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Date: 1864-11-26
By: The Economist
Citation: “The Text of the Federal Constitution for the American Colonies,” The Economist (26 November 1864).
Other formats: Not yet available.

THE TEXT OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION FOR THE AMERICAN COLONIES.

THE thirty-six delegates of the British American Colonies have completed their work, and have published the bases of the Federal scheme which they intend to submit to the Imperial Government. When revised and accepted by the Cabinet, it will be presented to Parliament, we imagine very much in the form of a treaty, to be accepted or rejected en bloc, and will then finally be referred to the Colonial Legislatures, for a vote which must of course be a simple yes or no. Six Provinces, Upper Canada, Lower Canada, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward’s Island, and Newfoundland will it is believed accept it, but provision is made for the adhesion of all the North American Colonies from Maine to the Pacific. The bases, which are very full and very well considered, do not modify greatly the information already placed before our readers, but there is a great difference between deductions from after-dinner speeches and draft bills, and we may perform an acceptable service to our readers by describing from the official record the machinery selected for the last new effort at the manufacture of Empires.

The object of the American colonists, it is clear from every clause of the resolutions, is to form a Nation and not a Union. They have been obliged upon points to defer to sectional jealousies and fears, but they have not given way in any direction save one to the desire of small communities for independence. From the very beginning each colony which accepts the scheme avowedly surrenders its claim to independence, declares itself by act of its local Parliament a Province,—a part that is of a much greater whole. It will lose its separate Governor responsible only to Great Britain, and receive one appointed by the “Acadian” Ministry, while, though it will retain its separate legislature, the powers of that body will be reduced to very narrow dimensions. It will still be absolute in the domain of civil law-commercial legislation excepted,—it may still impose direct taxes, and still provide for all municipal works and events, but the right of criminal legislation, of fixing customs duties, of levying general taxes, of arranging for great public works, of appointing judges, of providing defences, of doing anything which can in any way be considered of national importance, is surrendered. Moreover, even within its limited sphere every act must be submitted to the general Government, and even should the measure not be disallowed, it only runs subject to the general principle that, in the event of collision between a provincial and a national law, the Courts are to act only upon the latter. The Federation, it will be evident, is not one to be composed of Sovereign States.

All the powers thus surrendered, and all to which, saving the Queen’s prerogative, an independent nation can lay claim, are transferred to a central authority as unlike that existing at Washington as it is well possible to conceive. It will consist, in the first place, of a Viceroy appointed by the Crown, wielding all the powers of the Crown, protected like the Crown from attack or removal, and fettered like the Crown by the necessity of acting through Ministers responsible to Parliament. This Parliament is composed of an Upper House, to be ca1led the Council, and composed of 76 members selected by the Crown for life, in the proportion of 24 for Upper and 24 for Lower Canada, 10 for Nova Scotia, 10 for New Brunswick, 4 for Prince Edward’s Island, and 4 for Newfoundland, the immense number given to Lower Canada in proportion to its resources being a concession to the French element which in the Lower House will be overborne. In that House, the basis is to be population, arranged on the fixed idea that Lower Canada is to have 65 members always. When, therefore, a province amounts to double her numbers, it will have 130 members, the present proportions being—

The object with which this number has been settled is apparent at a glance. The Constitution has been arranged to meet the susceptibilities of the Lower Province, and Upper Canada is not mistress of the situation as against Lower Canada unless she can gain over more than one other entire colony. This Central Government, thus constituted, will, acting through responsible Ministers, make all laws required for the “welfare and good government” of the nation, all laws on criminal matters, commerce, currency, banking, emigration, marriage and divorce, and all subjects not specially named in the Constitution. It will have the entire control of taxation, internal and external, of the national defences, local militia included, of the post and of all inter-provincial means of communication, will appoint all judges, (who are to be irremoveable), exercise generally all except really local patronage, and possess the right of annulling within twelve months any act of the Provincial Councils. These powers are very extensive—may, indeed, be easily so interpreted as to meet all likely contingencies, but then nations are killed by unlikely contingencies ; and we would still advise the Canadians to submit to the insertion by Mr Cardwell of one more clause, enabling the Viceroy and his Ministry, in time of rebellion or visible emergency, to “proclaim ” any district or province, and while it remains proclaimed, to exercise absolute authority therein. On some such provision we trust Mr Cardwell will insist, and it is we think the only one in which Parliament should interfere. The principle being granted, there is nothing in any of these details which should offend the mother country, and much to gratify her pride and benefit her interest. The delegates affirm in their very preamble that their first object is to perpetuate their connexion with the mother country, they jealously reserve the prerogative throughout their arrangements, they specify that the Constitution requires the assent of the Imperial Parliament, and they insert this invaluable clause into their fundamental law. “All engagements that may be entered into with the Imperial Government for the defence of the country shall be assumed by the Confederation.” That clause gives us the right to call on the Canadians as allies under contract to perform their due share in the work of their own defence, and removes the anomaly under which we are bound to defend men who may refuse to help us—who may shut out our trade, and decline any assistance to our revenue. It is not, that we know of, the duty of Parliament to see that its colonial allies choose constitutions such as Englishmen approve; but even if it were, the Ministry could not object to a scheme which, except in the essential point of the absolute authority reposed in the Central Legislature, is a counterpart of their own. They may recommend certain modifications, such, for instance, as the insertion in the Act of the provincial constitutions, left by the delegates’ resolutions to the provinces themselves, but they are not bound to press any point not of pressing imperial interest.

There is, however, one for which no such provision is made, and for which a clause will one day be urgently required. This is the matter of boundaries. The Acadians expect to induce the people of the Pacific colonies, and, perhaps, the settlers on the territory now held by the Hudson’s Bay Company, to enter into their compact; but they have made no provision for the settlement of boundaries. Vancouver’s Island, for example, might like to stay out, while its mainland dependencies might like to go in, and who is to settle that quarrel? The vast expanse of the interior, too, is entirely without demarcations, and some appellate authority should be provided in case of serious dispute. That authority must, of course, be the Queen in Council, and the new Act, which may be interpreted a hundred years hence word by word by statesmen who see imperial interests depending on its construction, should contain some definitive provision for the difficulty. Intercolonial questions, too, such as have sprung up between New South Wales and Victoria, should be generally reserved, so that no Ministry, strong in its new militia, its maritime power, and its semi-independence, should be able to commence a legislative warfare with a colony outside its authority.