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Date: 1864-11-14
By: The Montreal Herald
Citation: “Opinions of the Press on the Confederation”, The Montreal Herald (14 November, 1864)
Other formats: TBA

OPINIONS OF THE PRESS ON THE CONFEDERATION.

(From the Hamilton Spectator.)

We are sorry to notice in the Toronto Globe a very decided article against the propriety of a general election before the new constitution for the United British American Provinces shall have been finally adopted. We regret this, because we believe the effect will be to raise up a spirit of hostility to the measure itself, which, feeling strongly how important it is that it should be adopted, we would be glad to see avoided. For in the discussion of this question we have no feeling to gratify beyond an earnest desire to see accomplished the great work of Union, for which we have laboured in an humble way for many years; and to see it so brought about as to give to the people who are affected by it the largest measure of contentment and happiness.

It is quite true that in the strict interpretation of the rights of Parliament under our free constitution there is no constitutional objection to the present Parliament adopting the requisite address to the Crown, based upon the resolutions of the Intercolonial Conference, for the passage of an Imperial Act to unite these Provinces upon the plan determined upon. Parliament under the British Constitution is omnipotent, so far as any earthly body can be called so. It has in England at times exercised very large powers—changing the religion of the realm, and altering the constitution itself, as in the act of Union. The absolute power of the Parliament is too clearly laid down by all the writers on constitutional law, and in the history of the English Parliament, to admit of its being disputed. The question is not, has Parliament the right to alter the constitution of the country, to destroy its own existence in fact as the Parliament of United Canada, but is it expedient that it should, under the circumstances, exercise that right.

We must remember, in the discussion of this question, that at this moment we have no official knowledge of what the precise details of the scheme of federation are.—True we were permitted to hear from day to day through the industrious correspondents of the press at the seat of Government, rumors of the decisions of the Conference. And Mr. Brown ventured at Toronto, in accordance, it is said, with a determination arrived at after the Montreal banquet, to give a quasi-official sanction to those reports. But in spite of this we are still without the clear official declaration of the precise character of the constitution which has been prepared for us. People are exceedingly sensitive on this point. Many men, earnestly in favor of intercolonial union, were chafed with the idea that the thing was being hatched in secret, that it was politicians and not a people’s measure, and that the people were not being fairly treated in the matter. We thought at the time, we think still, that it was wise that the discussions of the Conference should be carried on with closed doors. Any other course must have greatly embarrassed the question; for men, fearful of losing popularity, would be much more tenacious of local interests and would be apt to sink the practical statesman in the flashy orator or demagogue. But it is a question fairly open to debate, whether a grave error was not committed in refusing the request of the members of the Press at Quebec to be permitted to make public under official sanction, the resolutions actually determined upon—The request was refused; the utmost reticence was observed; and even at the Montreal banquet that reticence was continued; and it was only after it, when the members of the Conference must have felt that they were provoking opposition to the scheme itself by their silence, that they determined upon permitting a quasi official statement of what had really been done. We are bound to say that that has done something towards satisfying the public mind. And there are not wanting those, and they are the earnest thinkers of the community, who contend that when so much has been done, it would be better to allow the resolutions themselves to be published, so that the fullest opportunity of discussing them should be afforded.

And it is this same amour propre, this same sensitiveness as to their own rights, on the part of the people, that compelled the declarations of Mr. Brown at the Toronto banquet, which now demand that this question should not be disposed of by a Parliament elected under entirely different auspices, and when the question of a union of the Provinces was scarcely heard of, and simply sneered at by the Globe and kindred sheets as the idle dream of a few ultra loyalists. It may be true, as the Globe alleges, that an election would decide nothing as to the question, that the electors would be influenced by other considerations in casting their votes than this simple one of confederation, that personal, and may-be, party influence would prevail, and that the country would be no better represented as to the great question in the new Parliament than in the old. We think that there is some force in this objection; nay, we believe that in no single constituency, in Upper Canada at any rate, would the question come prominently up as the distinct issue between the candidates, for the simple reason that none would come out against it. But the people would still have the right to elect the men with reference to this question—men to deal with it—men in whose judgment they have sufficient confidence to entrust to them the important task of framing a new constitution. And their mouths would be forever after closed on the subject. The surest way to raise a feeling of hostility against the convention is to give the impression that it is being forced upon the people without their consent; and if it is clear that an election of a new Parliament, with the knowledge before the electors that the Parliament was destined to deal with the subject of the union of the Provinces, would at once do away with this feeling, and would unite all parties, more cordially in the work of carrying out the proposed constitution.

The objection that a general election would cause delay in the proposed union, is not a good one. It is well for us to remember that the whole subject has come upon us very suddenly, and that but little time has been afforded for the formation of that second thought which in a matter of so grave importance it is desirable should be brought to bear upon it. A year or two in the lifetime of a nation is a very small matter, it is no consideration when weighed in the balance against the dangers of party legislation in a matter of so great importance as the framing of a Constitution for a country with so many diverse interests as has British America. The fact that an appeal to the people would give ample time for the full consideration of the subject in all its details is one of the strongest arguments that can be urged in its favor. The very phraseology in matters of this kind is important and ought to be weighed. And it does seem too much to ask that the Constitution should be adopted by the Legislature in the same session in which it is submitted to them, and with comparatively little time for consideration. Why, when the Municipal Law was consolidated, it was deemed right to submit it to Parliament at one Session, and then allow it to remain over until next, before it was sought to be passed, so that it might, in the meantime, receive the fullest consideration. And if this [were?] [necessary?] in the [matter?] of municipal law, which our own Parliament could at any moment alter of its own mere motion, how much more important is it that in the matter of the framing of a Constitution of the country at least as full time for consideration should be given.

We urge these views in no spirit of factious hostility to the intentions or policy of the Government. We have the greatest confidence in the constitutional knowledge, the sterling integrity and thorough patriotism of the leaders of the Government. And we but record the views of the great mass of the people when we claim that an opportunity should be given them to chose representatives with special reference to this most important object, before it is entirely consummated. They may rely upon it that a contrary course will but create a spirit of discontent, and create an opposition to the whole scheme of the Confederation which to-day does not exist.

(From the Leader.)

At length we are enabled to lay before our readers, in its entirety, the scheme of the Intercolonial Conference. It comes to us in a French garb, in the Journal de Quebec, a journal so excessive in its modesty that it pretends to have collected it, in scattered fragments, from its cotemporaries; a pretence which has, on several occasions, been repeated, over this subject. The Leader has had its full share of early information in regard to the doings of the Conference; but it is too much to ask us to admit that the entire project we publish to-day was oringinally found in our columns. The main features of the scheme were indeed known before; but it has never before been presented, in so connected a form, and so complete as a whole. Most of what we now learn as new are the least captivating parts of the plan. We have looked for a confirmation of the announcement that the enlargement of our canals is secured, along with the construction of the Intercolonial railway; but we have looked in vain. There is an obscure reference to the question of improving the communications between the great North-West and the ocean; but it is remitted to that indefinite period when the Confederate exchequer is to be in a plethoric condition. We cannot regard this as satisfactory and we fear that it will not be so regarded by Upper Canada.

One can see at a glance that the aim of the Conference has been to centralize as much as possible. The General Government entrenches on some purely local questions. It does not even leave the Savings’ Banks to the local legislatures. It claims the appointment of the local governors and a veto on the local laws; and in cases of emigration, agriculture and fisheries where the general and local governments are to have concurrent jurisdiction, the laws of the former are to override those of the latter. We are convinced that the Conference acted in this matter from a conviction of what was best for the public good; but its members were so enamored of the principle of centralization that they shut their eyes to the possible evils of a centralized government, in a federal guise. The experience of these Provinces is not wholly uninstructive in this respect. When the two Canadas were first amused with the shadow of free institutions, it was no doubt thought they would be satisfied with the sham; but the result proved far otherwise. If we are to have a Confederate Government the federal principles must have fair play.

The proposed constitution of the Confederate Legislative Council presents some strange singularities. We leave out of the question the assumption that there was no alternative but to adopt the objectionable principle of direct election for both Chambers or to return to the discarded practice of Crown nominations as a means of creating the Legislative Council. The Confederate Government is not to have the absolute selection of the members of the Upper House. The several Legislatures are to present persons for selection. This will be some check on the Confederate Government and it is a favorable feature of the scheme. But the pretence that the members to be appointed by the Crown are to represent certain Divisions is a through sham. In other respects, the power of selection by the Crown is to be limited. A property qualification is required and thus the Crown will be unable to select any one otherwise well qualified without this requisite. And the property forming the qualification must be situated in the Electoral Division which the member is to be assumed to represent unless he resides in it himself. There will thus be three different restrictions on the choice of the Crown; one of which is reasonable and right; the others of at least a doubtful character. We can understand the desirability of a property qualification for members chosen by direct popular suffrage; but it is not so apparent when the Crown nominates, and especially when its right of selection is limited to a list of persons presented to it by a body of original selectors.

One of the most objectionable provisions is that which gives the Crown the right, not only to appoint, but also to remove the President of the Legislative Council. It is desirable that the Council should act independently; and not less so that its President should not be dependent on the smiles or frowns of the government for his seat. When questions come up which he is called upon to decide, he ought to be independent of the Crown, at least in so far that he cannot be deprived of his position if he happens to offend the dominant party in the Government.

The scheme, as a whole, bears marks of much ingenuity and great practical knowledge of details, but it is impossible, without gross flattery to its framers, to treat it as a perfect instrument. Nobody, we presume, certainly nobody outside the Conference, deems that the entire project will meet the approval of five Legislatures, without undergoing any alteration. If improvements are shown to be desirable, it would be the height of folly to reject them. This might cause some delay, it is true; but a complete change in our political institutions and relations is not a thing to be hurried through without due consideration. Besides, it must not be forgotten, the question is now. There has been no popular agitation for these changes; no pressure on the various governments of the Provinces to bring them about. On the contrary, the whole question was sprung upon the Provinces in an hour, and that was adopted as a ministerial programme which no party had seriously demanded, and which, in the little discussion that had taken place on it, one party had opposed with a warmth that far outstripped reason.

A great crisis may justify extraordinary remedies; but when the crisis and the proposed remedy are taken into account, it must be confessed that the urgency was not such as to justify a revolution, violent in the sense that it is great and sudden. There are many reasons for desiring that British America should present to the world the aspect of a united country; but when we are framing new institutions for future ages, the utmost circumspection is requisite. It is too much to expect of any body of colonial statesmen that, in one short month, they should frame a new constitution so faultless and perfect as to be incapable of improvement in any particular.

(From the Globe)

We give elsewhere to day an address by the Honorable A. A. Dorion to his constituents, wherein he declares himself opposed to the proposed Confederation of British North America. We regret exceedingly that Mr. Dorion has felt called upon formally to take ground against the Confederation scheme. No exception can be taken to his language. He states the leading features of the policy matured by the Quebec Conference very fairly, and urges his objections in courteous and temperate language. We may look in vain through his address for the violent and senseless appeals to national prejudices which marked the discussion of the question of Confederation in the columns of L’Union Nationale, and one or two other journals. The contrast, however, is only what any one who knows Mr. Dorion would expect. We are aware that in the minds of a portion of the Lower Canadian people there exists a dread that the Confederation will work harm to their local institutions, and that therefore there is a disposition on the part of some to resist it from the start. But we know that the fear is utterly groundless, and we must deeply regret that so able and liberal-minded a man as Mr. Dorion should, as it were, formally assume the leadership of an opposition based upon such a fallacy.

Mr. Dorion objects that the Confederation scheme does not really give a federal union but simply a disguised legislative union. This is, in other words, the doctrine of those who wish the federal tie made as weak as possible, and the local governments made as powerful and independent as possible. We may differ as to this. Some of us may wish the same union here which the secessionists claim to exist under the American constitution, while others may desire a firmer and closer alliance. But we do not think it fair to deny that either would, in the common acceptation of the term, be a federal union. While we go so far to preserve the autonomy of the separate Province and give to the local legislatures so much real power as is proposed in the Confederation scheme, we assuredly cannot call the union anything else. Mr. Dorion objects to the possession by the central authority of the right to veto the acts of the local authorities. That right, however, will no more destroy the federal character of the constitution than does the possession of a similar veto power by the Crown in Great Britain destroy the popular character of the British system of government. In practice the one veto would probably be as little used as the other. The reason for providing the central government with such a power, is of course the possibility that the local government might sometimes be unjust to the local minority. We believe that Mr. Dorion will find that that provision of the constitution will nowhere have more friends than in Lower Canada. So long as local authorities of any Province refrain from doing palpable injustice they will be very safe from the federal veto. The exercise of that veto, unless when the local government was clearly wrong, would be a most hazardous step, and one upon which no federal government would venture. The penalty for an indiscreet exercise of the veto power would probably be nothing less than an agitation which would sweep it away altogether. But, even were it otherwise, were it a likely thing that the federal authority would frequently intermeddle, local institutions would surely be infinitely safer from unjust interference under such a system than under one which compels the government of the united Provinces always to have its voice in the local affairs of all sections.

Mr. Dorion makes much of the increased debt which Confederation involves. He reviews the arrangement by which the debts of the various Provinces are to be adjusted, and the Provinces which are free or nearly free from debt are to be compensated for assuming the burdens which the joint debts of the whole will impose. We note, however, that he advances no reason for thinking that arrangement an unjust one. If the federal government is to pay the debts of Canada, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick, and to have the customs revenues of Prince Edward Island and Newfoundland to do it with, we surely could not refuse compensation. The adding up of the different debts, we are bound to admit, makes up a larger gross sum than we now owe; but it does not make a larger sum per head, nor a larger sum in proportion to the means of payment. The Lower Provinces are, in point of fact, heavy consumers of imported goods, and, therefore, under our present system of raising revenue would be heavy taxpayers. The rural population of Lower Canada consume very little in the way of imported goods, and, while the revenue is raised in great part by customs duties, they contribute but little thereto. Ten years ago it was admitted that Upper Canada was paying two-thirds of the consolidated revenue, and the disparity has much increased since. It certainly is not for Lower Canada to complain as to the financial aspects of the new arrangement. Both to the east and to the west she will have portions paying more heavily per man to the federal treasury than she has done, or can do under the present system of indirect taxation. Nothing but free trade and direct taxation could entirely deprive her of that advantage. The allowances for local purposes, which are to be in proportion to population, are noticed by Mr. Dorion—not, however, to make the complaint, as some Lower Canada journals have done, that the allowance for Lower Canada is less than that which she manages in various ways to get now. The present system, by which local appropriations are too often a matter of grab or the means of corruption, will well be superseded by a plan which will make the appropriation definite in amount and leave the distribution to the local authorities. The amounts which it has been proposed shall be thus appropriated, though not so large as those reached by a system which has involved the country deeply in debt, are still quite sufficient to allow the local governments with proper economy to get along without resorting to taxation. The sum which will fall to Lower Canada will, it is safe to say, be quite as large as is consistent with equity to the other Provinces.

Mr. Dorion bases a rather clever argument upon the basis of representation agreed upon by the Conference. Lower Canada, he says, has always refused to give Upper Canada Representation by Population in the existing Union, although four or five additional members in our Chambers, with equality in the other, would have satisfied her, because fear was felt for the local institutions of the East. Now, however, it has been agreed not only to give Upper Canada seventeen additional members in the Assembly, but also to add forty-seven British members to that House from the Maritime Provinces, and moreover to add twenty-eight British members from the same Provinces to the Legislative Council, This, quoth Mr. Dorion, is protection to the local interests of Lower Canada! This is very ingenious, but it involves several mistakes. Four or five additional members would not [satisfy?] [illegible] and as a guarantee that the whole would not be long in coming. We should sooner or later expect to get the seventeen additional members just as much in the present Union as under the federation, and along with that, provision for periodical re-adjustments on the basis of population in the future. The concession of four or five additional members might have carried a Government through a year or two, but Mr. Dorion is too much of a statesman to mistake that for a permanent settlement of the difficulty.

The objection to the admission of representatives from the Maritime Provinces is, of course, an objection to any union with them at all, and ought only to come from one who is for all time against union with the Maritime Provinces. In another part of his address, Mr. Dorion explicitly declares himself against all union, federal or legislative, with the Maritime Provinces, but does no more than declare such a union “premature.” If he expects the time to come when it will not be premature, how does he then propose to deal with the representative question? When they unite with us, the Lower Provinces will assuredly have representatives in the united Parliament. Is it not, then, very illogical in a public man, who expects the union with the Maritime Provinces to come at a future time, and who in 1859 made it ore of the advantages of the proposed Canadian federation that it would give facilities for the future extension of our union to the other Provinces, now to argue that the admission of members of Parliament from those Provinces will prove inimical to Lower Canadian interests? If that is a sound argument now it would have been a sound reply to the suggestion of a future extension of our Canadian union which Mr. Dorion and his friends made five years ago.

The position of affairs is just this: Constitutional reform must come in some form or other. We in Upper Canada were long anxious to get it within the Canadian Union as it is. We have freely assented to the scheme of Confederation as reaching the same end in a manner more acceptable to Lower Canada. If Mr. Dorion thinks he would prefer to give Representation by Population, pure and simple, let him set to work to convince his countrymen that such a concession would be less dangerous, and their will be no room for cavil at his course. But he can hardly afford, in justice to himself, and in recollection of his own frequent admissions that this constitutional question must in some way be settled, to take simply negative ground in the matter.