution for Canada?

,~ should our Canadian amending formula require approval
for amendments by

– all or some governments?
9

« all or some lorislatures.
— referendum?

THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF CANADA
CONFIDENTIAL

NOTES FOR PRIME MINISTER

The Constitutional Conference – February 1969

Amendinq Procedure and Provisional Arrangements

In turning to the subject of the amending procedure
and provisional arrangements we leave the substance of the
constitution and look instead at the procedure by which it may
be changed.

This is a subject which will deserve very careful
attention at some stage in our constitutional review. if we
should decide to have a new constitution, or a constitution
which is very extensively revised, we will require some pro-
visional arrangements whereby the old constitution may be replaced.
In a revised Constitution 1 am sure we would all want to see
our own amending procedure as well, so that the constitution
could be amended in Canada in the future. At present, the
most important formal changes in the constitution must still
be made by the Parliament of the United Kingdom. while the
Parliament at Westminster only acts at our request, this
procedure is an illogical relic from the past which I am sure
neither Canada nor the United Kingdom would want to see
preserved.

This subject is an important one and I shall look
forward with great interest to the comments of those who have
expressed an interest in having the matter discussed at this
time. As for the federal government, we do not wish to make
any proposals at present because we do not feel that the
constitutional review has proceeded far enough for us to
express an opinion on the best method of adopting or amending
a revised constitution. we have reached this conclusion for
three reasons.

First, this is a subject which the Continuing Committee

of Officials has not yet had the opportunity to discuss. when
… 2
ma.

– 2 — CONFIDENTIAL

this Conference decided last February to establish the
Continuing Committee of Officials, it was with the thought

that our discussions could be greatly assisted by the pre-
liminary work which the Committee would be able to do. I

think that our judgement has been proven correct and that we

have profited greatly at this meeting from the very substantial
amount of work which the officials have done in the course of the
last year. But as we have not had the benefit of any preliminary
discussions by the Committee on the subject of provisional
arrangements or the amending procedure, I do not feel that I

can profitably discuss the details of this subject at the

moment.

Secondly, it seems to me that we will not be in a
position to consider seriously the methods for adoption or
amendment of the constitution until we have a clearer under-
standing of the direction in which we are moving with the
constitutional review. If we should conclude, for example,
that we do not wish to replace our present constitution there
will be no need for any provisional arrangements for the
adoption of a new constitution. Similarly, we cannot usefully
discuss amendment procedures unless we have a very clear idea
as to the contents of the constitution that is to be amended.

For example, if we should decide to put a large number of
concurrent powers in a revised constitution, this might provide
enough flexibility and we would not need to have a very flexible
amendment formula. Also, until we decide about some fundamental
concepts, such as the ultimate source of power in the Canadian
state, we may not be able to choose a suitable means for adopting
or amending the constitution. If, for example, we feel that

the constitution should be an expression of the ultimate
sovereignty of the Canadian people, this might suggest that

the will of the people should be expressed directly in the
procedures used for the adoption or amendment of the constitution.

… 3

HO»

~ 3 — CONFIDENTIAL

Thirdly, I am reluctant to see the amendment problem
given too much priority in the constitutional review because
it might jeopardize the success of the whole process.’ I
think that we have given very adequate and thorough attention
to the subject of amendment in the past and have proven how
difficult it is to reach a consensus on this matter. After
37 years of intermittent discussion by the federal and provincial
governments, the Fulton~Favreau formula was finally approved by
the Prime Minister and Premiers in 1964. Yet even that formula
failed to be adopted by all legislatures. I do not think that we
can simply return to it today and expect now to find ready
agreement. The difficulties involved in getting agreement on
an amending formula in the past were related to difficulties
felt in some quarters about the contents of the constitution
itself, and it was this growing dissatisfaction which led to
the commencement of a thorough constitutional review. In other
words, we turned to a general constitutional review when we found
that we could not provide a cure for all of our constitutional
ills through a new amending procedure. I therefore do not think
that weilgnore the lessons of the past, and try once again to
take up a discussion of an amending procedure, until we have given
more serious consideration to the future contents of the
constitution. Such a course would probably result in more
frustration and possibly the end of constitutional review.

I would hope instead that we can keep an open mind
on the question of adoption and amendment of the constitution
until the outlines of our future constitution have more clearly
emerged. In the meantime we can, of course, keep in mind the
many interesting questions which will arise. For example, if
we should decide to have a substantially different constitution,
would we wish the United Kingdom Parliament to participate in
‘substituting a new constitution for the old British North
America Act? If we are to adopt the constitution by some
Canadian process so that it will be “made in Canada”, what

… 4
HI.

— 4 — CONFIDENTIAL

should that process he? should it be by agreement of some

or all of the governments in Canada both provincial and
federal? By some or all of the legislatures? If not by all
of them, by how many? Or should we submit the proposed
constitution directly to the people of Canada for their
approval expressed through a referendum? If so, what majority
will we require for approval?

Similarly, if we are to have a purely Canadian amending
procedure should it be something like the Fu1ton~Pavreau formula?
Should it involve the use of the referendum as, for example,
in Australia?

These are all questions which we will certainly be
prepared to study when we think we can do it with profit, and
with a hope of success. At this point I would suggest that we
should limit ourselves to a preliminary discussion of the
subject and I shall look forward to hearing the views which

others may wish to bring forward.

1‘v.’y‘

(1),. ‘_Nekvr_kBr’i,_znsjwi,ok‘
” (2). ‘

~-‘ While the__Co_nstitu
; fofx-who me£\na~~_for.‘it’
; Cana<‘3‘a’,” i1;;‘.~_:” prematu _:det.ai1‘s Q flame “this , }§~ovinoes Expkectlecl to Support: Feycliei-al’*i3os y(“k)”:_kNo:\ra_‘Sckot‘j.a C?/1/‘k‘k I vihces Whiéh Have“-Not: K ‘1-3ask‘a’t_]chem$n‘.“ T y ‘ 3 Pr5,nc_e~IRk1w‘z7:d’Is1 —New_fo_u_ndland 1 .— ” Prfovinoés Disagreei i)“_Bi=itish‘Coii1n1i>ia_

V ; e1,at‘ively~‘e_impl
1 1‘orximla_,=‘ _

-“Manif;oba‘_

_‘ Quebeo

Cut; aoi 0_

THIS DOCUMENT IS ‘THE 15£ioP3:R’mc* oF‘—‘mH%: gcvmmm 05%, «A

The Constitutional Conference —- February, l9k69
MVIENDING 1>RocEnmLE mo 1>RovIsIoN.eu. Ammnchmiwrs

1. Issue: we agreed in ~1964~on an amending formula_, but
has not been imp1em_en1:ed. why talk about general cons xt;
tional changes before we have devised some means or on g mg
the constitution? why not return to a ‘disc_us_sion—o£_ th
amending formula first? ‘ 2 ‘ ‘ . _. I , .

Comment: We have demonstrntéd that ‘there is’ little‘ orospe
for advancing a consensus on an amending procedure inthe
context of the existing .constitut;ion. * . _ . ‘
It is better to have another look as an,amei_m1ng‘
procedure and provisional arrangements after we know wh
kind or constitution we hope yt ‘ ‘Fedefal Pdsicionyt “i‘_}xé _’C’on§ti1iut‘j,onfshéfilé;‘prqv
~ ‘ ~ _ I for institutions to pro
and ‘ co—op_erat_i‘<_>n bet

‘ Prévtncés 1 SL122’ drtfing‘ -¥.éénera1’l_;y,
K _ 7NB_(

‘the Cons_ti,, 1:
_ _ _ he . _es_t‘abl~1sh:nézit_,
Vintezrggciverxgmgzntal‘ _
.,—,to prepare taxation
~ peribds ,(‘P;c0p _. 115. 24 .

d_i_vi5_ion ofxp
*po1ic‘ie‘s ~’shb_ _
‘systemaiéic consultation 1:
_n;§z__n1:s €,’Ero_p_‘ 11-,

‘ ‘ — – any dispu,tfe .,

~_m,e_m;s ~m‘ay’be‘re1Terre<1_ to _th ‘0i_2u.rt”i (Que-> Prop; 4.‘-2. )
N.B._:P.rfop_;.‘5.’;!-1 _1)’

3′ i I! r

“fiutreskpositions

“fiébec ~’Eiamine§ l’opportuhité as rémp acgfjig‘ —f‘
‘ s E parlementaire d’inspirabion hr annigue

‘aménicaing.(prop.‘#;l0;l7),:

‘:Ontarid 4 Les firqvincéé devraiefi§‘fivd’ ‘
_ 1 ertc d‘adapter-1e régimefparlementax e‘
_ leurs_be5oins.part1cu1iers Cprcp. 5.47.54

Conférehcé Con§titutionnellé,iféfiri
—s‘;rscv1ém:ss ‘}§AiiLJsMEWi‘!sIRE new ‘coNcRi§ssIoN‘Nm} : [— ‘
5Eosition féE’ralé Q Maifltenir ig $y$téme‘pafieméhba1fé.

Iwovincés approuvant la position fédérale
.Terre4Neuve.(pr¢p. O.l;l.).7 ‘
‘Nouve;1e~Ecossc (pzo .j;.2.6).
Nouveeusfirunswickjqprop. 5.9,2l)..,
Ontario (prop. 5.5.?). – ‘*
S8$k8tChCWBnr(pPOp. 7.1,5),._‘

I

L*11c~du~Pb;nce‘Edéuar4;_1é Man1£6ba; If

et la Colombia
opinion sur ce

yst me_ ‘ V __
par.un‘systome—pongnessionnel‘d’ip§pi at‘

11

19 $1 Janv;er~l969.

ca DQCUPENT EST LA_PnopnIE§E DU GOUVEHNEMENT nu Cngfifin.

1.

2.

le 51 janvier 1969.

Conférence‘Constitutibnnelle, févriér~l96§

SYSTEMESPKRLEMENTAIRE ET UONGRESSIONNEL

Objection:

Régonsez

Objection:

Régonse:

Objection:

Régonsez

Objection:

Régonse:

CONFIDEHTI

POIN”S DE Dxscussron

Ghoix parfois, restraint du Pnemier~
ministre quant A la sélection des
membres de son cabinet. – –

Cette lacuna occasionnelle pent étré
comblée en recrutant certains ministre
en dehors de la députatioh. Si ceux—_
ci refusent de se faire élire, le‘ _
gouvernement pourra répondre cb11ec#‘
tivement.de leur administration.

Les tfiches_des ministres danskle _
systéme parlementaire sont devenues‘=
trop lourdres. ‘

Plusieurs solutions peuvent étre
trouvées_ co probléme snns_pour col
mettre de cété le systéme—parlcmen—
taire. Parmi ces solutions on peutj ,
mentionner: la nomination de ministres
associés qui ne seraient pas nécessai«
rement membres du Cabinet, la nami
tion de sous—ministres po11tiques,’ e
renforcemont du personnel des bureaux-
de ministres, la création de sqciété
de la Couronne, etc.

Dans le systéme parlementaire tout‘,
ouvernement minoritaire est condamn
étre inefficace. . .

Ce probléme existe également dans le
systéme consressionnel; ’Lursque ]

, 1’exécutif ne J¢uit pas d’une majoe‘
rité an Congrés; son programme léris
latif est par le fait méme afrectg.

La séparatibn aes pouvoira conyientf
mieux aux circonstances qu1.prevalen
dans l’Etat moderne.~ ‘ . ‘

Le r61e sans cease croissant de 1’E
exige un gouvernement e£ficace,. Or,‘
le systéme congressionnel, de par 3
nature méme, tend A contr6ler—l‘exécuti
ce qui réduit inévitablement 1’efficac
de celui;” 0 ~TImGovEmmmvT 0 CANADA:

‘ ~ SIjfiI1ARY_~OF PIOSITIONSI

‘I-The Constitutional‘ Cox1i‘e’reInIcIe ‘-I-IIIv‘eb

” _ E EN:L?RAI;IIIzAfi5:I<511

Wis:
tron

‘_ _ :_$edera1′ governmem: :.ana

‘iPédera1.PIcIisi~tI:I. k I’ I CaxiaIdIa .Ix:e¢.jIL1iI’tIIe$ b6’shI

p:nov~incig1~ govezjzimem;

1-r5<n‘.nIcesI‘1axIpe’c‘tea‘ in sizpiabr -.FeI:IkI1ke2.3EaI1.‘PIc>§I:1tion

(1) IIINew1I’IoIundl§z_u3.II-

I (2) 7 New .BIz-unsw
I (3) mg Scofiia.
I(I4)pn_c,xIa;~iIk5‘ I I
§ naltoerta I
I I_III(6I)I—rNIan;1Itoba I_ I V ‘ H
‘ ‘I’II(I7h) Pninoe EaI-.Iz:Iu~d Iisiajnd
*(8)I Bx41ftI:i:sI1I1I _C_Io_l miyia I I

IinIZI[._-I1I=’Iroirin¢Ie‘sI .I)isag‘r£I:eI:LrIigW_ h_-Fédek 1,_PoIsi1;1on K
_Que§e_c I

bezfiuprem
V ‘;]uI}i_s<1ict_ion.g, ,_ ::p‘riat’e to‘ speak 0 the -_c,enfbx”a’l, go , Prépg). .i,Ra1;he:g’_‘ – ‘ ~o£—d,efi¥\i‘ns,the.-. _ _ ,, . :8¢vet’r.m,éX1_t’ in Jane ,Qo,X1St.‘U4‘\,Wl° – ~ _upx.imacyH -:tQ;.»bh (2) os.;skat¢new;no I r __ — ‘ , .; ‘- axX;1.e_1‘fec‘tq .I’r_0,P-’ I ’ ’l‘HISI DOOUMENTIIS ITHEIIPROPERTY oi’.I’1fI11i§ ‘dovrmmvr or cum I ‘ ’ ‘ I , comfxnnwlnl DISGUSSIC;I{I ; ‘The Constitutional Conference -IIFebrua.ry, 1,959 . DECENTRALI ZATION IN PRESENT GONSTI TU’1’II[ (I31? 3.. Issue: Judicial interpretation hasbrought about central I’ ‘I ‘ T553701: or jurisdiction. _ ~ 4 >
.°.<2I21;’J.e_r1’2= I i ; * (1) ‘This is gartlz true withrospect to I (a) broadcasti and aeronautics — bIu.It_wI:ro’u1d anyone new question the need tor t is, _apa1I’t‘1>erhape
from regulation or content in broadcasting?‘ ‘ —

(b) criminal law -—_ as used to prevent [provincial 7 I I I
restrictikngyfreedom of speech or religion.

(c) eggrcgriation by the N,C.C. I
(<1) offshore ImiInIera’1s’~ _~ . ‘ ~ ~
(2) This is _r_L_9_t__g:_~_u_e with respect to _ :I
(a) most aspects of 2‘ eaceg order and good governm
reduced in 50 years c in erpretatlon to an; _ *
emergencx power, its recent reviva1*on1;y_part_i

(1)) ‘reI*u.1ation‘o1.‘ trade and ‘commerce – confinedxt
interprovincia and mnterna _:Lona1~commerce,I

“particular trades” fexoluded _

(0) re ert and civil ri bts — ~en1argec1,to’ _embr ,
most regulation‘ of ‘IocaI trade and cth’er_—na1_:te
including labour relations,’ labour condition
insurance, securities‘ transactions, etc;

((1) treat in lementation —–‘as long as S.iI}_2Ia;5p1ied.
Ire: Eritisfi E pire treaties) Parli_aine_nt’;s_
was complete, Now itis seriously limited.

(e) taxation – _interpretat:‘.on has if anythingexten
provincial powers ‘by upholding provincielveale _
taxes, even on imported goodsend on _goods_—bought

. by builders, etc., for res_alc_(Cairns ca e)

(f) bankin and credit ~ ‘if anything, provincial
Eas Been extended, covering “near—[bex1ks“.__,(credi
granting institutions), interest dieclosuf law

I‘2.‘ Issue: The federal government has exercised i1I:e_‘powc1fIsI_
sucfi a way as to interfere with the exercise of provinci
powers. . . . . . *” “””” _ s e
(1.) This is gartlx true with respect to _

(a) thes endin ower ——e.g.‘ conditional grant
Tieaitfi insurance, social assistance, ~techni_c,a‘l
education (formerly). ~ But it is also true _ ‘

projects – the ’.I‘rans—Ce.nada highway, Southj
ewan dam, Roads to Resources, etc. I

(b) the ‘taxin ower – but only in _tIhIe_ sens_e~_Ith_at
increaseéy Elie yrovinceo in their inooinejtax
creates political, not constitutional difrlcu
(2) It is _r5<_>1:___t_:;-_x.}_<_e_ with respect to ‘
(9.)
(b)

(0)

(<1) ‘- ciyaux, novembre 1968). ,. _ :I~‘ositi‘on‘s groviixciélés .— (-tellkes’qu’éx”1{imée$_:dén§“ieSk ~ , .“éo’1ivel‘1e—l‘;cosse -9 Les droit_s’miniers.sous?-ma_z-irisfddl _(.emeurez~. ‘auxproyinces (Qu(:_be’_c, ~}k>_x-op. .l;.21,_§8).~~.— __ K
‘Akutres I-éacktick>kns fa K1}; iefitré duklépémiékr ‘miknkistfe xi‘ Cu @433‘ K K

* . en Co_1.omB1e-Iiritann

‘ . 590-‘-5C n‘est pas ‘satis _\ K _
_Premier. n_1_inis1;z-9 du‘x’;§Anada,'<).déc_emnr’e, ‘19_b ).

‘ k0n1:ékr1ok—- ‘La sfiégestkidfi ir\xté‘réss,arfxt;¢_a

.. Manitkiba N ‘La situation qui prévaut’d_ans_‘1.:-Bad.‘
es? ;_*cr3_.s_parti_cu _j._ére~’jet do§.t?é‘tre di-sc\M1tée‘Iai(e‘_

~ ‘ve,rnément du Canada (~Lettre_du P.M.j wair~au_;1’re
.- du ‘ –
Nduveau-Brunswick

~ ;1,s<;‘u er es _
min‘istz~e du Canada, 11 décymnbre, 1968). . _

_ comma pom. , _ _ _ _ _ .
.Cgxz_xpbe_ll__:‘eu IP1’emie;~. n_xinist_;_re‘ dulcnnada, 13‘ rdécyembreky 1968‘ .

i !’uébec _
. 1552.1’ voir,‘ to ‘décembre 1968.
_ – _{“uE5e ‘
:r Ju ‘Z_l’x‘em_i‘er zninistme‘ {in ‘C1xzia<_ia). -_

“ ~_ Cc’)1ombk;‘Lek.Britakrm’igu‘e _-_,Dé_si‘1’§e “uxie.coi’;’£‘é;4ezi<>’e”_a‘véc ,1e.gou’—_ ‘
K, Hand Mail, _19~ décembre -1968). ‘_ ‘

03 nccuxdtzm ‘EST LA‘1>1§oPR113?rE-nu GDUVERQNV ‘

} wsumi: n3sj :>o

‘Cofiférence Ckonstki-tutio‘m‘.‘el1e,—‘févriér’:i969‘ ‘

‘ LE 15I.J\’m«;Au ‘ CONTINEN€[‘AI, E W

Posi ion‘ fédéralezw Conserver-entiére ‘juridi_c_t1oxfz‘sur-les‘
‘ rm. _s-m1n1ers sous-marins et; remettre‘ 50% <1es__’reyen\.\s‘
aux _pro_vin<:_es selon _une formula .q‘a’.elles ;:ho1$iront,,.,. . 2
(Lettre du P._1‘§. du Canada aux Premier_ssmi‘nistre5‘provim‘

proposition_s_ . v

e.’—compéte‘jnce provilicaiale -(Nou1ve1lef_–Ecosse, . ‘
prrip-’.3~‘5-17); 1 1 * ~ ~ V .

_€y/x:ébeC~ -Q Préciéér 2;}: ‘1e platiéaurcohtin

énfé‘1’apf$ €::l~§-x::t:_ __ .

<1,\’1,é_Si‘ 6)‘ ‘ ‘ ‘— Un‘-parfzage des revcnus surf unerbéaee _de 1_‘aisan,t[(Let:tre idu” PJ1. ‘ ‘ piinéir “ Noxix‘/k;,>‘l-l駗r.ckosse’-‘-‘ ‘a‘dmek_’t; p‘2isk q1‘z_é” s app’

mm an

3,et’cre du‘ P._M. Robarts au ‘Pr_e,mie:.‘ minist
‘l décembz‘-e~1.9€:8~)_. – ‘- ‘_ — ‘ ‘

Lmada, 12 ‘d em re_,_.1968)_,‘ ‘

_ Accofd dé_‘;p:f‘ixié_ip_e _mz§._i.§ ,néce:ssit_;_é dc‘
‘ai_ls.‘(‘_Le’_c.1;re du P.N. ,Robichaud ‘tau nejmier‘.

‘I1e,.->‘z‘.i:-‘l”t‘ince ‘Edbuard — La‘ fozénxuie p‘roi:o$kée ._est _acc§pLéfb1é. S
e < par des nég;ociat1ons._(Lettre~r1u I’.Mr. ~ – La prop‘osi£ic_>n‘d‘u féd§ra3._est jugée“i‘naccej$tz§b_ie.. _
date c1u‘l6 ,janvier_’l969,_ lye
_n_ avgiz pas _encc>re_répondu officiellement £113 lefz.L_1‘e

.k’1*erSré-,-Neuvek ~ —L‘o1“r_1-é‘ d\:.1“1k‘é<iéra1§ est; ‘_sat’i”S!Tr-Ais‘ant;e._ . ‘

vepnement can_acL_1e_n:pour discuter de _ct_e_(;te_ fp_rwul¢ (Gl‘o‘_be’ -I-

51 aarivier 1969.}

-CE DOCUMENT EST $A P§OPRIETE DU GOUVERNEMENT DU Chfiflbn

“comm mm 131.

POINTS DE DI$CUSSION_

Conférence Constitutionfielle, février 1969

LE PLATEAU Q NTINENTA

Objection: Il est urgent de régler le conflit des_
droits miniers,sous—marins afin de
favoriser le développement de ces‘
richesses. ‘

Régonse: Cents question est en effet urgente.
Nous proposons qu’une conférence‘
fédéralesprovinciale soit convoquée _
pour résoudre ce conflit qui ne peut,
en raison de‘sa complexité, étre ~
ré%lé par la Conférence constitution-
ne 1e.

1e 31 janvier 1969.

1’8

cL DOQUNEN

Coriférence f}<i’nSti’ti1i;i’oiixie1le,’rféxirier _ vnniwbxnn _* Position fédézkvalek .-‘ Aucuz1ke“p:i‘o‘po‘s_$;t>i0n K. = K
\ ‘_PositignS.‘Qrovi_n: ales I ‘ ‘ ‘

‘ Colombia Britanni‘ uei -‘ F‘u_s,io,nne’r be‘:-t;a1na‘5
‘clnq nouveiies‘en%Tfés‘séo5raphiques;‘ ,,:‘ ‘_
~ . j _I~ ,_f- Etendre ‘vers le _:;ord.l s ~
tiérea des provinces ‘de 1″bu,est‘ jusquféx ~l’ext ma. du
pontinent (cf..~Me”moire pub1i_é‘par 1a‘Go1‘om_bi‘e Br annique
‘en‘<iéce_1z_1bre‘l968‘).* _ * _ ‘ ‘

{guébec _- Que‘ _l4a_coz1s_titution.mentionne‘que _ _

_ _’ c,ompo_se de __lo [pr-o\__ri‘x_)ces_¢t cie 1gie1_.1x tezfritoire

psgévoit ,1 ’_ac1mi ssio, de, _nouve,ll,es*p1-ovinc.es sou
nement de c/elles ui’exist_en‘_‘b_ déja (Québec,

~ I ~:~ Que, “le . _ _n_t‘iéres’r_espe,ctives_ _de.s_

aprés discussiqns. entre :_1es;_intéresséss‘, étre “,dé1“‘n;L

~ _.annexe A la constitution (Qu_6fb_ec;:pr__<>p,‘1+_.

I -‘-_ Que les <;i‘t;és_ _d,‘Ot_t;as_ua.,_e‘t ;3:1iul‘l so

1 _I_‘é5f$ étzte ,’1e_ ~,sié‘g;e_I_<_i\2 go ‘_rne_m_ent “c‘ ‘ ‘

“‘prop; 4;9.16). §*:- ‘} ~’ ”

~0n1:ario -‘- ‘ConGi_dér_ez= la, pose: _lité_ e‘modif~i‘er‘1es ,
c1:.vis1o_ns”géograph1gues“<1e1 fédéxfat n (Ont; 10’
.5.-16-.307» “* _* ”
. ‘i _ ‘- ‘route modificatign‘-a_ux fron ,
‘ dev1‘ait;é_tre njéggociée‘ e.nt_r_e iles yrgvinces‘ n
.s’i_1 ya ‘1ieu~”av<é la go1_iveI’_nsr_nent fédézfal
~ ‘ prop~a5-16.3154» ‘ ; _ »,.“},-F i ‘
“ – _ } —_{Qu’Otftaw,a et-Iiull :$oi‘én_ de _
c_apit.’ale_ natio ‘ Ie “(0r_1133I‘i.0; ‘PrOP-“ 5

‘ . 1\IouveauL,-‘B1‘?u1i:.<;“vvi<il‘< cute; mpdifi¢ation” ux fro,
~p,rovinz_:1~aIes_~?],evr‘a étrewapprouyyég p ‘ .

Chambre ides. Comm ne

. ~_—<_1ulSé_na‘t ‘et de ‘ f.P’°P‘»5 _. ‘ ‘ -‘ ‘Berra-Neuve «— Déc, ester qua Ste, Can‘ade_ domprend :95 3 aux fer~riI:_oi’x-jes mels _qu‘i’1s_ son}; pré._se,ixt’ ‘ __(_’.l‘erre-_-Neuyve, >pr<_>p‘.:O.‘1,l_-)‘.‘ * ~ 5 ._ , ~
, . _ ,-~;Prévoix_~‘~1a ipos,sibi1it_é de_ m dif er les
, ,£ro‘ntiéresf ais fau<:”une,?mot1iI‘ication_,ne rpo yvautfitre, , ._ , mite fsans _11_’a,sse_ntimen’t:,de$ ”pz§ovinc-es ~impliquées ét, j V. du_{z;ouvs_rn_eme‘nt;*ce__ ‘r’a,_1‘_(‘1’q;-r1je—I§Ie‘uve; prop. ‘).~ . 5. Prdvfnces niéxyant’e:tpriinérauc\in‘e~5pinioh .sfir ét ‘ – Nkczizx/eile‘-‘-Eéc:>sse_k,_‘ i[i‘e-,d\‘1y-‘-1’1k:’i1′)csy2_
_’ S;xska1:c}_xewan,~_A1ber1;zx.. ‘ __ ‘ 9 ‘

” – L31 davviér 31969; V

CE DOCUMENT EST UAUPHOPRIETE DU GOUVERNEMENT DU CANADA
CONFIDENTIEL

POINTS ms Discussion

Conférence Conscitutionnelle, révrier 1969

AMENAGEMENT DU TERRITOJRE

1. Objection: Le gouvernement fédéral s’est engagé 5 ._
une révision compléte de la constitution,
Or la délimitation des frontiéres fait
partie du processus d’é1aboration d’une
nouvelle constitution. Done cette question
doit étre discutée. . a

Régonse: Cette question, et plusieurs‘autres, doivent_
étre discutées. Gependant un certain ordre[
logique doit étre suivi si 1’exercice do

.sévision doit étre réussi. ~

Ce sujet sera discuté é une étapo u1térieuré.:
Lorsque les travaux de révision seront_rendus~
5 cette étape, la Conférenoe constitutionne1le_
devrait so limiter A prévoir les mécanismesi
qui seront uécessaires pour régler 125 ques»
tions de frontiéres_et non pas s‘engager; ‘
dans des négociations bilatérales et mu1ti+ —
latérales. ‘ l~

d‘affecter d’antres éléments de la nouvelle
constitution. Par conséquent, il est oppor
tun d‘étudier cette question simultanémentj

avec d’autres;

Régoneez Les divers éléments de la constitution font
évidemment pertie d’un tout. Cependant, ,
Lous les sujets ne peuvent pas étre étudiéé
simultanément. Lorsque 1e travail detré-~
vision sera sur le goint‘d’étre complété;
des retours en arriere seront_nécessaires_
afin de procéder A certains’réajusbementsp

le 31 janvier 1969.

‘I _ U U‘ 2. Objection: L’aménagement du territoire est susoeptible_’“

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