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Date: 1865-01-19
By: he Westminster and Foreign Quarterly Review
Citation: ““The Canadian Confederacy,” The Westminster and Foreign Quarterly Review (April 1, 1865), 533-560.[1]
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ART. VI. THE CANADIAN CONFEDERACY.

Resolutions relative to the Proposed Union of the British North American Provinces. Quebec. January 19, 1865.

THE probable fate of the British North-American colonies has, for many years, afforded wide scope for speculation. Both in this country and in America the chances have been weighed as passing events offered themselves for analysis. It has been regarded from various points of view; the result being, conclusions as widely different as such topics of discussion usually lead to. Argument resting upon a speculative basis is always unsteady, and kaleidoscopic glances at the present yield very unsatisfactory data from which to decipher the future. Hence it is that America and American affairs have so frequently belied prophecy. The conjectures evoked by the dealings between England and her North-American colonies have in many instances proved erroneous, and we are not now so liable to be led astray by the oracular utterances of nervousness and timidity. We were assured that Canada was incapable of self-control, but we find that political strife carried to the extreme has not been able to weaken the springs of government, or to disregard the promptings of patriotism. Recriminations and jealousies which formerly found vent in the Colonial Office, have been smothered where their origin could be soonest detected and their object most easily frustrated. The consequence of transferring responsibility from the shoulders of the Imperial Government to those of the colonists themselves, is that the shafts of temper no longer spend their force on an imperial target, while a spirit of loyalty and affection has taken the place of an ungracious allegiance. It has also been asserted that the democratic tendencies of these American colonies, would have the effect of weakening if not terminating the relations between them and the mother country; that the grant of freedom from imperial dictation naturally handed over to republicanism the keys of a British stronghold. Neither has this proved true, although the anticipation harmonizes well with the expressed wishes of the United States.

So long ago as 1775, when delegates from the American States assembled in convention at Philadelphia to agree upon the terms of an union, they evidently accepted as a foregone conclusion the immediate entrance of Canada, at least, into the federal compact, for Section XI. of their Articles of Agreement provided that ”Canada, acceding to the confederation and joining in the measures of the United States, shall be admitted into and be entitled to the advantages of the Union.” Every inducement to revolt was held out to all the British provinces; but neither open temptation nor secret intrigue was sufficiently powerful to allure them from their allegiance. Lower Canada was appealed to in terms that recognised its peculiar position as regards race, language, religion, and laws, and included a guarantee for their security and permanence. But the French inhabitants, besides having the recollection of past wrongs to prompt a rejection, were moved by a deep-rooted antipathy to republicanism to meet with disdain overtures thus insidiously made to them. In after years, the employment of force had as little effect in changing the determination of these stubborn colonists to remain a portion of the empire; and the several provinces not only fought nobly against the common enemy, but even sent assistance to the more sorely pressed.

Notwithstanding this, it has been an article of political faith with American statesmen and politicians that the ”manifest destiny” of their republic would, in its own good time, lead to the absorption of some, if not all, of the adjacent British provinces. To embrace these is their traditionary policy, having in its list of founders and supporters such names as Washington, Franklin, Monroe, and Seward. Mr. Seward’s views pointed to a peaceable rather than a forcible annexation; and both in England and in British America the idea has been entertained that Canada, New Brunswick, and Nova Scotia, but more especially the first-named, must sooner or later cast in their lot with the powerful nation at their side, impelled by sheer force of political attraction. Nor is this theory incapable of support, though formerly the reasons in its favour were much more numerous than they now are.

A glance at the position occupied by Canada a few years ago will be found to justify in some degree the Montreal annexation movement of 1849. It was a dependency shut in from the seaboard for five months of the year, at an enormous distance from the imperial metropolis; separated from those of kindred sympathies and acknowledging a like allegiance, by an almost untraversable tract of country; exposed to attack at every point along a frontier of a thousand miles; gazing at the prosperity of a nation which held out every inducement to unite with it; without manufactures, coal, or capital, yet witnessing a stream of British wealth pouring into the lap of its rival; thinly populated, and outbid in attracting emigration; with the hope of union between itself and the other British colonies uncertain, although having all the elements of prosperity ready to be combined, but suffering them, from various causes, to lie unimproved and unprofitable. Taking every circumstance into consideration, it cannot be denied that the prospects of a long-continued existence of such a dependency as a separate and distinct political organism were dim and dubious. The maritime provinces had not such influences to contend against; but the temptations brought to bear upon Canada, and her successful resistance to them, naturally beget surprise at the nature of the causes to which she owed her preservation from a loss of identity in the nation at her side. But it is unnecessary for present purposes to do more than notice the fact, as it serves to show the bent of her inclination.

Changed times have suggested new fields for debate, and prophecy has been driven to seek out new channels. A rapid advance in material prosperity brought with it considerations left out in previous forecasts; while, on the other hand, the American Republic presents to its admirers fewer attractions than formerly. The effect is seen in the almost total obliteration of annexation sentiment in the colonies, and in the strength and encouragement afforded to those in England who looked forward to the establishment of a British nationality in America that would not only rival the great republic, but would prove a faithful ally to the mother land. When we yielded to these colonies the right of self-government, we gave up the right to dictate, whether we reserved the privilege of guiding or not. This abandonment of control carried with it, said some, the last link in the chain that bound our British American colonies to the empire; but this hasty assertion has been thus far falsified. Confident in their capacity for self-government, we committed their fortunes to their own keeping, as a faithful guardian unburdens himself of his trust on the attainment of majority by his ward. Had we conceived that this transfer involved a mere change of masters, we should have unquestionably hesitated to sacrifice our interests to those of a foreign power.

But faith in their future was no less strong with our statesmen than it was in the colonists themselves. That self-reliance, that innate vigour, which defies misfortune and begets self-confidence, is a characteristic of our race, and, when grafted in other lands, reproduces its inherent qualities with the characteristics of the parent stock. We had confidence in our kindred and in the virtue of our institutions; and a colonial policy based upon this has proved successful, and in its success its wisdom. A complex relationship has been begotten, but the machinery has worked well. The evidences of stability exhibited by these self-governed colonies, the variety of resources at their command, and the vast progress they have made in utilizing the advantages placed by nature within their reach, have not been lost sight of by that school of politicians which regards the relations between us and states dependent but in name as presenting some unsatisfactory features. Nor has the change in circumstances been passed over heedlessly by the colonists themselves. They, too, have begun to reflect on the chances of the future. Everlasting youth is denied to nations as well as to individuals, and impulses from within combine with influences from without to urge a consideration of the best means for ensuring a lusty manhood. It is with no little pride, therefore, that we see them enter upon the discussion of a subject of such vital importance as a confederation among themselves with calmness and deliberation indicating a knowledge of the responsibility devolving upon them, and a determination to probe to the bottom the secret of national greatness. It is a complete vindication of our modern policy in permitting them to think and act for themselves. It is of importance, therefore, to know what they propose to do, the basis of the contemplated changes, and their effect. To arrive at a proper understanding, it is necessary to go back a little in their history.

It must not be supposed that the scheme of confederation is the offspring of fear. Its origin can be traced much further back than the civil war in the United States, however much a shock so terrible may have contributed to its maturity; nor can colonial emancipators, should their anticipations be realized, lay claim to its inception, however entitled to the credit of supplying a reason for its adoption.

It is stated that as early as 1810 a union of all the British American provinces was suggested by one of the colonists, and at various times afterwards the attention of the imperial authorities was directed to the subject by leading colonial politicians. Chief-Justice Sewell of Quebec, in 1814 laid before the late Duke of Kent a comprehensive plan, which met with the approval of His Royal Highness. In 1827, resolutions were introduced into the Legislative Assembly of Upper Canada, directed more especially to a union of the two provinces of Upper and Lower Canada; but proposing, as an alternative, “what would be more politic, wise, and generally advantageous,—viz., an union of the whole four provinces of North America under a viceroyalty, with a facsimile of that great and glorious fabric—the best monument of human wisdom—the British Constitution.”

Lord Durham, in his report on the affairs of British North America (1839), discusses the subject at considerable length, anticipating nearly all the arguments that can now be urged in its favour. In 1854, resolutions were brought forward in the Nova Scotia Legislature which indicated a strong desire to promote a closer connexion of the different provinces; and in 1857 the subject was pressed upon Mr. Labouchere, then Secretary of State for the Colonies, by delegates from that province; but he felt disposed to leave it to the colonists themselves to take action in the matter. In 1858, the Canadian Government announced as part of their policy that the expediency of a federal union of the British North-American provinces would be anxiously considered, and that communications would be entered into with the other provinces and the Imperial Government to secure adhesion to the project. In accordance with this announcement, delegates were sent from Canada, and the sanction of the Imperial Government was asked to the scheme; but the hesitation exhibited by the other provinces rendered the effort thus made fruitless. The Government of Nova Scotia made the next move, but the policy adopted by them had reference to a legislative union of Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and Prince Edward Island. In 1863 both Houses of the Nova Scotia Legislature passed, unanimously, resolutions authorizing the appointment of delegates to confer upon that subject with delegates from the other maritime provinces. Similar resolutions were adopted in the Parliaments of New Brunswick and Prince Edward Island. A meeting of delegates was accordingly called to sit at Charlotte Town, Prince Edward Island, in September of 1863.

Meanwhile, events in Canada were rapidly tending to render some change in its political condition an absolute necessity. One government after another was forced to confess itself unable to control parliament; and resignation followed resignation, and election succeeded election, with no other effect than to increase the embarrassment. The result was that sectional majorities, firmly united, impeded legislation, and assailed each other with every weapon that strong sectional differences place at the disposal of political factions. Lower Canadian representatives united to resist the demands of their compeers from the Upper Province, and Upper Canadian members were as resolute in enforcing what they considered to be just claims. In fact, Upper and Lower Canada were arrayed against each other, each determined not to yield an inch of ground.

This state of things, it was evident, could not long continue without leading to very serious results. The nature of the questions on which the two were divided admitted of no immediate satisfactory compromise, considering the relative position of the disputants. Upper Canadian members alleged that the population of their section of the province exceeded that of the other by 400,000; and as each had an equality of representation, the result was the practical disenfranchisement of these 400,000. It was also contended that the proportion of taxation raised by the respective sections showed a large excess in favour of Upper Canada, as that portion paid two thirds of the taxation of the country, while the relative expenditure exhibited a gross injustice. In answer to this, the Lower Canadians contended that, at the time of the union of the provinces, their section had a majority of 175,000; and it was not till 1850 that the scale was turned against them, by reason of a large immigration; and that they (comparatively rich) had borne the heavier part of the burthen of a debt contracted by the Upper Province, which, at the time, was staggering under the load; that any increase in the representation in Parliament would naturally place them (being a minority) at the mercy of a people dissimilar in race, character, religion, language, and laws. This quarrel culminated on the floor of Parliament, as we have already mentioned, in arraying sections against each other; the one bold in pressing for increased representation, and the other defiant in resisting it.

The union effected between the provinces of Upper and Lower Canada in 1840 was, after all, but a nominal one; each section preserved its identity, and the line between them remained in all its distinctness. The government has been administered by a ministry made up of an equal number from both sections, with, in most instances, a distinct staff of crown officers. It was, of course, to be expected that local politicians would keep alive sectional prejudices with such material as they had to work upon. Each half of the provincial cabinet has been expected to command the support of a majority from the section it represented, so that a ministry having a majority of the whole Houses of Parliament would be compelled to disband by reason of not having a majority within a majority. This policy could have but one effect, and it may be seen that the secret of frequent political crises lies, therefore, on the surface of Canadian politics. No government could be expected to stand out for any great length of time against a vigilant opposition, with so many conflicting interests to appease as the circumstances and extent of that country created. Party strife loses none of its violence by reason of the smallness of the community in which it is developed; and in its choice of weapons loses no advantage through courtesy.

The check given to public business brought both political parties to their senses; and returning reason suggested the necessity for a remedy by which responsible government would be saved from degenerating into a series of faction fights. It was apparent that constitutional difficulties lay at the bottom of this sectional strife. Both parties accepted the omen; the political leaders avowed their willingness to throw aside party ties and even personal feeling and a coalition was formed pledged to co-operate in searching out a practical remedy for the evils which had become intolerable. The result is embraced in the following memorandum, which expressed the policy of the coalition government:—

”The Government are prepared to pledge themselves to bring in a measure, next session, for the purpose of removing existing difficulties, by introducing the federal principle into Canada, coupled with such provisions as will permit the Maritime Provinces and the North-West Territory to be incorporated with the same system of government: and the Government will seek, by sending representatives to the Lower Provinces and to England, to secure the assent of those interests that are beyond the control of our Legislature, to be united under a general Legislature based upon the federal principle.”[2]

This coalition of parties (being accepted as a guarantee for the cessation of that species of political contention which had proved a source of constant annoyance and irritation ) met with the unanimous approbation of both Houses of Parliament, and gave satisfaction to the people and press of the country; while the policy announced afforded a gleam of hope to those who had begun to despair of an adjustment of difficulties hitherto seemingly incapable of settlement. After the prorogation of the Canadian Parliament, an invitation was extended by the Chamber of Commerce of St. John, New Brunswick, to the members of the Canadian Legislature, to pay a visit to the Maritime Provinces. This was accepted by a large number of Canadians, and the principal citizens of New Brunswick and Nova Scotia gave a hearty welcome to their fellow colonists. Their fraternal meetings went far to pave the way for an union, as public attention was at once turned towards the mutual advantage to be gained by a closer connexion. Such an incident may, at first glance, seem of little importance; but when we consider that up to this time public opinion had not kept pace with the dreams of the colonial statesmen (although individuals in all the provinces had agreed on what ought to be done rather than on what could be done), we are inclined to give it due weight.

Shortly afterwards, the convention appointed to consider the subject of an union of the Maritime Provinces, met at Charlotte Town, Prince Edward Island; and members of the Canadian Government attended and proposed to merge in the higher plan of a confederation of all the provinces,—that of a legislative union among the Maritime Provinces. The subject was discussed, and such progress made that it was thought desirable by the Conference that the subject should be resumed in an official manner under the authority of the governments of the several provinces.[3] The Governor-General of Canada communicated to the Secretary of State for the Colonies the suggestions of the Conference, stating in his despatch that ”the desire for a closer union amongst the colonies than has hitherto existed appears to be generally felt both in Canada and the Lower Provinces;” and, further, ”it appears to me that the mode of proceeding suggested is the only one in which the views entertained by the leading politicians of the British North-American colonies on this important subject can be brought intelligibly and in a practical form before your attention.” In reply, Mr. Cardwell merely expressed his approval of the course taken in the matter. Official delegates were appointed to represent each province, with the exception of Newfoundland. That province, however, was represented by some of its leading statesmen. The Conference met at Quebec, and formally entered upon the discussion of the subject.

From the foregoing it will be observed that the idea of a possible confederation has never been extinct in any of the provinces, although it has taken Rip Van Winkle slumbers. Until lately it had not been made a party question, nor had its discussion enlisted any very large number of persons. Now, however, it has assumed the proportions of a public question, and invites inquiry into its merits or demerits. Before reviewing the conclusions arrived at by the Conference, it may be as well to take a rapid survey of the country embraced by the confederation scheme, so that we may be enabled to judge of its probable success.

Public attention has but seldom been directed to the capabilities and resources of the British American provinces as a whole even among the colonists themselves has this been the case, and to such a degree that their knowledge of each other, not to mention the little importance they attached to their united value, has been as slight as an acquaintance with them has been superficial. They have had strange impressions of each other, and until lately, when they began to take stock, the general public had no idea that the provinces would unitedly possess all the elements necessary to constitute a powerful nation. No inducements were offered to render the acquisition of correct information of any practical service; so that while individuals regarded as visionaries bestowed time and labour in laying a basis for their schemes of future action, the mass of the communities paid little attention to their facts, and gave themselves no trouble about their theories. Each province has been so taken up with its own needs and the working out of its own projects, that greater interests have been kept in the background. But events have forced them to take thought for the future as well as to provide for the necessities of the present, and in setting out they naturally compare themselves with others.

The British possessions on the American continent embrace a territory nearly equal to that of the United States. It is difficult to give with accuracy the area under British rule, as that portion of the continent is but partially surveyed, and boundaries are not yet clearly defined, but an estimate sufficient for practical purposes has been formed. The latest calculation has this result:

If we add to this the probable area of the remainder—say, British Columbia 213,500, Vancouver Island 16,000, and the Hudson Bay Territory 1,570,500,—the sum total will show 2,218,641 square miles against 2,963,666, which is the area of the great American Republic given in the Report for 1853 of the American Topographical Bureau. A very large portion of this immense tract of country on both sides of the dividing line is of course incapable of cultivation, but the proportion really valuable even for agricultural purposes is very great. Confining ourselves to the North- American provinces likely to be included in the proposed confederation at once, we find, according to the statement of the Hon. George Brown, made at Halifax on Sept. 12, 1864, and alleged to be based upon the statistics of 1861, that the amount of land held by private individuals in the various provinces, with the number of acres under cultivation, stand respectively as follows—

Without referring to the agricultural produce of the provinces, which may always be looked to as the basis of their prosperity, and which now yields about 150,000,000 dollars annually, we shall now glance at other features which, though less important at present, yet afford for consideration, an inviting aspect. Besides a fertile soil and magnificent forests, the provinces possess inexhaustible mineral resources, such as are accessories to civilization and material, attractions to enterprise and skill. In Nova Scotia, gold, iron, coal, and copper are found in abundance. The quantity of coal at present raised is half a million of tons per annum. Four years ago gold was discovered, and now 151 mines are being worked, yielding in the way of revenues and royalties 20,000 dollars annually, New Brunswick, in common with Nova Scotia, has gold, iron, and extensive coal deposits, extending over seven millions of acres. Newfoundland has a coal formation of 1000 to 1500 feet in thickness; but it has not been worked, owing to other more profitable employments absorbing the attention of the inhabitants. As Canada has no coal, though abundance of iron ore and copper, it will be seen what an important bearing the possibility of obtaining supplies from the Lower Provinces may have in after years. Gold has been found in Canada, but thus far the yield is insignificant. Throughout the mineral regions of Canada forest trees exist in sufficient abundance to render the absence of coal for smelting purposes less felt than it otherwise would be. But the time will come when, wood being no longer at the disposal of the miner, coal will have to be resorted to. The profusion of iron ore in Canada, awaiting the magic touch of the capitalist to add to the country’s riches, is wonderful; and the copper mines in both the Upper and Lower Provinces have already given such evidences of productiveness as to justify the expressed opinion as to their national value.

Apart from these agricultural and mineral resources, there exists a guarantee for solid prosperity in the exhaustless fisheries that lie at the very threshold of the proposed. Confederacy. Their value cannot be over- estimated, and the many times they have been the subject of diplomatic contest shows that their importance has been in some degree, appreciated. For several centuries the governments of various countries have regarded them with envious eye. France has ever shown herself eager to push her interests in this quarter, and placing a proper estimate on their commercial and political importance, has lavished large sums on what she regarded as an investment producing an adequate money return as well as a nursery for her seamen.[4] It was a maxim with the French Government that the North-American fisheries were of more national value in regard to navigation and power than the gold mines of Mexico could have been if the latter were possessed by France. The number of men now employed by her in these fishing stations is about 11,500, and for years large bounties have been paid to encourage her seamen to engage in the occupation of fishing. The return from the French fisheries cannot be less than 3,000,000 dollars a year. On January 14, 1857, the French Government obtained from England certain concessions relative to fishery rights on the coast of Newfoundland, but the alarm created in the Maritime Provinces by what they looked upon as inflicting injury upon their interests, and the refusal of Newfoundland to accede to the terms of the treaty, prevented it from taking effect.

Nor are the United States wanting in appreciation of the benefits to be derived from a prosecution of this branch of trade. President Pierce, in his Message to Congress (Dec. 1862), in alluding to the Reciprocity Treaty, said: ”The treaty between the United States and Great Britain of 5th June, 1854, which went into effective operation in 1855, put an end to causes of irritation between the two countries by securing to the United States the right of fishing on the coast of the British North-American provinces with advantages equal to those enjoyed by British subjects. Besides the signal benefits of this treaty to a large class of our citizens in a pursuit connected in no inconsiderable degree with our national prosperity and strength, it has had a favourable effect, &c.”

The amount expended in bounties now averages 300,000 dollars annually, and the return is estimated at about eight and a half millions of dollars. The advantage of position enjoyed by the Maritime Provinces naturally attracts capital and enterprise from other pursuits to profit by an employment so lucrative as that placed by nature within their very grasp. They see with chagrin the treasures of the deep snatched from before their eyes, and going to the enrichment of foreigners, while the apathy of their fellow-colonists living inland prevents a just share being appropriated by those who should profit most by them. Without a system of bounties (except as regards Canada) the value of fish, fish-oil, and seal-skins exported from these provinces (independently of what was consumed in domestic use) is thus given—

We have not the returns necessary to found an accurate statement of the aggregate value of these fisheries, but competent authorities have suggested 20,000,000 dollars as falling short of the actual yield.

Possessing 5000 miles of sea-coast, the British North-American provinces when consolidated into one power would possess not only all the materials necessary for constructing and equipping ships of war, but also bands of skilful and hardy seamen wherewith to man a powerful fleet. Already their united commercial marine shows an amount of tonnage that would entitle a Confederacy such as is proposed to take high rank as a maritime power. The following table shows the tonnage required for the accommodation of trade:—

The tonnage employed by Canada on the inland lakes is stated to be 6,907,000 tons, but this includes many coasting vessels, between whose arrival and departure a very short interval elapses, so that a very great deduction must be made to express correctly the actual tonnage. But the sea-going tonnage of Canada amounts to 2,133,000 tons. The opportunities for commerce are such as to indicate the natural increase of the colonial marine. The facilities for ship- building turn the attention of a large number not only to the supply of the home demand, but also to competition in foreign markets for the sale of vessels. In 1832 the tonnage of vessels built in British America amounted to only 33,776 tons; in 1863 the number of vessels built was 645, with a capacity of 219,763 tons,[6] and representing an export value of 9,000,000 dollars. The number of sailors and fishermen of these colonies, as shown by the last census returns, is 69,256.

The total population of the united colonies cannot be said to indicate great strength, considering the vast region over which it is spread; it must, however, be regarded as a respectable nucleus of a nationality which the varied resources of the country will in time fill up and extend by attracting immigration. In five years Nova Scotia has doubled her population, while Canada has increased from 1,147,349 in 1842 to 2,507,657 in 1861; Upper Canada presenting the most rapid increase, as in 1842 her population numbered 486,055, and in 1861, 1,396,091. The population of the six provinces is represented by the census of 1861 to be thus distributed:—Upper Canada, 1,396,091; Lower Canada, 1,111,566; Nova Scotia, 338,857; New Brunswick, 252,047; Newfoundland, 122,635; Prince Edward Island, 80,857 : total, 3,294,056. Adding to this the increase from every source since 1861, and the numbers necessarily omitted, the whole population may be assumed to be nearly 4,000,000 of souls. If we place this aggregate in comparison with the population of European countries ranking as substantial powers—for instance, Portugal, 3,570,000; Holland, 3,500,000; Denmark, 2,480,000; Greece, 1,150,000—we are enabled to form a pretty fair idea of the position a British confederacy may ere long hold among the nations of the earth. The following tabulated statement shows the fighting material available for defensive purposes:—

The ebb and flow of the tide of population in a new country such as America presents curious results. While the population is being augmented from without, localities and sections of country suffer from the constant drain made upon them by the attractions of older or more inviting parts of the continent. The young Canadian or Nova Scotian, seduced by the prospect of an enlarged scope for ambition or the hope of acquiring a fortune more rapidly than he could do at home, deserts his native land to push his way in the adjoining States or the extreme west of the continent. Even the French Canadians, noted for their attachment to their native soil, become restive, and are found bold enough to seek new homes among a people whom they have been taught to regard as hostile to all that they hold sacred. The number of British colonists now residing in the United States is very great. It is said that there are 20,000 Canadians alone in the Federal army. What has contributed to this self-expatriation has undoubtedly been the want of inter-course between colonies which offer every inducement to industry. Instead of an interchange of floating population, the current has gone in a foreign direction, and thousands of young men have not only been lost to the colonies, but have gone to the building up of their rivals. As districts now scarcely rescued from native wildness become more closely settled, and intervening tracts that serve as so many barriers to communication are pierced by advancing civilization, communities now almost strangers to each other will feel the uniting influences of trade, and present to the colonial youth a greater diversity of pursuits than the limited means and distracted energies of each province have been able to open up.

Notwithstanding the disadvantages incident to divided counsels and sectional legislation, the provinces have advanced very rapidly in material wealth. Small markets have stunted their manufactures, but their great staples have enabled them to grasp and retain a fast hold on international trade. Their exports and imports already exceed those of the United States in 1821. The returns of 1863 are presented in one view in the following table—

While this trade in the aggregate is large, the part of it strictly intercolonial bears but a small proportion to that carried on with foreign countries. In 1863 the total imports by the St. Lawrence from the British North-American colonies to Canada amounted to 568,806, and the exports of Canada to the other colonies to 992,738 dollars. This low state of intercolonial trade is attributable to the hostile tariffs put in force by each province, amounting in effect to the exclusion of each other’s products. Free trade between them will no doubt remedy the evil to a great extent. In the three years preceding the Reciprocity Treaty, the exports of the United States to these provinces were 48,216,518, and the imports 22,588,577 dollars. During the ten years in which the treaty has been in operation, from 1854 to 1863, the expansion has been unexampled, showing an aggregate of exports to the value of 256,350,931, and of imports to the value of 200,399,786 dollars.[7]

It is very natural for the colonists to argue that if reciprocity between them and the United States lent such an impetus to trade, reciprocity between all the provinces would likewise cause an increase in their trade with each other. A large proportion of the goods which the maritime provinces now buy in the States could be supplied by Canada, and the competition would not be with the productions of Great Britain, but with those of the States.[8] The imports of all kinds of agricultural produce in New Brunswick amounted in one year to 2,060,702 dollars, of which Canada supplied only 177,328. Most of the flour is of Canada growth and manufacture, and instead of its being procured from Portland in the United States, it could be laid down at the head of the St. John River in New Brunswick as cheaply as it is carried to Portland. The New Brunswick Comptroller of Customs, in his report for 1863, says—“If New Brunswick were connected with Montreal and Quebec by direct railway communication through British territory, our imports from the States would decrease immediately, as much of our flour and other supplies could come direct from Canada.”

The same might be said of the other provinces. The subject of intercolonial reciprocity has been considered by the colonists, and various schemes have been suggested to change a state of things which all looked upon as anomalous, but which, being beset with difficulties, offered little prospect of a satisfactory or immediate improvement. In 1862 the Legislature of Nova Scotia passed resolutions empowering the Government to negotiate with the neighbouring provinces for an interchange of articles duty free. The Finance Minister of Canada gave his attention to the proposition, and reported to his colleagues the result of his examination. He said:—

“If a complete customs union could be formed between the provinces under which they could interchange, without restriction, all goods the produce and manufacture of whatever country, it would have a beneficial effect. But as, to carry such a union conveniently into effect, greater uniformity in the tariffs of the colonies must be secured, which would be almost impracticable under their present condition, the undersigned contents himself with recommending that, in answer to the despatch of the Nova Scotia Government, a proposal be made for the reciprocal free admission of all articles the growth, produce, and manufacture of Nova Scotia and any other province becoming a party to the agreement that may be founded on this proposal.”

The delegates from the provinces of Canada, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick, who met to consider the subject, came to the conclusion that the free interchange of goods and uniformity of tariff were indispensable consequences of the construction of the intercolonial railway, and that the diminution of the revenues of the respective provinces, from various causes, did not warrant the adoption of measures to carry the principle into effect.

The necessity for a line of railway between Canada and the Lower Provinces has been apparent for years past, and the project has occupied the attention of the imperial as well as the colonial authorities. The trade of Canada is dependent, in a great degree, upon the temper and feelings of the United States. For five months in the year exit by the St. Lawrence is completely cut off, and during this period Portland is the Canadian seaport. Should the Portland section of the Grand Trunk Railway be closed at any time, all communication with Europe must be carried on by the overland route to Halifax, and Canada would be forced to resort to the old system of importation by way of the St. Lawrence during the season of open navigation. The repeal of the Reciprocity Treaty and the abolition of the bonding system will compel Canada to find other outlets than those now available, and will force her to seek relief from a virtual blockade by connecting herself with the other colonies. For defensive purposes the road may also be of advantage, in enabling masses of troops to pass rapidly from province to province. However, as matters how stand, it is the only possible way of forestalling the consequences of complete isolation. The importance of the undertaking has never been questioned.

Lord Durham, in the report to which we have already referred, said—”The completion of any satisfactory communication between Halifax and Quebec would in fact produce relations between these provinces that would render a general union absolutely necessary.” In 1843 the Imperial Government caused a survey to be made with reference to a military road, and in 1848 Major Robinson and Captain Henderson reported as to the fitness for railway purposes of the proposed route. In a correspondence between Lord Elgin and Earl Grey in 1848, the former insisted strongly on the advantages likely to accrue from the construction of the line; among others, that it would ”tend to unite the provinces to one another and to the mother country, and to inspire them with that consciousness of their own strength and of the value of the connexion with Great Britain, which is their best security against aggression.” The Legislatures of Canada, New Brunswick, and Nova Scotia passed acts for the promotion of the undertaking. In 1851, Lord Derby, in the House of Lords, expressed himself in favour of the construction of the line; and in 1852 Sir John Pakington, in a despatch to Lord Elgin, gave expression to the views of the Imperial Government, declaring their intention to fulfil the just expectations held out by their predecessors. In a despatch from the Duke of Newcastle, dated April 12, 1862, a proposal was made, couched in the following terms:—

“Anxious, however, to promote as far as they can the important object of completing the great line of railway communication on British ground between the Atlantic and the westernmost parts of Canada, and to assist the provinces in a scheme which would so materially promote their interests, her Majesty’s Government are willing to offer to the Provincial Governments an Imperial guarantee of interest towards enabling them to raise by public loan, if they should desire it, at a moderate rate, the requisite funds for constructing the railway…. The nature and extent of such guarantee must be determined by the particulars of any scheme which the Provincial Governments may be disposed to found on the present proposal, and on the kind of security they would offer.”

In September, 1862, delegates duly appointed by the provinces met at Quebec to consider the proposal, and a memorandum of agreement was drawn up. Owing to a subsequent dissatisfaction with some of the conditions precedent proposed by the Imperial Government, the effort proved abortive. The objections to the construction of the line have been the probable immediate loss connected with it as a commercial speculation, owing to the insufficiency of paying freights, the difficulty of keeping it in running order in winter, and its uselessness for military purposes, owing to its proximity to the frontier. In its favour the arguments rest on a national, military, and commercial basis; that it furnishes the surest means of bringing about a confederation, that it will enable troops to be moved rapidly across British territory, and facilitate the concentration of masses of men, and that it will counterbalance to a certain extent the pressure of the United States on Canada by affording another method by which the foreign mails can be carried, and access to the seaboard obtained for Canadian products and manufactures; besides effecting a saving of time in the transmission of European and American correspondence. The length of railway to be built is estimated at 350 miles;[9] this, however, may be under the mark. When this line is constructed there will be a complete railway connexion from Halifax on the Atlantic to the shores of Lake Huron.

Thus far the energies of the different provinces have been directed to schemes of internal improvement, promoting facility of internal communication, and every effort has been put forth to secure the vast trade of the West, whose natural channel is the St. Lawrence. Costly though the struggle has proved, yet it is not fruitless. Every mile of railway has paid for itself tenfold in opening up the country and increasing the value of property, and the magnificent canal system has overcome the natural obstacles by which navigation was impeded and commerce forced into other and foreign channels. The benefits conferred will not be confined to one province, but must be shared with all to a greater or less extent, from their very nature. To sustain and extend the public works already in existence, and to call others into being that will act as feeders to them, can only be done efficiently, where the aim is a common prosperity, by unity of action and a clubbing of resources. It will be found that the Canadian Confederacy will set out with a respectable income. Its financial standing may be judged of from the following statement of liabilities, revenues, and expenditure:—

Summing up the resources of the provinces about to assume the attitude of a distinct power, we find that they possess every element that enters into the formation of a nationality which will, if properly guided, stand the test of time.

We are thus enabled to see at a glance the magnitude of the interests to be dealt with by the delegates appointed to the Quebec conference, and we can imagine the difficulties that presented themselves at every step in their negotiations, while striving to reconcile the prejudices of localities hitherto having complete control over their own affairs. The necessity for securing different races against mutual aggression, and protecting religious views from an intolerance already busy in sowing seeds of discord, involved problems not easy of solution. Had there been any inclination to trifle with the main object of their meeting, or a disposition to throw obstacles in the way of its attainment, the result of the convention would have extinguished all hope of a British American confederation for years to come, as well as suggested grave doubts as to the future peace and welfare of colonies so situated as the British North-American colonies are.

But great responsibilities outweighed narrow-minded views, and mutual concession enabled the delegates to lay down a substantial basis for a consolidated government. The scheme is outlined with prudent forethought, and in detail evinces the care of practical statesmanship. As a whole it is acceptable, taking it for granted that it is the best that could be arrived at. Its authors tell us that they were anxious to follow, as far as circumstances would permit, the model of the British Constitution. How far circumstances controlled their desires, an examination of the prominent features of the resolutions embodying their conclusions will show. The principle of federation, which forms the basis of the whole scheme, presents the widest departure from the model they were professedly anxious to follow.

This Confederacy is not, at first at least, to assume the character of an independent government. The executive authority, the shape and title of which are left undefined, is to be vested in the Queen. We are thus to have a confederation of colonies, with the Queen at their head. Whether its chief executive officer is to be known as Governor-General, or is to have the title and rank of Viceroy, are points apparently reserved for the determination of Parliament. All that the representatives of the several provinces undertook to determine was that the chief executive officer should be nominated by the Crown. It is of the very highest importance to the provinces that this office should be made one worthy the ambition of a statesman. The governors of Canada have necessarily, for the most part, been men of little or no mark at home. It would be very difficult to induce a rising statesman to abandon the prospects which a successful career in the House of Commons opens to him for any attractions that the Governor-Generalship of Canada, as heretofore constituted, has had to offer.

At the time of the union of the two Canadas, Lord Sydenham debated in his own mind whether he should make the salary of the governor six or eight thousand pounds sterling, but the former sum was determined upon. In the near neighbourhood of the American Republic, where the chief executive officer is confined to a salary of 25,000 dollars per annum, it may easily be conceived that many of the colonists regarded the salary of their Governor- General as very extravagant; and even as late as 1849, the Legislative Assembly of Canada, in a spasmodic fit of economy, expressed the opinion that a saving in this item ought then to have been effected.

As a natural consequence of this rate of remuneration, excessive as it may have seemed to a portion of the colonists, Canada has found it necessary to be content with, on the whole, an inferior order of men for governors. The two most striking exceptions have been those of Lord Sydenham and Lord Elgin. Nor is this the worst. It has happened more than once that the poverty rather than the will of the person selected for this post has induced him to accept the appointment; and the necessity for nursing the dilapidated fortunes of these functionaries has sometimes gone far to bring the representative of the Crown into discredit with the people. It is apparently to be left to our Parliament to fix the salary of the executive head of the confederation, and it is essential that, without being extravagant, it should be such as will attract men with some pretension to statesmanship.

The complexity inherent in all federations will be increased by the fact of this federation being one of colonies. Above their government, and vested with supreme sovereignty, is the authority of Parliament and the Queen; below will be that of the lieutenant- governors of the provinces, deriving their appointment and receiving their pay from the federal executive. Under this tertiary authority, in Canada at least, there prevails an elaborate and an expensive, because extravagant, gradation of municipalities, beginning with the village and ending with the aggregation of townships which forms the county municipality. A system of government so intricate, combining the imperial, the federative, the local, and the municipal elements, will, from its very nature, be exceedingly complex, and must be something like proportionately expensive. But there is no choice in the matter. Federation forms the only possible principle upon which British America can now be united. Lower Canada—of which a large majority of the population is of French extraction— being sensitively tenacious of its national distinctions, with the peculiar customs and rights growing out of them, could not, from its dread of absorption, be induced to assent to any closer form of union. Whether some of the other provinces might not have refused to surrender the privileges of local legislation may also be a question; for even now objections are made by the opponents of federation that the scheme exacts too great a surrender of local rights.

The relations between the Government and the chief executive officer of the confederacy will apparently differ in no respect from those which are at present subsisting between the Colonial Office and the government of any colony having representative institutions. The colonists advance with excessive timidity to whatever has the appearance of ultimate independence, and they seem to be wholly unconscious that they are framing a confederation which is to form a stepping-stone to this final end. It is not that four millions of people might not desire independence, if circumstances assured them of being able to maintain it. But the thoughtful colonist, aroused by the gigantic war which is going on in the neighbouring republic, finds it necessary to look carefully to his position on the American continent. The overshadowing predominance of a single state is the question which that war appears to him to be about to decide; for if the North can succeed in binding once more the broken fragments of the old Union, he fears an attempt to apply to the whole of Northern America the modern and exaggerated reading of the Monroe doctrine. For British America there is, therefore, no absolute independence. She must lean somewhere for support, and her inclinations, if not her interests, lead her to prefer a species of dependence upon the mother country, which shall be something more, though perhaps not much more, than a national alliance.

An ardent partisan of the perfect federative principle might find in the proposed constitution reason to object that it is not being dealt fairly by; that under the guise of federation there lurks a manifest desire and persistent determination to establish a form of government that will in effect partake of nearly all the characteristics of a legislative union. The theory of the United States’ constitution is, that the general government can exercise such powers only as are specially delegated to it by the separate states. The Quebec convention has attempted to reverse this principle by investing the confederate legislature with powers over all matters of a general character not specially and exclusively reserved for the local governments and legislatures.” Thus the residuum of unappropriated powers, whatever it may be, goes to strengthen the influence of the central government. Of the same character is the right of the federal government to appoint the local governors during pleasure. Nor will the circumstance of these functionaries being irremovable for five years, except for cause, be much, if any, check upon the centralizing tendency; for it is not to be supposed that the federal government would want the ingenuity to have a decent pretext for the removal of an obnoxious governor. In addition to this, the general government is to have a veto on the acts of the local governments. It is impossible to mistake the direction in which these provisions point, and they are calculated to raise the question whether there exists the most perfect conformity and good faith between the semblance and essence of the yielding to local interests in the name of federation. Any attempt of this nature at overreaching would be very likely, by creating dissatisfaction, to recoil upon the masked advocates of centralization, who, in the initiatory stages, doubtless flattered themselves that they were stealing a march on the opposing principle.

The two Federative Chambers are to be respectively called the Legislative Council and the House of Commons. In the formation of the Legislative Council is another and perhaps more excusable compromise of the federal principle. It is a peculiarity of the United States’ constitution that every State, great or small, is equally represented in the Senate. In this way the federative equality of all the States is maintained. The six provinces which are at first to form the British American Confederation are to be represented in the Legislative Council, not in their individual characters but in three several groups, of which the Canadas are to form one each, and the Maritime Provinces, exclusive of Newfoundland, a third. It may be perfectly just that neither Newfoundland nor Prince Edward Island should be allowed to stand on an equal footing with the great province of Upper Canada in the Legislative Council, but the disallowance of this right, nevertheless, negatives the idea of that equality which seems to belong to a perfect form of federation.

Twenty-four is the common number by which these three divisions are to be represented in the Legislative Council. A subdivision has been made for the Maritime Provinces, under which Nova Scotia and New Brunswick are each to have ten councillors, and Prince Edward Island four. Newfoundland, which was not officially represented at the Convention, is to be allowed to enter the union with four members. The scheme embraces prospectively the entrance into the union of the Northwest Territory, British Columbia, and Vancouver Island, just as the articles of confederation of the thirteen colonies made provision for the admission of Canada into the United States league. These distant colonies are not parties to the scheme, and it is only stipulated that they may be admitted in the future on such conditions as the Colonial Parliament may prescribe and the Imperial Parliament sanction. Practical men could hardly talk seriously about an extension, at the present time, of the proposed union from Newfoundland to Vancouver. Between Canada and British Columbia an unsettled wilderness, across which runs the great wall of the Rocky Mountains, intervenes. Without something like continuous settlements, and, at any rate, without other facilities for travel than those which at present exist, so extended an union is out of the question.

The promises of colonization made in the name of the Hudson Bay Company when it changed its proprietary, seem to have been already recalled. Add to this the disputed ownership of territory between the Company and Canada; the acknowledged want of means on the part of the proposed Confederacy to open up this country to civilization, and the hesitation of England to move in the matter, and it will become impossible to fix any probable time at which the extension of the new confederation of British America to the Pacific will be practicable. Another obstacle may be created by such action on the part of a much-neglected colony known as the Red River Settlement as will result in its annexation to the United States. Much discontent exists among the settlers there as to their present relations with their sister colonies and the empire; and their proximity to the American border, with its pushing and hardy settlers, should obtain for them that consideration which the future, if not the present, renders advisable.

The mode of appointing the legislative councillors suggested some difficulties. Of the five existing colonies three had adhered to the principle of Crown nomination; the other two, Canada and Prince Edward Island, had resorted to the principle of popular election. The delegates decided not to sanction the election by a popular vote of both houses of the Confederate Legislature, though some among them advocated the carrying the elective principle to this extreme. It was thought that if both chambers were made elective, it would be impossible long to restrain the Legislative Council to those limits within which it has hitherto been confined; that it would demand the right to alter money bills; and that as its popular credentials would be just as strong as those of the other house, the demand could not long be resisted. Besides, it was feared that some of the overgrown electoral divisions would claim a representation more nearly in accordance with their population, and that as the principle of representation according to population was to be made the basis of the House of Commons, it might become impossible to check an encroachment which would destroy every semblance of federal equality in the Legislative Council.

Some strange conditions have been attached to the selection by the Crown of legislative councillors. Far from leaving the Crown unfettered in its choice, the delegates thought it essential to prevent the appointment of any one of immature years to the dignified post of senator, and they decided that no one under thirty years of age should be capable of receiving this mark of distinction. To the qualification of age they thought fit to add one of property, which was placed at 4000 dollars, over all incumbrances, in real estate. An exception, however, was made in the case of Newfoundland and Prince Edward Island, where the property might be either real or personal. Another restriction on the power of the Crown, is the limiting of the number of councillors to eighty-two. reason for determining upon a fixed number was, that it would ensure to each province a certain proportional representation, which would be otherwise impossible.

Mr. Cardwell, in a despatch to the Governor- General of Canada, has objected to this fixity of numbers, on the ground that it may bring the legislative machinery to a standstill. There is no indication, however, that the local legislatures, in adopting the scheme, will comply with his suggestions to alter the provision. The Legislative Council is to be composed, in the first instance, of persons selected from the existing local councils—a mode of selection possibly intended to influence those bodies in their action on the proposed scheme. Even the elected councillors, in the provinces where the elective principle has been adopted, will for the most part be well enough contented with a change which relieves them from the cost and trouble of elections and the direct supervision of constituents.

Strangely enough, every one of the twenty-four councillors for Lower Canada is to be held to represent a particular electoral division, in which he must either reside himself or possess the property forming his qualification. This anomalous provision was introduced for the purpose of ensuring the English minority in that province a fair proportion of representatives in this chamber. The introduction of anything like an aristocratic element into the Legislative Council will be out of the question. In framing the Constitutional Act of 1791 for Canada, Pitt proposed to establish an hereditary chamber; but though the provision continued in force till within a few years, it was never acted on in a single instance. A French traveller remarked long ago that the atmosphere of America seemed charged with democratic ideas of liberty. Their influence is not confined to the great American republic, and any attempt to improvise an aristocratic order must prove abortive.

It is one of the disadvantages under which a new country lies that it has not a sufficient number of men of leisure, education, and property to fill the various legislative and executive positions. The quality of the Council is likely to be somewhat better for being selected by the Crown in the manner proposed, than it would be if elected under a suffrage so low as prevails at present. A trial of the two plans in Canada goes to show this, though perhaps not in any very striking degree. There is a contrast in the manners and habits of the two chambers in Canada. The Assembly is frequently violent and hasty; the Legislative Council is calm, dignified, but as a rule exceedingly facile, passing in an hour a measure over which the other house would wrangle for a month. The dignified indolence and quiet haste of the Legislative Council are due to the remnant of the non – elective membership, which, in spite of every new popular accession, has always sufficed to fix the character of the chamber. These qualities, perhaps, in some modified degree, will be transmitted by the proposed succession to the Legislative Council of the new confederation.

The Confederate House of Commons is to be based on the sole element of population, as determined every decade by the official census. A readjustment of the representation will take place every ten years, but no reduction is to be made in the number of members returned by any section until its population shall have decreased five per cent. relatively to the whole population of the union. The word section, as here used, is of obscure and uncertain meaning, and is capable of various interpretations. If a constituency be meant, or any number of constituencies, or a province, it would be better to say so. To Lower Canada are to be permanently assigned 65 members, and each successive readjustment is to be made upon this standard. In the first instance, it is proposed that the House of Commons shall contain 194 members, of whom Upper Canada is to send 82, Lower Canada. 65, Nova Scotia 19, New Brunswick 15, Newfoundland 8, and Prince Edward Island 5. The number may at any time hereafter be increased by the general legislature. The term for which the House is to be elected is five years—subject, of course, to be dissolved sooner if necessary. This is a longer term by one year than that for which any of the local legislatures are now elected. The extension of the parliamentary term will offer men who have neither time nor money to throw away in frequent elections in widely- spread constituencies, stronger inducements to enter public life than formerly. All laws relating to the qualification or disqualification of members, or of voters, now in force in the various provinces, are to remain undisturbed till the general legislature can supersede them by the adoption of some uniform plan.

A federative system necessarily involves something in the shape of a written constitution. It is required to define many of the powers which are respectively to be vested in the general and in the local legislatures; and to do this with such precision as to prevent any doubts afterwards arising is one of the main difficulties in the formation of such a constitution. Thirty- seven subjects of legislation are expressly named in connexion with the general legislature, and eighteen only in connexion with the local legislatures. The enumeration does not profess to be complete in either case, and a general clause is added comprehending all other subjects of a general or private nature, as the case may be. In some cases, including fisheries, agriculture, and immigration, a concurrent power of legislation is given. But it is evident that the power of the general government in respect of immigration will be very much restricted. The best way to attract immigrants is to offer them free grants of land. By the terms of union the several provinces will retain the public lands; so that, with the exception of the Crown lands of Newfoundland, which it is proposed to purchase at a figure disproportionate to their value, the general government will have no land to grant. It seems to have been regarded as impossible to make any arrangement by which the public lands of the various provinces should become vested in the general government; but surely this ought not to have been a more difficult achievement than the adjustment of so many public debts of different relative amounts. Whether any effort was made to place the public lands under the general government does not appear, but it seems to have been accepted as impossible from the outset.

England should do for them, and what the colonies ought to do in their own defence, are questions much debated. The ideas of the colonists are not very ambitious on the point of military expenditure, for they set out with the notion that a million of dollars a year is all they can afford. This sum will doubtless expand with their resources, or under the pressure of necessity. At present the colonists are firm in their determination to preserve their connexion with the mother country, and it is scarcely probable that the United States will drag into their Union an unwilling population on their northern boundary. They would be virtually placing their republic between two fires. As it is, they will have trouble enough with the Southern States for a long time to come. Although there are many obstacles in the way of the formation of the proposed Confederacy, yet when, as in the present case, these are clearly perceived and calmly weighed, they cease to be hindrances which need excite apprehension. With the men of education, intellect, experience, and position among the colonists nearly unanimous in support of the proposed scheme, with the Home Government cordially assenting to it, and prepared heartily to co-operate in giving it the force of law, with Parliament almost pledged beforehand to regard it with especial favour, there is no rashness in concluding that the establishment of a great British power on the American continent has ceased to be the glorious vision of a remote future, and will soon be numbered among the most splendid achievements of the present generation.

[1]      “The Canadian Confederacy,” The Westminster and Foreign Quarterly Review (April 1, 1865), 533-560. Some additional paragraphs have been divided for readability.

[2]      Statement by Hon. J. A. Macdonald in Canadian House of Assembly, June 21, 1864.

[3]      Report of Committee of Executive Council of Canada, September 23, 1864.

[4]      See the Report by M. Ancet for 1851, and that by M. Coste for 1861. [The Westminster Review]

[5]      We regret to be unable to obtain in time for publication in this article the statement of the value of fish, &c., exported from Prince Edward Island. [The Westminster Review]

[6]      Speech of Finance Minister of Canada, Feb. 7, 1865. [The Westminster Review]

[7]      Senator Summer- Speech on the Reciprocity Treaty in Congress, Jan. 11, 1865. [The Westminster Review]

[8]      Report of Canadian Finance Minister on Intercolonial Reciprocity, 1862. [Vol. LXXXIII. No. CLXIV.]—NEW SERIES, Vol. XXVII. No. II. O O [The Westminster Review]

[9]      Despatch of Duke of Newcastle, April 12, 1862. [The Westminster Review]