Document Information

Date: 1981-11-06
By: P.M.P.
Citation: Memorandum from P.M.P. to the Prime Minister, Outlook Following the Constitutional Agreement (6 November 1981).
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Note: This document is discussed in an article that has been recently submitted to a peer-review journal.

Confidential

November 6, 1981.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRIME MINISTER

Outlook following the Constitutional Agreement

Without detracting from the jubilance throughout the country, the fact the federal government must address without delay is that Quebec is not a part of the agreement.

1. Will Premier Levesque accept the agreement if Quebec is left to opt in on minority education rights?

Unlikely, but maybe we should wait and see.

The position of Mr. Ryan and the provincial liberals is also important. while critical of Mr. Levesque for not joining the consensus they have avoided taking a clear position on the substance of the agreement.

2. Should the federal government impose minority education rights on Quebec?

The Supreme Court might hold that we have not the power to do so. Though not very likely, there is enough of a superficial case to justify a reference (i.e. delay).

Furthermore, the moral case for doing so is not clear cut. The Quebec minorities have a certain protection under the Constitution already.

Federal ministers from Quebec are fond of saying that “we”, meaning the federal members from Quebec, must do so. And the other federal ministers and members find it very comfortable “to leave the decision to representatives from Quebec”. The equation is not so simple. Federal ministers and members from outside Quebec must accept their responsibility since it is their votes that their Quebec colleagues will rely on in “making war on Quebec’s sovereign jurisdiction.” Similarly, Quebec ministers and members must pause to appreciate the gravity of their act and be certain that their judgement is founded on the vital interests of the minority community and not on a sense of simply “getting at” the separatists, Bill 101 or whatever.

3. Can a fight with the Government of Quebec be avoided?

Probably not, but we should make sure.

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There has recently been every indication that the Parti Quebecois is moving strongly towards a re-affirmation of a separatist priority. The Quebec financial situation and economic conditions seem to dictate this strategy.

4. If there is to be another “fight to the finish” with separatism, is the constitutional agreement (with or without imposed minority education rights) the subject and is now the time for that fight?

The constitutional agreement can be defended in Quebec. Indeed, if it can be explained, it can possibly be sold as area advance for French Canada. It is probably a better fighting ground than another referendum question framed by Premier Levesque or an “election/referendum” called by him though both of these options remain open to him even with a fight on the constitutional agreement.

As regards timing, the Parti Quebecois strategy of slowly killing confederation in  Quebec, of not resisting disinvestment, of gradually squeezing out the minorities from the political life of and even residence in Quebec, is clearly working against the federal cause. Three more years of this and your retirement could decisively change the balance once and for all.

Conclusion

So, the option of a “fight to the finish” with Premier Levesque on the constitutional agreement is worth looking at very carefully)it may well be unavoidable.

But, if this is the true context for the preceding questions,

(a) we must examine the question very carefully and not rush at the decision,

(b) we must be very careful in choosing our position on the minority education rights question.

Given that the budget is set for November 12th., and that there is no way that the constitutional resolution can be done in the House before then, and that — in any event, — there is no absolute requirement to get the process finished within the next few days, Cabinet today should not try to adopt a firm and final position (especially not in the 45 minutes available to it).

It should, however, agree on a press line to be followed during the next four or five days. I suggest the following:

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(i) we regret that Quebec is not part of the agreement;

(ii) we intend to proceed to London deliberately and expeditiously;

(iii) with regard to Quebec’s views, however, we are still open to discussion and agreement;

(iv) (subliminally but widely broadcast) we do not expect a friendly agreement with the separatists —

(a) Quebec clearly came to the Conference trying to prevent an agreement;

(b) Quebec never put any compromise positions on the table;

(c) When on the referendum question, Quebec for the one and only time seemed to be trapped into an agreement, is moved quickly to retreat from its position;

(d) Quebec puts fiscal compensation and mobility up front, but its real basic line is that it will not accept reciprocal minority education rights.

In short, Quebec does not want an agreement because its government is dedicated to separatism.

P.M.P.